Joodse traditie als permanent leren

Abram, I.B.H.

JEWISH TRADITION AS PERMANENT EDUCATION

Translated by:

Christine E. Thirlway
The Hague

CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG

Abram, I.B.H.

Jewish tradition as permanent education / I.B.H. Abram; [transl. from the Dutch] - Den Haag: Stichting voor Onderzoek van het Onderwijs. - (Selecta reeks)
Vert. van: Joodse traditie als permanent leren. - proefschrift van de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1980. - Nederlandse uitg. eerder verschenen: [Arnhem]: B. Folkertsma-Stichting voor Talmudica, 1980. - Handboek voor de studie van de Rabbijnse literatuur; [2]. - Met lit. opg.
ISBN 90-6472-072-X
SISO 213 UDC [37.03+374] : 296
Trefw.: permanente educatie; Joodse godsdienst.

JEWISH TRADITION AS PERMANENT EDUCATION

dr. I. B. H. Abram

SVO

Contents Page

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEME OF JEWISH TRADITION AS LIFELONG LEARNING

1.1 Permanent education and lifelong learning

It is important first of all to consider the meaning of the four words that make up these two expressions 'permanent education' and 'lifelong learning'. Both concepts function exclusively in a human context so that 'permanent' means the same as 'lifelong', in other words, for the whole of a human life. 'Education' and 'learning' can be taken in two ways, either as result or assignment. In the sense of result they are used to describe the outcome of upbringing, training and formal education - we can speak of someone as having received a good education or being a person of learning - while education as assignment is the task of bringing up, training, giving and receiving instruction and studying; and learning in the same context has the same sense of process, but from the pupil's point of view. In combination with either of the words 'permanent' or 'lifelong', education and learning in the sense of result are virtually irrelevant because, by definition, the process described does not reach a conclusion within the life of the individual (see 2.3 and 2.4).

Various theorists concerned with permanent education are at present attempting to develop general concepts that can be applied to all forms of education and upbringing. Ideally, such concepts would be applicable to all cultures throughout the world. This would require international as well as interdisciplinary cooperation, for no single expert can possibly be versed in very form of education and upbringing, let alone every culture. In 'Lifelong Education and School Curriculum' (Hamburg 1973) R.H. Dave expresses concern for the "quality of life of all people, no matter which part of the globe they inhabit," and this brings me to the mainspring of my thesis: if such concern for the quality of life is a matter of real importance to educational theorists, and particularly if, as Dave claims, permanent education is seen primarily as a means of attaining the highest form of self-realisation, then it is the personal contribution made by each individual to his own learning that must be given pride of place. In the pages that follow, the accent will be placed not on what is done by the teacher, nor yet on the education itself, but on what is done by the pupil. The theme is lifelong learning and once again it should be mentioned that it is first and foremost learning in the sense of task that is relevant.

The present analysis of Jewish tradition and lifelong learning is concerned not only with utopian aspirations but also with facts in a historical context. What, in the past, have individuals wished to achieve and how far have they succeeded? What did they learn? The logical consequence of having before us the ideal of personal self-realisation is to emphasize the individual himself rather than the institutions where he learns, such as schools or universities. Throughout the following discussion the accent will always be on learning as something the pupil does, supported and stimulated by the teacher only if there happens to be one. Both pupil and teacher (if there is one) are responsible for the process of study and its continuation and renewal: together they must see to it that it is both shaped and stimulated. Directly teacher and pupil start working towards ends which are in opposition to each other, the teaching-learning process deteriorates into manipulation[1] of one partner by the other. This is expressed in the following diagram:

THE TEACHING-LEARNING PROCESS



Jewish culture is one in which learning occupies a central position. I now hope to show that it would be even better to say 'the central position'. This feature can be traced back to before the beginning of the Christian era and has continued down to this very day. The following passage from Dave's book can only have been written in total ignorance of Jewish culture: " If one fathoms the ancient literature of different civilisations, one soon discovers that the idea of lifelong learning is indeed a very old one. And one could argue that lifelong learning was always going on in one form or another without it developing into and educational principle and often without it being a conscious act. This is because learning is natural for human beings at any stage of life, and there is always a need to learn something new as long as one is active and

alive."
Such words cannot be applied to Jewish tradition because in that tradition lifelong learning is the primary educational principle. This principle is explicitly laid down in the various religious codes. Far from taking learning to be a natural activity, they see it as an occupation calling for considerable determination and perseverance.

This first chapter has two aims, the first of which is to convince the reader that any concept analysis of the expression 'permanent education' should not fail to take into account how this concept works itself out in Jewish culture. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 deal with this subject. Our second aim is to use certain examples to demonstrate that problems of education penetrate to the very heart of cultures and people and can well be problems of life and death. This is dealt with in 1.4.

1.2 Maimonides' religious code

M. Maimonides (1135-1205 CE), talmudist, philosopher, astronomer and physician, was the author of a religious code[2], at once systematic, clear and concise, qualities which will be evident from the quotations which follow. The Talmud[3] takes its origin from Moses and Maimonides' code derives, in turn, from the Talmud. The quotations reflect, therefore, not the personal opinions of Maimonides himself, but his own systematic arrangement of the living tradition which had been handed down. For this reason it would be wrong to claim a place for him in the succession of great figures who make up the precursors of permanent education.[4]
The quotations have been chosen from among the rules dealing with the study of Torah. Torah is taken to mean all that knowledge which gives form and content to Judaism (see also I.1.1). The manuscript of the text from which the quotations were originally translated is in the Bodleian Library[5] in Oxford.
"(1:1) Women, slaves and the young (under the age of puberty) are exempt from the obligation of studying Torah. But it is the duty of the father to teach his young son Torah...A woman is under no obligation to teach her son, since only one whose duty it is to learn has a duty to teach.
(1:6) When should a father commence his son's instruction in Torah? As soon as the child begins to talk...At the age of six or seven, the child comes under the guidance of a teacher.

(1:8) It is the duty of every Jew to study Torah, whether he be poor or rich, healthy or sick, in the prime of life or very old and feeble...
(1:9) Among the great sages, some were hewers of wood, some drawers of water. Some of the sages were blind. Yet they carried on studying Torah day and night...
(1:10) Until what period of life ought one to study Torah? Until the day of his death...No sooner does a man give up learning than he begins to forget.
(2:1) Teachers must be appointed in every province,[6] district and town. If any city fails to provide education for its children, its inhabitants shall be placed under a ban until teachers are appointed. If the inhabitants persist in neglecting their duty, then the whole city shall be excommunicated, for only the breath of learning schoolchildren keeps the world in existence.
(2:2) A strong healthy child goes to school when he reaches the age of six. A delicate child starts a year later (this rule applied from the first century BCE. The teacher studies with the children all day and also part of the evening in order to prepare them to study by day and by night...(only during religious feast days is there any sort of holiday)...On the sabbath nothing new is taught to the children, but they repeat what they have already learned. During their study pupils must never be disturbed; not even for the rebuilding of the Temple.
(3:3) Of all precepts [of the Torah] none is equal in importance to the study of the Torah. Nay: studying the Torah is more important than all the other rules put together. Learning flows into practice and, therefore, study always takes precedence of practice.
(3:7) [Find no excuse to put off studying.] Rather, make studying a fixed occupation...and don't say "I'll study when I have time." Perhaps you will never have time.
(3:12) The words of the Torah can only take root in those who are ready to spare themselves no sacrifice for it, both spiritually and physically..."

Maimonides also says, and here I have paraphrased:
Wisdom and arrogance are mutually exclusive; wisdom and humility go hand in hand (3:9).
It is good to practise a calling as long as it leaves time enough free for learning (3:9, 10, 11).
Whoever derives a profit for himself from the words of the Torah is helping on his own destruction (3:10).

Finally some remarks should be made on lifelong learning and women (see also III 1.1). Women are not bound to study Torah like men. And yet illiteracy is almost unknown

among women. Very learned women have been known. In general it may be said that women differ from men in being obliged to master a great deal more of their knowledge on their own. Men get more tuition than women. But what is not taught may of course be studied all the same.[7]

The following section is designed to shed further light on various points in an informal manner, making use of an interview with a contemporary talmudist.

1.3 Interview[8]

Some facts: S. Safrai was born in Poland in 1919, grew up in Israel and studied there. During his studies he worked for six years in a kibbutz. Since 1965 he has been teaching talmudica at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Question 1:
What role does 'learning' play in Jewish tradition? With what concepts is learning inseparably linked?
In order to know how to behave you have to learn. But this is only part of the answer. You study Torah because it is God's word. Studying is not a religious experience, but something everyone is bound to do. By studying you make progress. Studying leads you towards greater wholeness. It is for this reason that you must always study as much as possible. Important ideas are studied not merely in order to make you acquainted with them, but so that you should know how they came into existence. The crux lies not in the results, the important ideas themselves, but in the way in which you arrive at these ideas. The Talmud always records the whole discussion, including conflicting opinions, but not invariably the conclusions. Learning is a process of persistently questioning and attending to the answers. The answers are always open to discussion. It is true that attempts have been made to summarize the results of the discussions (Maimonides' code is a good example) but these summaries have never been thought of as replacing the Talmud text; they have always been considered not as ends in themselves, but as starting-points for further study.

Question 2:
In the Jewish tradition, is there anybody who does not study?
Perhaps a small number of people. Everyone learns according to his best ability. The great commentators (such as Rashi 1040-1105 CE) tried to make their commentaries comprehensible to everyone. But this is only feasible where everyone is already engaged in study and

carries on with it. In the synagogue children and learned men have always listened to the same teaching and that is still so today.

Question 2a:
Was there illiteracy within the Jewish tradition?
No, except for a handful of cases whom we should now call mentally handicapped people. Everyone could read but not necessarily write. It is absurd to class as semi-literate someone who can read without being able to write. Writing is not important; it has nothing to do with culture. Writing is a question of technique. Not long ago I was speaking to an extremely learned Yemenite. When I asked him to sign his name on a bill he was very offended: "I'm not a merchant you know," he said, "I'm a man of learning." In Yemen it is the merchant who has to know how to write, not the sage.
People often didn't bother to learn to write because they considered it a waste of time. Could not the time be better occupied with studying? I, myself, did not learn how to write until I was ten. Nobody worried about it because I was studying. When I saw that it would be useful to be able to write, then I learnt to do it. In the concept of illiteracy equal stress should not be laid on each of the two components, reading and writing. Reading is primary. In a culture where not everyone can write there are always specialists who can write down what has to be written. I am thinking, for example, of someone like the registrar of a court.

Question 2b:
Are there subjects which cannot be explained in everyday language?
Instead of saying 'everyday language', I would rather use the expression 'by the classic method of exposition' or 'in classic language'. Plato comes to mind as an example. Both the sage and the ordinary reader can read and understand what he wrote.

Question 2c:
Do you mean that you can explain everything to anyone using classic language?
Yes, and even so that any learned person who happened to be listening would not be bored by it.

Question 3:
Which are short-term and which long-term students?
Jewish tradition makes no such distinction. Men are bound to study and women are not. Even though the majority of men work in order to support their families, this does not release them from their duty to study daily to the

best of their ability. Women are exempt from the duty to study. They must, however, master a certain body of practical knowledge in connection with their own life, their children and with running a household.

Question 4:
What is expected of a student, a teacher and a learned man? How do they influence each other?
The maximum is expected from everyone whether student, teacher, or learned man; it makes no difference. Everyone must give as best he can. The difference between student, teacher and learned man is not in what is expected of them, but in the results. What a learned man contributes to tradition is his personality: how he teaches, but above all how he lives.

Question 5:
Is there any sort of learning which is harmful?
No, learning in itself is never harmful. By definition. Putting into practice what has been learnt can have harmful consequences of course.

Question 6:
Is there any sort of forgetting possible that is not harmful?
All forgetting is harmful, especially in a tradition that is disseminated orally. You carry on a perpetual struggle against forgetting and constantly try to keep what you have learnt alive. Keeping hold of what you know is just as important as carrying your studies further.

Question 7:
Can anyone learn without increasing his knowledge?
You must go over again what you already know and attempt to make progress in your studies. Anyone who continually discovers new aspects of what he already knows or professes to know, goes over again what has been learnt and at the same time deepens his knowledge. Once you cease to learn and to recapitulate what you have learnt then you can lose everything in a moment.

Question 8:
What is Torah?
Torah is everything you bring to the understanding of God. It may be history, or mathematics or something else. It doesn't matter what you study, but why and how you study. Every expedient used by the student in order to understand is Torah.

Question 9:
Can all knowledge be handed on?
Knowledge that cannot be handed on is not knowledge and

certainly not Torah. It can all be understood. By everyone. Everyone has his own Torah adapted to his own possibilities. You don't have to know everything about something before you can say that you know it or that it is important to you.

Question 10:
How are habits formed?
I don't know. You form your own habits, but other people influence them. From someone's habits you can tell where he comes from and what he has experienced. From the way he talks, for example, you realise what he knows and what his background is: not in detail, but as a whole. How habits are formed, I don't know.

Question 11:
How is character formed?
The previous question and this one come to the same thing for me. I see no distinction between habit and character.

Question 12:
Is there anything that cannot be learnt?
No! It is certainly true that one person learns more easily than another, but if anyone wants to learn something then he will be able to learn it.

Question 12a:
Can you learn to want (to learn)?
That is something else. It depends on how strong your motives are for learning.

Question 12b:
Can you learn to motivate yourself?
If you are not motivated to learn you haven't understood the point of learning. You haven't understood that the whole of civilisation hangs on learning. Neither have you understood that learning is a condition of existence. The importance of learning also has to be learnt. The teacher must explain it and the pupil has to understand it.

Question 13:
Does a lifelong learner need a teacher all the time?
I don't think so. You need a teacher until you reach a certain level. But the object of learning must be to be able to learn without a teacher. The aim of the teacher must be to enable the pupil to stand on his own feet as soon as possible.

Question 14:
Does the lifelong ability and determination to learn belong exclusively to a special type of person? If this is so then what are the distinguishing features of this type?

No. Everyone has to learn and everyone is able to do so. Children are already capable of learning the whole day with just a few breaks. Adults can also do it. Just as you can get used to taking breaks in your work, so can you get used to learning. Why not? Even people who take a lot of breaks also get tired.

Question 15:
Is lifelong learning possible only within certain sections of society? If so, what are the distinguishing features of these sections?
I shall start with the traditional[9] response: Rabbi Eliazar was extremely rich and he studied; Rabbi Akiba[10] was a very poor man and he too studied. As for me, my family was very poor, but my father studied and so did I. To say that the structure of society prevents you from studying is not true. One thing is crucial: study as much as you can - as you yourself can.

Question 16:
In what other cultures besides the Jewish one does lifelong learning occur?
I don't know. In Greece a small group of philosophers studied all their lives, but certainly not everyone.

Question 17:
Does Jewish tradition also acknowledge the concept of lifelong professional or vocational learning?
Yes. Whatever you do you must do as well as possible and that means continuing to learn all the time.

Question 18:
Why do people learn at all?
Learning is not only a command, but also a way of life. Learning should lead to doing right and in order to know what that is you have to study. Doing right means knowing what you are doing, how to do it and why you are doing it. The 'how' and 'why' are more important than the 'what'.

Question 19:
What do people learn?
They learn Torah. Each generation learns to recall and experience once more everything that has happened up to their own time. The Hasidim say: "You must go back to the old sources of Abraham. The sources are there, but you have to discover them for yourself."

Question 19a:
Is it possible to start from a new place and end at an 'old source'?
Perhaps?

Question 20:
How do people learn?
First of all they learn superficially and then, each time round better and deeper. An eight-year-old will study a text without any commentaries and a man of learning will study the same text with all its commentaries.

Question 21:
When do people learn?
The rule is to learn whenever you have the opportunity! So, on the sabbath, [religious] feast-days and in the evenings, in any case, and also early in the mornings.

Question 22:
Where do people learn?
Anywhere that is suitable. At home is often just as suitable as at the synagogue, which is always a study-house as well.

Question 23:
Are the results of study assessed?
In some yeshivot[11] regular examinations are the custom. In others the head of the yeshivah will discuss first with one pupil and then with another, what he has been studying recently. But the most important indication is the capacity of the pupil to continue his study.

Question 24:
How does the tradition develop and renew itself? Who develops and renews the tradition?
I see only one way in which the tradition can develop and renew itself. People must live the tradition. If nobody lives the tradition there is neither evolution nor renewal. Certain people, men of learning for instance, have to initiate it, but ordinary people must do it as well. That is what counts in the end.

Question 25:
Does learning bring happiness?
Nothing makes me happier!

1.4 Learning to be or not to be

Jewish culture is not the only culture that gets less attention than it deserves from some of the exponents of permanent education. This is well know in permanent education circles as can be seen from numerous articles in Unesco-Courier, a journal issued in several languages, and from the Unesco report Learning to be. The fact that each individual can only develop fully and come to self-realisation within his own culture or one that is nearly related to it, makes it incumbent on permanent education

experts to study the cultures with which they are dealing before they start proposing alterations in the local education systems. Because this does not always happen, many cultural renewals - for that is what educational innovations really are - take place at the expense of precisely that culture to which they belong or are closely connected. Furthermore, the actual decisions on such innovations normally lie outside the scope of the experts in educational theory, which makes it all the more vital for such experts to take the most scrupulous care in formulating advice on education.
The task of making decisions on permanent education falls very largely to governments and international organizations which are themselves distorted reflections of the cultures they represent and which are represented in them. It is an appalling thought that all sorts of cultural forms and culture bearers run the risk of being destroyed by misuse of administrative and political power while those responsible are hardly even aware of what it is they are destroying. If this should be the case, one would be forced to conclude that educational innovation had miscarried on a grand scale. The instigators themselves talk in one breath about educational problems such as illiteracy[12] and of deriving the "implications for the stages of childhood and adolescence."[13] The Brazilian education theorist Freire,[14] who developed a method by which eighty percent of adults could learn to read and write in from thirty to sixty hours, was deported[15] because at the same time he taught his illiterates to read and write, he also taught them to realise that they were victims of oppression.

How and by whom and with what aim are educational programmes developed? Are they chosen for the pupils' ultimate benefit? The answer to the second question is: not always. The first question I am unable to answer and it seems to me worthwhile to devote some critical effort to finding a solution.
Take first of all Dave's treatment of the idea that: "The ultimate goal of lifelong education is to maintain and improve the quality of life." Dave says:
"The meaning of the term 'quality of life' depends on the value system of a society. It depends upon the political system, concept of the good life, social beliefs and traditions, economic situation, and many other factors... there exists a universal need for peace, a desire to counteract the dehumanising influence of technology, and an urgent necessity to prevent pollution of air and water ...these and many other factors like the population

explosion and the indiscriminate exploitation of limited natural resources etc....the personal and social good of all people has to be achieved and enhanced. Lifelong education, in its ultimate analysis, aims at this lofty ideal."
All this sounds wonderful in theory. Everything has been taken into account; none of the problems has been left out.

The meaning of the term 'quality of life' depends on:
1. the value system
2. the political system
3. the concept of a good life
4. beliefs and traditions
5. the economic situation
6. and many (!) other factors

In addition to promotion of the quality of life, Dave's analysis also concerns itself with the following list of problems which apply more or less to the whole world:
1. world peace
2. the humanisation of technology
3. protection of the environment
4. birth control
5. and many (!) other problems

What do we find in practice? We find Unesco itself, the great propagandist of permanent education, taking political decisions which neither promote peace nor serve any educational purpose whatsoever.[16] The question now is not politics or no politics but which politics! The basic document of permanent education, the Unesco report Learning to be (1972 Unesco Paris-Harrap London), tries to gloss over political differences of opinion. Some quotations from the English text of the report will serve as examples.

In a letter of 18 May 1972, Edgar Faure, chairman of the commission which was responsible for the report, wrote to René Maheu, director-general of Unesco, saying among other things that: "The report we are submitting to you shows that there is broad agreement among the members of the commission...although reservations on some points are indicated in certain parts of it." (p. vii) Among Faure's list of the names of the other members of the commission is that of Arthur V. Petrovsky (USSR), member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, who adds a footnote towards the end of chapter 8, part III (p. 231), in which he says that while acknowledging the "qualities of clarity and balance in the report" he considers it

necessary to provide some more precise information:
"Although a series of amendments was inserted in the report following my remarks, the secretariat of the international commission did not see fit to include the general point of view which I expressed in the course of many statements during the commission's meetings,...I am referring to the need to adopt a very clearly differentiated approach to questions of educational development in countries with different socio-economic systems, and to the impossibility of relating, by a simple process of extrapolation, the real difficulties and problems inherent in educational systems of countries with a given political and economic structure to countries whose social structure is different.
I deplore the fact that the report systematically refers to the pedagogic concepts and educational systems characteristic of the capitalist countries, and that its treatment of the very rich experience of educational development in the USSR and other socialist countries is manifestly inadequate." (note 12, p. 231)
So permanent education is failing to take account not only of Jewish culture, but also of the rich educational experience of the socialist countries. It must be presumed that this rich experience does not cover the almost total destruction of Jewish culture in Russia,[17] Petrovsky's native country.
The main text of the report contains the following sentence:
"Those who wish to do so may perhaps find here the elements[18] of a kind of focal strategy for education, from which any country may borrow what it deems useful, according to its economy, ideology and convenience." (p. 231)
Petrovsky's point of view is honoured with this single sentence but he, himself, does not occur. The footnote to that very sentence ends up:
"Can I be satisfied with this brief mention of my point of view, in lieu and instead of the scientific analysis of important factors in educational developments, which would have been of exceptional interest to developing countries in the preparation of their own educational strategies? Unfortunately the report contains a number of similar examples." (note 1, p. 231)

That Petrovsky's point of view should have been hidden away in a footnote is both bad politics and bad science: bad politics because in a world in which all sorts of different forms of socialism are in process of evolving, a socialist point of view should be given full

consideration: at the risk of appearing superfluous, it should be pointed out that 'consideration' does not necessarily imply 'approval'. It is bad science because it is high time that the suspicion with which the extrapolation of pedagogical concepts and educational systems from one country to a totally different country is so often regarded, should for once have its underlying assumptions examined. Thus far the Unesco report.

It is self-evident that learning programmes can only succeed where they are linked to the needs and interests of the pupils. Assessment of these needs and interests is an extremely complex undertaking which governments and international organizations have to leave to 'experts engaged in this field'. The latter[19] can then give advice, but they themselves take no decisions. Finally, within the contours which governments and organizations are able to create it is the teachers who have to decide whether to follow the advice or cast it to the winds.
The depth of knowledge required in order to be able to measure the needs and interests of learners is aptly illustrated in an article by Neusner (1975). The question posed is whether such a thing exists as the Jewish culture, the Jewish history, the Jewish people or the Jews. How few people understand that for every Jew this is a question of life and death in its most literal sense. The innumerable answers to this question are in themselves a separate literary-scientific genre. When we take some passages from the article and set them side by side, we at once find ourselves in a sea of difficulties:
"The fundamental question is whether the Jews from Abraham to the present constitute an entity capable of presenting a single, unitary history. By the criteria to be adduced from the data conceived to form a normal historical unit, they do not. For that long period of time, the Jews have not occupied a single geographical area, have not spoken a single language, have not formed a single society, have not produced a single harmonious culture (p. 213)...what made a person or a group 'Jewish' in medieval Christendom, for example, bears virtually nothing in common with what made a person or group 'Jewish' in Nazi Germany (p. 214). From the Babylonian exile in 586 B.C. onward, the Jews have never used a single language in common. Judeo-German (Yiddish), Judeo-Aramic, Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Persian, Ladino - these undeniably Jewish languages admirably illustrate the ambiguity of the notion of 'Jewish history'. Each is Jewish in the context of the discrete language-system in which it was formed. But only traits common to all of

them will serve to tell us what is quintessentially, distinctively, and ubiquitously 'Jewish'. Those uniform traits add up to resort to some Hebrew words and the use of the Hebrew alphabet (p. 215). An observer, lacking prior religious or ethnic commitment - for instance the conviction that the Jews are indeed one people - can therefore hardly be asked to take for granted, without analysis of a searching sort, elements of a common history among discrete and disparate groups, all of them called, each for reasons largely though not wholly endemic to its context, Jews (p. 216). No 'history' of the Jewish people 'begins at Sinai' ((Ex. 19:20. God reveals himself to Moses.)) - if not when Abraham left Chaldea (as if that were an historical event!)....Less than three decades ago, all Jews, wherever they lived, were thrown into a single, disastrous category: the doomed. And one third of them indeed were killed for sharing what for many was not a very important trait: a single Jewish grandparent (p. 217). To put it...simply, while there is no single, unitary 'Jewish History', there is a single (but hardly unitary) history of Judaism (p. 218)."

What really emerges from a closer look at this summary? Neusner begins with history and ends up with religion, taking in language on the way. In the course of the article he mixes in a few more areas of knowledge for good measure, quoting Meyer, for example, as follows:
"For modern Jews a conception of their past is no mere academic matter. It is vital to their self-definition. Contemporary forms of Jewish identity are all rooted in some view of Jewish history, which sustains them and serves as their legitimation (p. 222). Does Jewish history encompass all aspects of the history of the State of Israel, or only those which are also of significance to Jews outside its borders? Or does it henceforth limit itself to Diaspora existence alone, declaring the history of the State of Israel 'Israeli History'? Does an Israeli who feels no connection with Jews outside (the State of) Israel belong within the purview of Jewish history any more than a Jew who has converted to Christianity? (p. 226)."
These quotations are of both theological and political significance. Where is the learned community capable of giving an answer to such wide-ranging questions? A community of men with a deep commitment to life, whose hearts have been made humble by experience. Jewish culture is old and has outlived many other cultures.

The title of this section, 'Learning to be or not to be'

combines the ideas of living, learning and surviving. Someone who has gone through more than I have puts it like this:
"Understanding Judaism cannot be attained in the comfort of playing a chess-game of theories. Only ideas that are meaningful to those who are steeped in misery may be accepted as principles by those who dwell in safety. In trying to understand Jewish existence a Jewish philosopher must look for agreement with the men of Sinai as well as with the people of Auschwitz."
In Judaism, learning is concerned not only with 'living' and 'surviving' but also with 'remembering' and 'handing down'. These five concepts have an important role; but not in Jewish culture alone. The point is strikingly made in a lecture given by Amilcar Cabral (Guinea (Bissau)) in July 1972 at the Unesco headquarters in Paris. The lecture appears in The Unesco Courier XXVI 1973, November, p. 12, under the title: 'The role of culture in the battle for independence'. Amilcar Cabral argues that a 'return to the source' (p. 14) or 'cultural renaissance' is a necessary condition for reaching independence.
"Culture has proved to be the very foundation of the liberation movement. Only societies which preserve their cultures are able to mobilise and organise themselves and fight against foreign domination." (p. 16) On 20 January 1973 he was assassinated.

Whether permanent education comes as a new concept or an old one depends on the culture in question. In Jewish culture 'lifelong learning' (which is to say permanent education with the emphasis on the pupil's activities) is not only the subject of a great volume of theory, but has for centuries had its own concrete expression. In many other cultures the idea is revolutionary. I want to plead here for the idea of permanent education as both a historical and utopian concept like 'messianism' or 'peace'.
The very first job of proponents of lifelong learning when they come into contact with a culture which is largely unknown to them is to make a thorough study of that culture and to track down all forms of learning which already exist within it. This will enable them to discover whether lifelong learning can be introduced into the culture as something already familiar or whether it must be treated as a wholly new concept; it may be called the initial historical task, for what is required is an analysis of all the existing forms of learning which the culture in question has evolved. Only then can the utopian analysis begin: the question of why, what, when,

how and where people should learn - in a lifelong sense - in order to realise certain ideals. In my opinion those best fitted to disseminate the ideas of permanent education in which the emphasis is on learning and not on teaching, are people who are themselves still in the process of learning. No theory seeking to influence human behaviour can hope to succeed without living examples of its practical effect.

Notes

[1] In its mildest usage, 'making use of' and in its strongest 'oppression'.

[2] Yad.

[3] See list of terms p.

[4] Confucius. Plato. Aristotle. More. Comenius. Franklin. Grundtvig. Livingstone (Schouten 1975, p. 1); or alternatively J. Dewey, G.H. Mead, A.F. Bentley, C.S. Peirce, P. Freire, I. Illich, E. Reimer (Houghton, Richardson 1974, p. 18).

[5] See the version in Hyamson (1965). See also III.1.7, ex. 1.

[6] "During the Second Temple (516 BC - 70 AD) the cities' autonomy was extended(...). Even in later periods every place that contained at least ten adult male Jews became the seat of a 'congregation' with all the duties of a true city; it had to establish a synagogue, provide for the education of the children (...)" (Dinur 1968). My emphasis.

[7] See for example Lieberman (1950), the chapter 'The Alleged Ban on Greek Wisdom'.

[8] This interview took place in October 1975 and is presented here in an edited and shortened form.

[9] TB Joma 35b.

[10] TB Joma gives Hillel here, but this is Rabbi Akiba (see Safrai 1970, ch. 1, p. 14, note 14 and ch. 2, pp. 67-68, note 4). See also Yad, hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:8, and ARN, ch. 1, p. 15a.

[11] See list of terms.

[12] Of all people 15 years old and over, 700 million could neither read nor write in 1950 (i.e. 44.3% of this group). In 1970 the number had risen to 810 million (34.8%). Population increase was thus greater than the increase in the number of illiterates, if we

look at actual numbers rather than percentages (NOVIB Cahier no. 12). See also ch. 4.

[13] Dave (1973, p. 13).

[14] Bouwman (1975).

[15] In 1964 (Achterhuis 1975).

[16] An example of this is the exclusion of Israel from Unesco activities (November 1974). How can exclusion of one member by another ever lead to mutual understanding? Fortunately, relations between Israel and Unesco returned more or less to normal from 12 September 1979. (Herald Tribune, 13 September 1979).

[17] Driessen (1975). The following quotation indicates the natural, direct progression that can take place from suppression of a culture to elimination of human beings (p. 587). "Destruction of the Yiddish culture begins in 1948. The last two Yiddish schools are closed in 1949. Foundations are put an end to, theatres closed, books removed from libraries. At the closure of the newspaper Der Emes the Yiddish types are also destroyed. Yiddish culture comes to an end on 12 August 1952 with the execution of 24 representatives of Jewish culture, among whom are the 12 most important writers in Yiddish."

[18] These elements are: diagnosis of systems, identification of disequilibrium, choice of options, experiment, logistic element, networks for change, seemingly contradictory requirements, functional reorganization, participation, financing, increasing expenditure, diversifying resources, reducing costs (p. 223-235, Learning to Be).

[19] De Groot (1971a, p. 18).

[20] Heschel (1959, ch. 43, p. 421).

2. PARADIGM FOR LIFELONG LEARNING

2.1 The words 'learning' and 'education' and their usage

What is learning? How is the word used? What connection is there between learning and teaching? In addition to people, animals and machines, the class of all those commonly said to learn or to teach,[1] or both, includes God, the gods, angels and those who have died. The embryo learns in the womb.[2] Parents and children learn from each other. Schools and universities are seats of learning. Sayings to do with learning are in common use: "you're never too old to learn" and "you learn from your mistakes."
Why collect all these examples together here? To show that even when we know how to use the word 'learning', we do not know what it means.[3]

The word 'learn' is an old word which has changed its meaning over the centuries. It seems originally to have meant repeat; later on it meant among other things both to teach (chief role the teacher's) and also to learn or study (chief role the pupil's) but now it only means to study. Its colloquial use, to mean teach, is described in the Oxford Dictionary as 'now vulgar'. The same is true of 'leren' in Dutch (which does retain its teaching sense even now) and 'lernen' in German.
So learning was originally something done by the pupil, then something done by both the pupil and the teacher and is now once again largely the concern of the pupil.
A comparable shift in meaning, although in the opposite direction, has occurred for the word 'education' and its French equivalent 'éducation'. The original meaning of the word was to lead out or guide, later on to teach and study and is now primarily teaching or bringing up.[4] Education originally meant something done by a teacher or leader, later on by teacher and pupil and now, once more, largely by teacher or parent.
These shifts of meaning can be expressed visually as follows:

Learning (lernen, leren) Education (educatie, éducation)



The use of the words 'learning' and 'education' in the expressions Education Permanente (permanent education = Lebenslanges Lernen = Permanent Leren) shows that in modern usage the activities of the teacher are not always distinguished from those of the pupil.

2.2 Permanent education (PE)

On the basis of three PE publications[5] it will be demonstrated that in PE the teacher's and the pupil's activities form an intricate pattern; what the teacher is supposed to do and what the pupil is supposed to achieve does not immediately leap to the eye. I quote:
"...that the term 'education' should be taken in its broadest connotation of a coherent and deliberate action aimed at the transmission of knowledge, the development of aptitudes, and the training and betterment of man in all respects and throughout his life..." (Ltb, appendix 2, p. 269).
"The establishment of close ties between schools and their milieu is a top priority in countries which view the education system as a vast mass movement, where each individual who has received an education has a duty to teach those who have been denied learning opportunities" (Ltb, ch. 1, pp. 19-20).
"Principle: Every individual must be in a position to keep learning throughout his life. The idea of lifelong education is the keystone of the learning society. (...) Recommendation: We propose lifelong education as the master concept for educational policies in the years to come for both developed and developing countries" (Ltb, ch. 8, pp. 181-182).
"In a society where the influence exerted by producers of cultural models is increasing, educators working in an educational system of this kind should keep themselves informed about the latest discoveries and developments. In order to do so they will have to be constantly

improving their own education by taking in-service courses or by taking tests at regular intervals" (Fs, J. Dumazedier, p. 81).
"If...an individual is engaged in a continuous process of education and is constantly learning something new, then a failure is only relative...a success is also relative..." (Fs, quoting P. Lengrand, p. 208).
"Education includes all oriented learning processes during youth and adulthood by which an individual is formed or forms himself by the acquisition of culture, its evaluation and critical appreciation. These, of course, include the more specific oriented learning processes such as those aimed at building up professional skills. In this sense, education is sort of umbrella word for a variety of processes, bringing up and being brought up, teaching and studying, the provision of opportunities for training and their exploitation and also self-development in its real sense" (Id.K. Doornbos, p. 48).

PE is a politico-cultural vision of man as teacher and pupil.
This picture of man can be elaborated from three different points of view: that of the politician (the government), the teacher (educator), and the pupil. The last point of view is the one I have chosen to consider here and have called Lifelong Learning (LL) in order to underline the fact that in 'learning', and LL, the pupil occupies the central position, whereas this is not necessarily true either of 'education' or of PE (see 2.1).

2.3 Lifelong learning (LL)

The substitution of LL for PE will not take us much further until we define more closely the expression 'lifelong learning' and particularly its 'learning' component.
Lifelong learning (LL) is understood to be:

(a) an overall vision,
(b) of every form of human learning,
(c) happening anywhere in the world,
(d) stretching from the cradle to the grave,
(e) in which man is taken as pupil.

The meaning of 'lifelong' in LL is given under (d) (see also III.1.3). LL is concerned only with human learning and everyone who learns is called a pupil (see (b) and (e).
Learning is taken to mean not the successful acquisition of knowledge but the attempt to acquire knowledge.
According to this definition 'learning' is something that

can go wrong. The attempt to build up knowledge can fail. Given that the knowledge to be built up is inexhaustible, any success (in the attempt to build up that knowledge) can be only relative: there is always more left to learn than the pupil has already mastered. Many of the current definitions of 'learning' are inappropriate in the context of LL because they lay too much stress on the learning result (the knowledge). LL looks on learning as a general human activity and stresses the attempt to reach the result rather than the result itself.[6]

2.4 The catch-phrase 'life is lifelong learning'

There are two sorts of learning processes: those including teaching and those not including teaching; the former are termed teaching-learning processes. Teaching-learning processes are a subdivision of the general class of learning processes.

"Human development has two distinctive aspects: on the one hand growth and decline (of the body, organs and functions including the psychical ones) and on the other, development through learning processes. If in the context of the second we apply the current psychological definition of 'learning' which includes learning in and out of school, conscious, unconscious, cognitive, affective and motor learning and which takes both unlearning and learning more, as part of learning, then it becomes clear that the whole of life, the whole psychical development of a person up to his death can be described as a permanent learning process. Living is learning: acquiring information, building up knowledge and skills, making adjustments, learning additional habits and routines or unlearning them. It is of course true that within 'learning' there is also growth (of the total number of extant mental 'programmes') and decline through forgetting; but from the very beginning, forgetting plays a large role...and is constantly resisted by...new learning processes (for example by adjustments to a failing memory). The catch-phrase 'life is lifelong learning' would thus seem to be amply justified."[7] (De Groot 1974, 2.3, p. 20).

In normal usage 'learning' sometimes indicates a task (activity) and sometimes a result (achievement). If I say that I have learnt a lot from somebody then I am using 'learning' as a result. A teacher who asks a pupil who doesn't know his lesson whether he has learnt it, is using 'learning' in the sense of task. In the LL context this is the sense I have given to learning; I think the quotation given above applies in this context with the

following amendments:

- Given that 'learning' is an 'attempt to...', I would prefer not to include 'unconscious' because this would imply 'unconsciously attempting'. I would omit 'unconscious'.
- I would end the sentence that begins 'Living is learning' thus: 'attempting to acquire information, build up knowledge and skills, make adjustments, learn additional habits and routines or unlearn them.

De Groot is a proponent of PE when it means permanent learning or, in other words, LL. In this case the pupil, and not the teacher, takes first place (which is something quite unconnected with whether 'learning' is taken in the sense of result or task). If, however, PE means permanently being taught, then he sees no good in it whatsoever:

"Adults, and particularly somewhat older adults, usually say that they are extremely glad no longer to be in a position to be brought up and taught by people who know what is good for them; fortunately, they are now allowed to decide that for themselves. They also claim to be more than happy not to have to go to school any more or to enjoy any other form of expressly 'given' teaching. Teaching is available but there is no obligation. To be adult is, among other things, to decide for yourself whether you want to learn anything extra (by studying), to decide what it is you want to learn and how you want to learn it."[8]

The author adds that:

"...living is in no way and must never become a permanent teaching-learning process although it is indeed a process of permanent learning. Teaching is not a necessary condition of this process although it can at times be extremely useful."[9] To this I agree.

At what age do people become adult? Many pupils at school, not to mention students, already want to decide for themselves whether they want to go on learning in the same way, what it is they want to learn and how they want to do it. The obligation to attend school, which exists in many countries, only obliges children to receive teaching but imposes no duty to learn. PE propagandists do not make a clear distinction between political aims, (what the politicians want to achieve), aims of education (what teacher and pupil want to achieve) and learning (what the pupil wants to achieve). As long as these aims are not in harmony PE will remain utopian. PE that is not also and primarily LL is doomed to failure.

LL is concerned with learning processes in which pupils take an active role all the time but teachers only sporadically.

2.5 The learning process

In every learning process three elements may be distinguished:

- The pupil who learns;
- Learning goals which the pupil tries to achieve (the knowledge which he tries to acquire);
- Evaluation (testing) of the pupil's learning results: how far has he got? Is he on the right road?

When the learning process is a teaching-learning process there is also:

- The teacher who teaches. His job is to help the pupils to reach or at least approach their learning goals.

In a teaching-learning process evaluation is usually in the hands of the teacher. The pupil usually learns in a special way (the learning method) and the teacher usually teaches in a special style (the 'teaching method'). Learning goals can be formulated in various ways. In chapter 3, I shall return once more to each of these elements of the learning process.

2.6 LL paradigm

The LL paradigm sketched in this section is simply a scheme of keywords. The keywords are:

- tradition
- authority
- image of the world
- image of man
- pupil
- learning goals
- evaluation
- teacher.

From these words the model is created by the use of categories and interpretation. There are four categories. The keywords given above fall into the first three. These are the categories:

I. Culture	1._____ 2._____
II. Framework	1._____ 2._____
III. Learning process	1._____ 2._____ 3._____ 4._____
IV. Individual learning as a daily habit.	

Analysis of the first three categories comes down to interpretation of the keywords and the way in which they impart meaning and form to lifelong learning. Chapter 3 deals with this. The analysis of the fourth category (chapter 4) is more speculative than that of the first three for the following reasons: all forms of learning of which we are aware up till now can be described within the first three categories using the keywords belonging to them, whereas the fourth category introduces a new element in that it looks at all forms of learning from the point of view of the individual engaged in lifelong learning.

LL paradigm 1

I. Culture	1. Tradition 2. Authority
II. Framework (or points of departure)	1. Image of the world 2. Image of man
III. Learning process	1. Pupil 2. Learning goals 3. Evaluation 4. Teacher
IV. Individual learning as a daily habit	

A version of this model for the individual learner, LL paradigm 2, is described in chapter 4 (p.).

Notes

[1] See Plato's Meno (81b-d) on the immortal soul which learns. W.K. Frankena (1973, p. 74): "...the basic idea of Christian education is that God is our teacher." This idea is as much Jewish as Christian. The talmud discusses a 'heavenly academy' in the following manner: "...an academic community of angels and the souls of saintly scholars, headed by the Master Teacher, God himself - all occupied in the study of Torah" (Kirschenbaum 1972, p. 22, note 3). Psychological theories of learning speak of people and animals learning. The behaviorist B.F. Skinner (1968, ch. 3) writes about 'teaching machines'. See also II.1.1, note 6.

[2] See for example Greenberg (1969, pp. 31 and 35, note 55). Lally (1972) writes that "...learning is a continuous developmental process starting in the womb and ending only at death (p. 113). Many nutritionists call for a change in the attack on intellectual deficiencies from remedy to prevention, with an emphasis on prenatal nutrition. Even in advanced countries it has been found that remedial programs for the underpriviliged come too late, after children have already suffered permanent physical and psychic damage due to malnutrition (p. 119)."

[3] So the word 'learn' does not belong to "the many cases" mentioned in the following passage: "In many, if not in all cases of the use of the word 'meaning', it is interpreted as it is used in speech." (Wittgenstein 1958, Teil 1, par. 43).

[4] It is interesting to note that 'learn' (leren, lernen) was formerly little used in connection with animals but that 'education' (educatie, éducation) was, whereas it is now the other way round. This can be seen from comparison of early dictionaries and modern ones.

[5] 1. Faure (1972), Learning to be. Abbreviated Ltb. The French title is 'Apprendre à être' and 'apprendre' means both to study and to teach.
2. The school and continuing education: Four studies (1972). Abbreviated Fs.
3. Het rapport - Faure in discussie (1974). Abbreviated Id.

[6] For an example of an inappropriate definition of 'learning' in the LL context see Van Parreren 1969, ch. 1, p. 17: "Learning is a process with more or less lasting results, through which new powers of behavior

develop in the individual or those already present are altered."

[7] De Groot (1974[a], par. 2.3, p. 20).

[8] Idem, p. 21.

[9] Idem.

3. INTERPRETATION OF THE KEYWORDS OF THE LL PARADIGM

3.1 Tradition (1.1 of the LL paradigm)

'Tradition' is whatever is passed down from generation to generation in the form of habits, customs, norms, values, judgements, prejudices, superstitions, myths, theories (both scientific and other), taboos, institutions (such as marriage, church, schools, political parties), dreams of the future, fears and so on. Without tradition the world in which we live would be chaotic and unpredictable. Without tradition there would be only instinctive or inborn knowledge.
"Quantitatively and qualitatively by far the most important source of our knowledge - apart from our inborn knowledge - is tradition. Most things we know we have learned by example, by being told, by reading books, by learning how to criticize, how to take and to accept criticism, how to respect truth. The fact that most of the sources of our knowledge are traditional condemns anti-traditionalism as futile. But this fact must not be held to support a traditionalist attitude: every bit of our traditional knowledge (and even our inborn knowledge) is open to critical examination and may be overthrown. Nevertheless, without tradition, knowledge would be impossible."[1] Traditional forms may be accepted or rejected, regarded as sacred or contested. To refuse all tradition would mean among other things, ceasing to speak a language, for that is traditional, and reading none of the classics, for these are traditional. All learning would cease to exist.[2]

In common usage we speak not only of tradition but also of traditions. When it comes to the generations which hand down the tradition, then we think, for example, of the generations of Chinese or the generations of Europeans who hand on their own Chinese or European tradition. The word tradition is exactly like the word language. Just as we can speak of 'language', 'the language', 'languages' and 'the languages' we can also speak of 'tradition', 'the tradition', 'traditions' and 'the traditions'. When, for example, Jewish and Christian traditions are spoken of, common features of differences in the two traditions can be pointed out. If, on the other hand, we speak of the Jewish-Christian tradition, then we are emphasising their unity.
The phenomenon of tradition is a general one. It is found everywhere in the world. Two traditions can fuse into a new tradition. Or, vice versa, a single tradition can

split up into two new traditions. The comparison with language holds good here as well.
The phenomenon of authority is as old as that of tradition and is dealt with in the following section.

3.2. Authority (1.2 of the LL paradigm)

Not only does authority play a large role in learning processes, but it is also one of the most important concepts of politics. Some writers even treat it as the most important. For them "it equates political analysis with the study of authority patterns in any or all social units."[3] Authority is, in addition, one of the most controversial of political concepts and in political discussions the words 'authority' and 'power' are often wrongly used as synonyms but: "Many tyrants have exercised vast power with little authority, while men of conviction living under their rule had great authority without much power."[4]
For the pupil the essential question is not: "Why should I obey?" but "Why should I agree?"[5] A person vested with power wants his subjects to obey him and carry out his commands and directions. A person of authority looks not for obedience but agreement, agreement with what he has to say: "...authority (is) a quality of communications, rather than of persons."[6]
Among the many definitions of authority,[7] Friedrich's is pre-eminently suitable for application to learning processes with or without a teacher. He stresses the reasonableness of the communication, the message sent out, and the concurrence of the person who receives it: in the case of a learning process, the pupil.

On the relationship between tradition and authority Friedrich remarks:
"Tradition and authority, Siamese twins in the history of political theory, refer to basic political phenomena; for there never was a political order or community without both."[8]
What is true and what is untrue are decided on the basis of authority. In tradition, truth and untruth, fact and fiction are distinguished on the basis of authority. On the basis of authority tradition is interpreted so as to bring the truth to light. Any interpretation which has any pretension to receive or retain the seal of authority has to present or be capable of presenting rational arguments: "Authority rests upon the ability to issue communications which are capable of reasoned elaboration. Anything which does not so rest is feeble and short-lived."[9]

(1) Authority rests on susceptibility to reasoned elaboration.

The personal authority of, for example, Artistotle, rested on the reasoned statements which he himself gave or could give and those which his followers, the Aristotelians, gave or could give. Even God, himself, did not escape the necessity of instructing Moses. The impersonal authority of, for example, the civil code, rests on the reasoned explanation of the laws which lawyers give or might give. Similarly, a preamble to the actual law itself augments the law's authority. The impersonal authority of lifeless objects (such as civil codes, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, quality newspapers and so forth) cannot always be traced back to the personal authority of their contributors because these are often anonymous. Authority is not inherent in those who bear the authority, living or dead, but in the reasonableness of what they explicitly or implicitly pronounce: "It is the communication rather than the communicator that is in a strict sense possessed of authority."[10]

(2) Authority resides in the communication and not in the communicator.

When we say that a person has authority we mean that that person communicates with authority; his message is authoritative and it is possible to demonstrate its reasonableness. It is important to emphasise the word 'possible' because, in practice, those who receive the message often do not require any demonstration of its rationality. When such a demonstration is given it can be done either by the authoritative person in question or by others (priests, scribes, experts, Freudians, Marxists, propagandists etc.). The authority of a legal code, the Bible or some other synthesis rests exclusively on the reasoned elaborations or interpretations of their contents provided by lawyers, theologians or others.

Authority is not seen here in psychological terms but as an actual, truly existent phenomenon: "Crucial is the potentiality for reasoned elaboration. Not the psychological belief in such a capacity is decisive, but the actual presence of such a capacity."[11] Where authority is sham, the potentiality is not a real capacity and can therefore never become actual. The reasoned statement fails to materialize and sooner or later the appearance of authority is torn away and rejected. Real authority can also be rejected, or might it be better to say that it does not have to be accepted. This happens when the reasoned elaboration is no longer understood and valued by

the 'recipient' (pupil, citizen) but only by the 'transmitter' (teacher, political leader). Such failures of communication are well-known phenomena in unstable and swiftly developing societies. "It is therefore necessary to sharpen further the definition of authority as 'the capacity for reasoned elaboration' by adding: "in terms of the opinions, values, beliefs, interests and needs of the community within which the authority operates."[12] Tradition and authority are closely bound up with each other: 'opinions, values, beliefs' are also traditional concepts and so, in many cases, are 'interests and needs'. The less traditional a reasoned elaboration is the fewer the people among those for whom it is destined who will understand and accept it. This brings us to the third characteristic of authority:

(3) The elaboration must be such as to be understood by the group for whom it is destined so that it becomes possible for the group to give willing agreement.

I do not agree with Friedrich when he says that 'logical and scientific proof' is not based on authority because evidence is evidence. "Even the most stupid or silly man who states that two and two make four will not be questioned,"[13] and why not? ...because "a communication that is scientifically 'proven' requires no authority for its acceptance."[14] In my opinion Friedrich is wrong here. What does logical proof really prove? If, as Wittgenstein says, 1000 plus 1 can equal 1000, why does two plus two necessarily have to equal four?[15] If Friedrich is really wrong on this point, it would give his concept of authority a wider validity than he himself claims for it and would mean that it could fruitfully be used outside a specifically political context.[16]

In learning processes 'reasoned elaborations that are to be understood by the pupils' play an essential role. Yet even if they are understood by the pupils this does not necessarily mean that they are true. Authority is fallible: "There can be no absolute, no total authority, because there is not open to man any absolute truth or total reason."[17] Reasoned elaborations are, for the pupil, at the least admissible and at the most compulsive, but never true beyond doubt. Understanding is also a matter of degree and can always be deepened. Whatever the problem it cannot be expected that any one teacher or any single treatment will provide an exhaustive elaboration. No pupil is ever asked whether he understands a particular explanation through and through. All explanations are temporary and the same holds for understanding. New questions will always be asked to which there is as yet no

answer.
In teaching-learning processes, besides the provision (by the teacher or the book) of reasoned elaborations which have to be grasped (by the pupil), the example set by the teacher and its imitation by the pupil are key factors: "...Most of the important things in education are passed on in this manner - by example and explanation."[18] Yet when the teacher does something (example) which is re-enacted by the pupil (imitation) the teacher still has the last word for he has to be able to explain why he does it in a particular way. It is upon his capacity to lay before his pupils the reasons for his action, for their understanding and approval, that his authority as a teacher rests.

Does a teacher have to subscribe to what he teaches? Must he always be completely honest, answering his pupils' questions to the best of his knowledge? This is for the teacher himself to decide according to his own sense of responsibility. It seems clear that a teacher who departs from this course of action, although he may well preserve his life and his job, will sooner or later lose his authority. I would say even further that teacher and pupil must share a certain number of values, norms and interests if they are to understand each other. In teaching-learning processes I assume that the teacher in authority will never purposely mislead his pupil.
It is interesting to see that Friedrich, in speaking of power situations where political authority counts, assumes that those in power have a number of values, norms and interests in common with their subjects. He apparently thinks this follows of itself from his definition of authority.[19]

3.3 Image of the world

The image of the world is the picture of the real world which people - that is a person or a specific group of people - project for themselves at a specific time and place. The picture is built up here and now from what is offered by tradition. In the LL model, 'image of the world' includes God, gods, angels, devils and so on, or perhaps one should say it includes what people think they really know about these things. The image of the world can change over a generation. It can be optimistic or pessimistic, idealistic or materialistic, static or dynamic. Both the learning process (III in the LL model) and individual learning (IV in the LL model) are affected by the image of the world and themselves affect it in

their turn.[20]
Visions of a better world or of the ideal world may belong just as well to the world image as to the image of man (II.2) which is discussed in the next section. The evils of the world are sometimes divided into three categories.[21] First of all there is the evil inflicted on man by nature, examples of which are disease and natural events such as floods and earthquakes.[22] Secondly there is evil which people do to each other, such as exploitation and war, and finally there is the evil that man imposes on himself by excessive eating or drinking, taking insufficient sleep or "endeavoring to seek what is unnecessary."[23] 'Natural' evil or the first of these categories belongs to the image of the world and not to the image of man, while the second and third types, 'human' and 'personal' evil, form part of the image of man.[24]

3.4 Image of man (II.2 of the LL paradigm)

The image of man is the picture of human possibilities and limitations which people, that is a person or a specific group of people, project for themselves at a specific time and place. A single person or a group of people sum up their tradition in a picture of what man can do and what is forever beyond his reach, what is typically human and what is not. Man is good, man is bad, rational or irrational, social or asocial, first in creation or last, and so on. The LL paradigm includes in the image of man the picture the individual makes of himself (image of self).
In the course of a lifetime the image of man can alter. Although man is a component of the world and the image of man forms part of the world image,[25] the image of man nevertheless deserves separate treatment because it is precisely the aspect of the world image which has the most telling influence on the learning process (III in the LL paradigm) and on individual learning (IV in the LL model). This becomes eminently clear from considering the question of what the ideals of human behaviour really are. Familiar instances of figures which have been set up as ideals of upbringing include the warrior, hunter, athlete, politician, sage, freedom fighter, saint and gentleman.
The process of influence can also work the other way round; the learning process, and individual learning, can have their own effect on the image of man which may alter as man-the-pupil learns even more about himself, other people and the world.

3.5 Pupil (III.1 of the LL paradigm)

The chief task of the pupil is to learn, to try to acquire knowledge. Knowledge is to be taken in a wide sense, wider than normal (more will be said about this in the section 'Learning goals'). Lifelong learning reckons among its pupils even the new-born baby, who of course belongs to the group of people not as yet responsible for their own actions. As a general rule young pupils are never entirely responsible for themselves (the accent lies on the word 'entirely'): the burden rests largely elsewhere, on the parents for example or on the state.

There is no doubt that the nature of the learning goals influences the way the pupil learns. How he learns is called the learning method. Where teaching-learning processes are concerned the teacher also has considerable influence on the learning method. In the LL paradigm, learning method comes under the heading 'Pupil' (III.1) which also includes the pupil's own task, his responsibility and his rights and obligations.

3.6 Learning goals (III.2 of the LL paradigm)

No-one can learn for longer than his own lifetime. His learning begins at birth and ends with his death. For every person there are two sorts of learning goals: what he can expect to achieve during the course of his life and what he hopes to have achieved at the end of his life. These may be called interim and final goals. Both are included in the learning goals of lifelong learning. The learner, or pupil, cannot achieve his aims in one leap, however great. His effort to reach his ultimate goals or at least to get as near to them as possible, has to take place via interim goals. Many goals, for example those of education, politics, ethics or upbringing, can serve either as interim or as final objectives. Both types can be expressed both sharply and vaguely:

LEARNING GOAL

Formulation	Interim goal	Final goal
sharp	to be able to type with ten fingers	to die with a prayer on one's lips
vague	to have flexible attitudes	to be happy

Sharply formulated goals are often called objectives and those defined more vaguely, ideals. The following summary demonstrates (perhaps unnecessarily) that it is no simple matter, and indeed sometimes impossible to put learning goals into separate compartments marked 'upbringing', 'education', 'politics', or 'ethics'.[26]

Column A (examples of cognitive 'educational objectives' in order of increasing difficulty according to the authority)	Column B (examples of 'affective' 'educational objectives' in order of increasing difficulty according to the authority)	Column C (examples of political and judicio-philosophical 'top values')
1. Familiarity with a large number of words in their common range of meanings.	1. Develops awareness of aesthetic factors in dress, furnishings, architectures, city design, good art, and the like	1. Equality
2. The recall of major facts about particular cultures.	2. Increase in sensitivity to human need and pressing, social problems.	2. Liberty
3. Familiarity with the forms and conditions of the major types of works, e.g., verse, plays, scientific papers, etc.	3. Alertness toward human values and judgement on life as they are recorded in literature.	3. God's Will. Human Reason's Metaphysical Insights.
4. Understanding of the continuity and development of American culture as exemplified in American	4. Willingness to comply with health regulations.	4. Nature
	5. Acquaints himself with significant	

Column A	Column B	Column C
life	current issues	5. Ethical
5. To recognize the area encompassed by various kinds of problems or materials.	in international, political, social & economic affairs	Evolution.
6. Knowledge of criteria for the evaluation of recreational activities.	through voluntary reading and discussion.	6. Suum Cuique.
7. The student shall know the methods of attack relevant to the kinds of problems of concern to the social sciences.	6. Enjoyment of self-expression in music and in arts and crafts as another means of personal enrichment.	7. Democracy.
8. Knowledge of the important principles by which our experience with biological phenomena is summarized.	7. Grows in his sense of kinship with human beings of all nations.	8. Happiness.
9. The recall of major theories about particular cultures.	8. Deliberately examines a variety of viewpoints on controversial issues with a view to forming opinions about them.	9. Society of Social Ideal.
10. Skill in translating mathematical verbal material into symbolic statements and vice versa.	9. Devotion to those ideas and ideals which are the foundations of democracy.	10. The Nation.
	10. Attempts to identify the characteristics of an	11. Power.

Column A	Column B	Column C
11. The ability to interpret various types of social data.	art object which he admires.	
12. Skill in predicting continuation of trends.	11. Weighs alternative social policies and practices against the standards of the public welfare rather than the advantage of specialized and narrow interest groups.	12. Culture.
13. Application to the phenomena discussed in one paper of the scientific terms or concepts used in other papers.	12. Judges problems and issues in terms of situations, issues, purposes, and consequences involved rather than in terms of fixed dogmatic precepts or emotionally wishful thinking	13. Harmony.
14. Skill in distinguishing facts from hypothesis.		
15. Ability to check the consistency of hypothesis with given information and assumptions.		14. The Golden Rule. (Do to others as you would have others do to you).
16. Ability to recognize the general techniques used in persuasive materials, such as advertising propaganda, etc.	13. Develops a consistent philosophy of life.	
17. Ability to tell a personal experience effectively.		15. Etc. (Personal affection, aesthetic enjoyment, truth, reliability, veracity, self-respect, social
18. Ability to		

Column A	Column B	Column C
propose ways of testing hypothesis.		security).
19. Ability to make mathematical discoveries and generalisations.		
20. Judging by internal standards, the ability to assess general probability of accuracy in reporting facts from the care given to exactness of statement, documentation, proof, etc.		
21. Judging by external standards, the ability to compare a work with the highest known standards in its field... Especially with other works of recognized excellence		

The fact that we attempt to analyze the affective area separately from the cognitive is not intended to suggest that there is a fundamental separation. There is none. (Handbook II, ch. 4, p. 45).

Columns A and B list what a pupil in the American education system is supposed to strive for. These more or less educational learning goals are not normally formulated by the pupil himself but by other people such as parents, others concerned with his upbringing, teachers, education experts, other experts, politicians, spiritual leaders, military leaders and so on. Nor does he himself often make the choice of which learning goals are best for him to pursue. In general the pupil neither formulates his possible learning goals nor chooses which

ones are best for him. A pupil is inarticulate when he is born and only in a few cases does he achieve sufficient oracy to formulate and select his own goals.
If we define learning goals as desired learning effects, we must then ask who it is who desires these effects. As a rule, pupils, parents, other educators, teachers and governments, do not have identical desires. Yet it would be an exaggeration to take as a foregone conclusion that the pupil will share none of the ideals and aspirations of any of his educators, teachers, parents or others. It seems fair therefore, to refer to learning goals or objectives as desired learning effects, on the assumption that teachers and pupils acting within the same learning process will be in broad agreement as to what 'desirable learning effects' are.[27]
To speak of desired learning effects is of little value unless the relationship between teacher and pupil is one of trust and mutual affection, together with agreement on at least the most important of the learning goals. According to Maimonides, such an ideal understanding between teacher and pupil is present "where the desire and purpose of both are directed towards a single matter, the good, and each wishes to assist the other in attaining that good together," and this relationship is none other than "the mutual sympathy existing between teacher and pupil."[28] It is assumed in the LL model that the pupil wants to learn what he is taught, or in other words that the category of teaching goals is a subdivision of the class of learning goals. Whether this assumption is reasonable is considered further in section 7 of this chapter.

"Over the last ten or twenty years education experts, in particular those engaged in research in education and educational innovation, have, in their theoretical and practical work on educational objectives, pressed very hard for a shift in emphasis from what the teacher ought to do to what the pupil is supposed to be achieving.[29] (...) There were formerly three categories in general use in discussions on education: The object was to 'instil' knowledge and insight, to 'train' the pupil in skills and to 'shape his attitudes or personality'. Our thinking on the subject of educational objectives has now advanced so far that we reject as irrelevant to our object - which is the analysis of the term 'educational objectives' - those terms of these categories that indicate teachers' activities. But the trio - knowledge and insight - skills - attitudes, remains. (...) In all three cases what it is about is dispositions to behaviour, repertoires of

possible behaviour..."[30]
De Groot now reaches his first formulation of what sort of thing an educational objective is:

"It can be put quite simply as follows: educational learning effects as aims to be pursued (thus educational objectives) are mental programmes that are to be acquired by the pupil and which he will possess when the learning process is complete. That is to say that he will know that they are in his repertoire and what he has been able to learn successfully by their means, and he will himself be able to bring them into operation (or not) as he chooses and himself direct them. Only the acquisition (or causing of the acquisition) of a mental programme - knowledge, insight, skill or attitude - that conforms to these requirements can be an educational objective.
(...) ((An educational objective)) is a learning effect thought to be desirable and having the character of a new mental programme added to the total repertoire of the pupil."[31]

De Groot goes on to provide a second definition of 'an educational objective'. This time he does not use the concept 'mental programme' but instead the concept of 'skills', taken, however, in a wider sense than it bears in the trio 'knowledge and insight - skills - attitudes'. He quotes approvingly the COWO report[32] in which this trio is replaced by the three categories 'knowing', 'competence', and 'volition', all of which then come under the super-category skill. The COWO 2 quotation, somewhat adapted by De Groot, reads as follows:
"In general a distinction is made within learning objectives between knowing, competence and volition. This threefold division may sometimes be useful, but the description of the objectives of an educational programme becomes more precise as soon as the desired knowledge and attitudes are translated into skills. Possessing knowledge implies also possessing the skill to make use of the knowledge retained in the memory; to demonstrate the knowledge for example by answering questions. It follows that the aim of the education is to teach the student to do things like solving mathematical problems or explaining the connection between different economic phenomena, describing the most important concepts of his particular science, drafting a psychological test or analysing Kant's philosophical opinions.
An attitude reveals itself by behaviour in given situations. This implies that the student has insight into the situation, mastery of a pattern of action and

readiness to behave in a certain way. The skills that are implicated in such behaviour can be important to learning objectives. Yet it would be unwise to say that the student's education should also teach him what he should want; it is only too easy to stray over the frontier between fostering the student's conscious choice and indoctrination."[33]
So any educational learning effect favoured by both teacher and pupil may be called an acquired skill (in its wide sense) and an educational objective is the same as a skill (in its wide sense) to be acquired. Clearly the term 'skill'[34] can be used to replace the term 'mental programme'. When all this is applied to De Groot's first definition of an objective, we get the new version:

An educational objective is an educational learning effect to be pursued. Educational learning effects to be pursued are skills to be acquired by the pupil which he will possess when the learning process is complete. That is to say that he will know that they are in his repertoire and what he has been able to learn successfully by their means, and he will himself be able to bring them into play (or not) as he chooses and himself direct them. Only the acquisition (or causing of the acquisition) of a skill that conforms to these requirements can be an educational objective.
An educational objective is a learning effect thought to be desirable and having the character of a new skill added to the total repertoire of the pupil.[35]

'Skill' in this second definition is as follows:
"A skill is a person's disposition with regard to his competence in a particular, more or less closely defined area of learning, concerning the world and/or himself."[36]
To speak of programmes of skills that the pupil possesses or has acquired, is not to imply that the pupil will necessarily use them in every situation. He is free not to do so for he can control them, put them into operation or take them out of operation, as he wishes. He is master of his programmes and skills. These words - programmes and skills - are used simply to describe and explain human behaviour. They do not describe episodes, but dispositions:
"I have already had occasion to argue that a number of the words which we commonly use to describe and explain people's behaviour signify dispositions and not episodes. To say that a person knows something, or aspires to be something, is not to say that he is at a particular moment in process of doing or undoing anything, but that he is able to do certain things, when the need arises, or that

he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts."[37]
The goals described in columns A and B are clearly different from those in column C. Those in the first two columns will be achieved, if not by all, then at least by some of the pupils and this will happen during the time that they are being educated. Column C contains ideals such that during his own lifetime no-one will ever be sure whether the goal has been reached or the ideal realised. The goals in column C require people to behave in a certain way or, it might better be said, to have certain dispositions which they can try to acquire by studying. But these dispositions are not those normally learnt at school and known as educational goals; they are rather the learning goals of learning processes that are precisely not teaching-learning processes.

There are writers who call all learning processes teaching-learning processes, the whole of life a school and anyone who explains something to someone else a teacher: "Just as the whole world is a school for the whole of the human race, from the beginning of time until the very end, so the whole of his life is a school for every man, from the cradle to the grave... Every age is destined for learning, nor is man given other goals in learning than in life itself."[38]
The metaphor seems to me to be false. Although every teaching-learning process is a learning process, every learning process is not a teaching-learning process. Living is learning, for living is certainly a permanent learning process,but not a permanent teaching-learning process.[39]
The most important things people learn, the knowledge that means most to them personally, are not usually acquired in a teaching-learning process at school but by personal experiences which come to them in the course of their lives, and from thinking things over and looking for the answers to the questions.
Learning is not the successful acquisition of knowledge but the attempt to acquire knowledge (see chapter 3 section 3). Learning can go wrong, and in more than one way:

(1) The pupil may be unable to acquire the knowledge, however much he studies, because it is beyond him. The learning fails because the pupil fails.
(2) The failure may be due to the knowledge itself or what passes for it. A pupil who lies does not acquire true knowledge.
(3) Both factors may operate at the same time: the pupil

fails and the purported knowledge is untrue.

It would be wrong to insist that all successful acquisition of knowledge happens consciously or as a result of effort, but in the LL context learning is not simply identical with the successful acquisition of knowledge but must occur in a certain way (by the learning method) and is neither automatic nor a matter of chance, which means that it does not happen without effort. (Compare the discussion in chapter 2, section 4 on the quotation "...the current psychological definition of 'learning'....")

If people's learning is the attempt to acquire knowledge, it is clear that the learning goal of every learning process is knowledge. Just as a relationship exists between educational goals and learning goals (the educational goals as a class make up part of the larger class of learning goals), so the three concepts 'mental programme', 'skill' (perhaps also repertoire) and 'knowledge' are also related. All three (or possibly four) are dispositional terms.

"When we describe glass as brittle, or sugar as soluble, we are using dispositional concepts, the logical force of which is this. The brittleness of glass does not consist in the fact that it is at a given moment actually being shivered. It may be brittle without ever being shivered. To say that it is brittle is to say that if it ever is, or ever had been, struck or strained, it would fly, or have flown, into fragments. To say that sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, or would have dissolved, if immersed in water. A statement ascribing a dispositional property to a thing has much, though not everything, in common with a statement subsuming the thing under a law. To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized. The same is true about specifically human dispositions such as qualities of character. My being an habitual smoker does not entail that I am at this or that moment smoking; it is my permanent proneness to smoke when I am not eating, sleeping, lecturing or attending funerals, and have not quite recently been smoking. (...) To be brittle is just to be bound or likely to fly into fragments in such and such conditions; to be a smoker is just to be bound or likely to fill, light and draw on a pipe in such and such conditions. These are simple, single-track dispositions, the actualizations of which are nearly uniform. (...) Now

the higher-grade dispositions of people with which this inquiry is largely concerned are, in general, not single-track dispositions, but dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous. (...) Epistemologists, among others, often fall into the trap of expecting dispositions to have uniform exercises. For instance, when they recognize that the verbs 'know' and 'believe' are ordinarily used dispositionally, they assume that there must therefore exist one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive dispositions are actualized.

Ryle distinguishes two sorts of 'knowing' or 'knowledge', knowing how and knowing that. Both are dispositional concepts and "it is essential to note that Ryle assimilates all 'knowing how' to the model 'knowing how to perform a task" and all 'knowing that' to the model 'knowing that such and such is the case'... Ryle's distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' is really a distinction between 'knowing how to perform skills' and 'knowing propositions of a factual nature'."[41] This becomes apparent from the examples he chooses to explain the terms 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' (see particularly chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind). In current usage these terms have a wider meaning: 'knowing how' is not used exclusively in the sense of 'knowing how you must do something' and 'knowing that' does not only refer to factual assertions.[42] Ryle's analysis of 'knowing how' (in its limited sense of 'skill') goes further than his analysis of 'knowing that' (in its limited sense of 'fact'): "...'knowing how' ((cannot be defined)) in terms of 'knowing that'.[43] (...) Theorists have been so preoccupied with the task of investigating the nature, the source, and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks. In ordinary life, on the contrary, as well as in the special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with people's competences than with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with the truths that they learn. Indeed even when we are concerned with their intellectual excellences and deficiencies we are interested less in the stocks of truths that they acquire and retain than in their capacities to find out truths for themselves and their ability to organize and exploit them, when discovered."[44]
'Knowing how' in Ryle's sense cannot therefore be defined in terms of 'knowing that' also in Ryle's sense. There are some claims that the converse is possible,[45] but Ryle

largely confines himself to analysing 'knowing how' because it is this aspect of 'knowing' that is so often ignored.

In the preceding discussion 'knowing how' is taken first and foremost as competence and the same emphasis is to be found in the formulation of learning goals which are taught, or in other words, educational objectives where the terms 'mental programmes' and 'skills' are interpreted: "Whether we speak of programme or skill, in either case the objective, the desired teaching-learning effect, is a competence."[46]
In the following pages 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' are used as technical terms in the sense given them by Ryle. As has already been remarked, in normal usage these terms have a wider connotation.

Schema 1 (the connection shown by the broken line is not expressed as such by De Groot but it is nevertheless valid)



Knowledge is used here in a dispositional sense. "To say that a person knows something, is not to say that he is

at a particular moment in process of doing or undergoing anything, but that he is able to do certain things when the need arises, or that he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts."[47]
This quotation speaks of two dispositions, knowing and aspiring. Does 'knowing' on its own need special treatment? Ryle gives no answer, but from the quotation and from his distinction between 'knowing' and 'believing', it would seem to follow that in his opinion a person who knows something is able to do certain things when the need arises, but is not necessarily prone to do those things.[48]
As we have already seen, if education is aimed at making pupils want certain things then there is the risk of straying over the border between conscious choice by the pupil and indoctrination by the teacher.[49]

Russell finds indoctrination unavoidable but not in itself harmful: "In all education, propaganda has a part; no adult can avoid expressing his aversions and preferences, and any such expression in the presence of the young has the effect of propaganda. The question for the educator is not whether there shall be propaganda, but how much, how organized, and of what sort; also whether, at some stage during education, an attempt should be made to free boys and girls, as far as possible, from the influence of propaganda by teaching them methods of arriving at impartial judgments. (...) It is not propaganda as such that is at fault, but one-sided propaganda. To be critical of propaganda, to have what is called in America 'sales resistance', is highly desirable, and is not to be achieved by remoteness from propaganda, any more than immunity from measles is achieved by remoteness from measles. It is achieved by experiencing propaganda and discovering that it is often misleading. For this purpose, no plan could be so suitable as rival propagandists in every school, for which broadcasting supplies the mechanism."[50]

It is not my intention here to answer the question of whether indoctrination is a bad thing and if it can or should be avoided and how this might be done, because there is a different question to be dealt with. As an educational objective, influencing the will may be a dubious undertaking, but as learning goal it is not. Any pupil who wishes to strengthen or bend his will is perfectly entitled to do so. In so doing he is simply following the same path as many saints who have been able to direct and master their own impulses and have thus

ceased to be slaves to their inclinations and have been able to turn them to good or suppress them. The mastery to which the inclinations are here subject is a competence based on knowledge of those very tendencies and their potential consequences. Any pupil who wishes to conform to another's will (or the will of God) is ultimately also developing a competence based on his knowledge of that other will. In other words, here again the character of the learning goal contains a 'knowing how' and a 'knowing that'. The distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge can be compared to that between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. The distinction is not always easy to make and there is no competence without knowledge and no knowledge without competence. But this does not mean that 'knowing that' follows automatically from 'knowing how' or vice versa. Ryle's explanation is as follows: "His knowledge how ((knowledge of the rules of chess)) is exercised primarily in the moves that he makes or concedes, and in the moves that he avoids or vetoes. So long as he can observe the rules, we do not care if he cannot also formulate them.[51] It is not what he does with his head or with his tongue, but what he does on the board that shows whether or not he knows the rules in the executive way of being able to apply them. Similarly, a foreign scholar might not know how to speak grammatical English as well as an English child, for all that he had mastered was the theory of English grammar."[52]
According to Ryle the 'knowing how' is more important than the 'knowing that' (see p. 45) and the schema on p. 46 can be simplified by replacing the terms 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' by the term knowledge. Provided that by knowledge is understood a competence based on knowing so that a person who knows something is able to do or undergo certain things when the need arises (see p. 46), in which 'is able' is expressed primarily a knowing how and the knowing when the need arises primarily a 'knowing that'. Then De Groot's definitions of educational objectives as competences fit in very well with Ryle's epistemological opinions, the more so in that De Groot also bases competence on knowing.[53]

The schema can now be simplified as follows:

Schema 2



The competence referred to here is a disposition which is expressed or can be expressed in the pupil's behaviour. The latter specifically but not exclusively includes verbal behaviour. A pupil's competence may express itself in his behaviour, but it is not necessarily so expressed because of its dispositional nature. If he does not wish to do so a pupil may decide not to display his competence but to leave it hidden. In so doing, whatever his reasons may be, he puts himself out of reach of criticism, both of a negative and possibly destructive kind and of a positive or constructive kind. He shuns any form of evaluation other than self-evaluation and avoids, in other words, any sort of assessment, judgement or stricture by other people.
It goes without saying that such a pupil will never feel at home in a teaching-learning process in which learning achievements are regularly assessed by other people.
The discussion continues in the next section. So as to

avoid the present section's becoming too long the evaluation of what has just been said together with some objections to the analysis of learning goals given above, have been carried forward into that section.

3.7 Evaluation (III.3 of the LL paradigm)

The LL model places the learning process under four headings: pupil, learning goals, evaluation and the teacher. Learning method comes under the heading of pupil and teaching method under that of teacher (see 2.5). Methods are taken to be more or less systematic courses of action aimed at achieving specific goals. They are means to obtaining ends. The LL model may, quite wrongly, suggest that in lifelong learning the emphasis is or should be mainly on goals and not on the means or methods of reaching or nearing these goals.
My position is that in learning processes in general and in teaching-learning processes in particular, both means and ends should be morally defensible and that the end cannot justify the means or vice versa. Any attempt at evaluation should always begin by posing two questions: (1) the question of function: do the means lead to the goal? And (2) the question of principle: are both means and goal morally defensible? Ends-means analysis of learning or teaching-learning process always runs the risk of attaching too little importance to the second of these two questions, the question of principle. "Values are involved in education not so much as goals or end-products, but as principles implicit in different manners of proceeding or producing. (...) ...most disputes about the aims of education are disputes about principles of procedures rather than about 'aims' in the sense of objectives to be arrived at by taking appropriate means."[54] These words are true not only of educational learning processes but also of learning processes in general, wherever the pupil tends to pursue exclusively his own goals: "The crucial question to ask, when men wax enthusiastic on the subject of their aims, is what procedures are to be adopted in order to implement them. (...) The Puritan and the Catholic both though they were promoting God's kingdom, but they thought it had to be promoted in a different manner. And the different manner made it quite a different kingdom."[55] The objection to over-emphasis on ends as compared with procedures or methods can be met by inserting in the LL model an express reference to procedures or methods:

III. Learning process

1. Pupil and learning procedure (method)
2. Learning goals
3. Evaluation
4. Teacher and teaching procedure (method)

The second objection to the learning process analysis concerns the apparently simple distinction between two sorts of goal, interim and final (pp. 34-35). The student uses interim goals as stages on the way to final goals; he hopes that every interim goal that he reaches is bringing him nearer to his final goals, or in other words that interim goals are also situated on the path between him and his final goals. Yet the assumption that interim goals are bound also to occupy an intermediate position, is false. Even if only a single final goal is assumed to exist, rather than for example two badly assorted ones (or ones that are flatly contradictory), it would still be wrong to assume that interim always equals intermediate. This may seem obvious, but the diagram given below may still be of help in clarifying the reasoning:



T_i (i = 1, 2, ... 9);
Interim goals

a. There is no optimal route to the final goal (as planners of curricula regularly claim).
b. But there are various routes to the final goal, such as $T_1T_2T_3T_4$, $T_1T_2T_7T_8$ etc.
c. There are various wrong routes (erroneous) which do not lead the pupil to the final goal; $T_1T_2T_6T_5$, $T_5T_6T_3T_7T_1$, and so on.
d. Conclusion: interim goals are not necessarily intermediate goals (on the route to the final goal) and are therefore sometimes better avoided than reached.

The two objections already discussed concern the choice of terms. The first warns us not to place too great an emphasis on goals at the expense of means, and the second to beware of identifying interim with intermediate goals.

The third objection is of a totally different nature. It is not concerned with the actual choice of terminology nor with the theory described in the preceding section, but with a logical consequence in connection with knowledge evaluation which, to my mind, ought to be drawn from them but which is seldom mentioned. Briefly it comes down to this: if a pupil's competence - which includes knowing - also called knowledge, mental programmes or skills - is a disposition, then it cannot be directly evaluated. Events can be evaluated directly but not dispositions. "To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized."[56] When we say that a person 'can' do something it does not mean that he is at a certain moment occupied in doing something or undergoing something, but that he is able to do certain things when necessary. The competence itself cannot be evaluated but only its actualization.
Now competence which includes knowing is a disposition that can be actualized in many different ways. "Now the higher-grade dispositions of people with which this inquiry is largely concerned are, in general, not single-track dispositions but dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous."[57]
Ability or inability do not point to events but are modal words and there is no specific sign or test to show what a person is capable of or whether he is capable of it. In other words, we never test a person's competence but what he reveals of his competence: never what he knows but what he expresses. As long as a one-to-one relationship between a person's inside and outside does not exist, whatever evaluation is made of his dispositions on the basis of their actualization is bound to remain problematic. All the more so if the pupil fails to see the necessity of demonstrating his competence to the best of his ability or if for some reason he finds it unreasonable to do so. This situation is liable to arise when there is a lack of trust between evaluator and pupil and in practice this is all too often the case.

To return to the reality of learning in learning or teaching-learning processes, the third objection, which is of rather an abstract character, ought to be filled out with a number of factual observations:

(1) The biggest difference between teaching-learning processes and learning processes that are not teaching-learning processes lies in the fact that in

the first case there is a great deal of evaluation of the pupil's learning results and in the second hardly any. In teaching-learning processes it is normally the teacher who has to carry out the evaluation; in other learning processes there is no teacher and the student's learning is not usually evaluated systematically unless the student himself arranges it.

(2) For the pupil, evaluation can be either a blessing or a curse. It can be a blessing when it lets the pupil know how far he has advanced and what remaining steps he should take in his attempt to reach or approach his goals, and also when it encourages him to go on trying, always assuming that the learning goals are ones that really can be attained or approached. Evaluation can be a curse if it does not tell the pupil how to improve his learning but only pronounces judgement on the learning results. Censure often discourages the pupil from going on and approbation offers him too little insight into the weaker side of his achievements, so it is a curse either way. The most notorious examples of this sort of evaluation are found in teaching-learning processes: for instance where marks alone are given without any comment from the teacher or examination results are confined to the equally uninformative 'failed' or 'passed' without further specification.[58]
Evaluation of the first kind is of the greatest importance in learning processes in general as well as in the particular case of teaching-learning processes. In learning processes that are not teaching-learning processes it is the pupil's responsibility to keep certain moments free for this kind of evaluation.

(3) The ability to evaluate a pupil's work in a manner that is of positive value to the pupil is a rare quality. Not only must the evaluator be a wise person but he must also know his pupil well if he is to help him; "...the specifications as to what he ((the pupil)) is to learn are dependent on his previous educational development, his abilities and skills, and his aspirations and motivations."[59] Learning is personal and must be a context within which both the personal history of the pupil and his aspirations for the future must be able to resonate. In a free society space must be left or created for people to attain or approach their own individual learning goals, at least insofar as the society can tolerate such goals. The personal nature of learning, especially of lifelong learning, is expressed in the LL model where individual learning occupies a separate category

(category IV: Individual learning as a daily habit).

On the learning processes and teaching-learning processes Bloom says:
"The basic questions to ask about examinations and other evaluation procedures are whether they have a positive effect on student learning (and instruction) and whether they leave (both teachers and) students with a positive view of themselves and of the subject and learning process."[60]
In teaching-learning processes Bloom distinguishes two kinds of evaluations: formative and summative.
"((Summative evaluation)) is the evaluation which is used at the end of the course, term or educational program. ...Quite in contrast is the use of 'formative evaluation' to provide ((the student and the teacher)) feed-back[61] and correctives at each stage in the teaching-learning process. By formative evaluation we mean evaluation by brief tests used by teachers and students as aids in the learning process."[62]
The results of summative evaluation are often improperly used and take on a life of their own. Bloom describes this in the case of examination results which can poison the life of a student if they are used inadvisedly: "The postexamination effects may be very profound, depending on the uses made of the examination results. The results of some examinations, such as an intelligence test or a major external examination, may be to mark an individual for the rest of his life. An I.Q. index, the results of a school or college entrance examination, or the results of the matriculation examinations in many countries may determine the individual's educational and vocational career, his own view of himself, and the ways in which others regard him. These major examinations create self-fulfilling prophecies in which later success or failure or the educational and vocational openings available are largely determined by the results. It is no secret that teachers may rationalize their difficulties in instruction by pointing to the I.Q. or standardized test scores of their students. Parents may also come to judge their children, positively as well as negatively, in terms of their I.Q.'s or other examinations results. As the child himself will come to view himself partly in terms of his performance on certain key examinations."[63]

It goes without saying that such nightmare examples of the misuse of examination results can completely put a student off any sort of evaluation by other people. It is for this reason that it is so important for the teacher

and pupil to enjoy a relation of sympathy in which the pupil can place his confidence in the teacher. As soon as the pupil has become frightened of letting anyone see what he knows and doesn't know, the problem of evaluating his knowledge, already a difficult one, becomes several times more difficult. There is nothing left for him to do but to carry out the evaluation for himself. Proponents of what is called self-evaluation would claim that it is indeed the pupil himself who is best fitted to judge his own progress, but the corollary to this belief is that self-knowledge is easy to acquire, an opinion which I find mistaken.
Bloom postulates his two forms of evaluation for teaching-learning processes, but getting feedback is just as important for any student in any learning process. For lifelong learning, some form of formative evaluation is much more significant than anything resembling summative evaluation. If we confine the terms formative and summative to evaluation in teaching-learning processes, as is normally the case, then for LL we need a further kind of evaluation which might be termed '<u>informative evaluation</u>'.

With the fourth objection we now come back to the question whether it is possible or realistic to look on indoctrination as something distinct from the pursuit of educational objectives.[64]
This distinction seems to be perfectly possible as long as teacher and pupil are working together as partners each of whom does his best to help the other to arrive at or approach his goals, educational or not. Of course both teacher and pupil must be convinced that the goals are worth working for. If a teacher teaches a pupil that it is good to get debts paid off, and he also succeeds in convincing him and explains how it should be done, then, if he wants the pupil to free himself from his debts in actual fact, it is still not indoctrination. As long as teacher and pupil are not in opposition but in sympathy, and share a common goal, then there can be no question of indoctrination.
Is it realistic to make a distinction between indoctrination and the formulation of educational objectives? The troubles that disrupted teaching-learning processes in schools and universities in Europe and the U.S.A. in the sixties can be attributed first and foremost to crises of confidence between teacher and student. A teaching-learning process can only work as it should if pupils as well as teachers are convinced that what has to be learnt is worth learning. At the times of crises in

the sixties this was not the case. The sole solution to such crises is for pupils and teachers - not parents, pressure groups, political parties or educational boards, etc. - to agree on the aims to be pursued in education. Whether teachers are also parents or party members, or students organize pressure groups, or whether all sorts of other things of this sort occur, is irrelevant to the issue. Pupils and teachers are the pillars of the educational process; they are the leading figures and, as such, responsible both for what is learnt and for what is taught. To allow indoctrination a place in the teaching-learning process actually indicates a disregard for reality because no sooner do pupil and teacher begin to pursue goals at variance with one another than the whole process degenerates into manipulation of one partner by the other. As time goes on the pupils, disappointed by their teachers, learn less and less and may well turn their backs on any form of regular - let alone lifelong learning.

After all these points of dispute, the question that must finally be asked is how people's knowledge, or competence which includes knowing, is normally assessed, because, for good or evil, assessed it will be. The answer is appallingly simple: knowledge is evaluated on the strength of evaluation of particular expressions or actualizations of that knowledge. Given that knowledge can be actualized in very many ways and given the difficulty of deciding which among them may be the most representative expression of the disposition (if indeed there is any such thing as representation), any evaluation of someone's knowledge can be no more than a more or less successful guess - a rough estimate. Often the spoken or written word is chosen as the form of expression to be evaluated. "When we use, as we often do use, the phrase 'can tell' as a paraphrase of 'know', we mean by 'tell', 'tell correctly'. We do not say that a child can tell the time, when all that he does is deliver random time-of-day statements, but only when he regularly reports the time of day in conformity with the position of the hands of the clock, or with the position of the sun, whatever these positions may be." What applies for 'can tell' applies equally for 'can write'.[65] Knowing can be expressed in deeds as well as words and often only in deeds. Although words can often replace deeds and sometimes even are deeds,[66] all knowledge cannot be reduced to linguistic expression. If someone who knows how to swim falls in the sea he will have to swim so as not to drown. Words will not help him.

There is a dualism between knowledge and its factual actualization and this is what makes knowledge evaluation so difficult. The greater the dualism the more imprecise and uninformative the evaluation. For every learning person, therefore, the central problem is how to overcome this dualism. In teaching-learning processes the teacher has to help the pupil accomplish this. He can do it by giving the pupil self-confidence as well as knowledge so that he will always be ready and willing to show what he knows. Later on in life the pupil will have to resolve the dualism on his own.

"The disciple of Socrates believes that all virtue is insight and that knowledge of what is right will in itself enable him to practise it. Not so the disciple of Moses: inherent in him is the belief that understanding is not enough, that teaching must penetrate the deepest instincts of man and subject his elemental totality to the spirit, like clay in the potter's hands, if right is to become reality. This is rejection of dualism at its most extreme. The Midrash says: 'If a man learns without intending to put his learning into practice, it would be better for him if he had never been created.'[67] Learning without deeds is wrong, and this is even worse if one is studying the doctrine of deeds. Living in the detached world of the spirit is evil, even more so in the realm of ethics. From the 'Teaching of the Fathers' right through to the definitive Hasidic formulation, the simple man of deeds is given precedence over the scholar who cannot put his learning into practice. 'If a man's deeds are greater than his wisdom, then he has wisdom; but if a man's wisdom is greater than his deeds, then he has no wisdom.'[69] And, by analogy, 'if a man's wisdom is greater than his deeds, to what can he be likened? A tree with many branches and few roots. The wind comes and tears it out and casts it down. The man whose deeds are greater than wisdom, to what can he be likened? A tree with few branches and many roots. All the winds of the world may come and blow on it but they will not move it from its place.'[70] Therefore it is not the extent of a man's intellectual possessions that is important, nor the depth of his knowledge, nor the sharpness of his wit, but that he should know what he knows and believe what he believes in such a way that it translates directly into real life and has an effect on the world."[71] By 'learning' is meant the Torah, Jewish tradition, or what the Jews study all the days of their life (see I.1.1).

The straightforward questions of function and principle in evaluation, posed at the beginning of this section,

are also relevant when it comes to interim learning goals on the permanent learner's path through life; but in the case of learning goals that he hopes to reach in the last phase of his life and that he intends to work towards during the whole course of his life, then the functional question scarcely counts. In III.3.1 more on this subject.

3.8 Teacher (III.4 of the LL paradigm)

It has already been suggested in the preceding section that in the LL paradigm it would be better to replace the word 'teacher' by 'Teacher and teaching procedure or method'.
The teacher's role belongs in the teaching-learning process; therefore not in all learning processes. Like the pupil (compare 3.5) the teacher has particular tasks, responsibilities, rights and duties, which are considered under III.4.
The most vital element in the relationship between teacher and pupil is confidence. It is the absence of this that leads to the abuses described in the preceding section and explains the hate and horror of schools which exudes from so many anti-school publications.
Teacher and pupil are not by any means always aware of what they can expect from each other. It will certainly improve their personal relationship if their roles are more clearly defined so that each knows what is expected of him and what he can expect from the other. If the roles themselves are not clear then a contract, for example, may serve to focus them more sharply. The contract has to be a good one of course. "...the most important - sometimes pathogenic - factors in the student's situation relate to the weakness of the social contract between government, teacher (or faculty) and pupil (or student); the relationship between the two last is characterised in particular by lack of commitment, helplessness, partial or defective allocation of a responsibility in any case easy to evade, and obscurity."[72] But even a good contract is useless if teacher and pupil have a bad relationship or none at all. Unless they feel a mutual sense of responsibility and a shared affection the most perfect contract can have no effect.

Notes

1 'On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance' (Popper 1974, pp. 27-28).

2 See for example: 'Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition' (Popper 1974, ch. 4). 'Tradition and the

Role of Education' (Friedrich 1963, ch. 33). 'Tradition' (Friedrich 1972, Part I).

[3] Eckstein, Gurr (1975, preface, p. ix).

[4] Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 226). For the political controversy see for example Friedrich (1963, part II) or Friedrich (1972, ch. 4).

[5] Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 222).

[6] Idem, p. 224.

[7] Kim (1966) gives an extremely condensed survey.

[8] Friedrich (1972, ch. 10, p. 113).

[9] The actual text reads: "The following analysis seeks to show that authority and reason are closely linked, and indeed it develops the proposition that much authority rests upon the ability to issue communications which are capable of reasoned elaboration, and that authority which does not so rest, is feeble and short-lived" (Friedrich 1972, ch. 4, p. 46). I have left out the word 'much' because Friedrich claims that real authority is based on reasonableness. Compare Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 218): "We shall hope to show that authority and reason are closely linked, indeed that authority rests upon the ability to issue communications which are capable of reasoned elaboration." The word 'much' does not appear here.

[10] Friedrich (1972, ch. 4, p. 54)

[11] Friedrich (1972, ch. 7, p. 80).

[12] Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 226).

[13] Friedrich (1972, ch. 10, p. 115). See also ch. 4, p. 48.

[14] Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 224). See also p. 217.

[15] "I mean that with the logic of 'Principia Mathematica' one could establish a system of arithmetic where 1000 + 1 = 1000 and all we could do is doubt the material accuracy of the calculations. But if we do not doubt them, then it is not our conviction of the truth of logic that is at fault." (Wittgenstein 1972, Teil II, par. 39).

[16] Friedrich says most on 'political authority': the title of his ch. 12 is 'Political Authority and Reasoning' (Friedrich 1963. See also p. 223). This text also expressly mentions the authority of "the teacher, the scholar, the dictionary...laws and

constitutions...the doctor, the lawyer" (pp. 221-222). See also De Groot (1971a) on the function of the forum in science.

[17] Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 230 and 1972, ch. 7, p. 81).

[18] 'Must an Educator Have an Aim?' (Peters 1959, ch. 7, p. 92). My emphasis.

[19] See Friedrich (1963, ch. 12, p. 223). Kim (see note 7) comments: "Friedrich's assumption about the widespread diffusion or sharing of values and beliefs between a power-handler and the recipients of communications tends to restrict in scope the phenomena subsumed under the concept of authority. In a situation characterized by such sharing, the capacity for elaborate reasoning presumably involves no elements of deception. One may ask if Friedrich would classify a control phenomenon as authority when the reasoned elaboration capable of being offered by a power-handler is clearly at odds with his personal values and beliefs. Would such a reasoning (intended for manipulative purpose) be called authority if only such reasons appeared reasonable to and made sense to those to whom the preferences of the power-handler had been communicated? It may be that Friedrich has in mind the acceptance of or belief in reasons on the part not only of the ruled but also of the power-handler. At any rate, the notion of shared beliefs and values has precluded his discussion of such a problem. His focus is clearly on the acceptability to those to whom a communication about preference of a power-handler is addressed" (p. 227).

[20] Belief in lucky and unlucky days can affect both planning and people's behaviour. If people learn that such belief is superstition (see the quotation below) then this in turn can influence planning and behaviour and alter the world image. "Superstitions about lucky and unlucky days are almost universal. In ancient times they governed the actions of generals. Among ourselves the prejudice against Friday and the number 13 is very active, sailors do not like to sail on a Friday, and many hotels have no 13th floor" ('An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish', Russell 1970, p. 94).

[21] See Pines (Guide 1964, part III, ch. 12). Obviously this is not the only possible classification.

[22] If Maimonides had been our contemporary he might have called the first sort of evil 'evil done to each

other by people and nature' and thus ecological evil.

[23] This, according to Maimonides, is the danger that "... when one endeavours to seek what is unnecessary, it becomes difficult to find even what is necessary" (Idem, III.12, p. 446).

[24] Maimonides judged personal evil as most important and natural evil as least (Idem, III.12, pp. 444-445).

[25]



T = Tradition
W = World Image
M = Image of Man

[26] Column A: Bloom ed. (1972, Appendix: pp. 201-207).
Column B: Krathwohl, Bloom, Masia (1971, Appendix A: pp. 176-185).
Column C: Chapter 8: 'Twentieth Century Attempts to Identify Highest Values' (pp. 202-262) Brecht (1970).

[27] Compare section 3.1 on authority.

[28] M. Maimonides' commentary on M. Avot 1:6 (Maimonides 1968, pp. 8-9). See also III.4.2.

[29] De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.1., p. 26).

[30] De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.1, p. 29-30) and (par. 2.4.3. p. 30).

[31] Compare Idem (par. 2.4.5., p. 34). I have slightly altered the text of this quotation.

[32] COWO 2 (1971).

[33] COWO 2 (par. 2.1, p. 21) and De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.7, pp. 36-37).

[34] De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.7, p. 36).

[35] De Groot leaves the reader to supply the second version.

[36] Cf. De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.7, p. 38). The definition given there calls a 'skill' an 'acquired disposition'. A 'skill to be acquired' would then become an 'acquired disposition to be acquired' which is to say the least, a tautology. I have therefore slightly altered the definition proposed by De Groot.

[37] Ryle (1975, ch. 5, par. 7, p. 116).

[38] The words of J.A. Comenius (1592-1670), quoted in Fs

(1972, p. 170). Torsten Husén says something similar: "We must come to appreciate more and more that the whole of life is a permanent school." (Husén 1977, ch. 15, p. 136).

[39] Par. 2.4, notes 8 and 10.

[40] Ryle (1975, ch. 1, par. 7).

[41] Roland (1958, pp. 379-388).

[42] A knows how an engine works, B knows how C felt yesterday, D knows how the accident happened, E knows that he must be honest, F knows that he ought not to interrupt G, H knows that stealing is wrong.

[43] Ryle (1957, ch. 2, par. 3).

[44] Ryle (idem); N.B. De Groot and Ryle use the word 'repertoire' in different senses, compare note 30 with note 44.

[45] Commenting on such a claim by Hartland-Swann, Roland (1958) writes: "If I understand him ((H-S)) correctly, what he means is that if we call the statement 'Johnny knows that Columbus discovered America' dispositional, then it must be translatable into some such form as 'Johnny knows how to answer the question 'Who discovered America?' or 'What did Columbus discover?' correctly."

[46] De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.8; p. 39). The whole of section 2.4 is called:'Educational learning effects: competence learnt (programmes, skills)'.

[47] Ryle (1975, ch. 5, par. 1).

[48] Ryle (1975, ch. 5, par. 3).

[49] Cf. note 33.

[50] 'Propaganda in Education' (Russell 1970, ch. 15, pp. 126 and 133).

[51] It is also possible for the beginner to be able to recite the rules to perfection because he has learnt them by heart while the experienced chess player has forgotten how to do this although he once knew. (Cf. Ryle 1975, ch. 2, par. 6).

[52] Ryle (1975, ch. 2, par. 6); Klinkenberg (1971, p. 46).

[53] De Groot (1974, par. 2.4.7 and 2.4.8, pp. 38-39).

[54] 'Must an Educator Have an Aim?' (Peters 1959, ch. 7, pp. 87 and 90).

[55] Idem, pp. 94-95.

[56] Ryle (1975, ch. 2, par. 7, p. 43).

[57] Idem, p. 44.

[58] I will not go into the subjective aspect of awarding marks and the assessment of exam results. For this see e.g. Hartog, Rhodes (1935) and De Groot (1974). See also De Groot's bibliography in the same volume.

[59] Bloom (1968, p. 34).

[60] I have added the brackets in order to indicate that if what is inside them is omitted. Bloom's words also apply to learning processes in general. See also Buis (1978).

[61] Feedback: The carrying back of some of the effects of some process to its source or to a preceding stage so as to strengthen or modify it (Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford 1972, fifth edition).

[62] Bloom (1968, pp. 47-48). My emphasis.

[63] Idem, p. 42.

[64] Cf. pp. 41 and 47.

[65] Ryle (1975, ch. 5, par. 3).

[66] 'Performative Utterances' (Austin 1962, ch. 10).

[67] TJ Shab., perek 1, halakhah. See also TB Ber. 17a, Sifra, behukotai, Lev. R. 35.

[68] M. Avot 3:9. See also ARN[1], ch. 22, p. 37b and TB Jebamot 109b.

[69] M. Avot 3:17. See also Heschel (1962), introduction, ch. 3 and ARN[1], ch. 24, p. 39a.

[70] 'Die Lehre und die Tat' (Buber 1963, p. 667).

[71] 'Systeem en Student' (De Groot 1971, ch. 10, pp. 99-100).

4. INDIVIDUAL LEARNING AS A DAILY HABIT (CATEGORY IV OF THE LL PARADIGM)

In lifelong learning it is assumed that every individual has the right to learn throughout his life and to regard his life as a continuous learning process. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights should include in addition to Article 26 on education an Article on learning:

- Article on education -	- Article on learning -
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) reads:	This non-existent article might read:
1. Everyone has the right to education. (...)	1. Everyone has the right to learn throughout his life.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (...)	2. Learning shall be directed to the acquisition of knowledge, the full development of the human personality and the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. Parents shall have prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.[1]	3. The pupil shall be given the right to choose his own learning goals as soon as he is able.

In reality, notwithstanding Article 26, education is not available to everyone: "If we take the situation in developing countries in 1970 we find that in that year, in developing countries, of the total population of children of primary-school age for every child attending school there were two who did not attend. (...) One in three of the pupils goes to primary school but if this particular child lives in a country district there is every chance that he will not finish the course. (...)

PERCENTAGE DROP-OUTS

	Total	Urban zones	Country areas
Columbia	72.7	52.7	96.3
Dominican Republic	69.6	48.1	86.1
Guatemala	74.7	50.4	96.5
Panama	37.7	19.3	54.7

(...) At the present rate of population growth there will be an extra three million children each year who will not be able to attend school. There are at present about 130 million children who are forced to do without universal skills such as reading, writing and arithmetic. In the absence of these fundamental requirements the acquisition of special abilities such as, among others, those required for professions, must be illusory. For illiterate adults the figure is even higher. In 1970 there were 810 million. The increase per year comes to about 5.5 million so that there must be approximately 840 million illiterate adults by the present time."[2]
If this is the actual situation in the largest portion of the world (the developing countries), what is the point of Article 26 of the Universal Declaration at all? The point is that people should be able to appeal to the Declaration if they are receiving no education or education that is extremeley deficient. The more people appeal to their right to education and the more people devote themselves to making education work, the sooner the individual right to education will become part of international customary law.[3]

"The rights of man are part of the process of becoming conscious which has no regard for frontiers, either of countries or of age. One of the most difficult tasks is to translate the rights of man from the worldwide macro-level into the microcosm of household, family, school, business or local community."[4]
In countries where the educational system is only partially functional, pupils in teaching-learning processes will build up little knowledge. Their learning will come to fulfillment outside these processes, if indeed it reaches fulfillment at all. However, learning cannot feed on air but must be able to draw on a cognitive basis and this basis has to be laid in some form of fundamental education. So in the framework of lifelong learning (LL) it is precisely the very first fundamental education that is so important, which is why the teacher of the smallest children has an exacting task. He must try to awaken not only knowledge but the love of knowledge - and so of course must every teacher - so that child or pupil will never cease to learn because he will always long to increase his knowledge. "Let us remember that it is not enough to impart information. We must strive to awaken appreciation as well" and this 'we' means teachers.[5]
Lifelong learning presupposes daily practice and this is often difficult to accomplish. Therefore if the pupil is

to acquire the habit of learning all the time, the knowledge which he is after must be of some importance to him personally. The key figure absent from the LL paradigm is the individual pupil, the person of whom there is but one and who cannot be lumped under the heading 'Pupil' (III.1). It is in order to make up for this omission that the fourth category has been added under the title 'Individual learning as a daily habit'. Each pupil has his own specific difficulties with daily learning, depending on his capacities, his personal history and what his expectations are. And his potentialities are equally specific.
The fourth category has to be regarded as an open space in the model, which only the pupil himself can fill in. The content of the other three categories is not entirely up to the individual learner although he will have to co-operate in the choice of how to fill them in. In the end, the interpretation of the keywords 'Tradition', 'Authority'. 'Image of the world', which he chooses will be a personal choice. Although the keywords are expressly designed to cover a wide semantic range, it is perfectly possible that in each category the individual pupil will feel the need for his own semantic space. These special spaces belonging to the individual pupil are symbolised by an empty frame ☐

The LL paradigm finally looks like this:

LL paradigm ☐

I. Culture	1. Tradition 2. Authority 3. ☐
II. Framework	1. Image of the world 2. Image of man 3. ☐
III. Learning process	1. Pupil and learning procedure (method) 2. Learning goals 3. Evaluation 4. Teacher and teaching procedure (method) 5. ☐
IV. Individual learning as a daily habit	☐

In lifelong learning it is not the goal that is to be attained, the learning goal, which is paramount, but the attempt to reach that goal. Another word for this particular 'attempting' is 'learning'. This is valid even for the people whom Mohammed called the people of the Book.[6] Even if the Book was revealed by God to Moses it is not the Book that takes first place but its study: "The key word is not the Book. The key word is talmud torah, study. What we glorify is not knowledge, erudition, but study and the dedication to learning. According to Rabba "when man is led in for judgment, he is asked...did you fix time for learning?" (Shabbath 31a). Man is not asked how much he knows but how much he learns. The unique attitude of the Jew is not the love of knowledge but the love of studying. A learned rabbi in Poland, the story goes, was dismissed by his community because no light was seen in his house after midnight - a sign that he was not studying enough. It is not the book, it is the dedication that counts. Study is an act which is analogous to worship."[7]

Notes

[1] Van Boven (1974).

[2] Prins (1976). A more recent quotation, with different figures but the same picture, reads: "The number of illiterates in the world is growing apace. In 1970 there were 742 million people who could neither read nor write, in 1980 it will be 814 million and by the turn of the century 950 million. Three in ten adults are illiterate at the present time according to the Secretary General of UNESCO, M'bow, speaking in Paris. UNESCO is the UN organization concerned with education, science and culture. If the present trend continues only two in three children between six and eleven years old will be attending school in 1985." (Trouw, 11 September 1979).

[3] Cf. Van Boven (1974), introduction, pp. 9-10 and 20.

[4] Idem, p. 24.

[5] 'Jewish Education' (Heschel 1975, ch. 15, p. 236).

[6] Koran, Sura III - v. 106.

[7] Heschel (1975, ch. 15, p. 237). Cf. TB Kid. 40b and TB Sanh. 7a.

5. SUMMARY OF PART 1: THE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED

The résumé of Part 1 has been arranged under points a to i. Points j and k cover the question to be answered and how it is approached in Part 2.

a. Permanent Education (PE)

Permanent Education (PE) is a politico-cultural vision of a man as teacher and pupil. This picture of man can be elaborated from three different points of view: that of the politician (the government), the teacher (educator) and the pupil. In the present study it is the pupil's point of view that is taken as central; the development of the theme of permanent education in which the pupil occupies the chief position is called Lifelong Learning (LL) (cf. p.21-22)
In Jewish tradition, consideration is given not only to the theoretical side of LL but also to its concrete form which has already been in existence for centuries in this tradition (see p.16)
The term éducation permanente as used by UNESCO, meaning permanent education or PE, became current at the end of the sixties. LL stands for lifelong learning and is a term coined specifically for the present study.

b. Learning

In normal usage 'learning' indicates sometimes a task or activity and sometimes a result or performance. In the context of LL, in this study, learning is taken in the sense of task (see p.3, 24)

c. Lifelong Learning (LL)

In the present study Lifelong Learning (LL) means
(a) an overall vision,
(b) of every form of human learning,
(c) happening anywhere in the world,
(d) stretching from the cradle to the grave,
(e) in which man is taken as pupil.
(see p.21)
In lifelong learning it is not the goal that is to be attained, the learning goal - competence or knowledge - that is paramount, but the attempt to reach that goal. Another word for this particular 'attempt' is 'learning' (see p.66)

d. 'Knowing that', competence and knowledge

If people's learning is the attempt to acquire knowledge it is clear that the learning goal of every learning process is knowledge (see
In the present study knowledge is used in its dispositional sense (see
By knowledge is understood a competence based on knowing, so that

> a person who knows something
> is able to do certain things
> when the need arises,

in which 'is able' expresses primarily a 'knowing how' and the knowing when the need arises a 'knowing that' (see
When we say that a person 'can' do something it does not mean that he is at a certain moment occupied in doing something or undergoing something, but that he is able to do certain things when necessary (see

Schema (see



N.B. Learning effects in the pupil, and thought desirable by both teacher and pupil, are often untaught. In that case they are not educational objectives (see the left-hand column of the schema).
The assumption that everything worth learning must also, of necessity, be taught in some sort of teaching-learning process, is a popular misconception.

e. The pupil-teacher relationship

In this study 'learning' always means the pupil's activity supported and stimulated by the teacher only if there is one. In LL philosophy the task of both teacher and pupil is to fashion, enable and stimulate studying and its constant renewal. Directly teacher and pupil start working towards conflicting ends then the learning process deteriorates into manipulation of one partner by the other. Degenerate teaching-learning processes such as those which arise out of a degenerate pupil-teacher relationship, have no place in this study (see pp. 3-4)
It is assumed that pupil and teacher must have a number of values,standards and interests in common if they wish to understand each other. It is also assumed that in a teaching-learning process the teacher will never mislead the pupil on purpose (see p. 41)
A further assumption made in the present study is that teacher and pupil involved in the same teaching-learning process will be in general agreement on what learning effects are desirable. This means that they will be in general agreement on educational goals or the framework of their objectives (see p. 51)
As long as teacher and pupil continue to work in partnership, helping each other as much as possible towards whatever goals they are pursuing, educational or not, there can be no question of indoctrination by the teacher. Pupil and teacher are not antagonists but people working as colleagues with a single goal. But as soon as indoctrination is allowed to creep into the teaching-learning process and pupils and teachers start to pursue conflicting goals, the process degenerates into manipulation (see above). The pupils then learn less and less, become disillusioned and turn away from their teachers and often reject every form of learning, including, needless to say, lifelong learning (see p.55)

f. Evaluation

It is impossible to evaluate competence; all that can be evaluated is its actualisation. The terms 'competence', 'being able', and 'not being able' are modal and do not

directly imply an event: normally there is no particular indication or test by which to tell what someone is capable of doing or whether he is capable of it. In other words, what is tested is never someone's ability but merely the portion of it that he allows to appear; evaluation does not test a person's knowledge but its expression. Unless a person's interior exactly corresponds to external appearances, the real value of evaluating his dispositional knowledge on the basis of its actualizations remains unkown. This is certainly the case when the evaluator - possibly the teacher - and the pupil are not in a relationship of mutual trust (see p.51)
Knowledge is evaluated by evaluating certain of its expressions or actualizations. Yet it is possible to actualize a specific piece of knowledge in a wide variety of ways, and the difficulty is to decide which of these gives the most representative expression of the dispositional knowledge in question (if indeed there can be such a thing as representative expression), and therefore any evaluation of personal knowledge is bound to remain an estimate or guess of greater or lesser adequacy. Between knowledge and its factual actualization there is always a discrepancy. The greater the discrepancy the more inexact and uninformative the knowledge evaluation will be (see p.55)

g. <u>The learning person/the pupil's path</u>

Learning programmes can only succeed if they are correlated with the priorities and interests of the people engaged in learning. Assessing these priorities and interests is an exceedingly complex task which governments and international organizations are obliged to leave to 'the relevant, committed experts in the field'. These then act as advisors but further to that the decisions do not rest in their hands. Within the contours which governments and organizations are able to create it is those engaged in learning who must finally decide whether the advice should be followed or cast to the winds (see p.14)
LL means daily application, and this is often difficult to achieve. Therefore the pupil will only be able to acquire the habit of lifelong learning if the knowledge he is pursuing is of personal importance to him (see p.64)

This study emphasizes the individual in the LL context and not the institutionalized learning situations such as are met with, for example, in schools and universities (see p. 3)

The central problem for every learning person is how to make the gap between knowledge and its factual actualization as small as possible. When the process is a teaching-learning process the teacher's job is to help the pupil bridge the gap. This he can do by teaching the pupil not only knowledge but also self-confidence, so that the pupil is always willing and able to show what he knows. Later on in life, the pupil will have to resolve this dualism alone (see p. 55)

h. LL paradigm



(see p.65)
Tradition means here what is passed down from generation to generation in the form of habits, customs, norms, values, judgements, prejudices, myths, superstitions, theories (scientific and others), taboos, institutions (such as marriage, church, schools, political parties), dreams of the future, fears, and so on (see p. 28)
In itself, tradition is neither sacred nor secular, good nor bad, valuable nor worthless, but simply all that can

be remembered from the past which plays a role in the present.
An ancient tradition need not be old-fashioned nor a modern tradition progressive. It is both unreasonable and foolish either to reject or accept tradition just because it is tradition. In common with all knowledge, traditional knowledge must remain subject to critical examination and research (see p. 28)
Authority is taken in this study to mean a quality of the communication and not of a person of persons:
(1) Authority rests on susceptibility to reasoned elaboration.
(2) Authority resides in the communication and not in the communicator.
(3) The elaboration must be such as to be understood by the group for whom it is destined so that it becomes possible for the group to give willing agreement.
The words 'authority' and 'power' are never synonymous in this study (see p. 28)
Image of the world is the picture of the real world which people - that is a person or a specific group of people - project for themselves at a specific time and place (see p. 29-31)
Although man is a component of the world and the image of man forms part of the world image, the image of man is nevertheless treated separately in this study because it is this aspect of the world image which has the most telling effect on the learning process in general and particularly on each individual case of learning.
Image of man is the picture of human possibilities and limitations which people - that is a person or a specific group of people - project for themselves at a specific time and place. The image of man includes the picture the individual makes of himself (see p. 32)
The LL model is an open system. The symbol  represents the specific contribution each pupil is able to make to the development of the concept of LL. The content of the LL paradigm described here is provided solely by individual pupils who integrate lifelong learning into their daily life (see p.19 en 65)

i. Jewish tradition

Study is central to Jewish tradition: LL is its fundamental educational principle. This principle constantly recurs in the literature and is even stated explicitly in various religious codes (see p. 4-6)
In Jewish tradition, LL, far from being taken as a natural activity, is seen rather as an occupation requiring

considerable determination and perseverance (see p. 4). In Jewish tradition, all the rules governing human conduct are subject to the LL principle. Whatever a pupil learns he has to integrate into his personal life (see p. 6, 56, 65).

j. The question to be answered

The question which this study, Jewish Tradition as Lifelong Learning seeks to answer, can be expressed in the following terms:

> What can Jewish tradition with its emphasis on the importance of study, contribute to the development of the idea and theory of EP.

Certain limitations have been imposed on the context in which the question is answered: the form of EP chosen for this study is the one in which the pupil is the central figure, in other words, LL or lifelong learning (see p. 66).

k. How the question is tackled in Part 1 and Part 2

Part 1, chapter 1 begins with a general account of the relevance of Jewish tradition to possible LL ideas and theories. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 build up a model or paradigm for lifelong learning, the so-called LL model. This LL model is LL model 2 (p. 65) which is derived from LL model 1 (p. 25).
Part 2 attemps to demonstrate the relevance of Jewish tradition to LL on the basis of the LL model developed in Part 1. Sections I.3, II.3 and III.5 (see the LL model on p. 65) present some conclusions drawn from chapters I.1-2, II.1-2 and III.1-4, respectively. Chapter IV, in conclusion (see LL model p. 65) is devoted to my own personal vision of LL, inspired by Jewish tradition.

I. TRADITION

I.1.1 Jewish tradition (Torah)

Torah is the whole substance of what is taught and learnt. 'Jewish tradition' and 'Torah' are used here as interchangeable terms. In the Septuagint, 'Torah' was translated as nomos or 'law'; Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Franz Rozenzweig (1886-1929) translated 'Torah' not by Gesetz or 'law' but by Weisung or Unterweisung, 'instruction' or 'teaching'. While the word Torah is used in various ways and thus has a variety of meanings or shades of meaning, it always indicates something taught and something learnt, such as, for example:
...A particular mitzvah or rule of conduct (precept or prohibition,[1]
...The five books of Moses (The Pentateuch),[2]
...The tenach, or Old Testament comprising the Pentateuch, the Prophets and the Writings,[3]
...The whole Jewish tradition, including the written and oral Torah[4] (see I.1.2).
Advice given by a father, mother, or teacher can also be called torah[5] and in modern Hebrew one can speak of the torah of Spinoza (1632-1677) for example, when what is meant is his philosophical system.[6]
Torah can also mean the study of the Torah as in:

> "The world is based upon three things:
> the torah, divine service and the practice of kindliness"[7]
> and "The more Torah, the more life"[8]

What Jews look for in the Torah is not just particular truths or merely a way of life, nor simply insight into life's experience, but, quite literally, 'everything':

> "((Study Torah again and again)) turn it over and turn it over, for all is therein."[9]

The broad interpretation of Torah adopted here as being synonymous with Jewish tradition, has two major implications. The first is that all Jewish thinking and every development within Judaism has affected the meaning of the term Torah: "As someone has said, no man ((Jew)) need say that there is no room for him to lodge in Jerusalem."[10]
The second implication is that the meaning which we assign to 'Torah' also includes all the effects on Jewish tradition of exposure to other traditions, cultures or philosophies, which may in turn have been affected by Jewish tradition. Jewish tradition goes on developing all the time and so, consequently, does the meaning of 'Torah'.

I.1.2 The written and the oral Torah

The oral Torah is the interpretation of the written Torah, that is, of the text of the five Mosaic books or Pentateuch. According to tradition Moses received the written and the oral Torah together from God at Sinai. Ambiguities in the written Torah are clarified in the oral Torah and contradictions removed. This is particularly the case with the 'mitzvot' (plural of 'mitzvah', precept or prohibition) formulated in the written Torah. Thus, when the written Torah says,

> "Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy. Six days you shall labor, and do all your work, but the seventh day is a sabbath of the Lord your God: you shall not do any work, etc.",[11]

it is not immediately clear, i.e. without the 'oral' Torah Torah, what is meant by 'work'.

The sentence enjoining

> "You shall not leave any of it over until morning; if any of it is left until morning, you shall burn it."[12]

contains the contradiction 'shall not leave - if any is left'; the oral Torah demonstrates that this is only an apparent contradiction. As well as ambiguity and contradiction, there is the problem of apparent clarity to be overcome in studying the written Torah. Thus 'eye for eye, tooth for tooth' does not enjoin retaliation in kind but almost the opposite, compensation in terms of money.[13]

The oral Torah cannot do without the written one, since in its absence there would be nothing left to interpret; conversely, the written Torah cannot do without its oral counterpart, since this would mean that the written Torah would no longer be interpreted and would have lost its meaning as a guide for human thought and action. A modern historian has formulated the mutual dependence of written and oral Torah as follows:

"It can be regarded as a historical fact that the Oral Law existed not merely from the moment the Written Law was given ((and in this sense it is correct to say that the Written and Oral Laws were given together to Moses at Sinai)), but it may even be maintained that the Oral Law anticipated the Written Law, as the Written Law not only assumes the observance of the Oral Law in the future, but is in effect based on its previous existence. Since the Written Law ((and this applies to every written law)) relies - by allusion or by its silence - on statutes, customs, and basic laws not explicitly mentioned in it, these institutions are ipso facto converted into a part of the Oral Law."[14]

As the Torah texts themselves are less important than their interpretation, the oral rather than the written Torah is of the greater consequence:

> "God made a covenant with ((the people of)) Israel only for the sake of that which was transmitted orally."[15]

'Oral Torah' here means the words that are passed on in speech only, that go from mouth to ear, that are not written down and thus preserve the vitality and potential for survival of a traditional force.

While it is thus in principle wrong to set down in writing a living oral tradition like the Torah, this was nevertheless done because it was seen that many were in danger of forgetting it. Maimonides (1135-1205) discerns three causes:[16] the declining numbers of Torah students, the recurrent persecutions that befell the Jews, and their dispersion to many lands. This is not the place to analyze these causes in more detail nor to discuss how they are related. The point to be made here is that Maimonides is not in fact referring to his own time, but to the days in which the nucleus of the oral Torah was first reduced to writing, around the year 200 of the Christian Era. This recording of the oral Torah is no doubt the most drastic innovation that has ever taken place in Jewish tradition. It went in the face of injunctions expressly forbidding such practices:

"Those who write the traditional teachings, ((are punished)) like those who burn the Torah."[17]

and

"Whoever writes down the aggadah (again see I.1.4) loses his portion ((of the future world))."[18]

There was a fourth and obvious factor, not mentioned by Maimonides, which affected the retention and preservation of the oral Torah. It had grown so much in volume and complexity that it was deemed desirable to record certain portions to save them from oblivion - although knowledge of course is lodged in people rather than books.[19]

To justify the recording of the oral Torah, the verse

"It is time to act for the Lord,
for they have violated your teaching."[20]

was interpreted as:

"It is better that some things in the Torah should be done away with than that the entire Torah should sink into oblivion among ((the people of)) Israel."

But this argument was not accepted by everyone.

"Rabbi Mendel of Kotsk (1787-1859) asked: "How could the ancient Rabbis abolish the fundamental principle of Judaism, not to write down what is to be kept as an oral tradition, on the basis of a single verse in the book of

Psalms? The truth is that the oral Torah was never written down. The meaning of the Torah has never been contained by books."[22]
All that Rabbi Mendel himself left behind was what people could remember of him. He published no books and allowed no notes to survive him. He burnt whatever he had written.[23]

DIGRESSION: "The exaggerated regard in which our culture holds writing and the printed word must not blind us to the fact that this is a secondary and somewhat artificial form of communication and contact. The written word can never achieve the same subtle, living clarity of expression as can the human voice and presence. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether written traditions are more 'reliable' than oral ones. Anyone who for years has had to conduct a correspondence over a long distance, say, something like from 3000 to 6000 miles, knows how rife with mistunderstandings distance can be, how chilling indirect contact.
Moreover, an oral, collective tradition will reflect cultural processes and social change much more accurately than a written strongly individual tradition."[24]

I.1.3 The oral Torah as an open-ended system

The implications of the paradox of writing down the oral Torah are formulated by G.G. Scholem (born 1897) as follows:
"The writing down and codification of the Oral Torah, undertaken in order to save it from being forgotten, was therefore as much a protective as (in the deeper sense) a pernicious act. Demanded by the historical circumstance of exile, it was profoundly problematic for the living growth and continuance of the tradition in its original sense."[25]
Initially in the 'original sense' of the tradition, it was held that the risk of forgetting was less serious than that of rigid doctrinism, and it was therefore expressly forbidden to write down the oral Torah.[26]
Once portions of the oral Torah had nevertheless been recorded, only one thing could guard the Torah from rigidity, its continuous study:
"Turn it over ((the Torah)) and turn it over,
for all is therein."[27]
This saying explains the character of many Jewish writings. God revealed himself to Moses and Moses gave an account of this event to his followers, who tried to understand him because they were anxious to know what God

wanted from them. So in each generation students sought to understand their teachers so that in turn they would be able to understand God.
"Moses received the (written and oral) Torah at Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua, Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets to the men of the Great Synagogue etc."[28]

A direct encounter between the individual and God was and still is considered inferior not only to the encounter between Moses and God, but also to Moses' account of it. Moses' account was partly in writing (the written Torah) and partly oral (the oral Torah). During the forty days that Moses spent on Mount Sinai (Ex. 34:28) God taught him the Torah with all its implications; even the questions that would be asked and the answers that would be given by future students and teachers were already revealed to Moses at Sinai.[29] By contrast, there is a passage which shows that Moses can no longer recognize his own words in the manner in which many generations later they are being taught and interpreted in the school of Akiva (50-135).[30]
Revelation means that no one who looks in the Torah for answers to his questions will look in vain. The pupil who studies the Torah tries to find answers that can guide his conduct <u>now</u>. He will try to find solutions to problems in existing texts and in the written and spoken commentaries on these texts.
"Thus commentary became the characteristic mode of expression of Jewish ideas about truth and might be described as the genius of rabbinical thought."[31]

It is impossible to draw a strong dividing line between commentaries on the Torah and its renewal (<u>hiddush</u>). Every commentary is an interpretation and interpretation more than anything else preserves the tradition and at the same time permits it to be developed and renewed.
"Well, when you get this tremendous idea of <u>hiddushee-torah</u>, introducing new ideas in the Torah, you'll see it is a very profound notion really, because it means that although the rabbis had the idea that the Torah was eternal, and was given to Moses, yet it was still possible for each student to find something new in it and he had to find something new for that is the way the Torah works. It was a kind of new truth that was at the same time the old truth, but it was <u>his</u> discovery, it was <u>his</u> particular Torah and that was why he had to keep on introducing 'hiddushee-torah'. The Zohar[32] for example says that whoever introduces a new idea into the Torah,

builds a new heaven."[33]
Everyone is able to contribute in his own way to the development and renewal of the tradition:
"The renowned Hafez Hayyim (real name Israël Meir Hacohen, 1838-1933) once said to a little boy: "Tell me some Torah." So his students said to him (H.H): "What can you learn from a little boy?" So he said: "Everyone has his portion in the Torah and he may have some idea, that I can't have." Everyone has his sole root in the Torah and his particular understanding of it. Just because it's infinite, everyone has his share in it."[34]
Everyone who studies the Torah 'for the sake of study' (li-Shema)[35] is able to discover meanings and precepts that were not even revealed to Moses at Sinai.[36]

I.1.4 The interplay of halakhah and aggadah

Both the written and the oral Torah have normative and narrative components. The normative component called halakhah, concerns man's conduct, defining what he must or must not do. Halakhic laws are specific rules that bring about the desired pattern of behaviour. The narrative component of the Torah, on the other hand, which is taken here to include everything that is not normative, is distinguished as aggadah and is concerned with:
"the creative exposition of episodes from the Bible, theology, ideology, morals and ethics, into which are woven legends and stories of the sages and which draws on contemporary phenomena and ideas."[37]
Use is made of a vast variety of figures of speech and symbolic interpretations such as parables and allegories, metaphors and proverbs, lyric poetry, songs of lamentation, dramatic dialogues, hyperbole and play on words and letters, to name but a few.[38]
The halakhic discourses stand in sober contrast to the baroque narrative style of the aggadah. The original meaning of the word 'halakhah' was way or, when appropriate, step, but this meaning gradually changed into the concept of the right way in the sense of custom, usage or law.[39]
"The Halakhah is concerned both with ritual precepts which attach to the person and with those which are of binding force only within Jewish territory. They include the laws of the sabbath and feast days, laws on ritual cleanness und uncleanness, laws about cult and prayer, regulations governing the status of the individual, marriage and divorce, property and commercial law, criminal law and rules of a political nature including

those which concern the kingship. Even ethics are cast by the Halakhah in a legal mould."[40]
The consequences of these rules - and this is important in relation to the methodology of the halakhah - is that: "The Halakhah makes no distinction in principle between cult, religion, morality, or law. Everything that falls under halakhah is given the same treatment, is structured and developed in the same way and is subject to the same rules. It is therefore possible to draw analogies between different areas without making special allowance for the peculiarities of each area."[41]

Right up to the end of the 18th century approximately eighty per cent of all Jewish literature consisted of halakhic studies.[42] While the halakhah is normative and the aggadah is not, the halakhic is therefore not more important and nor is the aggadah merely for entertainment. Maimonides compared the aggadah to poetry;[43] in his opinion, both those who reject the aggadah on the grounds of its exaggeration[44] and those who, in contrast, claim that it is in the aggadah that the true meaning of the Torah must be sought,[45] fail to realize that:
"At that time this method was generally known and used by everybody, just as the poets use poetical expressions."[46]
It would be wrong to say that the essence of the Torah's being is the halakhah, but it would be equally false to make the same claim for the aggadah. The interplay of halakhah and aggadah, normative and narrative, is a special feature of the Torah. Many aggadic statements of an ethical nature have received concrete expression[47] as rules of the halakhah and the normative authority of the halakhah finally rests on the aggadic fact that on Sinai God gave the Torah to Moses.
"The Torah is more than a system of laws; only a portion of the Pentateuch deals with law. The prophets, the Psalms, agadic midrashim[48] ((as opposed to halakhic midrashim)), are not a part of halacha. The Torah comprises both halacha ((law, rule)) and agada ((meaning, narrative)). Like body and soul, they are mutually dependent, and each is a dimension of its own.[49] (...) Halacha deals with the law; agada with the meaning of the law. Halacha deals with subjects that can be expressed literally; agada introduces us into a realm which lies beyond the range of expression. Halacha teaches us how to perform common acts; agada tells us how to participate in the eternal drama. Halacha gives us knowledge; agada gives us aspiration. Halacha gives us the norms for action; agada, the vision of the ends of living. Halacha prescribes, agada suggests; halacha decrees, agada

inspires; halacha is definitive, agada is allusive.[50]
(...)
To maintain that the essence of Judaism consists of halacha is as erroneous as to maintain that the essence of Judaism consists exclusively of agada. The inter-relationship of halacha and agada is the very heart of Judaism. Halacha without agada is dead, agada without halacha is wild.[51] (...)
There is no halacha without agada, and no agada without halacha. We must neither disparage the body, nor sacrifice the spirit. The body is the discipline, the pattern, the law; the spirit is inner devotion, spontaneity, freedom. The body without the spirit is a corpse; the spirit without the body is a ghost. Thus a mitswah ((rule of conduct)) is both a discipline and an inspiration, an act of obedience and an experience of joy, a yoke and a prerogative. Our task is to learn how to maintain a harmony between the demands of halacha and the spirit of agada."[52]
Those who identify the Torah with the halakhah miss the nuances of the Jewish tradition and are inclined to consider it as a type of legalism, orthodoxy or religious behaviourism. But the aggadic elements of the Pentateuch are just as important as its halakhic portion[53] and this is true of the entire Torah.

I.1.5 Torah study and LL (lifelong learning)

The Torah, that is, the study of Torah and the actions[54] that rest upon it, is even more important than God: "If they only abandoned me (God) and yet fulfilled my Torah, for its light would teach them to find out once more the path that leads to the good."[55]
In this passage fulfilling the Torah means Torah study and the practice to which that must lead. Anyone who wished to understand God must understand the Torah. "A personal God, one that is unique, does not reveal himself like the image that appears in a darkroom! The text that we have just been studying shows how ethics and the hierarchy of principles create a personal relationship worthy of the name. Loving Torah even more than God is exactly that: an access to a personal God against whom it is possible to revolt, that is for whom one can die."[56]

What is Torah? No single answer will ever meet with universal agreement. What is philosophy? What is ethics? What is evil? Who or what is God? Who is a Jew? Who am I? To questions such as these there are no hard and fast

answers. For instance I have interpreted Torah in a wide sense as identical with Jewish tradition, but this hardly fits in with Safrai's opinion that Torah is everything you bring to your understanding of God.[57] God is not exclusive to the Jews and neither is Torah. Greek thought has not influenced only Greek thinkers, nor has Torah influenced only Jewish thinkers. Hellenism was not produced only by Greeks, nor is Torah the product simply of the Jews. Cultures that come into contact, whether peacefully or not, always have an effect on each other in the end. In the aggadah and halakhah of the sages, represented in talmud, tosefta[58] and midrash coming from the period between 300 BCE and 600 CE, traces of non-Jewish cultures are clearly to be seen.[59]
That the Torah, in turn, has acted on Christendom and Islam is well-known and indeed well-catalogued. The contents of Bevan's classic work The Legacy of Israel[60] lists among others the following Jewish influences:

- The Hebrew genius as exhibited in the Old Testament,
- Hellenistic Judaism,
- The debt of Christianity to Judaism,
- The influence of Judaism upon Jews in the period from Hillel to Mendelssohn,
- The influence of Judaism on Islam,
- The Jewish factor in medieval thought,
- Hebrew scholarschip in the Middle Ages among Latin Christians,
- Hebrew studies in the Reformation period and after; their place and influence,
- The influence of Judaism on Western Law,
- The influence of the Old Testament on Puritanism,
- Jewish thought in the modern world,
- Influences of the Hebrew Bible on European languages,
- The legacy in modern literature.

Although in comparison with his knowledge of other subjects, which was often encyclopaedic, Karl Marx[61] (1818-1883) knew little about Jewish tradition, socialism bears the clear signature of Jewish or at least Judaeo-Christian influences:
"The idea of socialism provides, perhaps, the most effective contemporary vehicle of ancient Judeo-Christian ideals: the ideal of charity, justice, and equality on earth as in heaven."[62]
Something of the same is true of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and psychoanalysis because although Freud did not know Hebrew and was estranged from Jewish tradition,[63] his work nonetheless exhibits Jewish characteristics.[64]

To go back to the question of what Torah is, I think it should be emphasized that there is nothing to be gained from treating Christendom, Islam, socialism, psychoanalysis and so forth, as if they were all different types of Torah, or even different strands of the Torah. People and theories can have a profound influence on each other while still retaining their own identity and authentic character. Figures such as Jesus, Mohammed, Spinoza, Marx and Freud demonstrate that originality and the ability to assimilate outside influences are not incompatible but that, on the contrary, the new always builds on the old. Every learner lives within a tradition which is and must be itself shaped in part by the course of his own life. The tradition in which he lives usually consists of a number of traditions or tradition-influences of which he is not necessarily entirely aware.
People are often needlessly afraid of outside influence, especially when they do not realize that those very influences have already been familiar to their own tradition for a long time and have been assimilated into its own authentic nature, as has been shown in the case of the Torah and the sages of talmud, tosefta and midrash.[65]
It goes without saying that I have no time for the mentality expressed in the following quotation:
"The Jewish people was healthy, before Rabbis became Doctors."[66]
Although in the context the quotation is presented as an old Orthodox Jewish joke, the chauvinist mentality it betrays is no laughing matter. Thinkers of this sort are convinced that their variant of the Torah is the only true one and therefore reject all other variants as unauthentic. From dogmatic minds such as these little can be learned of relevance to the LL which aims to include in the scope of its vision every form of human learning. (See Part 1, 2.3).

For the Torah, the second L of Lifelong Learning can be seen as a synthesis of two concepts which are designated in Yiddish as lernen and shtudirn (learning and studying): "The Germanic lernen means both "to learn" and "to teach", and unless the context specifically points to a secular subject it implies only the sacred Jewish field. If one says of a man er ken lernen, "He knows (how) to learn" (itself an idiom for "He is a man of learning"), only the sacred books are implied, that is to say, all Jewish books ultimately related to Jewish thought on God and man. The question Ir hot amol gelernt?, "Did you at one time learn?" means "Did you at one time attend a yeshiva[67] (or receive equivalent instruction)?" If directed at

secular subject - and even general ethics would come under that heading - the Germanic shtudirn is in order, and the question would be ir hot amol shtudirt?, "Did you at one time study?" meaning, "Did you at one time attend a university?" One may, however, say er lernt (zikh) franteseyzish, meaning "He is learning French", as well as er shtudirt franteseyzish, but one cannot say er shtudirt bobe messiye (a popular tractate of the Talmud)."

The synthesis of learning and studying is designed to do away with the separation between sacred and secular; the sacred must cease to exclude and the profane must be sanctified. In the words of Abraham Issac Kook (1865-1935):
"The sacred and the profane together influence the spirit of man and he becomes enriched through absorbing from each of them whatever is suitable."
In traditions other than the Torah 'lernen' is used for traditional study and 'shtudirn' for modern studies.

The first L of Lifelong Learning might be said to stand for the learner himself who is able to make learning a central part of his daily life. The synthesis between traditional and modern knowledge will be achieved by those learners who are able to combine both forms of knowledge in their everyday life.

Notes

[1] Eg. Lev. 6:7; 7:1; 7:37; 14:54-47 and Num. 6:21. S.R. Hirsh (1808-1888) defined 'torot' (plural of torah) as follows: "Historically revealed truths transformed into principles of life, God into your God, that is the director of your thoughts, feelings, words and deeds." (Hirsch 1919, 11 Brief, S. 68).

[2] Eg. Deut. 4:44; 33:4, and Josh. 1:7 and Ezra 3:2; 7:6 and Mal. 3:22.

[3] Eg. Dan. 9:10-13.

[4] Eg. "For the Jews of Alexandria ((in the time of Philo, ± 20 BCE to 50 CE)) the term 'Torah' was not a word but an 'institution', embodying the covenant between the people and its God, and reflecting a complex of precepts and statutes, customs and traditions linked to the history of the people and the acts of its rulers, kings and prophets" (Abrahams, Urbach 1975, vol. I, ch. 12, p. 289).

[5] Prov. and Job passim.

[6] EJ, vol. 14, under Torah, col. 1236.

[7] M. Avot 1:2. See also Abrahams, Urbach (1975, Vol. I, ch. 12, p. 286) and TB Pes. 68b.

[8] M. Avot 2:7. See also Abrahams as above Vol. II, ch. 12, p. 814, note 1) and TB Hag 3b.

[9] M. Avot 5:22. See Jastrow (1950) under 'hafakh'. See also note 27.

[10] Jacobs (1975, ch. 12, p. 345).

[11] Ex. 20:8-10.

[12] Ex. 12:10.

[13] Ex. 21:24, Lev. 24:20, Deut. 19:21. See Rashi's commentary (1040-1105). See also 'La loi du talion' (Levinas 1963, pp. 177-179); also included in Nobel. Peperzak (1975, ch. 6: 'Oog om oog, tand om tand'). See also Kaufmann (1963, ch. 49, pp. 177-184). See also Hoffmann (1905-1906, zweiter Halbband, S. 315-316), Hoffmann (1964, p. 216), Cassuto (1959, p. 192-193), Abraham, Cassuto (1967, pp. 272-278), Yaron (1969, pp. 43-45).

[14] EJ, vol. 12, under Oral Law, col. 1440.

[15] TB Git, 60b. See also TJ Pe'ah 2:6 and TB Tem. 14b.

[16] Yad, introduction.

[17] TB Tem. 14b. See also TB Git. 60b, Tanh. B, Kitissa 17 and TJ Pe'ah 2:4.

[18] TJ Shab. 16:1. See also Tanh. B., Kitissa 17 and TJ Pe'ah 2:4.

[19] This is parate knowledge. In the context of knowledge in general, what people have in their heads is very much less important than what has been collected up in books (cf. Magee 1975, ch. 4, p. 61).

[20] Ps. 119:126.

[21] TB Tem. 14b. See also TB Git. 60a and TB Joma 69a.

[22] Heschel (1959, ch. 27, p. 276).

[23] See Heschel (1974, ch. 10, p. 323).

[24] Blauw (1978, p. 85). See also Gerhardson (1961).

[25] 'Offenbarung und Tradition als religiöse Kategorien im Judentum' (Scholem 1970, S. 110-111).

[26] See notes 17 and 18.

[27] M. Avot 5:22. See also note 9.

[28] M. Avot 1:1. See also M. Pe'ah 2:6 and ARN[1], perek 1 and M. Ned. 8:7.

[29] Tanh. B. II, B1.60a, 58b. Quoted in Scholem (1970, p. 100). See also TJ Pe'ah 2:4 and Ex.R. 47:1 and Lev.R. 22:1 and Ecless. R. (on Eccles. 1:9).

[30] TB Men. 29b. See also TB Shab. 89a and Tanh. B., Hukkat 24. See also Aschkenasy, Whitlau (1971) and Safrai (1970).

[31] Scholem (1970, S. 101).

[32] See Zohar.

[33] L. Jacobs in a conversation with myself in London in 1975.

[34] Idem. "The Jews of Eastern Europe used to tell of Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan, known as the Haphetz Hayyim, that he would occasionally ask a small boy to tell him of Judaism. When Rabbi Kagan was asked what he could possibly hope to learn from a child the saint replied that every Jew has his own particular portion in God's Torah and that it may well be that the little boy has been entrusted with a tiny portion of truth denied to the greatest of scholars" (Jacobs 1968, ch. 12, p. 187). Hafez Hayim is the title of a book by I.M. Hacohen. Authors were sometimes referred to by the title of one of their works. See also 'Only in Israel people and Torah are one. All of Israel, not only the select few, are the bearers of this unity' (Heschel 1975, ch. 13: 'The Individual Jew and his Obligation', p. 190).

[35] See section III.2.2 on the expression 'li-Shema'.

[36] Heschel (1959, ch. 29, p. 304, note 11) attributes this remark to the medieval sage Yehiel, father of Rabbenu Asher. See Alfred Freimann's article on Torah study in Louis Guizberg Jubilee Volume, 1945, p. 360.

[37] De Vries (1959, p. 5).

[38] Cf. EJ, vol. 2, under: Aggadah, column 356.

[39] Cf. De Vries (1959, p. 5).

[40] Idem, p. 7.

[41] De Vries (1959, p. 5).

[42] "The literary output of the eighteen centuries from the beginning of the common era to the year 1795 ((?)), the date of the emancipation of the Jews in France and Holland when the modern history of the Jews begins, contains seventy-eight per cent of halakic material. We may easily convince ourselves of the exactness of this statement by looking at the classification of the Hebrew books in the British Museum, the largest collection of its kind in the world (this was what L. Ginzberg wrote in his article in 1920), prepared by such an eminent and careful bibliographer as Zednur." (Ginzberg, 1970, p. 165).

[43] Guide, 3:43. See also Heinemann (1970, pp. 2vv) and Heschel (1926b, pp. xxix vv).

[44] TB Hul. 90b. See also TJ Ma'as, perek 3 (end).

[45] Sif.Deut. 49 (at 11:22). See also Mid.Ps. 28:5 and Sif.Deut. 48.

[46] Guide (Pines 1964, III.43, p. 573).

[47] See e.g. the tractates M. Avot and TB Derekh Erez.

[48] See Midrash.

[49] Heschel (1959, ch. 32, p. 324). See also Elon (1973), part 1, p. 146, notes 15 to 19.

[50] Idem, ch. 33, pp. 336-337.

[51] Idem.

[52] Idem. See also Heschel (1962b, introduction).

[53] Cf. Gen.R. 44:8.

[54] Cf. Part 1, section 1.2, Guide, Talmud Torah 3:3 and 3:7, notes 68-71.

[55] See Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 5, pp. 64-65) and Gen.R., Petichta Eega Rabatti 2. See also TJ Hag. 1:7 and Lev.R. 35:2.

[56] 'Aimer la Thora plus que Dieu' (Levinas 1963, p. 176). See also Heschel (1959, ch. 32, pp. 329-330).

[57] See Part 1, 1.3, question 8.

[58] See Tosefta.

[59] Cf. EJ, vol. 14, under Sages, par. 'General Knowledge' and 'The Influence of Non-Jewish Cultures'. See also Lieberman (1950 and 1965) and Safrai (1978).

[60] Bevan, Singer (1953).

[61] It appears from a letter dated 1 February 1877 from the historian H. Graetz (1817-1891) to Marx, that Marx knew little or no Hebrew and was scarcely interested in Jewish history. The letter can be found in an article by Prinz (1970): 'New Perspectives on Marx as a Jew'.

[62] Novak (1977, p. 84) in a book review in which he criticizes socialism as carried out in practice.

[63] Freud wrote this in a preface to the Hebrew translation of his Totem und Tabu.

[64] See e.g. Bakan (1958) and Grollman (1965).

[65] Cf. note 59.

[66] Himmelfarb (1974, p. 70).

[67] See Yeshivah.

[68] Samuel (1971, p. 38). This quotation also appears in Goldman (1975, ch. 14, pp. 261-262).

[69] This quotation comes from the article on A.I. Kook in EJ, vol. 10, column 1185. See also 'Die Erneuerung der Heiligkeit' (Buber 1963a, S. 448-455).

I.2 AUTHORITY

I.2.1 God, Moses, the sages

God taught Moses and the authority of the Torah relies on the reasoned elaborations given by God to Moses, to which Moses assented and which he taught in turn to others who were thus his pupils and carried on the process of studying and teaching which has continued right up to the present day. In the forty days he spent on the mountain in Sinai, Moses did not learn the entire Torah from God but only the general principles:
"Could Moses have learned the whole Torah? Of the Torah it is said, 'Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea' (Job 11,9): could then Moses have learned it in forty days? No, it was only the principles (klalim) thereof which God taught to Moses."[1]
It is the task belonging to the sages of every generation since Moses to interpret the Torah and work out actual rules of conduct.
"The law of God cannot be (given) in complete form so as to be adequate for all times...and therefore at Sinai Moses was given general principles...by means of which the sages in every generation may formulate the details as they present themselves."[2]

It is the sages and their pupils who have given form and content to Jewish tradition, the halakhah stressing its form and the aggadah its content. But to what extent is the halakhah still in force? According to Maimonides every Jew is bound to observe the halakhah as it was formulated in the Babylonian talmud:
"Whatever is already mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud is binding on all Israel. And every city and country is bound to observe all the customs observed by the sages of the Gemara, promulgate their decrees, and uphold their institutions, on the ground that all these customs, decrees and institutions mentioned in the Talmud received the assent of all Israel, and those sages who instituted the ordinances, issued the decrees, introduced the customs, gave the decisions and taught that a certain ruling was correct, constituted the total body of the majority of Israel's wise man. They were the leaders who received from each other the traditions concerning the fundamentals of Judaism, in unbroken succession back to Moses, our teacher, upon whom be peace."[3]

The reasons cited by Maimonides in support of the halakha's binding force are, first of all, that the

entire Jewish people assented to the halakhah, secondly that it was established by the majority of the sages, and finally that the halakhah belongs to tradition that goes as far back as Moses. Halakhah decisions derive their authority from the way in which they come into being. The sages whose task it is to discuss the halakhah and ultimately come to a decision, conduct their arguments and discussions according to certain rules or principles one of which is that the halakhah is to be established by majority decision. The following passage illustrates the sort of situation that may arise in this context, the actual subject matter can be left aside for the moment, the point being that here the rabbi Eliezer is seen to stand alone against the majority of the other rabbis:
"That day, rabbi Eliezer made very possible rejoinder to defend his position but in vain, no-one would accept it. So he said, "If the halakhah is what I say it is then let this carob tree bear witness." Then the carob tree heaved itself out of the ground and moved a hundred el further off (many say it was four hundred el). But his opponents replied that arguments were not to be proved by a carob tree. Then he said, "If the halakhah is what I say it is, let this stream bear witness," whereupon the stream started to flow in the opposite direction. But his opponents replied that arguments were not to be based on a stream. At this he said, "If the halakhah is what I say it is, let the walls of the study house (where they were all sitting) prove it." Then the walls of the study house leaned over and threatened to collapse on them. Now rabbi Joshua, one of his opponents, joined in and spoke to the walls: "What are the sages' arguments on the halakhah to do with you?"[4]
The Talmud then relates that the walls refrained from falling in out of respect for the rabbi Joshua and yet failed to return to an upright position out of respect for rabbi Eliezer, and that they lean towards each other to this day. But still rabbi Eliezer wouldn't give up and said:
"If the halakhah is what I say it is, let Heaven bear witness. Then came a voice from Heaven that said, "Why do you go on arguing with rabbi Eliezer; the halakhah is as he says." Then rabbi Joshua stood up and quoted the following words: "It is not in Heaven."[5] What does this mean? Rabbi Jeremiah gave the answer: "the Torah has already been given to us on Sinai, so it is no longer in Heaven. We do not found the halakhah on a voice from Heaven because it is written in the Torah, which was given on Sinai: 'The decision shall be according to the majority of the sages.'"[6],[7]

So Eliezer's opinion did not prevail even when it seemed to be borne out by signs and wonders, voices from Heaven or even God himself, because his was a single voice against the majority. The story indicates that the individual is obliged to submit to the majority of Torah sages, even if he has God on his side. God revealed himself on Sinai, which means that he then entrusted the Torah, both written and oral, to the sages, giving them the responsibility of interpreting it according to His intention. 'Revelation' specifically means that the sages - with the help of the Torah, which speaks to mean in their own language,[8] - are capable of acting according to the will of God:
"You shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you ...observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left."[9]
Even if the sages declare that left is right and right is left, the people must give heed to them,[10] not because what they say is always true but because that is God's command. God wants the halakhah to be developed by the sages and while it is thus the work of men and therefore imperfect, it is nonetheless binding.

The halakhah's authority does not rest in the halakhah itself, nor in its own rules of conduct, but on the reasoned elaborations to which the people assent. These reasoned statements are aggadic rather than legal in nature. A good example is Maimonides' introduction to his halakhic codex Yad. The authority of the aggadah, in contrast, is to be found in aggadah that is, in reasoned elaborations which are, once more, aggadic, and to which the people once again assent.

I.2.2 Development of the halakhah

In Jewish tradition the halakhah takes the place of dogma. The halakhah is man-made:
"The Torah was not given to the angels, but to man who possesses human intelligence...the Torah was given to be determined by human intelligence, even if human intelligence errs...and the truth is determined by the agreement of the sages by using human intelligence."[11]
The truth is defined by agreement among the sages and one of the points of departure for determination of the halakhah, which has the assent of the sages themselves, is that the halakhah is to be established by majority

decision.[12] Every new halakhah develops from the halakhot already in existence, according to a system of patterns of derivation frequently of a rational and down-to-earth character. The Halakhah's authority rests in the discussions that precede its adoption. Both the halakhah adopted as binding and the rejected halakhah possess authority: students of the Torah and particularly of the talmud, study the propositions that were not adopted as well as those that were. The talmud is an anthology of competing opinions. It consists largely of discussions on what halakhah is to be adopted and in many cases, but not invariably, these discussions are followed by a decision. A student of the Talmud studies discussions and interpretations rather than a set of final conclusions, so that talmud study tends to be undogmatic. If a discussion finally ends in the adoption of a certain rule of conduct this still does not carry the implication that the rejected rule of conduct is inferior. Those who take part in discussions can never lose although some of them win. The final conclusion is reached by the combined effort of both sides as appears from the following talmudic account of rivalry between the schools or followers of Shammai and Hillel:

"For three years there was a dispute between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, the former asserting: The halakhah is in agreement with our views and the latter contending, 'The halakhah is in agreement with our views'. Then a bath kol issued announcing, '(The utterances of) both are the words of the living God, but the halakhah is in agreement with the ruling of Beth Hillel."[13]

The Talmud immediately asks:

"Since, however, 'both are the words of the living God' what was it that entitled Beth Hillel to have the halakhah fixed in agreement with their rulings?"[14]

And the answer comes:

"Because they were kindly and modest, they studied their own rulings and those of Beth Shammai, and were even so (humble) as to mention the actions of Beth Shammai before theirs."[15]

One of the fundamental rules of Jewish tradition is that what a man does is more important than what he thinks, but it would be wrong to conclude from this that the halakhah is more important than the aggadah. The talmud passages already quoted[16] contain aggadah as well as halakhah and neither can be understood without the other. In what they do people are required to go further than the halakhah because this is not the most perfect pattern of conduct:

"Torah is not the same as law, as din. To fulfill one's duties is not enough. One may be a scoundrel within the limits of the law.[17] Why was Jerusalem destroyed? Because her people acted according to the law, and did not act beyond the requirements of the law."[18, 19]

The halakhah looks at the benoni, the average man, that is someone who does not stand out significantly from other men:
"The sages pronounced an edict only if the majority of the people could abide by it."[20]
Although this passage refers to a special sort of rule of conduct, a gezerah,[21] it also applies to the halakhah in general. The sages who developed the halakhah were not content for the people simply to give their assent,[22] but also wanted them to behave accordingly, so they produced a code of conduct which the majority were able to follow. This minimal code of conduct - minimal in the sense that most of the people observed it - constituted the adopted halakhah, but in the course of time it became less and less minimal:
"In their intention to inspire greater joy and love of God, the Rabbis expanded the scope of the law, imposing more and more restrictions and prohibitions. "There is no generation in which the Rabbis do not add to the law"[23]
In the time of Moses, only what he had explicitly received at Sinai ((the written law)) was binding, plus several ordinances which he added for whatever reasons he saw fit. ((However)) the prophets, the Tannaim,[24] and the rabbis of every generation ((have continued to multiply these restrictions))"[25][26]
By their expansion of the halakhah, did the rabbis achieve their goal? Was the majority of the people brought nearer to God by the additional restrictions and prohibitions? Heschel does not think so:
"The industrial civilisation has profoundly affected the condition of man, and vast numbers of Jews loyal to Jewish law feel that many of the rabbinic restrictions tend to impede rather than inspire greater joy and love of God."[27]

By prescribing how people should live and making every aspect of life subject to specific rules, the rabbis hoped to sanctify the sphere of the profane and preserve the human dignity of each individual. The other side of the coin is that formalization of living patterns leads in many cases to routine and automatic action:
"In their zeal to carry out the ancient injunction, "make a hedge about the Torah"[28] ((this means the restrictions

and prohibitions designed to prevent people from doing wrong,))[29] many Rabbis failed to heed the warning, "Do not consider the hedge more important than the vineyard. Excessive regard for the hedge may spell ruin for the vineyard."[30] The vineyard is being trodden down. It is all but laid waste."[31]
And Heschel, pushing the parallel forward into our time, continues:
"Is this the time to insist upon the sanctity of the hedges? "Were the Torah given as a rigid immutable code of laws, Israel could not survive...Moses exclaimed: Lord of the universe, let me know what is the law ((halakhah)). And the Lord said: Rule by the principle of majority... The law will be explained, now one way, now another, according to the perception of the majority of the sages."[32][33]

If our own time is taken to begin with the emancipation of the Jews approximately two centuries ago, then it is clear that the authority both of the halakhah and of the aggadah now has to compete with all the traditions, ways of life, philosophical ideas, scientific theories, and so on, that while not specifically Jewish, have been studied since the emancipation just as intensively by Jews as by non-Jews.

I.2.3 Epistemic and deontic authority

The distinction between epistemic and deontic authority is the work of the logician J.M. Bochenski who introduced it in 1965 in a study on the logical aspects of the concept 'religion'.[34] According to Bochenski there are two forms of authority, the first of which influences or defines a person's opinions, and the second, his behaviour:
"A field[35] of authority is twofold: it is either a class of propositions which state what is, or a class of rules, prescribing what should be done. The term "rule" is used here in a very broad way, covering the various kinds recently distinguished by students of normative logic (rules, imperatives, etc.).
If the field is a class of propositions, then the authority is that of one who knows better, i.e., of the expert in the field. This sort of authority will be called "epistemic authority". If, on the other hand, the field is a class of rules, the authority is that of a superior, a leader, a commander, etc., and will be called "deontic authority"."[36]

Epistemic authority is concerned with propositions (Dutch: proposities. German: Sätze) and deontic authority with rules (Dutch: gedragsregels, German: Weisungen).[37] Propositions possess three qualities which rules do not have.[38]
A proposition is true or untrue, can have differing degrees of probability, refers to a specific state of affairs.[39]
None of these properties belong to rules. A rule can be, say, purposeful, justified or immoral, but not true, untrue, or probable. In addition, a rule does not describe a specific state of affairs but what should be done about them.[40] It is unnecessary at this point to discuss Bochenski's complete, logical analysis of the concept of authority, but it may be useful to look at some of his statements which apply in general to both propositions and rules. In the analysis of authority in Part 1 (3.2), where authority is described as a property of the communication rather than the communicator, the word communication covers more than simply propositions and rules and is an altogether broader concept than Bochenski's 'field of authority' (note 35) or 'Gebiet der Autorität' (see below). The distinction between epistemic and deontic authority is important to anyone who is engaged in converting theory into action and wants to formulate rules that will serve as a basis for practice.[41]

On the subject of the two forms of authority he postulates, Bochenski makes the following statements:[42]

(1) The field of authority is a class of propositions or a class of rules.
(2) Every authority is either an epistemic or a deontic authority.
(3) The bearer of deontic authority in one field can at the same time be the bearer of epistemic authority in the same field.
(4) It is desirable for the bearer of deontic authority to also be the bearer of epistemic authority in the same field.
(But, and this is a very important fact, each of these authorities is independent of the other).
(5) Deontic authority in one field and epistemic authority in the same field do not necessarily coincide.

For Bochenski the bearer of authority is a person[43] - not a group of people - who communicates authoritative propositions, or rules, or both, or is at least capable of communicating them; and his authority is based on the authority of the communication, that is on the authority

of the propositions or rules that he communicates. The authority bearer's epistemic authority is based on the propositions he expresses and his deontic authority on the rules of conduct he formulates. Bochenski makes the point that epistemic and deontic authorities are independent of one another but that it is possible and even desirable for them to coincide (see point 4 above). Misuse of authority occurs when someone who has epistemic authority but no deontic authority behaves as if both were in his possession:
"The classical instance of the misuse of authority...is collective declarations by professors, usually highly competent, in certain scientific fields such as radiology, philosophy or biblical studies, who communicate with assertion statements belonging to politics."[44]
It may also happen the other way round: a person of deontic authority behaves as if he had epistemic authority as well. Bochenski gives an example:
"that...a leader, while being no more than leader, wants to count as an expert."[45]
This too is misuse of authority. So much for Bochenski.

I.2.4 Epistemic authority and the aggadah

The concept of epistemic authority does not apply to the aggadah, at least not to the aggadah in the spacious interpretation suggested in I.1.4. This is because the aggadah does not concern itself with important propositions that have a single meaning. When they are to be found, propositions occur in texts which can be interpreted in various ways and two different interpretations may nevertheless both be true:
"From a modern point of view one might say that the search for truth in Scripture was not directed towards propositional truth, and that the very conception of propositional truth was lacking. The most persistent intellectual energy and the most prodigious analytic effort were devoted to the loving care of a tradition, to the continual contrivance of beautiful and profound interpretations, and to questions of morality and ritual."[46]

The value and importance of the aggadah spring from the very fact that it is possible to interpret its texts in many ways, all of which are relevant; the aggadah's intrinsic purpose would be called in question if, among all the interpretations of a particular text devised by the sages through the centuries, any single one should prove to be the only real true interpretation. This in

turn affects the propositions contained in the text. Let us say that a certain proposition has various meanings - which also happens:
Class 1: Meanings that people think are true;
Class 2: Meanings that people think are not true;
Class 3: Meanings on which people are uncertain whether they are true or untrue and also uncertain as to how probable or improbable they are;
Class 4: Meanings that people no longer understand.

This is the reality confronting anybody engaged in reading or listening to aggadah: the question of the epistemic authority of a proposition of which the meaning may belong to any of the four classes described above, is simply irrelevant. Not only texts and propositions but words as well are susceptible of more than one interpretation, which raises yet another complication in the thankless task of seeking for aggadic propositions which might be said to bear epistemic authority.
"Taken literally, many sentences in the Bible would contradict each other. Hence it was one of the first principles of the rabbinical tradition - still very much in evidence in the Epistles of Paul in the New Testament[47] - that the sentences and words of the Bible need not be taken literally, and truly daring interpretations were common."[48]
Maimonides remarks that in some cases the words, taken literally, might even lead to backsliding:
"The literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt ideas and to form false opinions about God, or even entirely to abandon and reject the principles of our Faith. It is therefore right to abstain and refrain from examining this subject ((ma'aseh bereshit)) superficially and unscientifically."[49]

The class to which any one meaning of an aggadic proposition belongs is not irretrievably fixed but depends on the identity of the 'people' who figure in the fourfold division of 'meanings', on whether, for example the people are all contemporaries, or, on the other hand, comprise the procession of sages who lived in different centuries or periods. This choice determines to which of the four classes the meaning belongs.

But the aggadah consists of more than simply propositions and of course whatever is aggadah without being in any way proposition, has no epistemic authority.

I.2.5 Deontic authority and the halakhah

The time when the entire Jewish people gave its assent to the halakhah (see note 3) which was adopted, is now past. The majority of Jewish people today pays little or no attention to the halakhah, which means that the halakhah continues to have deontic authority only for the few. This does not mean that the few who acknowledge the deontic authority of the halakhah all have the same estimate of its value. It is possible to acknowledge the deontic authority of the halakhah and still find a certain opinion of the concept 'halakhah' simplistic, even though it may be subscribed to by the majority of halakhic authorities. The following quotation illustrates the point:

"Most halakhic authorities regard the halakhah as a body of rules handed down by the Divine Sovereign to enable the Jew to live according to His will. Some of these rules were transmitted by Moses in writing, while others were transmitted orally by him, together with a methodology for creativity within the revealed rules. Disobedience to some of the rules may be punished by authorities to whom God delegated that power, while for other breaches of the Covenant he reserved to Himself the power to punish.

In such a simplistic conception of the halakhah, the rationale of the rules is rarely, if ever, an integral part of the rules themselves. Man simply lives to obey these rules - and in obedience lies his salvation. To the extent that creativity is possible, it must be without reference to social or economic conditions, unless such considerations are implicit in the rule. Such instances are very few. The process of halakhah is discovering what God had said. This is what the law is. Such an analysis must be strictly logical, arrived at deductively or inductively from existing rules and texts, without reference to ideal end or social facts."[56]

The criticism expressed in this passage is directed not against the halakhah's strict logic but against the depreciation of empirical reality and total neglect of psychological and sociological considerations in the development of the halakhah. And yet the critic sees in this no reason to gainsay the halakhah's deontic authority.

The very same halakhah which, in earlier times, welded the Jews into a people and bound their tradition to them, now brings division among Jews and alienates from the

Torah many of those who do not recognize its deontic character. A Torah, a Jewish tradition, is unthinkable without the halakhah: as unthinkable as a halakhah that speaks to fewer and fewer people. The halakhah must develop; so that those who now refuse to recognize its deontic authority will be ready to change their minds.

While a concept such as 'deontic authority' is certainly applicable to the halakhah, in order to do full justice to the latter's pluriform nature yet another concept must be put to work. This fourth concept of authority is neither epistemic nor deontic and, except that it is weaker, greatly resembles the concept of authority developed in section 3.2. If we call the latter communicative authority (it shows up clearly in language,[51] in the words used by political leaders and citizens, teachers and pupils), then the fourth authority concept which differs from communicative authority only in the third and last condition mentioned in 3.2, may be described as weakly-communicative authority, understood once again as a quality of the communication and not of any person or persons:

(1) Weakly-communicative authority relies on the possibility of reasoned elaboration.
(2) The elaboration and not the elaborator possesses weakly-communicative authority.
(3) The elaboration must be accessible to the understanding of the group for which it is meant. The group does not have to assent to it.

The halakhah is discussed and is open to discussion. Those for and against the adoption of a halakhah stimulate each other with argument and it is typical of halakhic development that both the halakhah adopted and the halakhah rejected possess weakly-communicative authority, although the latter has of course no deontic authority. One example of the weakly-communicative authority of the rejected halakhah has already been given in the words: "The words of the first school and the words of the other school are the words of the living God,"[52] where Hillel's was the halakhah adopted and Shammai's the one that was rejected. The weakly-communicative authority of the latter comes to light in the opinion of one of the later cabbalists, "...that in the Messianic erga, the Halakhah would be determined according to the opinions of the school of Shammai, that an interpretation of the meaning and application of the Torah, which is unacceptable at a certain stage in the history of the world, is, in reality,

anticipating a Messianic period where it has its true place..."[53]
So Shammai's halakhah was rejected because its time had not yet come; only in the messianic age will its weakly-communicative authority become deontic.

I.2.6 LL hermeneutics and heuristics

In this development of the LL philosophy, as a rule the aggadah will be used hermeneutically and the halakhah heuristically; that is, quotations from the aggadah will be used to interpret and explain ideas on LL and the rules of the halakhah will be used to formulate practical rules of thumb and guidelines for LL.
In other words, the problem of what the Torah with its stress on the importance of study can contribute to the development of ideas and theories of LL will, with the help of aggadic and halakhic ways of thought, resolve itself into LL hermeneutics and heuristics.
The LL-hermeneutics will consist of a more or less coherent assemblage of LL ideas which give content to the concept of LL.
The LL heuristics will consist of a more or less coherent assemblage of LL rules of conduct by which the concept of LL can be put into practice.

What communicative authority (in the sense described in 3.2) will such LL hermeneutics and heuristics have? What sort of communicative authority do the ideas of LL hermeneutics and the rules of conduct of LL heuristics have? The answer is as follows: if the reader understands the interpretative and elaborative force of LL ideas or hermeneutics and if he is of the opinion (or even more if it already seems obvious or later becomes obvious to him) that this force can be used to give content to the concept of LL, then the ideas or hermeneutics can be said to have communicative authority. Whether this is true or not thus remains to be seen.
If the reader understands the rules of conduct or heuristics of LL and if he is of the opinion (or even more if it already seems obvious or later becomes obvious to him) that these can be used to establish guidelines and rules of thumb for putting LL concepts into practice, then those rules of conduct and heuristics possess communicative authority. This too remains to be seen. If it indeed turns out that the ideas or hermeneutics, and rules of conduct or heuristics, expressed in this study, do possess communicative authority, then the Torah will have succeeded in making a contribution to the

development of the ideas and theory of LL.

Notes

[1] Ex.R. 41:6. See Heschel (1959, ch. 29, p. 302). See also TB Git. 60b and TJ Pe'ah 2:6 and TJ Sanh. 4:2.

[2] Albo (15th century). Sefer ha-Ikkarim, 3:23. See EJ, vol. 3, under Authority, Rabbinical, col. 907. See also EJ under Hermeneutics.

[3] Yad, introduction. My emphasis. (Hyamson 1965, p. 4a).

[4] TB BM 59b. Not word for word.

[5] Deut. 30:12.

[6] Ex. 23:2. Not word for word.

[7] Idem note 4. See also TB Ber. 52a, TB Er. 7a, TB Hul. 44a, TB Yom. 80a, TB Tem. 16a, TJ Sanh. 4:2. See also Ibn Ezra's commentary on Ex. 23:2 and Ashkenasy, Whitlau (1971).

[8] TB Yev. 71a, TB BM 31b.

[9] Deut. 17:10-11.

[10] Commentary on Deut. 17:10-11: Mid. Tan. op ibid.: Sif Deut. 154 et al.

[11] Aryeh Leib b. Joseph ha-Kohen: introduction to Kezot ha-Hoshen on the Sh.Ar., HM. See EJ, vol. 3, under Authority, Rabbinical, col. 909.

[12] Cf. notes 3, 6 and 7.

[13] TB Er. 13b.

[14] Idem.

[15] Idem.

[16] TB BM 59b, TB Er. 13b.

[17] Nahmanides, commentary on Lev. 19:2.

[18] TB BM 30b. See also TB BM 85a and Heschel (1962b, introduction)

[19] Heschel (1959, ch. 32, p. 327).

[20] TB BK 79b. See also Luzzatto (1966, perek 13). On the concept 'benoni' see TB RH 16b in combination with TB Ber. 7a.

[21] Usually a preventive measure or general limitation. See The Jewish Encyclopedia, 1901, under gezerah.

[22] Cf. note 3.

[23] Heller, Tosefot Yom Tov, foreword.

[24] See Tanna.

[25] Horovitz, Shenei, p. 25b. See Cordovero, Pardes, p. 23, under humra.

[26] Heschel (1959, ch. 29, p. 302).

[27] Idem.

[28] M. Avot 1:1. See also TB Ber. 2a.

[29] Maimonides (1968) on TB Avot 1:1.

[30] Gen.R. 19, 3. See also ARN[1,2] and TB Sanh. 29a.

[31] Heschel (1959, ch. 29, pp. 302-303).

[32] TJ Sanh. 4, 22a. See Margoliot, Penei, ad locum; also Mid.Ps., ch. 12.

[33] Heschel (1959, ch. 29, p. 303).

[34] Bochenski (1965). See also his article (1974a), note on p. 71. Abbr. AA refers to his article.

[35] "The field is not a class of utterances, but of what utterances mean, in other words, a class of meanings. These meanings must be communicated by utterances. Yet authority is not about utterances, but about what they mean." (AA, p. 58).

[36] AA, pp. 70-71.

[37] "The former we will call "the authority of knowledge" from the Greek 'epistemic authority' (episteme meaning knowledge or knowing). The latter, which gives instructions, we will call the governing authority, from Greek 'deontic authority' (deomai means in Greek 'I should')." Bochenski (1974b, 4. Kapitel, S. 53).

[38] A, S. 51-52.

[39] A proposition always refers to a so-called state of affairs, i.e. it says how things are, what exists. Therefore, it can be true or false: true if things are indeed as it says, false if they are not. (A, S. 51).

[40] "An instruction never refers to what exists but to what should be. It cannot even say what exists because the situation with which it is dealing will only come about by means of my action." (A, S. 52).

[41] Cf. the end of Part 1, section 3.7 (quotation from Buber).

[42] A, 4. Kapitel, S. 49-56.

[43] A, S. 23. See also AA. p.

[44] AA, p. 59. On p. 60 Bochenski adds: "Such a statement was published by a large group of prominent German scientists in 1914. It asserted that Germany did not attack Belgium. Among the signatories were Roentgen, Husserl and Harnack."

[45] A, S. 55.

[46] Kaufmann (1961, VIII.64, p. 270).

[47] This does not imply that Paul is part of rabbinic tradition. "Paul claims that careful reading of the Bible leads again and again to Christ. This gives, in essence, the key to Old Testament exegesis. Whether this is fair to the Old Testament is not called in question. Paul thinks that this is how we should read the Bible." (Verhoef 1979, par. 2.12, p. 275).

[48] Kaufmann (1961, p. 270). See also Safrai (1978), 15. Kapitel: Halacha und Aggadah, particularly pp. 91 and 92.

[49] Guide, Vol. II, ch. 29. This is Friedlander's translation (1946, p. 211). Another translation of the same passage (Pines, 1964, p. 347) identifies 'literal meaning' with 'superficial, external interpretation': "For the external sense of these texts leads either to a grave corruption of the imagination and to giving vent to evil opinions with regard to the deity, or to an absolute denial of the action of the deity and to disbelief in the foundations of the Law. The correct thing to do is to refrain, if one lacks all knowledge of the sciences, from considering these texts merely with the imagination." See also the final sentences of chapters I.51 and II.27 (Guide, Vol. 1, ch. 51 and Vol. II, ch. 27).

[50] Rackman (1976, p. 134). Rackman is a representative of orthodox judaism and recognizes the deontic authority of the halakhah.

[51] Cf. Friedrich (1972, ch. 10, p. 114).

[52] See note 13.

[53] Scholem (1970, S. 103). "This thesis seems to have been proposed originally by Moses Gray in Prague; cf. Wa-jakhel Mosche, Dessau 1699, p. 45b and 54a." (Scholem, 1970, footnote 9, S. 103).

I.3 Propositions

The main points of the ideas on tradition and authority developed in I.1 and I.2 can be expressed briefly in the form of a number of propositions:

1. Tradition can be learnt and taught and is inexhaustible.
2a. It is possible to look for 'everything' in tradition and not merely certain truths, a particular way of life or philosophy.
2b. This searching for everything in tradition is a phenomenon which is found mainly in so-called revelationary traditions but also in non-revelationary ones.
3. Living tradition is tradition that belongs to a culture that is still in the process of development.
4. Without oral tradition there can be no written tradition. Oral tradition in the absence of written tradition does exist but is becoming rarer and rarer in the world today.
5. Oral tradition is more important than written tradition.
6. From time to time parts of oral tradition are set down in writing.
7. The setting down of tradition, in writing for example, can lead to rigidity. One means of getting rid of rigidity is to study the tradition which has been laid down.
8. Oral tradition is of its nature open-ended and within it the difference between development and renewal is bound to be vague.
9. Everyone has his own contribution to make to the development and renewal of tradition.
10a. In every living tradition there is tension between the forces of conservation and innovation.
10b. Where this tension is absent the tradition is dead.
11a. Tradition influences what people do; that is it influences the human milieu. The influence expresses itself in rules of conduct.
11b. Tradition influences man's thoughts and dreams; that is, it influences his mode of thought. This influence shows itself in the form of concepts and opinions.
11c. Rules of conduct and concepts and opinions interact with each other.

12. Knowledge that is not used and applied cannot be tested. Therefore study must lead to practice.
13a. The concept of God-as-teacher has far-reaching consequences: (1) Authority. No other teacher whatsoever has God's authority, that is to say absolute authority, which means that it is always possible to conceive of a higher authority, whether human or not, over and above any specific human authority. (N.B. We are talking here of communicative authority (section 3.2)). (2) Humility. In view of the fact that the distance between God and any teacher is greater than that between teacher and pupil, intellectual and moral humility is a desirable quality for teachers as well as pupils.
13b. The general principle behind the preceding remarks on authority and humility speaks for itself so that it is possible for an atheist or an agnostic, for example, to agree with their general tendency.
14. For a student of lifelong learning the quest for knowledge lasts all his life.
15. It is possible to derive certain 'LL hermeneutics' and 'heuristics' from Jewish tradition.
'LL hermeneutics' are a more or less coherent assemblage of LL ideas which can be used to give content to the concept of LL.
'LL heuristics' are a more or less coherent assemblage of LL rules of conduct which can be used to put the concept of LL into practice.
16. If it becomes clear that the ideas or hermeneutics and the rules of conduct or heuristics, mentioned above, possess authority, Jewish tradition will have contributed to the development of ideas and theories of LL. (N.B. The authority concerned is communicative authority as defined in section 3.2).

II.1 WORLD IMAGE

II.1.1 The struggle against idolatry

Warnings against idolatry and suggestions of how best to wage war on it are a central theme of the Torah:
"...the first intention of the Law as a whole is to put an end to idolatry, to wipe out its traces and all that is bound up with it, even its memory as well as all that leads to any of its works - as, for instance, familiar spirits and a wizard and making to pass through fire, a diviner, a soothsayer, an enchanter, a sorcerer, a charmer, and a necromancer - and to warn against doing anything at all similar to their works, and, all the more, against repeating the latter."[1]
It is essential to resist idolatry and avoid following the ways of idolaters:
"It is explicitly stated in the text of the Torah that everything that was regarded by them as worship of their Gods and as a way of coming near to them, is hateful and odious to God. This is stated in His saying: "For every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth, have they done unto their gods" (Deut. 12:31)"[2]
Maimonides' instances of idolatry in this passage fall short of defining exactly what idolatry is. Nor does he explain how the Torah proposes to combat idolatry although it is clear that at the very least the idolaters are not to be imitated.

What then is this idolatry which is so repugnant to the Torah? The essence is not that an idolater believes his idol to be the one true god but that he believes it to be the necessary intermediary between God and himself, and that in order to make contact with God it is necessary for him to pray to the idol. That is idolatry.
"...whoever performs idolatrous worship does not do it on the assumption that there is no deity except the idol. In fact, no human being of the past has ever imagined on any day, and no human being of the future will ever imagine, that the form that he fashions either from cast metal or from stone and wood has created and governs the heavens and the earth. Rather it is worshipped in respect of its being an image of a thing that is an intermediary between ourselves and God."[3]
Idols do not have to be things of metal, stone or wood but can also be ideas or ideals that the idolater thinks of as indispensable in order to get in touch with God.

What does the Torah suggest as an alternative? How does

man come into contact with God? The reply from the Torah is that contact occurs during the process of learning in which the pupil is engaged in the search for God. One way to seek God is to frequent the company of the sages and their pupils...
"...to attach oneself to the sages and their disciples, so as to learn from their example; as it is said, "And unto Him shalt thou cleave" (Deut. 10:20. Cf. Deut 30:20). But can a human cleave to the Shekhinah ((Divine Presence))? Our wise men explained this text thus: "Attach thyself to sages and their disciples."[4]"
With whom is God present? With whoever is engaged in study.[5] The learning process may be a teaching-learning process involving a teacher and tradition tells us that the teacher is sometimes God himself. Moses was not God's only pupil for even little children have also been known to receive instruction from God.[6]
Between God and the individual there is no intermediary to whom it is necessary to pray, but a learning process. "Study ((is)) a means of worship, of 'thinking God's thoughts after Him' and so linking the human mind with the divine."[7]

Studying or learning is not only a matter of the intellect but also a way to religious experience. Learning has the character of a cognitive and existential liturgy in which praying to idols and serving false gods can have no place. As soon as an intermediary comes between the individual and God, intermediary or mediator become ends in themselves and liturgy is transformed into idolatry.[8]

II.1.2 Keeping the world in existence and learning

Tradition claims that it is the pupils who hold the world in existence. Not the sages, it should be noted, but the pupils.
"The world is only maintained by the breath of ((learning)) schoolchildren."[9]
No other rule of conduct in the Torah is as important as the exhortation to study. Torah study even takes precedence over all other commandments[10] and this is because the sort of study that is meant is also bound to lead to practical action.[11] Studying or learning is a preparation for doing, directed towards holding the world in existence. Such doing has to be learnt from an early age and constantly requires relearning, so that "learning always has to precede doing"[12] and every individual is bound to go on and on learning:
"Until what period in life ought one to study Torah?

Until the day of one's death."[13]

Torah study is not only the way to God[14] but also the way to the world: not merely the subjective world centered on the student himself, but the real world, or, if you like, objective reality.
"God consulted the Torah and created the world."[15]
Some commentators take this to mean that the blueprint of the world was there before the world itself so that the Torah existed before the world was made.[16] It is not feasible here[17] to go into the questions this raises as to how or whether such a thing is conceivable and what sort of Torah it was that God looked in. The sentence quoted is important to the Jewish world image because its exegesis involves defending two key propositions, first that the world (creation and reality) and the Torah are of equal reality, and secondly that the Torah may well be of greater importance than the world.
A modern talmudist puts this point:
"((The)) analogy between the natural world and Torah is ancient and was developed at length by the sages. One of its earliest expressions is the theory that just as an architect builds a house according to a blueprint, so the Holy One, Blessed be He, scanned his Torah in creating the world. According to this viewpoint, it follows that there must be a certain correlation between the world and Torah, the latter forming part of the essence of the natural world and not merely constituting external speculation on it."[18]

Holding the world in existence also includes holding in existence the Jewish people, both spiritually and physically. Through the centuries, much of Jewish tradition has been set down in books to be woken to life by learning children and adults, all of them therefore counting as pupils. Attacks on the Jewish book such as systematic book burnings, have always been attacks on the Jewish people:
"That was just the beginning. If they burn books today they will burn people tomorrow."[19]
It is from unceasing study of the Torah that the Jewish people have drawn strength time and again to re-emerge from the lowest points of their history. Their enemies also realized that this people's strength lay in 'learning' as appears in the following passage:
""Would you destroy the Jews," is the reply of the wise Oenomaus of Gadara to Israel's foes, "you must first destroy their synagogues and schools; for while the voices of their children continue to chirp in the schools,

and they are taught the word of God, all the world will not prevail against them."[20]
Oenomaus was a 'heathen' or non-Jewish philosopher who lived in the reign of the Roman emperor Hadrian (117-138). He was well-disposed towards the Jews and personally acquainted with the tanna[21] R. Meir.[22]

Notes

1 Guide III.29 (Pines 1964, p. 517).

2 Idem. Cf. also the end of III.30.

3 Guide I.36 (Pines 1964, p. 83). See also Yad: Av.Zar., ch. 1 and 2, par. 1. See also Yad, Teshuvah 3:7.

4 Yad, Hilkhot Deot 6:2. (Hyamson 1965, p. 54b). See also TB Ket. 111b.

5 Cf. TB Men. 110a, where learning is considered equivalent to bringing sacrifices to God's honour. See also TB Hor. 13a.

6 TB Av.Zar. 3b. See also Ex.R. 28:5. "The striking image of God as the Teacher of Israel is found in the Prayerbook which contains the following benediction from the Talmud to be recited every morning before one begins to study Torah: "Blessed art Thou ... who has sanctified us by Thy commandments and commanded us to study the Torah. Make pleasant, therefore, we beseech Thee, O Lord our God, the words of Thy people to the house of Israel, so that we with our offspring and the offspring of Thy people the house of Israel may all know Thy name and study Thy Torah." Note especially the formulaic conclusion: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who teaches Torah to Thy people Israel." (TB Ber. 11b; cf. Daily Prayer Book (ed. P. Birnbaum), p. 13)" (Kirschenbaum 1972, p. 22).

7 'The Study and Practice of the Torah' (Jacobs 1965, ch. 9, p. 93). See also Isaacs (1928) and Heschel (1959, ch. 15, p. 237).

8 This being neither a theological nor a rabbinical study it is not the place to pursue the halakhic instances in rabbinic literature which reflect the interaction of the Jewish communities with their non-Jewish environment (Islamic and Christian host countries) where the means had indeed been raised into an end. See e.g. Guttmann (1927): 'The Chosen People Idea and the Attitude of Judaism Towards Other Faiths' in Jacobs (1965, ch. 12); 'Gentiles and Semi-proselytes' in Lieberman (1965); Bloch (1922); Alon (1977); Katz

(1960, 1969 and 1971). In Hebrew: Yad, hilkhot melakhim 8:11. Special number of Heigot (1978, Jerusalem); 'Bein Jisrael le-Amim', articles by J. Levinger, J. Rosenthal, M.B. Levner; 'Sovlanut datiet etc.' in Rosenthal (1967).

[9] TB Shab. 119b. "Jerusalem was only destroyed because children were prevented ((from going to school)). The world is only kept turning by the breath of school children. One should not keep children ((from their lessons)) not even to build the Holy Place. It was handed down to me by my forefathers, according to some readings, your forefathers, that any city which has no school children will be destroyed, or according to Rabina, annihilated." (TB Shab. 119b, after Goldschmidt 1930-1936).

[10] TB Pe'ah 1:1a. See also TB Shab. 127a and TB Kid. 39b and ARN[1] 40.

[11] Yad, Hilkhot talmud torah 3:3. See TB Kid. 40b and Sif.Deut. Ekeb 41. Cf. also Part 1, par. 3.7, note 71.

[12] Yad, idem.

[13] Idem, 1:10.

[14] Cf. note 5.

[15] Gen.R. i, 1, p. 2. See also Abrahams, Urbach (1975, ch. 9, pp. 198-202) and Tanh. and Yal. on Gen. 1:1.

[16] See Abrahams, Urbach (1975, ch. 9, p. 198) and ARN[2], ch. 31 (Goldin 1967, p. 126).

[17] On this see e.g. Abrahams, Urbach (1975, ch. 9, pp. 199-202). The Torah into which Good looked does not indicate the entire Jewish tradition up to the present day.

[18] Steinsaltz (1977, ch. 1, p. 7).

[19] Heinrich Heine ("Almansor", 1820).

[20] Gen.R. 65:20.

[21] See Tanna.

[22] EJ, vol. 12, under Oenomaus of Gadara.

II.2 THE HUMAN IMAGE

II.2.1 Human ability to learn lifelong

If we ask at what point a human being first starts to learn and we also know that in Jewish tradition 'texts' are of the utmost importance, we may well be surprised to find it held that learning begins long before the pupil can have any idea of understanding a text and indeed even before he is born:
"The notion that a child's moral character could be influenced by the mother's activities during pregnancy goes back to the Biblical story of Samson whose mother was told not to drink wine nor strong drink, not to eat any unclean thing.[1] Thus the Talmud records that pregnant women sought to influence the developing embryo by listening to the voice of the learned engaged in the study of Torah."[2,3]
As LL confines itself to the period from the cradle to the grave[4] neither prenatal learning nor learning after death will be discussed here.[5]

The learning with which LL is concerned begins in the cradle:
"We are told that the great teacher Shammai removed part of the roof of his house in order to convert the space beneath it into a Sukkah ((booth)), so that his infant grandson in a crib could participate in the mitswah of living in a Sukkah during the Festival of the Tabernacles."[6]

Whoever goes on studying all his life will see his wisdom increase with his years:
"The learned - or to be more exact - those who continue to study,[7] the older they grow, the greater becomes their wisdom."
It is perfectly possible to study Torah fruitfully into very advanced old age (to the grave), and the mishnah[8] that has already been quoted
"Go on and on studying Torah, turn it over and turn it over, for all is therein," adds "And become old and grey therein neither move thou away therefrom."[9]
The form taken by lifelong learning - that is, learning throughout the whole of a human life - in the Jewish tradition, will be analyzed later on, in chapter III.1 to 4. In this section it is sufficient to show that the Torah sees lifelong learning as lying within man's capacity, literally from the cradle to the grave. Clearly that does not imply that every one will necessarily make

the same amount of progress:
"If a thousand men go to the house of study to study the Bible, only a hundred will come away knowing that they have profited by it: a hundred men may study the Mishnah; but only ten of them will gain anything by it. Ten men may study the Talmud and only one of them will learn anything from it."[10]
The Torah does not demand identical learning results from every individual but only that each should apply himself as well as he can.

DIGRESSION: The Torah principle stating the possibility of learning lifelong, from cradle to grave, has now become generally accepted as part of everyday life. It is now possible to learn, to go on learning and to learn yet more, not only in the years of one's youth but also later on. The human capacity to learn in this way is illustrated in the following quotation from Diesfeldt:
"It may seem strange to lay so much stress on learning when dealing with adulthood. It is often said that you learn most in childhood and youth. Yet it may be asked what exactly is meant by 'learnt'. A human being spends the whole of his life accumulating experience and that is a learning process too. While it is important to draw attention to the fact that the capacity for learning itself does not depend on age, adulthood cannot be discussed at all without giving due consideration to the significance of the experience which a person builds up in the course of a lifetime. For example, in intelligence tests older people often give evidence of possessing a larger vocabulary than younger people, a quality which is one of the results of accumulated experience.
(...) A situation which one person finds extremely complicated and fails to judge correctly, may be immediately grasped by someone more experienced and this person is then able to take appropriate action. The whole question of 'good sense' and 'wisdom' is one that has been too much neglected in the study of the aging process, because of the dominating emphasis on performances in intelligence tests and memory tests.
(...) There should no longer be room for doubt that older people also need to go on with self-development, but we should also have no hesitation in acknowledging that older people possess the capacity to master new insights and skills."[11]
Although as people grow older their experience increases this does not mean that at the same time their intelligence also increases, and some researchers are of the opinion that intelligence decreases with age.[12] Diesfeldt

summarizes the scientific discussion on the relation of intelligence to age as follows:
"As far as we can see there is no simple relationship between intelligence and age. An older person's capacities - and an intelligence test can only give a very defective view of what they are - are not dependent simply on age but also on the factors of upbringing, health and the particular experience of the individual."[13]

II.2.2 All human beings resemble each other but never in every way

All human beings resemble each other,
"The Lord God formed man from the dust of the earth,
He blew into his nostrils the breath of life..."[14]
because each person resembles God
"And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him;"[15]
and yet, strangely enough, no two people are exactly alike
"But a single man was created to proclaim the greatness of the Holy One, blessed is He; for man stamps many coins with the one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of Kings, the Holy One blessed is He, has stamped every man with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them is like his fellow."[16]

Differences among individuals and between groups of people and races do not detract at all from the fundamental equality in value of each human being:
"A single man was created for the sake of peace among mankind that none should say to his fellow, "My father was greater than thy father."[17]"
In spite of the undeniable intellectual and physical differences between people as Greenberg describes it, "...for just as "men's faces differ one from the other" whether they like it or not, so "men in their thoughts differ from one another"[18] whether they want to or not."[19] each person is of equal value to another because each is made after the image of God. This equality reaches far beyond the dissimilarities that exist between any two individuals, and it follows that to every person, whether saint or criminal, must be attributed value as a human being. Indeed, within every person is an element of likeness to God. If anyone humiliates another person, or himself, he is by this act denying his own or another's human value.

But a person's duty goes further than merely to avoid

trampling human dignity underfoot, although it may be difficult enough in itself simply to follow the negative path that this implies. The rest of this section will be concerned with the most important of man's further obligations, which, like the principle of human worth, follow from (or may at least be thought to follow from) the statement that all people are of equal value.
Take, for example, the duty (or rule of conduct) of love for your neighbour: "Love your neighbour as yourself."[20]
'As yourself' means here: he (your neighbour) who is like you, both in good and evil:
"The word (Love your fellow man as yourself), on which the entire world is depending, was proclaimed on Mount Sinai with an oath: If (you) dislike your fellow man whose deeds are evil as your own, I, your God, shall visit judgment upon him who dislikes; and if you love him since his deeds are as right as your deeds, I can be relied upon to bestow my mercy upon you for loving my creatures."[21]
Your neighbour is someone just like you. The quotation "And you shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18, note 20) can be interpreted as "And you shall love your neighbour who is so like you":
"This interpretation, which relates the Hebrew comparative pronoun kamokha ((as yourself)) to the subject rather than to the predicate - "your fellow man who is like yourself", instead of "love him like you love yourself" - is sound and legitimate exegesis that can be corroborated by a number of biblical texts, as Wessely has shown in his commentary on Mendelsohn's translation (with a personal objection to it by the translator). Two recent Jewish philosophers, Herman Cohen[22] and Martin Buber[23], take his interpretation even as the original intent of the biblical verse."[24]

DIGRESSION: Arnoni, whom Bertrand Russel called "the most astute political commentator I know" and whom Albert Schweitzer referred to as "a fellow fighter for the blessing of humanism" says in his book Instead of Ideology, under the heading 'The Eichmann in us':
"What holds for any one person also holds, at least psychologically, for all. There is no human emotion or inclination which is not present in all of us. There is no set of psychological traits specific only to one person or one group of people. Each of us is a psychological microcosm of humanity (...).
As long as we think of an Eichmann as a human being totally different in kind from ourselves, then we go on failing to destroy in ourselves the probability of our

becoming, ourselves, unconscious Eichmanns. The best way to ensure that the Eichmann syndrome does not overtake us is to realise that by virtue of the fact that such a person has existed, there is in each of us a potential to become some sort of an Eichmann too. To draw a veil of piety over this unwelcome fact in the hope of lulling it to sleep is the last way to prevent its becoming reality. We must continue to weigh our deeds, not against the yardstick of rationality but with regard to their empirically-ascertained effect on human beings, and at the same time devote every ounce of mental energy to keeping ourselves free from base passions, numbing rationalisations and every other sort of aberration of which any other person may be the sign. It says much for Albert Schweitzer that when he had finished reading an essay in which it was claimed that there were no significant differences in the conscious motivations of a Schweitzer and an Eichmann, he did not feel insulted but, on the contrary, sent the author a long letter of congratulation."[25]

The differences between individuals - between people like Eichmann and Schweitzer - lies not in their powers but in their deeds: not in the choices that they might be able to make in life but in those they actually make: "Who is man? A being in travail with God's dreams and designs, with God's dream of a world redeemed, of reconciliation of heaven and earth, of mankind which is truly His image,[26] reflecting His wisdom, justice and compassion. God's dream is not to be alone, to have mankind as a partner[27] is the drama of continuous creation. By whatever we do, by every act we carry out, we either advance or obstruct the drama of redemption; we either reduce or enhance the power of evil."[28]

To return to love of our neighbour: it has been shown that the interpretation of Leviticus 19:18 in which your neighbour's resemblance to you is stressed, is radically egalitarian. There is in addition another extremely well-known and this time moderately egalitarian interpretation of the same verse, based on the idea that what you hate your neighbour will hate and what you failed to love he also will fail to love. This interpretation, which belongs to Hillel, might also be taken as the very essence of the Torah. When a proselyte contemporary with Hillel demanded to be taught the entire Torah in the space of time for which he could stay standing on one leg, the sage answered:
"Whatever is hateful to you, do it not unto your fellow.

This is the essence of the Torah, the rest being just its corollary; now go and study that!" [29]
The positive form of Leviticus 19:18 ("And you shall love your neighbour as yourself"), Hillel replaces with a negative:
"Bacher[30] sees correctly in this negative promugation the biblical commandment: Love your fellow man as (you love) yourself, stressing the comparative pronoun kamokha ((as yourself)) as a regulative modifier of the predicate: Love him in the mode and measure that you love yourself, which, then in its negative or restrictive formula, is known as the Golden Rule: Do not unto others, what you would not have done unto yourself."[31]
Whichever interpretation you choose, one that is radically egalitarian or one that is somewhat less so; and whatever may be understood by neighbourly love; one thing remains clear: love of your fellow man is a principle which occupies an extremely important place in the image of man within the Jewish tradition.

DIGRESSION: Those who are ignorant of the fact that Jesus and the apostles were Jews[32] usually think of love of one's neighbour as a typically Christian principle. However, Jesus' God is "the God of Israel. The mercy of God towards sinners and the love of one's neighbour are Old Testament concepts and in the time of Jesus were emphasised by the Pharisees in particular.[33] His demand to love your enemy goes to an extreme, it is true, but the religious preference he gave to prostitutes, publicans and 'low company' shocked the Jews of his time less than it would now shock Christian society."[34]
'Love your neighbour as yourself': "R. Akiba[35] and, before him, Jesus, called this directive for altruistic love the 'essential commandment' or 'great principle' (kelal gadol) of the Torah."[36] "According to the teaching of Jesus you have to love sinners, while according to Judaism you have not to hate the wicked. It is important to note that positive love even towards the enemies is Jesus' personal message. We do not find this doctrine in the New Testament outside the words of Jesus himself.[37] But later in Christianity Jesus' doctrine of love became important and cannot be forgotten even by those who do not live according to it. The consequence of the doctrine is today that a Christian knows that you must not make a difference in treating your neighbour according to his moral qualities or his good or bad attitude toward you. In Judaism hatred is practically forbidden, but love to your enemy is not prescribed. (...) Christianity surpasses Judaism, at least theoretically, in its approach of love

to all men, but its only genuine answer to the powerful wicked forces of this world is, as it seems, martyrdom."[38] 'Flusser ...: "In the New Testament Jesus' message has a gentle, restrained sound. The sole call which comes through loud and clear is his call to love others, including your enemies. And this is no mere abstraction but means your relationship to other people whom you know. Forgiveness must also be understood from the point of view of love. You can only forgive someone if you know them: forgiveness is a two-way action. The point about Jesus is that he injected new dynamism into all the concepts current among the Jewish people of his time: love is dynamic, faith moves mountains, forgiveness is a force which disarms opponents. If you read the gospels calmly through you will be able to identify with this message and if you avoid at once converting it into a 'doctrine' bristling with prejudices, the sense of release will come of itself.
This release or relaxation is a non-magical freeing of your best powers. I do not think Jesus had a social message; that seemed to him unnecessary. He seems to have thought that social justice would emerge of itself if people would only free themselves from tension in the way he was pointing out and get rid of their accumulated cargo of frozen prejudice." When I suggested that this view of Jesus' message might have a somewhat paralysing effect on committed left-wing Christians, and give the Christian establishment, which prefers to leave social relationships as they are, a welcome pat on the back, and added that I hardly dared fly back to business-like Holland bearing such a message, Flusser again became agitated: "My view of Jesus does not lead to social escapism: you can't use it as a way of avoiding social obligations. But anyone who thinks of setting up a politically subversive programme in the name of Jesus ought to give serious consideration as to whether he has given due regard to God and his Son. I have my doubts. Of course one must have sympathy for those who suffer. And yet: blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake. Martyrdom has its place, which was what those gentlemen have forgotten. This is why I do not think they are followers of Jesus. And of course they aren't. The Roman Catholic Church has not properly fulfilled her task of transmitting Jesus' message. It was seen as a sermon for monks, and ordinary people were denied access to the Bible. The Church thus prevented people from living according to the Old and New Testaments while she herself, in the meantime, gave support to mundane powers, assisted the rich and so on."[39]

II.2.3 God's partner

All these long words and expressions - religion, monotheism, tradition, authority, world image, image of man, and so on - must not be allowed to obscure the real significance of the Torah concept. Torah designates a way of life rather than a system of thought. High-sounding ideas which cannot be given concrete expression in human lives do not belong in the Torah. The simplicity with which it speaks of God in relation to man illustrates the point:

God is not remote but near at hand:
"God does not dwell beyond the sky. He dwells, we believe, in every heart that is willing to let him in."[40]

God and man are partners who are necessary to each other and who have entered into an agreement or covenant:
"There is only one way to define Jewish religion ((Jewish tradition, Torah)). It is the awareness of God's interest in man, the awareness of a convenant, of a responsibility that lies on Him as well as on us. Our task is to concur with His interest, to carry out His vision of our task. God is in need of man for the attainment of His ends, and religion, as Jewish tradition understands it, is a way of serving these ends, of which we are in need, even though we may not be aware of them, ends which we must learn to feel the need of.
Life is a partnership of God and man: God is not detached from or indifferent to our joys and griefs. Authentic vital needs of man's body and soul are a divine concern. This is why human life is holy. God is a partner and a partisan in man's struggle for justice, peace and holiness, and it is because of His being in need of man that He entered a covenant with him for all time, a mutual bond embracing God and man, a relationship to which God, not only man is committed."[41] (...)
God is in need of man, because he freely made him a partner in his enterprise, "a partner in the work of creation." "From the first day of creation the Holy One, blessed be He, longed to enter into partnership with the terrestrial world" to dwell with His creatures within the terrestrial world (Numbers Rabba, ch. 13, 6; compare Genesis Rabba ch. 3, 9). Expounding the verse in Genesis 17:1, the Midrash[42] remarked: "in the view of Rabbi Johanan we need His honor; in the view of Rabbi Simeon ben lakish He needs our honor" (Genesis Rabba, ch. 30; unlike Theodor, p. 277)."[43]

Man, who is God's partner, is capable of performing more than human actions. This holds both for the individual and the entire people:
"What we have learned from Jewish history is that if a man is not more than human then he is less than human. Judaism is an attempt to prove that in order to be a man, you have to be more than a man, that in order to be a people we have to be more than a people. Israel was made to be a 'holy people' (Deut. 7:6)."[44]

Everyone is capable of sanctifying his own life, not merely exceptional individuals:
"The great dream of Judaism is not to raise priests, but a people of priests; to consecrate all men, not only some men,"[45]
and then Heschel quotes Maimonides:
"And why was not the tribe of Levi granted a share in the land of Israel? ... Because it was dedicated to the worship of God and His ministry. The vocation of the tribe of Levi was to teach the multitude the upright ways of the Lord and His righteous judgements ... But not the tribe of Levi alone was consecrated thus. Every human being born into this world whose spirit stirs him and whose intellect guides him to dedicate himself to the Lord in order to minister to Him and worship Him and to come to know Him, and who acts in conformity with God's design and dis-embarrasses himself of the devious ways which men have sought out, becomes sanctified with supreme sanctity."[46]

Because man is made in God's image he can be required to sanctify his life and has the capacity to do so:
"You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy."[47]

Sanctification is not a self-evident skill lightly to be acquired but something that can and must be learnt. It can also be taught (cf. the quotation from Maimonides above) and the Torah supplies rules enabling man to reach this (learning) goal:
"(...). You shall not pick your vineyard bare, or gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger: I the Lord am your God. (...) You shall not render an unfair decision. (...) You shall not hate your kinsman in your heart. (...) You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your kinsfolk. Love your neighbour as yourself: I am the Lord. (...) You shall rise before the aged and show deference to the old; (...) When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your

citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the Lord am your God."[48]

It is possible for man as God's image to make his life holy as God's partner and to live as it were on a superhuman plane, but he may equally well go to the other extreme and behave, so to speak, in an inhuman fashion. So the gamut of man's capacities runs between the two extremes of inhuman and superhuman, expressed in the Torah by the epithets 'the dust of the earth' (Genesis 2:7) and 'image of God' (Genesis 1:27).[49] This duality, which exists in every human being, and the field of high tension it creates and to which everyone is subject, will be dealt with in section II.2.5, but first of all the discussion of human freedom and responsibility must be taken a little further.
Martin Buber has played a principal role in working out the implications of 'being God's partner', in a great variety of ways in his writing and lectures, at the same time promoting the idea of thinking as dialogue, a principle which sets itself up against the notion of approaching God, man and the world as isolated entities, pleading instead for appreciation of reality in terms of relation.[50]

II.2.4 Human freedom and responsibility

Man has the capacity to choose and it is the human capacity to act or consciously to refrain from acting that is seen by the Torah as the essence of human freedom: "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, "Of every tree of the garden you are free to eat; but as for the tree of knowledge of good and bad, you must not eat of it..."[51]"
Man is the sole creature told not to do something, something which he is capable of doing and which later on he in fact does. Only man is commanded 'not to' for to no other creature is given the freedom to choose between doing and not doing.[52] Man alone has freedom of choice: "See, this day I set before you blessing and curse: blessing if you obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I enjoin upon you this day; and curse, if you do not obey the commandments of the Lord your God..."[53] "...I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life..."[54]
Man has to learn how to excercise his freedom; he has to learn to choose, and this he can do by studying Torah: ""And the tables were the work of God, and the writing

was the writing of God, graven upon the tables" (Ex. 32: 16): read not "graven (harut)" but "freedom (herut)", for whosoever studies Torah is a free man."[55]

Inherent in human freedom is the possibility of abuse and it may well be that to resist such abuse is too difficult a task for man. The rabbis even wondered whether it would have been better if God had chosen a different partner and had not created man:
"Our Rabbis taught: For two and a half years the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel engaged in debate, the former declaring that it had been better for man not to have been created than to have been created, and the latter maintaining that it was better for man that he was created rather than not created. They decided, upon voting, that it had been better for man not to have been created, but now that he has been created, let him examine his ((past)) deeds; others say, let him consider his ((future)) actions."[56]
Man's free will goes hand in hand with the obligation not to act at random and always to give due consideration to what has been done and what still remains to be done. Man is free to choose and responsible for his choice. Yet far from imposing limits on his freedom, man's responsibility rests on the assumption of his freedom. Precisely because man is free to choose what he does or does not do, so he is also in a position to bear responsibility for his actions.

It is possible for a person to be robbed of his freedom, for example by violence or by sickness, and for him to be forced to do certain things or to react in a certain way. In this case he is no longer responsible for his actions. A child still in the process of learning how to make a free choice, bears only a limited responsibility.

It would be too great a digression here to go into the problem of how human freedom can be reconciled with God's foreknowledge:
"All is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given"[57]
and solutions to this problem will not be discussed here. Yet it must be said that any solution that ascribes to man a freedom that is incomplete in any way or less than real, simply raises further difficulties: the distinction between good and evil, reward and punishment at once begins to lose much of its value and the idea of man as responsible for his actions becomes devoid of meaning.[58]

II.2.5 The two springs of action

The idea of the dual nature of man, the being called forth from 'below' (Gen. 2:7) and yet imprinted from 'above' (Gen. 1:27),[59] has been elaborated using two different approaches, the main characteristics of which are given below.[60]

The first approach assumes a basic division between matter and spirit, body and soul. Whatever is material and corporeal is evil and whatever is spiritual and of the soul is good. By following a strictly ascetic life, disregarding the material world, and repressing or even punishing the body (by flagellation for example), man is able to prevent his soul from being contaminated.
The halakhah comes down against this construction and is in favour of marriage, procreation and caring for the body's health; the forms of asceticism that do occur in individual Jews and in various Jewish sects, are exceptions rather than the rule.[61] From a traditional Jewish point of view the first approach to man's dual nature is not the one in general application but appears only in a sectarian context.

The second approach is indicated by the title of the present section and is the one generally accepted by Jewish tradition as the explanation of the duality of man. Underlying all human actions there are two springs of action: the yezer ha-tov or urge to do good, literally the good urge, and the yezer ha-ra or urge to do evil, literally the evil urge. As both springs of action are God's creation, the evil urge or yezer ha-ra is not intrinsically evil and it is man's task to turn it to good. This, briefly, is the second approach, and will now be explained in further detail.

The word yezer or urge, is connected with the word yazar which means to shape or create.[62] When God created man he created both the bad and the good springs of action:
"The Lord God formed ((vayyizer)) man from the dust of the earth. He blew into his nostrils the breath of life..."[63]
The word 'vayyizer' is written with a double 'y' (yôdh) and the Talmud says that these indicate the two urges, the good and the bad.[64]
Yet the bad urge is not intrisically bad, and is indispensable to the creation:
"Were it not for the yezer ha-ra, remarks a Rabbinic Midrash[65], no man would build a house or marry or have

children or engage in commerce. This is why Scripture says ((at the moment when the creation, hitherto repeatedly described as 'good', but not yet 'very good' is completed by the creation of man)): 'and God saw everything that He had made and behold, it was very good.'[66] 'Good' refers to the 'good inclination' ((yezer ha-tov)); 'very good' to the 'evil inclination' ((yezer ha-ra)).'[67]"
Without the yezer ha-ra there would be no physical or cultural survival. For this reason it must never be destroyed or repressed but controlled and turned to good.[68] It is sometimes also called 'the leaven in the dough':[69] the wrong proportion of leaven spoils the rising process but without any leaven the dough is tasteless.[70]

Man has to use both springs of action in his life, good and evil. In the passage:
"You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart..."[71]
the aggadic gloss explains that the Hebrew word for 'your heart', lebhabhga, is written with a double 'bh' (pronounced 'v') or bêth instead of with only one, in order to indicate that God is to be served using both urges of the heart, the good and the bad.[72] But how is this to be done? How can the evil urge be turned to good?
"The idea that we should serve the Lord 'with the good impulse and with the evil impulse' is very beautiful, but one could also serve Hitler or Stalin with both impulses. One can serve an evil cause with tremendous courage and intelligence, with self-control and humility, and millions have done it in our time. Many whose life had lacked direction found a purpose - an evil purpose - that integrated their whole personality till everything fell into place."[73]
It is by studying Torah that man comes to know how the evil impulse is to be turned to good and because this struggle goes on for the whole of his life (see below), he is bound to go on learning throughout his life and continually testing what he learns by putting it into practice. The study that leads to practice is an effective antidote to the poison of yezer ha-ra.
"Thus spoke the Holy One to Israel: my children, I have created the evil impulse and I have created the Torah as a remedy for it; if you devote yourselves to the Torah then you will not fall prey to the evil impulse and if you do not devote yourselves to the Torah then you will succumb to it."[74]
When learning takes place on a permanent basis and the Torah is studied daily, to learn becomes a habit, second nature, almost an instinct; it is impassioned learning

such as this which can successfully join issue with the yezer ha-ra. The Jewish tradition teaches that learning can become a passion which itself controls our passions.

DIGRESSION: "Whoever has completed successfully the education for truthfulness towards himself, is permanently immune against the danger of immorality, even if his standard of morality should differ in some ways from what is customary in society."[75]

FURTHER DIGRESSION: "High standards of honesty mean that one has a conscience about what one says and about what one believes. They mean that one takes some trouble to determine what speaks for and against a view, what the alternatives are, and what alternatives are preferable on these grounds.
This is the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity. I shall call it the canon. (...) The canon takes the form of a series of imperatives. These imperatives define the essence of scientific method. But the practice of a method can become a habit or, as people sometimes put it, speaking rather loosely, it can become 'instinctive'. And virtues are habits. They can be acquired and developed by practice. Confronted with a proposition, view, belief, hypothesis, conviction - one's own or another person's - those with high standards of honesty apply the canon, which commands us to ask seven questions: (1) What does this mean? (2) What speaks for it and (3) against it? (4) What alternatives are available? (5) What speaks for and (6) against each? And (7) what alternatives are most plausible in the light of these considerations?"[76]

To return to the theme of this section, in contrast to such pessimistic passages dealing with human nature as "The Lord saw how great was man's wickedness on earth, and how every plan ((yezer)) devised by his mind was nothing but evil all the time."[77]
"... the devisings of man's mind ((yezer)) are evil from his youth..."[78]
comes the optimism that even the evil urge can be turned to good. How this is to be done has to be learnt and can be learnt and this is the optimistic view. The evil impulse is present from a very young age:
"Some are of the opinion that it appears in youth, i.e. before puberty,[79] some that it appears at birth,[80] others that it appears simultaneously with conception"[81,82] and the evil impulse renews itself daily[83] and this contributes to pessimism. The good impulse comes into

being, according to Jewish tradition, during puberty when the faculty of understanding matures and is capable of distinguishing good from evil.[84]
There are two conclusions to be drawn here, one in the field of pedagogy and the other in that of anthropology. First of all, learning at a young age should be directed primarily to the formation of desirable habits and later on, as the intellect matures, these habits can be made conscious and critically analyzed and weighed. Maimonides comments on Hillel's reply "And if not now, when?"[85] by saying:
"If I will not acquire virtues now, in the period of youth, when shall I acquire them - in the period of old age? - no, for it is difficult to turn aside from dispositions at that time because traits and attributes have become firm and permanent, whether virtues or vices. And the sage said: 'Train a child in the path he should follow; even when he is old he will not turn aside from it'."[86,87]
In this case 'train' means 'bring up' (that is, the same Hebrew word lies behind both, and Maimonides should not be interpreted as advocating drill. The child or pupil who is being trained is encouraged to ask questions: "((It is)) not a shamefaced person ((who is apt to)) learn."[88]

The great commentators have always tried to write their commentaries in such a way as to be understood by everyone, learned or not learned; the works of Rashi (1040-1105), greatest and most popular of commentators,[89] prove the point. From a very early age children become familiar with aggadic stories which provoke an initial response but which convey a clear message only at a later age.[90]
Secondly, the battle with the evil urge is never done. No-one can ever be sure that victory is definitive and the evil inclination turned once and for all towards good. Even those who lead an exemplary life and reach an advanced age can still go astray[91] so that Hillel finds it necessary to give warning:
"Neither trust thou in thyself until the day of thy death."[92]
No-one is immune to immorality and the talmud equivalent of the expression "he who falls furthest falls hardest" is "The greater the man, the greater his Evil inclination."[93] Neither Moses nor David was perfect and ħor are their misdeeds passed over in silence in the Torah but clearly exposed.[94] The idea of <u>zaddik</u> or righteous man is not so much that of a person who never does anything bad[95] as that of one who does more good than bad.[96]

II.2.6 The search for truth and the pursuit of peace

In spite of the fact that there is no rule of conduct in the Torah as important as its incitement to study all the time and to go on putting what has been learnt to the test of practice,[97] seeking for the truth is nevertheless not the most important activity. One activity alone takes precedence and that is the pursuit of peace. A sage himself is expected to value peace above truth
"He ((a scholar)) loves peace and ensures[98] it. (...) He will not deviate from the truth; neither add to it nor detract from it, except in the interest of peace or similar worthy aims."[99]
It is God Himself who gives the clearest example of setting peace before truth, for when Abraham and Sarah were already of great age and heard that they were to have a child, Sarah did not believe it and commented that not only she, herself but also Abraham was too old to produce children:
"And Sarah laughed to herself, saying, 'Now that I am withered, am I to have enjoyment - with my husband so old?'[100]"
after which God asks Abraham why Sarh laughed and why she said:
"Shall I in truth bear a child, old as I am?"[101]
But this is not in fact what Sarah had said and it was in the interests of peace that God altered her words.[102]
Clearly there will be moments when the search for truth and the pursuit of peace will clash and at these times the Torah sets peace above truth. The search for truth is set within limits and as soon as peace is endangered these limits have been exceeded.[103]

Putting peace above truth does not mean that in the learning-teaching process pupil and teacher are not to disagree. Quite the contrary, for both learner and teacher gain most from stoutly defending their own viewpoint and attacking the opposing one:
"Even fathers and sons, teachers and pupils can become enemies when they devote themselves to the Torah (i.e. have conflicting opinions on the interpretation of the Law) but they do not stop until they are friends again, for it is written 'Vaheb ((friendship)) in Supha ((conflict))'[104] and here we should read not 'Supha' but 'Sopha' ((in the end))."[105]
People do not engage in debate in order to be proved right but in order to learn from each other and when this happens they have more respect for each other at the close of the discussion than they had before.

The principle of putting peace before truth may also be interpreted as a principle of survival, and the inner stability of the Jewish community can be seen to lie in peace. Particularly in times of peril for the community, its spiritual leaders have been of the opinion that radicalism and modernism do not contribute to that stability and have now and then found it politic to declare certain individuals, sects or books heretical; included among these have been:
"((sects such as)) the Samaritans, Judeo-Christians, Karaites, Shabbateans, Frankists, Hasidim, and liberal branches of modern Judaism; books ranging from Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed to the Zohar; and such men as Uriel da Costa, Baruch Spinoza, and Shneur Zalman of Lyady."[106]

In our own time charges of heresy have fallen out of use and liberal thinkers hold that the cause of peace is never served by suppression of ideas or by limiting spiritual freedom or freedom of research. This is also true - and perhaps even more forcibly so - of the cause of truth.[107]

DIGRESSION: "A Hasid asked the Bershider: 'You teach that a man should always tell the truth. How can one do this if he wishes to make peace?' The Rabbi replied: 'To make peace, I demand the full truth, and with the full truth, I make peace.'"[108]
"Said the Ladier: 'I had labored twenty-one years on truth; seven years to learn what truth is; seven years to drive out falsehood; and seven years to acquire the habit of truthfulness.'"[109]
The last quotation provides us with a living example of the process of training and studying described in the two digressions in the preceding section (II.2.5).

The dilemma confronting the peace-loving seeker after truth or the truth-loving pursuer of peace is this: even if he accepts in principle that the search for truth has reached its limit when peace is endangered, he will still have to establish exactly where the frontier lies by now and then stepping over it.
In fact the frontier seems to shift its position from time to time and not to stay always in one place. Some of the heretics of long ago now belong to the very nucleus of orthodoxy and those who cross frontiers today may perhaps find themselves the frontier setters of tomorrow, whom posterity will regard not as having exceeded the limits but as having pushed out the frontiers still further.

Every living tradition finds itself on the horns of a

dilemma; the search for truth and the pursuit of peace are not always compatible, and yet both are indispensable elements in the continuance of the tradition. Maimonides, commenting on the mishnah:
"On three things does the world stand: on justice, on truth and on peace."[110]
takes truth as an intellectual quality and peace as a moral quality; law belonging to the political order;[111] but this still does not resolve the dilemma because at the highest level of knowledge, according to the Torah, intellectual and moral qualities overflow into each other.[112]

Notes

1 Judg. 13:4. Samson's mother was not permitted to partake of what would be forbidden to Samson himself as nazir, after his birth.

2 Rashi on M. Avot 2:8. See also TJ Yev. 1:6.

3 Greenberg (1969, p. 31).

4 See definition of LL in Part 1, section 2.3.

5 "The talmudic 'heaven' is nothing more than an academic community of angels and the souls of saintly scholars, headed by the Master Teacher, God Himself - all occupied in the study of Torah." (Kirschenbaum 1972, p. 22), quoted also in Part 1, section 2:1 no. e 1. See also EJ, vol. 2, under Academy on High.

6 TB Suk. 28a. In Greenberg's paraphrase (1969, p. 31).

7 TB Shab. 152a. See Greenberg (1969, p. 25) for translation and underlining. See also M. Kin. 3:6.

8 See Mishnah.

9 M. Avot 5:22 and Maimonides' exposition (David 1968, p. 122).

10 Lev.R., 2 (beginning). Quoted in Wiesen (1892, S. 24). 'Talmud' or the study of the talmud. (Cf. definition of 'talmud' in Yad, hilkhot talmud torah, 1:11 quoted on p. 172).

11 Diesfeldt (1979, pp. PO 3200-10, 11, 12). My emphasis.

12 Idem, pp. 3200-1, 2.

13 Idem, pp. 3200-3. See also De Groot (1979a, pp. 16-17).

14 Gen. 2:7.

15 Gen. 1:27.

[16] M. Sanh. 4:5. See also TB Sanh. 38a and TJ Sanh. 4:9 and T. Sanh. 8:4.

[17] M. Sanh. 4:5. See also 'Gleichheit aller Menschen' (Bernfeld 1922, Erster Teil, Kapitel 6).

[18] Tanh., commenting on Num. 27:16 in par. 10 of the Sidrah Pinhas.

[19] Greenberg (1969, p. 20).

[20] Lev. 19:18.

[21] ARN^1 and ARN^2, 16. See Flusser (1968). The quotation and the interpretation given above are on pp. 114-115. See also Ex.R. 24:7 and Sifra on Lev. 19:18.

[22] Cohen (1935, p. 17). Cohen did not want to decide the philological implications. See Flusser (1968, p. 116).

[23] Kosmala (1965, pp. 13-17). See Flusser (1968, p. 116).

[24] Flusser (1968, p. 116).

[25] Ferron, Arnoni (1972, pp. 60-61), chapter entitled 'De macht van het negatieve denken'.

[26] See also Heschel (1975), ch. 10: 'Sacred Image of Man' esp. pp. 150-151.

[27] Cf. II.2.3: God's partner.

[28] Heschel (1965b, p. 119).

[29] TB Shab. 31a. See Flusser (1968, p. 116).

[30] Bacher (1903, 4f.).

[31] Flusser (1968, p. 117).

[32] Zuidema, Flusser (1975, proposition 43, p. 141).

[33] Further light can be shed on the subject of neighbourly love in the context of two general theories which underlie the talmud's treatment of capital punishment: "Talmudic law distinguished four methods of judicial execution (arba mitot bet din): stoning, burning, slaying, and strangling (...). Two general theories were propounded which ... reflect old traditions and well-established ways of thinking: namely, first, that 'love your neighbor as yourself' (Lev. 19:18) was to be interpreted as applying even to the condemned criminal - you love him by giving him the most humane ('the most beautiful') death possible (TB Sanh. 45a, 52a; TB Pes. 75a; TB Ket. 37b); secondly, that judicial execution should resemble the taking of life by God: as the body remains externally unchanged when God takes the life, so in judicial

executions the body should not be destroyed or mutilated (TB Sanh. 52a; Sifra 7:9)." EJ, vol. 5, under Capital Punishment, col. 142.

[34] Flusser (1975, proposition 3, p. 134).

[35] Sifra, TJ Ned. 9:3. See also Rashi on Lev. 19:18.

[36] Flusser (1968, p. 117). Footnote 15 loc. cit. contains references to Jesus.

[37] "The new interest in Jesus' message seems to bear some resemblance to the birth of a monster: a Jesus who loved sinners and apparently hated good men; and in Jesus' name it is the victims and not the murderers who are declared guilty. This tallies, moreover with the concept of the Anti-christ found in many Church Fathers." (Flusser 1975, proposition 51, pp. 142-143).

[38] Flusser (1968, pp. 126-127).

[39] Flusser, in an interview in Jerusalem with Ton Oostveen (Oostveen 1978, pp. 39-40).

[40] Heschel (1972, ch. 23, p. 251). Compare with II.1.1 note 5, and also with what Buber says, not about God but about the Messiah, yet another difficult word: "When I (Buber) was a child, I read an old Jewish legend which I could not understand. All it said was this: 'A leprous beggar sits before the gates of Rome and waits. It is the Messiah.' Then I went to an old man and asked him 'What is he waiting for?' And the old man gave me an answer which I only learnt to understand much later - he said: 'For you.'" (Buber 1920, S. 31). See also TB Sanh. 98a.

[41] Cf. Deut. 26:17-18.

[42] See Midrash.

[43] Heschel (1972, ch. 23, pp. 241-243). 'Theodor' which means 'Gen.R., ed. Theodor'. Jacobs (1968, ch. 9, p. 142) described being God's partner as follows: "See e.g. Sabb. 119b.: R. Hamnuna said: "He who prays on the eve of the Sabbath and recites 'and the heaven and the earth were finished' scripture treats of him as though he had become a partner with the Holy One, blessed be he in the work of creation," and Sabb. 10a: "Every judge who judges with complete fairness even for a single hour Scripture gives him credit as though he had become a partner with the Holy One, blessed be He, in the work of creation." Without evident awareness of the Rabbinic view, Harvey Cox

(The Secular City, Macmillan, New York, 1965, p. 164) remarks: "Recent discussions of the concept of the covenant in the Old Testament suggest it means that Yahweh was willing to stoop so low as to work in tandem with man, to work on a team, no matter how poorly the human partner was working out." (Harvey Cox is a modern, American, Christian theologian). See also Zuidema (1977).

44 Heschel (1959, ch. 43, p. 422).

45 Idem, ch. 42, p. 419.

46 Yad, Shemitah ve-Yobel 13:12-13. Quoted in Heschel (1959, ch. 42, p. 419).

47 Lev. 19:2.

48 Lev., ch. 19.

49 See II.2.2, notes 14 and 15.

50 The series of books published as Das dialogische Prinzip (Buber 1962) give evidence of this in their titles: Ich und Du, Zwiesprache, Die Frage an den Einzelnen, Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen. See also III.4.2, note 25.

51 Gen. 2:16-17.

52 Cf. Greenberg (1969, p. 20).

53 Deut. 11:26-28.

54 Deut. 30:19.

55 ARN^2 (Goldin 1967, ch. 2, p. 20). Cf. also M. Avot 6 (Kinyan Torah): 2: "... Read not haruth (graven) but heruth (freedom), for thou findest no free man excepting him that occupies himself in the study of the Law." (tr. H. Danby, used in ARN^2, Goldin 1967, p. 248). See also TB Er. 54a and Tanh., tissa 16. See also III.2.2, note 181.

56 TB Er. 13b (Abrahams, Urbach 1975, ch. 10, p. 252). See also Gen.R. 8:3-5 and TB Sanh. 38b.

57 M. Avot 3:15 (trans. H. Danby, quoted in ARN^2, Goldin 1967, p. 239). See also TB Ber. 33b and TB Nid. 16b and Yad, hilkhot teshuvah, 5:5.

58 See e.g. Jacobs (1973, ch. 5, pp. 77-80). See also Bernfeld (1922), Erster Teil Kapitel 4: Willensfreiheit.

59 "The double nature of man as the being that comes from 'below' and is sent from 'above' is what underlies

the duality of his basic character." Buber (1953a), ch. 'Gott und der Menschengeist', S. 151. See also Heschel (1975), ch. 10: 'Sacred Image of Man'.

60 Cf. Greenberg (1969, pp. 21-24). See also Gen.R. 8:11 and 14:3.

61 In times of persecution asceticism occurred more often than in peaceful times. See Greenberg (1969, p. 21).

62 Cf. e.g. Ps. 103:14 and Genesis 2:8.

63 Gen. 2:7.

64 TB Ber. 61a. See also Gen.R. 14:(2), 3 and 14:4.

65 Gen.R. 9:7.

66 Gen. 1:31.

67 Jacobs (1973, ch. 17, p. 244). A better, more logical, version of this midrash says: 'Good' refers to the 'good inclination', 'very' to the 'evil inclination' (Eccles.R. 3:11). See also Mid.Ps. 9:11.

68 The impulses natural to man are not in themselves evil ... the appetites and passions are an essential element in the constitution of human nature, and necessary to the perpetuation of the race and to the existence of civilization. In this aspect they are therefore not to be eradicated or suppressed, but directed and controlled." (Moore 1927, pp. 482-483). See also TB Yoma 69b and M. Avot 4:1.

69 TB Ber. 17a.

70 Schechter (1975, p. 264f.) See also Jacobs (1973, ch. 17, p. 245).

71 Deut. 6:5.

72 Sifrei, TB Ber. 54a. See also Rashi on Deut. 6:5 and Mid.Ps. 9:5.

73 Kaufmann (1973, ch. 7, par. 63, p. 181).

74 TB Kid. 30b (tr. after Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). Cf. Heschel (1959, ch. 36, p. 375); Jacobs (1973, ch. 17, p. 245); EJ, vol. 8, under inclination, good and evil, col. 1319. See also TB BB 16, TB Av. Zar. 5b, Mid.Ps. 119:4, ARN[1], 16.

75 Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), psychiatrist; words quoted in Kaufmann (1973, ch. 7, par. 68, p. 197).

76 Kaufmann (1973, ch. 7, par. 61, p. 178). Walter Kaufmann the philosopher is described in EJ, vol. 10,

col. 846 as a 'vigorous opponent of arguments of religion, ((who)) made an attack on theology of all kinds and favored a naturalistic, humanistic approach."

77 Gen. 6:5.

78 Gen. 8:21. See also Rashi on this.

79 Ex.R. 46:4a.

80 TB Sanh. 91b.

81 Idem.

82 Greenberg (1969, p. 21).

83 TB Kid. 30b. See also Mid.Ps. 14:2 and TB Suk. 52a and Gen.R. 22:6.

84 Cf. Greenberg (1969, p. 22). EJ, vol. 10, under inclination, good and evil, col. 1319 it is held that the evil impulse starts at birth: "While the yezer ha-ra is created in man at birth, the yezer ha-tov, which combats it, first makes its appearance 13 years later at the time of his bar-mitzvah ((see Bar-mitzwah*)) ... and with the onset of the age of reflection and reason (cf. Eccles.R. 4:13, 1)." See also Mid.Ps. 9:5.

85 M. Avot 1:14.

86 Prov. 22:6.

87 Maimonides' commentary on M. Avot 1:16 (David 1968, ch. 1, p. 15). See also ARN[1], 12.

88 M. Avot 2:5. See also Yad, talmud torah, 4:4.

89 See interview with Safrai (sect. 1.3: question 2, 2b, 2c). Cf. also Bruner's famous 'hypothesis': "Any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any state of development" (Bruner 1974, ch. 23, p. 413).

90 Cf. Buber's words in note 40.

91 Examples are to be found in TB Ber. 29a and TB Kid. 81b.

92 M. Avot 2:4. Cf. note 83.

93 TB Suk. 52a. See also Heschel (1959, ch. 36, p. 370).

94 Num. 20:12 (Moses) and II.Sam. 11 (David).

95 Cf. the discussion in TB. Kid. 40a, b and the image of the scale.

96 Cf. the discussion in TB. Kid. 40a, b and the image

of the balance: "Man should always see himself as being half sinful and half virtuous. It is well for him when he has obeyed a commandment, for he has weighted the scales on the side of virtue; but woe unto him if he has committed a sin, because he has weighted the scales on the side of guilt" (TB Kid 40b, tr. after Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). See also T. Kid. 1, 13 and 14.

[97] See sections II.1.2 and II.1.6.

[98] Maimonides is quoting M. Avot here, 1:12. The English word 'ensue' is too weak.

[99] Yad. hilkhot deot 5:7. Hyamson (1965, p. 53b).

[100] Gen. 18:12. My emphasis.

[101] Gen. 18:13. My emphasis.

[102] TB BM 87a, TB Yev. 65b, Gen.R. 48, Lev.R. 9:9. Further examples of peace prevailing over truth can be found in Gen. 50:16-17 and I.Sam. 16:2.

[103] See e.g. DEZ, perek ha-Shalom. (Minor Tractates, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 597-602).

[104] Num. 21:14.

[105] TB Kid. 30b (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). Cf. also M. Avot 5:17 and ARN^2 (Goldin 1967, ch. 1, p. 3): "So long as they sat studying Torah, they acted as though they were jealous of each other; but when they parted, they were like dear friends of old ((literally, 'from their youth'))."

[106] EJ, vol. 8, under Heresy, col. 361-362.

[107] "Emeth ((truth)) is the seal of the Holy One, may he be praised." TB Sab. 55a (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936).

[108] Pinchas of Koretz (1876, p. 49, in Hebrew). The English comes from Newman (1972, 120:4, p. 311).

[109] Rosengarten (1907, in Hebrew). English in Newman (1973, 185:17, p. 491).

[110] M. Avot 1:18.

[111] David (1968, ch. 1, p. 25).

[112] On the theme of truth and peace see also Jacobs (1960, ch. 11: 'Truth', ch. 12: 'Peace'). Also Bernfeld (1922), Zweiter Teil, Kapitel 9: 'Der ewige Friede'.

II.3 

The main points of the ideas on the Jewish image of the world and of man developed in this chapter can be expressed briefly in a number of propositions:

1a. Between the individual and God there is no intermediary to whom it is necessary to pray, but a learning process.
1b. Idolatry is prayer to an intermediate object or person standing between the individual and God.
1c. As soon as the intermediate object or person ceases to be a means and becomes an end in itself, then (in a figurative sense) idolatry begins.
2. What is learnt about the interpretation of reality and about commentaries on reality is just as important as the reality, or perhaps even more important.
3. The world, with all its traditions and bearers of tradition has to be kept in existence by the learning of children, adults and the aged.
4. Man is capable of learning from cradle to grave.
5. The fact that people are so dissimilar nevertheless fails to justify classifying certain types of people as non-human, subhuman or superhuman.
6. Man is capable of learning to see that every human being is of value as such.
7. Man can learn (a) to love his neighbour or at least not to hate him; (b) to love himself or at least not to hate himself; (c) to love his neighbour as he loves himself or at least not to hate either his neigbour or himself.
8a. God and man are partners each of whom needs the other.
8b. Man can learn to break out of his isolation and also to understand reality in terms of relation.
9. There are people who can learn to act in a more than human (or holy) fashion and others who can learn to act in a subhuman (or beastly) fashion: the gamut of human possibilities runs from superhuman to subhuman.
10a. Only when a person is free to choose can he be held responsible for the choices he makes. When he is not completely free he is also not wholly answerable.
10b. Bearing responsibility can teach man just as much as the exercise of freedom. He can learn how to exercise his freedom by making choices in all sorts of situations.
11a. Everyone has two urges: an evil urge for the whole of his life, and a good urge nearly all his life (from

the years of discretion).
11b. The evil urge can be turned to good. Only the life-long pupil can hope to reach this learning-goal.
12. In common with all living traditions, Jewish tradition finds itself on the horns of a dilemma: the search for truth is not always compatible with the pursuit of peace and yet both are essential elements in the continuance of the tradition.

III.1 PUPIL AND LEARNING METHOD

III.1.1 Learning for women and girls

In lifelong learning a person is considered as a learner and learning is taken to be a general human activity (cf. section 2.3). Here 'man' or 'person' means man, woman or child, and a 'pupil' is any person who learns. In the context of LL, learning and the pupil have more to do with life considered as a learning process, than with formal, institutionalized teaching-learning processes such as are met with in training-schemes, in schools and in universities (cf. section 2.4).
As learning is only one among the many human activities and because one person will spend more time studying than another, learning will occupy different positions in the lives of different people. Looking at Jewish tradition in this perspective we are struck by the clear disparity between men and boys on the one hand and women and girls on the other.

It can be seen in general that learning occupies a relatively limited area in the life of the Jewish woman in comparison to the place it takes in the life of the Jewish man, if both are taken as living within Jewish tradition. Only in the present century has the situation begun to change so that a learned Jewish woman is no longer a rarity, although female talmudists are few and far between. Women's upbringing has always been different from men's and women and men have occupied different positions. It would be out of place here to give an analysis[1] of the Jewish woman's traditional position, but the female role might be described in general in terms of service, home and family:
"Jewish women have been culturally and religiously colonized into acceptance of their identities as 'enablers'. Jewish society has projected a uni-dimensional 'proper' role for women which denies to them the potential for fulfillment in any area but that of home and family."[2]
The Talmud describes woman's restricted share in Torah study and the exact nature of what was expected of her, in the following significant words which also provide a nice illustration of the quotation given above:
"Rab said to R. Hija: Whereby do women earn merit? By making their children go to the synagogue to learn Scripture and their husbands to the Beth Hamidradi to learn Mishnah, and waiting for their husbands till they return from the Beth Hamidrash."[3]
With few exceptions,[4] the study of the Torah continued to

be a largely masculine prerogative well into the twentieth century, one half of the Jewish population (the female one) making it its business to see that the other half (the male one) was able to study to its heart's content. "All human beings are equal" but as far as Torah study goes men seem to be "more equal than women."[5]
Nowadays the inequality of men and women and boys and girls with regard to study of the Torah, is unacceptable to most women, and indeed men, certainly just as unacceptable as blatantly negative or positive stereotyping of female characteristics (see digressions 1 and 2 below). Women now study Torah even though there are still some sections of the community who are opposed to it.

DIGRESSION 1: Inequality of men and women in Torah study: some halakhic perspectives.
"During the Tannaitic period ((1st and 2nd centuries CE)) there were three distinct positions as to the relationship of women to the mitzvah ((rules of conduct)) of Talmud Torah ((the study of the Torah)). While the Mishnah[6] reflects the extreme position of Ben Azzai arguing for obligation,[7] and Rabbi Eliezer propounding that it is prohibited to teach Torah to women,[8] the Tosefta[9] suggests an intermediate position in which women are not obligated to study Torah, but would not be prohibited from doing so. Amoraic[10] discussion ((3rd to 5th centuries CE)) already reflects only this intermediate stance, clearly indicating the absence of obligation[11] but not pursuing the prohibitive character of the position of Rabbi Eliezer.[12] (...) However, this position fades during the period of the Rishonim[13] ((mid-11th to mid-15th centuries CE)) to be replaced with variants of the more extreme position of Rabbi Eliezer. Maimonides ((1135-1205)), Jacob B. Asher ((1270-1340)) and Joseph Karo ((1488-1575))[14] gave full effect to the prohibitive statement of Rabbi Eliezer, but limited it to teaching the Oral Law, permitting for women the study of the Written Law, though hesitating to allow men to teach even that to women.[15] Among Ashkenaz[16] scholars, Rabbi Eliezer's position also came to the fore, but with exemption granted to allow for the teaching of functional as opposed to theoretical Jewish knowledge, whether in the Written or Oral Law.[17]
Among the Acharonim[18] ((mid-15th to 20th century CE)), two divergent approaches have manifested themselves:
(1) On one hand, the stringencies have been carried even further to the point of serious consideration being given to the possibility that it is even prohibited for women to study the Oral Law by themselves,[19] and for men to teach them even the complexities of the Written Torah.[20]

(2) On the other hand, two more permissive lines of thought have also begun to emerge.
(2a) One such line constructs its case for permission to teach women both Written and Oral Torah, on a purely functional base. Thus the Chafetz Chayyin (1838-1933) and others have argued that the fact that Jewish women are beneficiaries of a secular education makes it mandatory for us to assure that their knowledge of Scripture and Rabbinic thought be sufficient to preserve their identity as Jews.[21]
(2b) A second line of opinion developing among the Acharonim is even more interesting because for the first time since Ben Azzai it speaks in terms of an obligation of women to study Torah, albeit a limited one. Rabbi Josef Karo (1488-1575) already suggested that women are obligated to study those laws which pertain to them.[22] But is is Schneur Zalman of Liadi (1745-1813) who formulates a broad principle by which women are obligated to study all laws of the Torah, both Biblical and Rabbinic, except those concerning mitzvot (rules of conduct) which they are not obligated to perform[23]."[24]
To sum up it may be concluded that in Jewish tradition women have less obligation to learn than men and also that they are not permitted to learn as much. They also receive less teaching than men.

DIGRESSION 2: Stereotyping of female qualities.
"Four qualities in particular are ascribed to women: They are greedy, eavesdroppers, lazy, and jealous; they are also querulous and garrulous (Gen.R. 45:5). 'Ten measures of speech descended to the world; women took nine' (Kid. 49b). Women are said to be 'lightminded' (Shab. 33b), i.e. unreliable.
Women were feared as a source of temptation. In Babylon, possibly because of the greater laxity in sexual matters among the general population, it was said that a woman's voice is a sexual enticement as is her hair and her leg (Ber. 24a) and that one should under no circumstances be served at a table by a woman (Kid. 70a). In all probability, this is the reason for the extremely harsh description of a woman, paralleled by the Church Fathers, as 'a pitcher full of filth with its mouth full of blood, yet all run after her' (Shab. 152a). On the other hand it is said that a man without a wife lives without joy, blessing, and good, and that a man should love his wife as himself and respect her more than himself (Yev. 62b). When R. Joseph heard his mother's footsteps he would say' 'let me arise before the approach of the Shekhinah'[25] (Kid. 31b). Israel was redeemed from Egypt by virtue of

its righteous women (Sot. 11b). A man must be careful never to speak slightingly to his wife because women are prone to tears and sensitive to wrong (BM 59a). Women have greater faith than men (Sif. Num. 133) and greater powers of discernment (Nid. 45b) and they are especially tenderhearted (Meg. 14b). The Torah, the greatest joy of the rabbi's, is frequently hypostatized as a woman (e.g. in Yev. 63b) and is represented as God's daughter and Israel's bride (Ex.R. 41:5)."[26]
Conclusion: Rabbinic literature contains both strongly positive and markedly negative stereotyping of female qualities.

In the present study, when man the pupil is spoken of, no distinction is intended between men and women and the term 'image of man' (LL model, key word II.2) covers both image of man and image of woman. Yet the reader would be wise to remember that in classic Jewish writings, which stretch over a period of roughly 2000 years, and which were almost all written by men, the person who is a lifelong learner is almost always a man and the learning child a boy. And yet even if the extent to which women were allowed to participate in Torah study may seem restricted from a historical point of view, it nonetheless existed. If girls or women had not learnt then mothers would have had no knowledge to pass on and it would have been impossible to say:
"My son, keep your father's commandment (mitswah); Do not forsake the teaching ('torah') of your mother."[27]
And this certainly was said. Although girls did not normally go to school during the tannaitic and amoraitic periods, they did receive some sort of elementary schooling at home, and there were in those times already a few female sages:
"Tannaitic literature only makes learning the Torah obligatory for boys and not for girls.[28] This view is also expressed in the later books of the Bible, the apocryphal literature and in the works of Philo ((c. 20 BCE-50 CE)) and Josephus ((c. 38-after 100 CE)). We find a dispute in the Jabneh period among the Tannaim with Ben Azzai saying that a man is obliged to teach his daughter the Torah and R. Eliezer maintaining that teaching a girl the Torah would encourage too much intimacy between the sexes,[29] and that 'there is no wisdom for a woman except at the spindle.'[30] Whether as a result of the prevailing conditions or because the decision went according to R. Eliezer, his point of view became widespread and girls did not generally attend school. Women were, however, obliged to utter blessings and recite grace after meals;

and from the place they occupied in the life of the family, including the occupation with the children's education, it would appear that the girls too were given some education. We frequently find women present in the synagogue at times of prayer and sermons, though mainly as passive listeners.[31] We know of several women from the tannaitic and amoraic periods who were Torah scholars. The most outstanding example is Beruryah the daughter of R. Hananiah ben Teradyon from Siknim in Galilee and the wife of R. Meir, who had received her education before the Bar Cochba revolt ((132-135 CE)). Beruryah disagreed with the rabbis on a halakhah and they actually accepted her viewpoint. There are also stories of her outstanding knowledge of the Law,[32] but she and the few similar women probably constitute exceptions."[33]

In general girls did not attend school in those times and what they learnt they learnt mainly from their mothers at home.[34]
Over the centuries various alterations took place and girls did begin to go to school as well, instead of being taught mainly or solely by their mothers at home, but in general, up to the twentieth century
(1) women did take part in Jewish culture
(2) their role was an active one when the cultural setting was the home
(3) outside the home their role was a passive one.
Popular literature written in Yiddish made it possible for all women in Central Europe to have an intellectual and emotional share in Jewish culture.[35] In spite of their generally passive participation outside the home, women did become professional teachers.[36] The phenomenon of the learned woman continued to occur, even if only sporadically,[37] and there were even some female hasidic 'rebbes'.[38]

A full development of the idea of woman as lifelong learner in Jewish tradition would occupy a separate volume. Although in the historical context the lifelong learner in Jewish tradition is nearly always a man, Torah pronouncements on lifelong learning in the present study are generally neither specific to nor limited by a single sex, in the hope that they will be found as relevant to women as to men.

III.1.2 Man as lifelong learner

According to tradition there are forty-eight ways in which those who wish to acquire the knowledge of the

Torah can set to work:
1 By studying
2 by listening attentively
3 by speaking out ((what one has learnt)) in an orderly manner
4 by understanding
5 by meditation
6 by passionate seriousness
7 by being filled with awe
8 by good manners
9 by being alert
10 by association with learned men
11 by working together with one's fellow pupils
12 by taking part in pupil's discussions
13 by continuing to study both written and oral Torah with undeviating regularity
14 by moderation in business
15 by moderation in social life
16 by moderation in amusement
17 by taking little sleep
18 by speaking little
19 by moderation in joking
20 by long-suffering
21 by having a good heart
22 by having faith in the sages
23 by accepting trials and tribulations
24 by knowing one's place
25 by rejoicing in one's lot
26 by restricting one's words
27 by claiming no credit
28 by being loved by others
29 by loving God
30 by loving other people
31 by behaving rightly
32 by having integrity
33 by being open to criticism
34 by keeping oneself far from honours
35 by not being conceited about one's knowledge
36 by taking no pleasure in having to decide for others
37 by helping to bear other people's burdens
38 by wishing to see good rather than evil in others
39 by helping others to find the truth
40 by helping others to find peace
41 by learning conscientiously
42 by asking and by answering
43 by imbibing knowledge and developing it further oneself
44 by learning in order to teach ((what has been learnt))
45 by learning in order to practice ((what has been learnt))

46 by making one's teacher wiser
47 by repeating what one hears with precision
48 by always giving the name of whoever said what one is now repeating ((citing one's sources)).[39]

As it is basic to the Jewish tradition that everyone must attempt to acquire knowledge of the Torah, this set of rules is not meant for a specific group of students or simply for intellectuals, but for everyone. Everyone is supposed to learn throughout his life and the Torah regards everyone as a permanent pupil:
"If thou hast learnt much Torah, do not claim credit unto thyself because for such ((purpose)) wast thou created."[40]
"Let not this Book of the Teaching cease from your lips, but recite it day and night."[41]
Maimonides expands on the idea of a person as lifelong pupil for the male Jew (and not for the female Jew nor for man in general) (see III.1.1) in the following unequivocal terms:
"Every Israelite is under an obligation to study Torah, whether he is poor or rich, in sound health or ailing, in the vigour of youth or very old and feeble. Even a man so poor that he is maintained by charity or goes begging from door to door, as also a man with a wife and children to support, are under the obligation to set aside a definite period during the day and at night for the study of the Torah, as it is said, 'But thou shalt meditate therein day and night.'[42]
Among the greatest sages of Israel, some were hewers of wood, some drawers of water, while others were blind. Nevertheless, they devoted themselves by day and by night to the study of the Torah. They are included among the transmitters of the tradition in the direct line from Moses. Until what period in life ought one to study Torah? Until the day of one's death, as it is said, 'And lest they ((the rules of conduct)) depart from thy heart all the days of thy life.'[43] Whenever one ceases to study, one forgets."[44]
Learning begins in the cradle and in fact before birth (see section II.2.1).

Knowledge of the Torah cannot be inherited - Moses' successors were not his sons[45] - every pupil has to acquire knowledge by his own efforts:
"Fit thyself to study Torah for it is not ((a thing that comes)) into thee (as) an inheritance."[46]
Knowledge of the Torah is not transmitted by heredity but the Torah itself is an inheritance, the inheritance of the Jewish people:

"The teaching as the heritage of the congregation of Jacob" (i.e. the Jewish people)[47]
Every Jew has the inalienable right to the opportunity to study Torah and in contrast to what has sometimes been claimed, this right cannot be denied to women either: (see section II.1.1, Digression 1); the duty to learn assumes the right to acquire knowledge.

It is impossible here to expatiate on all the forty-eight ways leading to knowledge of the Torah, given at the beginning of this section. In the present context it will be sufficient to consider five principles which play an important role in Jewish tradition and which can also be thought of as making a valuable contribution to LL in general. The five principles will be referred to as rules of study; they comprise:
Rule of study 1: Learn lifelong,
Rule of study 2: Repeat what has been learnt,
Rule of study 3: Learn both individually and collectively,
Rule of study 4: Learn by putting into practice,
Rule of study 5: Plan your own learning.
Succeeding sections will deal with these rules.

Two concluding remarks:
1. It is amply clear from the forty-eight precepts that the Torah vision of lifelong learning is a matter of both head and heart and that it asks, if not the impossible, nevertheless a great deal from the pupil, intellectually morally and physically.
2. If man is considered as lifelong learner then both a duty and a right ensue, his constant duty to learn corresponding to the right he has to acquire knowledge.

III.1.3 Rule of study 1: learn lifelong

The exhortation to learn lifelong is not strictly a call to learn continuously and uninterruptedly. This would be beyond anyone's powers in any case. The word lifelong is to be taken in the sense of 'always': lifelong learning is learning that keeps on happening again and again and anyone who learns lifelong - that is to say the lifelong pupil -
(1) is not prone to put off learning because other important things claim priority,
(2) studies at fixed times, ideally every day.
Number one (absence of procrastination) can be illustrated by a quotation from Hillel:
"Say not: 'when I shall have leisure I shall study'. perhaps thou wilt not have leisure."[48]

and number two (learning at a fixed time and ideally every day) by two quotations:
"Shammai used to say, make thy (study of the) Torah (a matter of) established (regularity)."[49]
and do whatever else you have to do in the time that remains,[50] and try to learn every day, for:
"if you forsake the Torah for one day, the Torah will forsake you for two days."[51]
Anyone wishing to learn lifelong should not set up only learning-goals that can be reached within a foreseeable period because if he does only this, a time may come when there is nothing left for him to learn. Jewish tradition draws a line between the concepts of LL and any sort of practical profession: lifelong learning is done in order to become a complete human being or in order to please God, but not in order to become a doctor or rabbi. Lifelong learning is primary and any other form of work subsidiary:
"The correct approach is that of the early Saints, who made their Torah primary and their labour secondary, and were successful in both."[52]
The primacy of learning is not only true for 'saints' but for everyone:
"Nor (is it) everyone who engages much in business (that) becomes wise."[53]
"Do (rather) less business, and busy thyself (mainly) with the Torah."[54]
"He who gives up his study of Torah because he is rich will in the end have to give it up on account of poverty (Avot 4:11); while he who persists in the study of the Torah in poverty will in the end continue it in wealth." (Avot 4:11)[55]

Learning is entered into with the ultimate object of putting what has been learnt to the test in practical matters (see section 3.7, note 71 and also II.1.2), but this sort of practice has more to do with ordinary every-day life than with special professional activities or skills. Study of the Torah is independent of any concrete training, even training to become a rabbi.

Schoolchildren aged six and seven are, even at this early age, impressed through and through with the importance of lifelong learning:
"He ((the teacher)) is to teach them the whole day and part of the night, so as to train them to study by day and by night. And there is to be no holiday except on the eve of the Sabbath or festival, towards the close of the day, and on festivals."[56]

Bringing learning into practice receives the same stress as lifelong learning itself only when adulthood is reached. For children it is at first less important because children do not yet bear full responsibility for what they do.

DIGRESSION: The Hebrew (and Yiddish) word for the lifelong learner is ha-matmid,[57] a word that relates to the following words, among others:
hatmada[58] (adverb), constant and persistent study
matmid[59] (adverb), continuous, constant, preserving, lending stability
temidut[60] persistence, continuity
temidi[60] (adjective) constant, lasting
temidiut[60] consistancy, continuity.
Ha-Matmid is the title of a long poem on the lifelong learner and his learning by Ḥayyim Naḥman Bialik (1873-1934), "the greatest Hebrew poet of modern times, essayist, storywriter, translator, and editor, who exercised a profound influence on modern Jewish culture."[61] A German translation of the poem translates its title as 'Der Matmid' and adds:
"the consistently industrious man, name given to industrious Talmud student."[62]

III.1.4 Rule of study 2: Repetition

In Jewish tradition repetition is the corner stone of learning. Before going into the subject of repetition itself it would be as well to pause a moment to consider the underlying assumption that repetition in itself is or at least can be of value. This assumption implies that there is knowledge that retains its value; that there is knowledge that
- can be profitably studied both in youth and in old age,
- can be profitably studied by both father or parent, and son or child,
- all generations rightly attempt to assimilate.
The term 'Torah' or 'Jewish tradition'[63] is often used to mean the living portion of Jewish tradition and the living portion of Jewish tradition or of any other tradition is the part that includes whatever knowledge is of lasting value.[64]
This description can easily be misunderstood and therefore it must be said at once that the phrase 'knowledge that is of lasting value' does not imply that such knowledge can simply be applied in a summary and unpremediated way to any situation that may arise, but simply that it may well have something to offer in

solving present-day problems. It seems to me to go without saying that modern man can and must make use of non-traditional as well as traditional solving methods in order to cope with his problems. It should be added here that whatever proves to be of lasting value in the non-traditional knowledge of today will be part of the traditional knowledge of tomorrow.

Various reasons can be given in support of the practice of repetition. First of all a student who goes over his work again will retain what he learns better than one who doesn't:
"He who studies and does not go over it again is like a man who sows but does not reap."[65]
"The words of the Torah are not forgotten except for inattention in study."[66]
Secondly, going over it again gives the student a chance to understand more fully things that he understood only partially at first:
"One should always study the Torah first and meditate in it afterwards - Let one by all means learn, even though he is liable to forget, yes, even if he does not fully understand all the words which he studies."[67]
Thirdly, repetition enables the student to deepen and enrich his knowledge, his knowing how and knowing that:
"The more one meditates upon the words of the Torah, the more meaning they acquire."[68]
"The more the words of the Torah age and ripen in the mind and body of the learner, the more they improve."[69]
Finally, there is a fourth reason for repetition, particularly relevant to the student who wants to be a lifelong learner: regularly going over what he has learnt will make learning a habit which will become a second nature to him and a permanent part of his life.

A thirteenth-century writer sums op these reasons as follows:
"((The student)) should make it his duty to go over what he has learnt from his teacher in whatever subject, day and night, and he should not think that going over it twice or three times is enough, because by industriously going over a subject he will master it, consolidate his knowledge and fix it in his mind - otherwise it will all be superficial. This is because of the mysterious power of habit, just as the rope which draws the bucket up from the well will gradually wear away a groove in the curb stone."[70]
No student can ever claim to have finished learning and in the same way he can never come to the end of repeating

what he has learnt. Repetition, like learning,[71] is without end:
"He who repeats his chapter a hundred times is not to be compared to him who repeats it a hundred and one times."[72]
Repetition is seen neither as a daily chore nor as a way of learning parrot fashion but as an inner process:
"There is a story about a learned man who came to see the Kotzker. No longer young - he was close to thirty - the visitor had never before been to a rebbe. 'What have you done all your life?' the master asked him. 'I have gone through the whole Talmud three times,' answered the guest. 'Yes, but how much of the Talmud has gone through you?' Reb Mendl inquired.[73]
The point is not what the pupil does with his knowledge but what the knowledge does with the pupil. The knowledge assimilated by the pupil must change him for the good and influence his conduct for the better.

III.1.5 Rule of study 3: Learn both individually and collectively

Learning is something every student has to do for himself, but in order to do it he also needs other people. It is an activity neither exclusively individual nor exclusively social, but both. Learning in isolation can swiftly become unmotivated and easily gives rise to errors that the student himself fails to notice and is therefore not in a position to correct. This is why collective study is also necessary and the student has to learn in a group. By literally learning together, and by taking part in group discussion of what has been learnt, students create the ambience in which their mistakes can be corrected, their will to work strengthened, their knowledge clarified, broadened and made more profound.[74]

The Torah stresses the importance of collective study in the following words:
"The words of the Torah do not endure with one who limits himself to private study alone"[75]
adding that this leads to eccentricity and incorrect practice[76] so that one should learn in company with others:
"Form yourselves into bands to study the Torah, for the Torah is not acquired except in groups."[77]
"Transport yourself to a place of Torah, and do not say that it will follow you. For it will endure as yours through study with your colleagues, and do not rely upon your understanding"[78]
and Maimonides paraphrases this with:

"Seek the place of study and learning. For with someone else study will be made possible for you and it will endure. Do not rely upon your sagacity and say that you do not require colleagues and students to bestir you.[79]
Collective study is stimulating:
"Just as fire cannot ignite by itself, so the words of the Torah cannot endure with him who studies alone."[80]
"Just as one piece of iron sharpens another, so do two students of the Law ((halakhah)) stimulate one another in the study of the Law."[81]

For the novice learner it is less essential to learn both individually and collectively than for the more advanced or permanent learners. The beginner is bound to rely on concentrated assistance from a teacher and cannot yet acquire knowledge on his own, either by himself or in a group. Rule 3 does, however, apply to advanced and life-long students and also to those who already have the reputation of being learned:
"Just as a small piece of wood kindles the larger piece, so do lesser scholars, by their inquiries, sharpen the scholarship of the greater scholars."[82]

It is significant that in a tradition where learning is paramount, a learned man is normally known as a talmud student (talmid hakham) and not a talmud sage. Even the wisest of all has never done with learning and should never let himself forget that he owes a large part of his knowledge to other people.[83]

In collective learning students alternate the roles of teacher and pupil and find both equally instructive. If, having learnt something, the student nonetheless discovers that he is unable to convey it to his companions, this often means that he himself has not fully understood and should study the subject once again. If, on the other hand, he can put it over succesfully then it is quite certain that he himself also understands it.
What has been said here with reference to the pupil in the role of teacher is also true of the 'real' teacher. If a teacher did not learn so much from teaching, Jewish tradition would not regard the profession as such a noble one and God would never be presented as teacher.[84] To teach is to walk in one of the forty-eight ways that lead to knowledge of the Torah[85] and the possibility of learning in the act of teaching has been expressed by the rabbi Hanina in the words:
"I have learnt much from my teachers, and from my

colleagues more than from my teachers, but from my disciples more than from them all."[86]
Later on, in chapter III.4, the teacher's role will be dealt with in greater depth as will also the relationship between pupil and teacher. Both pupil and teacher are there *not principally to keep education going* but to advance learning.[87] Anyone acting as teacher in a teaching-learning process who finds no echo of rabbi Hanina's words in his life, would be well-advised to look for a different position where he can learn better. To learn is better than to teach; Maimonides explains the precept
"Be thou a tail unto lions and not a head unto foxes"[88]
by saying that
"When a man is a student to one who is wiser than he, it is more beneficial to him, and it is more suitable than his being a teacher to one of lesser stature than he."[89]

A company of people engaged in lifelong learning, learning both day and night, will inevitably include some individual learners. All members of a learning society, young and old, will not, as a rule, be content or competent to learn only collectively. Individual learning will also have to have its place and should be recognized as of positive value:
"(When there are) ten sitting together and occupying themselves with Torah, the Shekhinah ((the Divine Presence)) abides among them"[90]
and this holds good for five or three or two or even for a single person studying individually:
"and whence (do we infer that) the same (applies) even (when there is) one? (from) that which is said: in every place where I cause my name to be mentioned, I will come unto thee and bless thee. (Ex. 20:21)"[91]

In Jewish tradition the basic structure of all learning processes - and also of all teaching-learning processes - is some combination of individual and collective learning, studying alone and studying in and with a group. Smallest of all groups is a group of two; learning in pairs has already been done for centuries:
"Appoint for thyself a teacher and acquire for thyself a companion and judge all men in the scale of merit."[92]
Learning in groups of more than two is done in schools[93] (yeshivot) mostly by mature and advanced students and outside the world of school lifelong learning in groups has led to the formation of all sorts of fellowships for the advancement of learning, the so-called hevrot,[94] which may be likened to guilds or student fellowships for

lifelong learners:
"The crown of Jewish social life was the hevrot organised solely for the purposes of lehrnen - learning and the pursuit of Jewish study. The Jewish occupational and charitable holy brotherhoods had their counterparts in the Christian guilds, but there are no parallels in any other religious culture to the holy brotherhoods for Jewish learning."[95]
The most erudite members of Jewish society would be members of a Hevrah Shas, a foundation for talmud study.[96] Those with less talmudic training would belong to a Hevrah Mishnayot, a foundation for the study of the mishnah. In addition there were also foundations for the study of the Hummash (the Pentateuch)[97] and related literature such as midrash, of the codices or collections of halakhic conclusions, of ethical works such as the aggadah compilations, or mystical writings such as the Zohar. Finally, for the relatively uneducated there were many other foundations where psalms were recited.
In the preceding paragraph the terms 'erudite' and 'uneducated' mean respectively erudite and uneducated in knowledge of the Torah and Torah culture. Only during the last hundred years has the situation arisen of there being innumerable learned Jewish intellectuals, writers and artists for whom the Torah is a closed book.

III.1.6 Rule of study 4: Learn by putting into practice

There is often an enormous gap between theory and practice, between what people know - knowing how and knowing that - and what they do. The business of a human being is to bridge this gap. In this connection it is interesting to compare the quotation from Martin Buber given on p. 56 (section 3.7) with the following three theses put forward by Karl Marx:
"Feuerbach, dissatisfied with abstract thought, prefers intuition but does not conceive of the world of the senses in terms of practical human activity (Thesis 5).
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which give rise to the theory of mysticism have a rational explanation in human praxis and in the comprehension of this praxis (Thesis 8).
All the philosophers have done is to interpret the world in different ways; what really matters is changing it (Thesis 11)."[98]
The crux of the matter is not interpreting society but changing it. Different interpretations are to be judged by the quality of the changes they bring about in man and in the world. If they improve matters they are of value,

and if not then they are worthless. Marx' critique has in mind philosophers who refuse to stray outside theoretical descriptions and never take account of the practical consequences of their theories. In making this critique Marx places himself in the line of Jewish tradition and in this respect he can undoubtedly be called a Jewish thinker: the mishnah says:
"study ((the interpretation)) is not the most important thing, but the deed."[99]
Under 'praxis' Marx puts among other things, man in society, in the production process, in work relationships, in poverty relationships.[100] For the Torah, praxis means the whole of a person's being as it expresses itself in every aspect of human behaviour, in what you do, how you arrange your life, what choices you make, how you behave with other people and towards yourself, your style of life and how you employ your time. In short, the way a human being appears in action.

Torah is concerned not only with learning and education but also with behaviour;
"In its wide meaning, ((the term Torah)) includes all the studies of Judaism, both whatever refers to belief and practices and whatever refers to the study itself."[191]
Yet while the term 'Torah' is to be applied to doing as well as learning, in most contexts it comes in conjunction with the concept of learning.[102] From this the erroneous conclusion is drawn that in Jewish tradition learning is more important than doing. This in itself is incorrect and it is also wrong to suppose that the insight acquired through learning automatically leads to right action. The idea that right action is a question of knowledge may fit in with the socratic picture of man[103] but it is not part of the Jewish image. Moreover, anyone who can still believe in this 'socratic' notion in the face of the multitude of historical examples of misuse of intellect, must be both naive and unaware of the facts. When Maimonides writes:
"Of all precepts ((rules of conduct)), none is equal in importance to the study of the Torah. Nay, study of the Torah is equal to them all,[104] for study leads to practice.[105] Hence, study always takes precedence of practice"[106]
he does not mean that study automatically leads to practice but that it should have practical consequences. An extra effort is required from each individual pupil if he is to apply correctly what he has learnt, not only at a particular moment during the learning or teaching-learning process, but also in his life thereafter.

Here we have a paradox: the pupil is learning in order to live and in the very midst of the learning process he is suddenly brought to a halt on the edge of the gulf that yawns between learning on one side and life on the other.

The gap between learning and life.

A person may persevere in the study of all the halakhic rules of conduct - indicating that he is far advanced - and yet behave as a scoundrel: knowledge is no guarantee of good behaviour:

"It is not impossible for a man to be learned in the Torah and act the scoundrel. The Rabbi's are aware of 'the learned who study Bible and Mishnah' and who are not honest in their business dealings;[107] of the learned who quarrel with one another;[108] and of the hate engendered by scholastic jealousy, even those who know Mishnah hating sometimes those knowing Talmud.[109] In fine, the Rabbi's realize that there are 'Men who come to the Bible and Mishnah and are sullied with ugly ways and unseemly things,' a euphemism for sins."[110,111]

The opposite may also be true. People can achieve distinction in society neither being particularly learned nor knowing the Torah:

"The Rabbi's know of the ignorant 'in whom there are Derek Erez ((social conduct)) and the rest of the mizwot ((rules of conduct)), who keep themselves far from transgression and from every unsightly thing;'[112] and ignorant men with these qualities they designate as upright.[113]

A man may know neither Bible nor Mishnah, and be able to pray only the main prayers, and yet guard himself from sin."[114,115]

Learning and knowledge are neither indispensable nor sufficient conditions for acting correctly: an ignorant person does not necessarily behave badly nor a learned person well. There is in fact a discontinuity between theory and practice, learning and life, and the question is, how can it be bridged?

Bridging the gap between learning and life.

While human actions may sometimes be resultant upon human knowledge, they are capable in turn of originating and influencing knowledge. People learn from what they do. The deed instructs, and[116] overt actions can give rise to inner changes and produce learning effects:

"Through outward actions, which are under his control, he can affect his inner self."[117]

The only way to bridge the gap between learning and life is to put learning to the test of living and bring both into harmony:

"...his deeds be consistent with his words, as they said: 'Pleasant are the words that emanate from the mouth of one who practices them" and it was to this subject that he ((Simon, son of Rabban Gamliël)) referred when he said: 'The expounding is not the fundamental point, but the practice'."[119,120]

In the harmonization process neither learning nor life should be regarded as immutable: there is no learning that can dispense with adjustment and no life that is only worth living in one particular way. This holds for all learning and all lives. In the Torah, learning and life are fitted together in a continuing analytic process. Only by putting what he has learnt into practice (rule 4) can the pupil discover its meaning or at least the meaning it can have, and the relation or possible relation between learning and life:

"Man is affected by all his actions; his heart and all his thoughts follow the deeds which he does, whether good or bad. Though one be altogether wicked at heart and all his inclinations be always evil, if he makes a valiant effort to continually study the Torah and follow its commandments, even if not out of pure motives, he will in course of time incline towards the good, and, despite his engaging in religious pursuits out of impure motives, he will come to follow them for their own sake ... On the other hand a perfectly righteous person, whose heart is upright and sincere, who takes delight in the Torah and its commandments, but engages in offensive matters - say, for example, that the king compelled him to pursue an evil occupation - if he devoted himself to that business all the time, he will ultimately turn from his righteousness and become wicked."[121]

In a living tradition, learning and life, theory and practice, exert a reciprocal influence. It would be foolish to hold that a lifelong learner should only begin to apply his learning when he has finished acquiring it, for such a time never comes, so what might seem a mere delay would in fact mean never doing anything at all and would, in addition, deprive him of the chance of learning from his actions.

The Torah is not only a study but a way of life. Therefore Torah study means studying both learning and life. The lifelong learner studies, applies what he has studied, interprets what he has learnt and evaluates how it has been applied. Learning finds its consummation in the life of the pupils and not in the learning itself:

"The goal of wisdom is repentance and good deeds, so that a man should not study Bible and Mishnah and then despise his father and mother, his teacher or his superior in

wisdom, as it is said: 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; a good understanding have all they that do thereafter' (Ps. 111:10). It does not say 'all that learn' but 'all that do'."[122]
The pupil is bound to analyze not only his learning but his life; not only his way of life or what he learns but also the way in which he applies what he learns in his daily life.[123] Moreover, he must compare what he himself learns and does with what others learn and do and always be ready and able to recognize mistakes and where he is making them. This disposition, this being ready and able, is called by the Torah 'fear' and is the beginning of all wisdom. It is an intellectual and moral quality capable of ensuring that the pupil is not blind to the defects in his own thought and deeds (see also section III.3.2).
If the pupil analyzes what he thinks and does and what others think and do and tries to improve, then he is throwing the much sought after bridge across the gulf between learning and life, theory and practice.

III.1.7 Rule of study 5: Plan your own learning

Typical of Jewish tradition is that the individual's daily life is shaped according to halakhic rules.[124] It includes his daily study in school, or in a group or by himself, and this too is governed by rules and institutionalized. The reglementation and institutionalization of the daily life of the individual which makes it the province of the halakhah, also influences the forms of organization and life patterns of the society of which the individual is a part.
The lifelong learner who plans his own learning is himself exerting an influence on his milieu
- by making every situation a learning situation,
- by taking part in or initiating many different forms of individual and collective learning,
- by working for the foundation and maintenance of schools and study houses[125] and for the setting up of learning cells (study groups and study centres) attached to virtually every organization.

It is the learning members of the community who make it into a learning community. By taking upon themselves the duty to study and by creating concrete space for learning, they establish a learning community. In the nineteenth century, when compulsory education was introduced in various European countries, it has already been in existence in the Jewish tradition for two thousand years. But there were differences: firstly, to learn was only compulsory for boys and men,[126] and secondly, it was

compulsory for adults as well as for children. The obligation to learn was not linked of itself to school attendance or even scholastic instruction; whether the pupils were children or grown-ups made no difference.[127] In spite of the fact that 'school' was already an age-old institution, this was not the basis of lifelong learning: its basis was the individual pupil who organized his daily life in order to devote a definite daily period to learning.

Something must at once be said on the subject of schools, the beginning of schools and school attendance. There are two traditions on this subject, one from the Palestinian and the other from the Babylonian talmud:
"The Palestinian Talmud says of Simeon ben Shetah, who was president of the sanhedrin during the reign of Alexander Jannaeus and Salome (103-76 BCE) that he ordained 'that children go to school'."[128,129]
The Babylonian talmud contains another, more detailed tradition:
"Rabbi Judah has told us in the name of Rab to wit: Verily the name of that man is to be blessed, Joshua ben Gamala, for but for him the Torah would have been forgotten from Israel. For at first if a child had a father, his father taught him, and if he had no father he did not learn at all...They then made an ordinance that teachers of children should be appointed in Jerusalem... Even so, however, if a child had a father, the father would take him up to Jerusalem and have him taught there; and if not, he would not go up to learn there. They, therefore, ordained that teachers should be appointed in each prefecture, and that boys should enter school at the age of sixteen or seventeen. They did so; and if the teacher punished them, they used to rebel and leave the school. At length Joshua ben Gamala came and ordained that teachers of young children should be appointed in each district and each town and that children should enter school at the age of six or seven."[130]
It is not clear whether these two traditions are contradictory or complementary. Joshua ben Gamal lived in the first century of the Common Era,[131] thus later than Simeon ben Shetah. In addition to these two traditions there are also other sources that indicate
"...that in the first century not only a basic knowledge of Jewish culture was widespread, but also that schools existed in all towns and even in the smaller settlements."[132]
In those times, wherever the pattern of life was dictated by the halakhah there were schools and there was learning.

But at the same time there were communities which did not organize daily life on the basis of the halakhah and it was precisely in such areas that instruction and learning were neglected:
"There existed settlements which were not organized according to the Halakhah, which had no proper schools and 'which did not employ teachers of the written and oral law,' as we hear from the complaints of sages at later times.[133] There were children who did not study at all during their childhood."[134]
However, this was the exception rather than the rule. In the first century children generally went to school, learnt to read the five books of Moses (the Pentateuch), and acquired the bases of knowledge which would serve them in later life.[135] From that time onwards no organized Jewish community would be without some sort of provision for schooling for children.[136]
So much for the schools and organized learning for the pre-adult pupils.

Adult education is just as deeply-rooted in the past as that of children, but there is a clear distinction between the two when it comes to who was permitted to learn. Education for children was destined for all boys[137] but adult education was not invariably intended for all male adults:
"Some wanted to teach the Law only to apt and deserving pupils and trained disciples only from among those whose 'inside was as their outside', but others taught everyone and trained everyone who came to them, without examining who it was who came to study the Torah."[138]
On the whole, adults are more independent than children, which appears in the way they learn and their attitude to their teacher and to what they learn. Adults are more inclined than children to stress what they themselves learn rather than the instruction they receive. For that reason it is preferable not to speak of 'schools' for adults but of houses of study. Wherever there was a Jewish community there was also a house of study where both individual and collective learning went on, and where regular lectures were given.

The schools were responsible for introducing the idea of permanent study to the pupils and the houses of study helped to maintain the process of lifelong learning. It would be inappropriate here to describe or even list all the types of school and study house familiar to Jewish tradition,[139] nor is it necessary. Our concern is with lifelong learning and not with permanent education: with

the lifelong learning of students but not with the instruction they receive during that life. Institutes of education are important of course, but Jewish tradition lays responsibility for lifelong learning squarely on the shoulders of each individual student and not on the institutes. This, I think, is right.[140] The only educational systems developed in Jewish tradition have been ones in which the accent is not on education by the teacher but on learning on the part of the pupil.[141] The Torah seems to me to display particular insight in looking at education, of adults certainly but also of children, as primarily learning together, involving pupils and teachers in a single activity, rather than as a process in which the teacher teaches and the pupil learns. This notion would seem to be an element essential to much of modern PE theory, but is, in fact, all too often sadly absent. Schools and houses of study are organized bodies for the advancement of pupils' learning. Pupils who attend a school or house of study are given help in organizing their own potentially lifelong study, whether this actually takes place within the school or house of study or not. The efficacy of the help they receive, however, depends entirely on the pupils' own personal commitment to study lifelong, and on their capacity to make a place for learning in their daily schedule. In Jewish tradition, the instrument by which this capacity is to be translated into concrete terms is the halakhah, or, in other words, a collection of rules which imparts direction to the daily learning of individual students and which itself rests on their readiness to engage in lifelong learning. The two most famous examples of halakhah by means of which lifelong learning can be organized, are given below. The first is Maimonides' and the second Joseph Karo's. The two compilations make up part of a larger system of rules, or codex, and include the rules of study that have already been discussed (III.1.3-III.1.6).
Maimonides and Karo have been quoted in full because one rarely meets with detailed illustrations of rule 5 (plan your own learning) so it seems worthwhile to give the whole text here. They also provide excellent insight into the nature of halakhah, at least in so far as learning is concerned. Any reader who finds the text too long is at liberty to move straight on to example 3.

Finally, these are only examples, and examples are meant to illustrate rather than to authenticate. I would implore every reader confronted with these two texts, never to forget that what he is reading is halakhah, and

that taken out of context, and in isolation from the aggadah, halakhah gives a one-sided and distorted view of Jewish tradition (see I.1 and I.2). Jewish tradition cannot be judged on the basis of its halakhah alone, any more than a school can be judged merely on the showing of rules and syllabus. It is essential to remember that the context of these compilations of rules is not a petrified community but a many-stranded cord of living tradition.

EXAMPLE 1: Maimonides' rules (12th century)

The text is from Goldman (1975), pp. 136-150. He gives Maimonides' Hilkhot Talmud Torah, leaving out rules 1:1-7, 2:1-7. Apparently Goldman leaves these out because he is writing mainly about adult education[142] and the rules he omits deal with children's education and with the proscription of pupils and sages and with lifting such a proscription. Strictly speaking these rules are not connected with adult education even though they concern lifelong learning. The whole of Maimonides' 'Hilkhot Talmud Torah' is given here because every single passage is relevant to 'Jewish tradition and Lifelong Learning'. At the end Goldman adds some further rules from Maimonides' oeuvre, illustrating the elevated status of Torah study, but coming from a different place in the codex. The English translations are all by the same hand.

The first great compendium of Jewish jurisprudence was the Mishneh Torah, popularly called the Yad Hazakah ('Strong Hand'), by Moses Maimonides, completed in the year 1180. Maimonides designed his code to be "a compendium of all the oral law, ordinances, customs and decrees from the days of Moses, our master, to the close of the Talmud, including the interpretations of the Geonim since that time." This monumental code opens, significantly, with the sefer ha-Mada, the 'Book of Knowledge', which contains the oft-quoted Hilkhot Talmud Torah, the 'Laws Concerning the Study of Torah'. These in turn are subdivided into chapters and sections dealing with the affirmative precepts (mitzvot Aseh) to study the Torah and to honor its teachers as well as those versed in it. The following passages from the Hilkhot Talmud Torah are all relevant to our theme of lifelong learning among Jews.[143]

((Rules 1: 1-7))

1.1 Women, slaves and the young (under the age of puberty) are exempt from the obligation of studying Torah. But it

is a duty of the father to teach his young son Torah: as it is said, "And ye shall teach them, to your children, talking of them" (Deut. 11:19). A woman is under no obligation to teach her son, since only one whose duty it is to learn has a duty to teach.

1.2 Just as it is a man's duty to teach his son, so it is his duty to teach his grandson, as it is said, "Make them known unto thy children and thy children's children" (Deut. 4:9). This obligation is to be fulfilled not only towards a son and grandson. A duty rests on every scholar in Israel to teach all disciples (who seek instruction from him), even if they are not his children, as it is said, "And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children" (Deut. 6:7). On traditional authority, the term 'thy children' includes disciples, for disciples too are called children, as it is said, "And the sons of the prophets came forth" (II Kings 2:3). This being so, why does the precept (concerning instruction) specifically mention (Deut. 4:9) a man's son and son's son? To impress upon us that the son should receive instruction in preference to a grandson, and a grandson in preference to another man's son.

1.3 A father (who cannot teach his son) is bound to engage a paid teacher for him. But the only obligation one owes to a neighbour's son is to teach him when it involves no expense. If a father has not had his son taught, it is the duty of the latter, as soon as he realizes his deficiencies, to acquire knowledge for himself, as it is said, "That ye may learn them and observe to do them" (Deut. 5:1). And so too, you will find that study in all cases takes precedence of practice, since study leads to practice, but practice does not lead to study.

1.4 If a man needs to learn Torah and has a son who needs instruction, his own requirements are to be satisfied first. But if his son has better capacity and greater ability to grasp what he learns, then the son's education takes precedence. Still, even in this case, the father must not wholly neglect the study of the Torah. For, just as it is incumbent on him to have his son taught, so is he under an obligation to obtain instruction for himself.

1.5 A man should always first study Torah and then marry; for if he takes a wife first, his mind will not be free for study. But if his physical desires are so overpowering

as to preoccupy his mind, he should marry and then study Torah.

1.6 When should a father commence his son's instruction in Torah? As soon as the child begins to talk, the father should teach him the text "Moses commanded us a law" (Deut. 33:4), and the first verse of the Shema ("Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one") (Deut. 6:4). Later on, according to the child's capacity, the father should teach him a few verses at a time, till he attains the age of six or seven years, when he should take him to a teacher of young children.

1.7 If it is the custom of the country for a teacher of children to receive remuneration, the father is to pay the fee, and it is his duty to have his son taught, even if he has to pay for the instruction, till the child has gone through the whole of the Written Law. Where it is the custom to charge a fee for teaching the Written Law, it is permissible to take payment for such instruction. It is forbidden however to teach the Oral Law for payment, for it is said "Behold, I have taught you the statutes and ordinances, even as the Lord, my God, commanded me" (Deut. 4:5). This means: "Even as I (Moses) learnt (from God) without payment, so have ye learnt from me, gratuitously. And throughout the generations, whenever you teach, do so gratuitously, even as you learnt from me." If a person cannot find any one willing to teach him without remuneration, he should engage a paid teacher, as it is said "Buy the truth" (Prov. 23:23). It should not however be assumed that it is permissible to take pay for teaching. For the verse continues "And sell it not", the inference being, that even where a man had been obliged to pay for instruction (in the Oral Law), he is nevertheless forbidden to charge, in his turn, for teaching it.

((The Obligation of Life-long Learning))

Every Israelite is under an obligation to study Torah, whether he is poor or rich, in sound health or ailing, in the vigour of youth or very old and feeble. Even a man so poor that he is maintained by charity or goes begging from door to door, as also a man with a wife and children to support, are under the obligation to set aside a definite period during the day and at night for the study of the Torah, as it is said "But thou shalt meditate therein day and night" (Josh. 1:8). Among the great sages of Israel, some were hewers of wood, some drawers of water, while others were blind. Nevertheless, they

devoted themselves by day and by night to the study of the Torah. They are included among the transmitters of the tradition in the direct line from Moses.
Until what period in life ought one to study Torah? Until the day of one's death, as it is said, "And lest they (the precepts) depart from thy heart all the days of thy life" (Deut. 4:9). Whenever one ceases to study, one forgets. ((1. 8-19))

((What to study))

The time allotted to study should be divided into three parts. A third should be devoted to the Written Law; a third to the Oral Law; and the last third should be spent in reflection, deducing conclusions from premises, developing implications of statements, comparing dicta, studying the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted, till one knows the essence of these principles, and how to deduce what is permitted and what is forbidden from what one has learnt traditionally. This is termed Talmud.
For example, if one is an artisan who works at his trade three hours daily and devotes nine hours to the study of the Torah, he should spend three of these nine hours in the study of the Written Law, three in the study of the Oral Law, and the remaining three in reflecting on how to deduce one rule from another. The words of the Prophets are comprised in the Written Law, while their exposition falls within the category of the Oral Law. The subjects styled Pardes (Esoteric Studies) are included in Talmud. This plan applies to the period when one begins learning. But after one has become proficient and no longer needs to learn the Written Law, or continually be occupied with the Oral Law, he should, at fixed times, read the Written Law and the traditional dicta, so as not to forget any of the rules of the Torah, and should devote all his days exclusively to the study of Talmud, according to his breadth of mind and maturity of intellect. ((1. 11-12)

((Education of Women))

A woman who studies Torah will be recompensed, but not in the same measure as a man, for study was not imposed on her as a duty, and one who performs a meritorious act which is not obligatory will not receive the same reward as one upon whom it is uncumbent and who fulfills it as a duty, but only a lesser award. And notwithstanding that she is recompensed, yet the Sages have warned us that a man shall not teach his daughter Torah, as the majority

of women have not a mind adequate for its study but, because of their limitations, will turn the words of the Torah into trivialities. The sages said "He who teaches his daughter Torah - it is as if he taught her wantonness." This stricture refers only to instruction in the Oral Law. With regard to the Written Law, he ought not to teach it to her; but if he has done so, it is not regarded as teaching her wantonness. ((1.13)

((Rules 2: 1-7))

2.1 Teachers of young children are to be appointed in each province, district and town. If a city has made no provision for the education of the young, its inhabitants are placed under a ban, till such teachers have been engaged. And if they persistently neglect this duty, the city is excommunicated, for the world is only maintained by the breath of school children.

2.2 Children are to be sent to school at the age of six or seven years, according to the strength of the individual child and its physical development. But no child is to be sent to school under six years of age. The teacher may chastise his pupils to inspire them with awe. But he must not do so in a cruel manner or in a vindictive spirit. Accordingly, he must not strike them with whips or sticks, but only use a small strap. He is to teach them the whole day and part of the night, so as to train them to study by day and by night. And there is to be no holiday except on the eve of the Sabbath or festival, towards the close of the day, and on festivals. On Sabbaths, pupils are not taught a new lesson, but they repeat what they had already learnt previously, even if only once. Pupils must not be interrupted at their studies, even for the re-building of the Temple.

2.3 A teacher who leaves the children and goes out (when he should be teaching them), or does other work while he is with them, or teaches lazily, falls under the ban "Cursed be he that doeth the work of the Lord with a slack hand" (Jer. 48:10). Hence, it is not proper to appoint any one as teacher unless he is God-fearing and well versed in reading and in grammar.

2.4 An unmarried man should not keep school for the young because the mothers come to see their children. Nor should any woman keep school, because the fathers come to see them.

2.5 Twenty-five children may be put in charge of one teacher. If the number in the class exceeds twenty-five but is not more than forty, he should have an assistant to help with the instruction. If there are more than forty, two teachers must be appointed.

2.6 A child may be transferred from one teacher to another who is more competent in reading or grammar, only however, if both the teacher and the pupil live in the same town and are not separated by a river. But we must not take the child to school in another town nor even across a river in the same town, unless it is spanned by a firm bridge, not likely soon to collapse.

2.7 If one of the residents in an alley or even in a court wishes to open a school, his neighbours cannot prevent him. Nor can a teacher, already established, object to another teacher opening a school next door to him, either for new pupils or even with the intention of drawing away pupils from the existing school, for it is said, "The Lord was pleased for His righteousness' sake, to make the Torah great and glorious" (Is. 42:21).

((The Crown of the Torah - Its Claim to Primacy))

With three crowns was Israel crowned - with the crown of the Torah, with the crown of the priesthood and with the crown of sovereignty. The crown of the priesthood was bestowed upon Aaron, as it is said, "And it shall be unto him and unto his seed after him, the covenant of an everlasting priesthood" (Num. 25:13). The crown of sovereignty was conferred upon David, as it is said, "His seed shall endure forever, and his throne as the sun before Me" (Ps. 89:37). The crown of the Torah, however, is for all Israel, as it is said, "Moses commanded us a law, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob" (Deut. 33:4). Whoever desires it can win it. Do not suppose that the other two crowns are greater than the crown of the Torah, for it is said, "By me, kings reign and princes decree justice. By me, princes rule (Prov. 8:15-16). Hence the inference, that the crown of the Torah is greater than the other two crowns.
The sages said, "A bastard who is a scholar takes precedence of an ignorant High Priest, for it is said, 'More precious it is than rubies' (Prov. 3:15), that is (more to be honoured is the scholar) than the High Priest who enters the innermost sanctuary. (A play upon the word Peninim ((rubies)) taken as Lifny v'lifnim ((High Priest who entered the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement)))."

Of all precepts, none is equal in importance to the study of the Torah. Nay, study of the Torah is equal to them all, for study leads to practice. Hence, study always takes precedence of practice. If the opportunity of fulfilling a specific precept would interrupt the study of the Torah and the precept can be performed by others, one should not intermit study. Otherwise, the precept should be performed and then the study be resumed.
At the judgment hereafter, a man will first be called to account in regard to his fulfillment of the duty of study and afterwards concerning his other activities. Hence, the sages said, "A person should always occupy himself with the Torah, whether for its own sake or for other reasons. For study of the Torah, even when pursued from interested motives, will lead to study for its own sake." ((3. 1-5))

((Learning Before Riches))

He whose heart prompts him to fulfill this duty properly, and to be crowned with the crown of the Torah, must not allow his mind to be diverted to other objects. He must not aim at acquiring Torah as well as riches and honour at the same time. "This is the way for the study of the Torah. A morsel of bread with salt thou must eat, and water by measure thou must drink; thou must sleep upon the ground and live a life of hardship, the while thou toilest in the Torah" (Ethics of the Fathers 6:4). "It is not incumbent upon thee to complete the task; but neither art thou free to neglect it" (ibid. 2:21). "And if thou hast studied much Torah, thou hast earned much reward. The recompense will be proportionate to the pains" (ibid. 5:26). (The numbering of the paragraphs in the Ethics of the Fathers in the editions of the Mishna and in the editions of the liturgy does not always correspond.)
Possibly you may say: When I shall have accumulated money, I shall resume my studies; when I shall have provided for my needs and have leisure from my affairs, I shall resume my studies. Should such a thought enter your mind, you will never win the crown of the Torah. "Rather make the study of the Torah your fixes occupation" (ibid. 1:15) and let your secular affairs engage you casually, and do not say: "When I shall have leisure, I shall study; perhaps you may never have leisure" (ibid. 2:5).
In the Torah it is written, "It is not in heaven ... neither is it beyond the sea" (Deut. 30:12-13). "It is not in heaven," this means that the Torah is not to be found with the arrogant: "nor beyond the seas," that is, it is not found among those who cross the ocean. Hence,

our sages said, "Nor can one who is engaged overmuch in business grow wise" (Ethics of the Fathers 2:6). They have also exhorted us: "Engage little in business and occupy thyself with the Torah" (ibid. 4:12). ((3. 6-8))

((Study Requires Humility and the Simple Life))

The words of the Torah have been compared to water, as it is said, "O every one that thirsteth, come ye for water" (Isa. 55:1); this teaches us that just as water does not accumulate on a slope but flows away, while in a depression it stays, so the Words of the Torah are not to be found in the arrogant or haughty but only in him who is contrite and lowly in spirit, who sits in the dust at the feet of the wise and banishes from his heart lusts and temporal delights; works a little daily, but just enough to provide for his needs, if he would otherwise have nothing to eat, and devotes the rest of the day and night to the study of the Torah.

One, however, who makes up his mind to study Torah and not work but live on charity, profanes the name of God, brings the Torah into contempt, extinguishes the light of religion, brings evil upon himself and deprives himself of life hereafter, for it is forbidden to derive any temporal advantage from the words of the Torah. The sages said, "Whoever derives a profit for himself from the words of the Torah is helping on his own destruction" (Ethics of the Fathers 4:17). They have further charged us, "Make not of them a crown wherewith to aggrandise thyself, nor a spade wherewith to dig" (ibid. 4:7). They likewise exhorted us, "Love work, hate lordship" (ibid. 1:10). "All study of the Torah, not conjoined with work, must, in the end, be futile, and become a cause of sin" (ibid. 2:2). The end of such a person will be that he will rob his fellow-creatures.

It indicates a high degree of excellence in a man to maintain himself by the labour of his hands. And this was the normal practice of the early saints. Thus, one secures all honour and happiness here and hereafter, as it is said, "When thou eatest of the labour of thine hands, happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with thee" (Ps. 128:2). Happy shalt thou be in this world, and it shall be well with thee in the world to come, which is altogether good.

The words of the Torah do not abide with one who studies listlessly, nor with those who learn amidst luxury, and high living, but only with one who mortifies himself for the sake of the Torah, constantly enduring physicial discomfort, and not permitting sleep to his eyes nor slumber

to his eyelids. "This is the law, when a man dieth in a tent" (Num. 19:14). The sages explained the text metaphorically thus: "The Torah only abides with him who mortifies himself in the tents of the wise." And so Solomon, in his wisdom, said, "If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small indeed" (Prov. 24:10). He also said, "Also my wisdom stood unto me" (Eccles. 2:9). This is explained by our wise men thus, "The wisdom that I learnt in wrath. (Play upon the word aph, meaning 'also' and 'wrath'.) - this has remained with me." The sages said, "There is a solemn covenant that anyone who toils at his studies in the Synagogue, where it was customary to study privately, will not quickly forget." He who toils privately in learning, will become wise as it is said, "With the lowly (literally, the reserved) is wisdom" (Prov. 11:2). If one recites aloud while studying, what he learns will remain with him. But he who reads silently soon forgets. ((3. 9-12))

((Methods of study))

While it is a duty to study by day and by night, most of one's knowledge is acquired at night. Accordingly, when one aspires to win the crown of the Torah, he should be especially heedful of all his nights and not waste a single one of them in sleep, eating, drinking, idle talk and so forth, but devote all of them to study of the Torah and words of wisdom. The sages said, "That sound of the Torah has worth, which is heard by night, as it is said, 'Arise, cry out in the night' (Lam. 2:19) and whoever occupies himself with the study of the Torah at night - a mark of spiritual grace distinguishes him by day, as it is said, 'By day the Lord will command His loving kindness, and in the night His song shall be with me, even a prayer unto the God of my life' (Ps. 42:9). A house wherein the words of the Torah are not heard at night will be consumed by fire, as it is said, 'All darkness is laid up for his treasures; a fire not blown by man shall consume him' (Job 20:26). 'Because he hath despised the word of the Lord' (Num. 15:31) - this refers to one who has utterly neglected (the study of) the words of the Torah." And, so too, one who is able to occupy himself with the Torah and does not do so, or who had read Scripture and learnt Mishnah and gave them up for worldly inanities, and abandoned and completely renounced this study, is included in the condemnation, "Because he hath despised the Word of the Lord." The sages said, "Whoever neglects the Torah because of wealth, will, at last be forced to neglect it owing to poverty. And whoever ful-

fills the Torah in poverty, will ultimately fulfill it amidst wealth" (Ethics of the Fathers 4:11, with order of sentences reversed). And this is explicitly set forth in the Torah, as it is said, "Because thou didst not serve the Lord thy God with joyfulness and with gladness of heart, by reason of the abundance of all things, therefore shalt thou serve thine enemy" (Deut. 28:47-48). It is also said "That He might afflict thee ... to do thee good at thy latter end..." (Deut. 8:16). ((3.13))

((Who Shall Be Taught))

Torah should only be taught to a worthy pupil whose conduct is exemplary or whose disposition is simple. One, however, who walks in a way that is not good should first be reclaimed, trained in the right way and tested (as to his sincerity); then he is admitted into the Beth Hamidrash (College) and given instruction. The sages say "To teach a pupil who is unworthy is like casting a stone to Mercury (the idol), as it is said, "As one puts a stone in a sling, so is he that giveth honour to a fool" (The stone does not stay long in the sling; it is soon shot out, so honour given to a fool does not stay long with him) (Prov. 26:8). There is no honour but the Torah, as it is said, "The wise shall inherit honour" (Prov. 3:35)." Soo to, if a teacher does not walk in the right way - even if he is a great scholar and all the people are in need of him - instruction is not to be received from him till he reforms; as it is said, "For the priest's lips shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law from his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts" (Mal. 2:7). Our sages applied this text thus: "If the teacher is like an angel of the Lord of Hosts, they may seek the Law from his mouth. But if he is not, then they shall not seek the Law from his mouth." ((4.1))

((Master and Disciple - Principles of Pedagogy))

How is instruction to be imparted? The teacher is seated in the schoolroom facing the class, with the pupils around him like a crown, so that they can all see him and hear his words. The teacher is not to sit on a stool while his pupils are seated on the floor. Either all sit on the floor, or all on stools. Formerly the teacher used to be seated, while the pupils stood. But before the destruction of the Second Temple, it already had become the universal custom that pupils, while being taught, should be seated.
If it was his custom to teach the pupils personally, he

may do so. If, however, he taught through a Meturgeman (an interpreter), the latter stands between him and his pupils. The teacher addressed the interpreter, who declaims what he has just heard to all the pupils. And when they put questions to the interpreter, he asks the teacher. The teacher replies to the interpreter who addresses the answer to the one who put the question. The teacher should not raise his voice above the interpreter's voice. Nor should the latter raise his voice above that of the teacher, when he addresses a question to him. The interpreter may not detract aught from the teacher's words, nor add to them nor vary them - unless he is the teacher's father or instructor. In addressing the interpreter, the teacher uses the introductory formula: "Thus my revered preceptor said to me" or "Thus my revered father said to me." But when the interpreter repeats the words to the listener, he recites them in the name of the sage quoted, and mentions the name as if he were the teacher's father or teacher, and says, "Thus said our Master so-and-so" (naming him). He does so, even if the teacher abstained from naming the sage on the ground that it is forbidden to mention one's teacher or father by name.

If the teacher taught and his pupils did not understand, he should not be angry with them or fall into a rage, but should repeat the lesson again and again till they have grasped the full meaning of the Halacha (rule) he is expounding. So also, the pupil should not say, "I understand" when he has not understood, but should ask again and again. And if the master is angry with him and storms at him, he should sau, "Master, it is Torah. I need to learn, and my intellectual capacities are deficient."

A disciple should not feel ashamed before his fellow-students who grasp the lesson after hearing it once or twice, while he needs to hear it several times before he knows it. For if this makes him feel ashamed, he will go through college without having learnt anything. The ancient sages accordingly said: "A bashful man cannot learn, nor a passionate man teach" (Ethics of the Fathers 2:6). These observations only apply when the students' lack of understanding is due to the difficulty of the subject or to their mental deficiency. But if the teacher clearly sees that they are negligent and indolent in their study of the Torah and that this is the cause of their failure to understand, it is his duty to scold them and shame them with words of reproach, and so stimulate them to be keen. And in this regard, the sages said, "Arouse awe in the pupils." It is thus improper for a

teacher to indulge in frivolity before his pupils, or to jest in their presence, or eat and drink with them - so that the fear of him be upon them, and they will thus learn from him quickly.
Questions are not to be put to the teacher immediately on his entering the school, but only after his mind is composed. Nor should a pupil put a question as soon as he has come in, but only after he himself is composed and rested. Two pupils are not to put questions at one time. The teacher is not to be questioned on a topic not pertaining to the lesson, but only on the subject that is being treated, so as not to embarrass him. The teacher, however, should set 'pitfalls' before his pupils, both in his questions and in what he does in their presence, in order to sharpen their wits, and ascertain whether they remember what he had taught them or do not remember it. Needless to add, that he has the right to question them on a subject other than that on which they are at the moment engaged, in order to stimulate them to be diligent in study.
No questions should be asked standing, nor answers given standing; nor should they be addressed by any one from an elevation, or from a distance, or when one is behind the elders. The teacher may only be questioned on the topic that is being studied. The questions are to be put in a respectful manner. One should not ask concerning more than three Halachoth (rules) in the topic.
Two individuals put questions. One of these questions is germane to the subject under discussion, while the other is not. Heed is given to the question that is germane. One question refers to a legal rule, the other to exegesis; the former receives attention. One question is exegetical; the other homiletical; the former is taken up. One question is homiletical; the other appertains to an inference a fortiori; the latter is answered. One question refers to an a fortiori inference, the other to an inference from similarity of phrases; the former is dealt with. Questions are put by two persons, one of whom is a graduated scholar, the other a disciple; attention is paid to the scholar. One of them is a disciple, the other is unlettered; heed is given to the disciple. Where both are graduated scholars, disciples or unlettered, and the questions of both concern two legal rules, or two responses, or two practical issues, the interpreter may in these cases give the preference to either.
No one should sleep in the Beth Hamidrash (House of Study). If a student dozes there, his knowledge becomes a thing of shreds. Thus Solomon, in his wisdom, said, "And drowsiness shall clothe one in rags" (Prov. 23:21). No

conversation may be held in the House of Study, except in reference to the words of the Torah. Even if one sneezes there, the others do not wish him 'good health'. Needless to add, other topics must not be discussed. The sanctity of a Beth Hamidrash is greater than that of synagogues. ((4. 2-9))

((The Honour and Respect Due to Teachers))

Just as a person is commanded to honour and revere his father, so is he under an obligation to honour and revere his teacher, even to a greater extent than his father; for his father gave him life in this world, while his teacher who instructs him in wisdom, secures for him life in the world to come. If he sees an article that his father had lost and another article that his teacher had lost, the teacher's property should be recovered first, and then the father's. If his father and his teacher are loaded with burdens, he should first relieve his teacher and then his father. If his father and teacher are in captivity, he should first ransom his teacher. But, if his father is a scholar, even though not of the same rank as his teacher, he should first recover his father's lost property and then his teacher's. There is no honour higher than that which is due to the teacher; no reverence profounder than that which should be paid him. The sages said, "Reverence for thy teacher shall be like the fear of Heaven" (Ethics of the Fathers 4:15). They further said, "Whoever distrusts the authority of his teacher - it is as if he disputes with the Shechinah!; as it is said, 'When they strove against the Lord' (Num. 26:9). Whoever starts a quarrel with his teacher, it is as if he started a quarrel with the Shechinah; as it is said, 'Where the children of Israel strove with the Lord, and He was sanctified in them' (Num. 20:13). And whoever cherishes resentment against his teacher - it is as if he cherishes resentment against the Lord, as it is said, 'Your murmurings are not against us, but against the Lord' (Exod. 16:8). Whoever harbours doubts about his teacher - it is as if he harbours doubt about the Shechinah; as it is said, 'And the people spoke against God and against Moses' (Num. 21:3)."
Who is to be regarded as disputing his teacher's authority? One who sets up a college, holds sessions, discourses and instructs without his teacher's permission, during the latter's lifetime, and even if he be a resident in another country. To give decisions in his teacher's presence is forbidden at all times. Whoever gives a decision in his teacher's presence is deserving of death.

If there was a distance of twelve mils (A mil, Hebrew mile, is 2,000 cubits) between him and his teacher and a question was put to him concerning a rule of practice, he may give the answer; and, to save a man from doing what is forbidden, he may give a decision even in his teacher's presence. For instance, if he sees one committing a violation of the Law, because that person did not know that it is prohibited, or out of sheer wickedness, it is his duty to check the wrongdoer and say to him, "This is forbidden". He should do so, even in the presence of his master, and even if the latter has not given him permission. For to save God's name from being profaned, we forego the honour due to the teacher. This, however, is only permitted casually. But to assume the function of a decisionist and give decisions regularly to all enquirers, even if he and his teacher live at opposite ends of the earth, is forbidden to a disciple, during his teacher's lifetime, unless he has his teacher's permission. Nor even after his teacher's death, may any disciple regularly give decisions, unless he has attained a standard of knowledge qualifying him to do so. A disciple who is not thus qualified and nevertheless gives decisions is "wicked, foolish and of an arrogant spirit" (Ethics of the Fathers 4:9). And of him it is said, "For she hath cast down many wounded" (Prov. 7:26). On the other hand, a sage, who is qualified and refrains from rendering decisions and withholds knowledge of the Torah, puts stumbling blocks before the blind. Of him it is said, "Even the mighty are all slain" (Prov. 7:26). The students of small minds who have acquired an insufficient knowledge of the Torah, and yet seek to aggrandise themselves before the ignorant and among their townsmen by impertinently putting themselves forward and presuming to judge and render decisions in Israel - these are the ones who multiply strife, devastate the world, quench the light of the Torah and spoil the vineyard of the Lord of hosts. Of such, Solomon, in his wisdom, said, "Seize for us the foxes, the little foxes that spoil the vineyard" (Song of Songs 2:15).

A disciple is forbidden to call his teacher by his name, even when the latter is not present. This rule only applies if the name is unusual, so that anyone hearing it knows who is meant. In his presence, the pupil must never mention his teacher's name, even if he desires to call another person who bears the same name; the same is the rule with his father's name. In referring to them even after their death, he should use a descriptive title, ("my honoured father", or "my honoured teacher"). A disciple may not greet his teacher or return his greeting

in the same manner as people are wont to greet their companions and return their greetings. But he should bow to his teacher and address him with reverence and deference, "Peace be unto thee, my teacher." If the teacher greeted him first, he should respond, "Peace to thee, my teacher and master."

So too, he should not remove his phylacteries in his teacher's presence, nor recline in his presence, but should sit respectfully, as one sits before a king. He should not recite his prayers, while standing in front of his teacher, or behind him, or at his side; needless to add, that he must not step (backward or forward) side by side with the teacher, but should stand at a distance in the rear, not, however, exactly behind his teacher, and then he can offer up his devotions. He must not go with his teacher to the same bathroom. He must not sit in his teacher's seat. When his teacher and a colleague dispute with one another, he must not, in his teacher's presence, interpose his opinion as to who is right. He must not contradict his teacher's statements. He may not sit down in his teacher's presence, till he is told "be seated", nor stand up, till he is told to stand up, or till he obtains permission to stand up. And when he quits, he must not turn his back, but should retire with his face to his teacher.

It is his duty to rise before his teacher, from the moment he sees him at a distance (and keep standing), till he disappears from view and is no longer visible; then the disciple may resume his seat. It is a person's duty to visit his teacher on the festivals.

Courtesy must not be shown to a pupil in the teacher's presence, unless the teacher himself is wont to show courtesy to that pupil. The various offices that a slave performs for his master, a pupil performs for his teacher. If, however, he is in a place where he is unknown, and has no phylacteries with him (only worn by free Israelites), and fears that people will say that he is a slave, he does not help his teacher to put on or remove his shoes. Whoever refuses his pupil's services, withholds kindness from him and removes from him the fear of Heaven. (Suggested by the exhortation in the Ethics of the Fathers, "Let reverence for thy teacher be as the fear of Heaven"). A pupil who neglects any of the courtesies due to his master causes the Shechinah to depart from Israel.

If a pupil saw his teacher violating the ordinances of the Torah, he should say to him, "Our master, thus and thus, hast thou taught us." Whenever a pupil recites a dictum in his teacher's presence, he should say, "Thus,

our master, hast thou taught us." He should never quote a dictum that he has not heard from his teacher, without giving the authority to it. When his teacher dies, he rends all the garments he wears till he bares his breast. These rends he never sews up. These rules only apply to the chief teacher from whom one has learnt most of what he knows. But his relation to one from whom he did not acquire most of his knowledge is that of a junior to a senior fellow student. Towards such a senior student (who was at the same time his teacher), the disciple is not required to observe all the above-mentioned points of courtesy. But the junior has to stand up before him, and, on his demise, has to rend his garments, just as he does for a deceased relative for whom he mourns. Even if one learnt from a person one thing only, be it great or small, one has to stand up before that person and rend one's garments at his demise.

No scholar who possesses good manners will speak before his superior in knowledge, even if he has learnt nothing from him.

If one's teacher desires to excuse all his pupils or any one of them from all or any of these observances, he may do so. But even then, the disciple must show courtesy to him, even at the moment when he explicitly dispenses with it. ((5. 1-11)

((Courtesy to be Shown to Pupils))

As pupils are bound to honour their teacher, so a teacher ought to show courtesy and friendliness to his pupils. The sages said, "Let the honour of thy disciples be as dear to thee as thine own" (Ethics of the Fathers 4:15). A man should take an interest in his pupils and love them, for they are his spiritual children who will bring him happiness in this world and in the world hereafter. Disciples increase the teacher's wisdom and broaden his mind. The sages said, "Much wisdom I learnt from my teachers, more from my colleagues; from my pupils, most of all." Even as a small piece of wood kindles a large log, so a pupil of small attainments sharpens the mind of his teacher, so that by his questions, he elicits glorious wisdom. ((5. 12-13)

((Reverence Due to All Men of Learning))

It is a duty to honour every scholar, even if he is not one's teacher, as it is said, "Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man" (Lev. 19:32). The word 'Zaken' (rendered 'old man') refers to one who has acquired wisdom. When ought people to rise up

before him? At the moment that he has approached within four cubits (and they should keep standing), till he has passed out of sight.
This courtesy is not to be observed in a bath-house nor in a latrine, for it is said, "Thou shalt rise up and honour" (Lev. 19:32); the courtesy of rising must be such as to express honour. Labourers, at the time when they are working, need not rise up before scholars, as it is said, "Thou shalt rise up and honour"; even as the "honouring" enjoined does not involve a monetary loss, so the courtesy of rising before the scholar is only required when it does not involve a monetary loss. And whence do we know that one should not shut one's eyes when a scholar passes, so as not to see him and thus evade the obligation of standing up before him? It is inferred from the text, "And thou shalt fear thy God" (Lev. 19:32); wherever the fulfillment of a duty is left to the conscience, the exhortation is added, "Thou shalt fear thy God."
It is improper for a sage to put the people to inconvenience by deliberately passing before them, so that they should have to stand up before him. He should use a short route and endeavour to avoid notice so that they should not be troubled to stand up. The sages were wont to use circuitous and exterior paths, where they were not likely to meet those who might recognize them, so as not to trouble them.
The same rule applies to riding as to walking. As it is a duty to rise up before the sage when he walks, so this courtesy should be shown when he rides by.
Where three are walking on a road, the teacher should be in the middle, the senior (of his disciples) at his right, the junior on his left.
On seeing a Chacham (a sage or religious authority), one does not rise till he has approached within four cubits; and as soon as he has passed, one resumes one's seat.
When a Chacham enters, each person stands up as he approaches him within four cubits, and then resumes his seat, and so does the next one till the Chacham has reached his place and is seated.
A pupil, in regular attendance, may only rise before his teacher in the morning and in the evening, so that the honour paid to the teacher shall not be more than that shown to God.
One rises up before an old man, advanced in years, even if he is not a sage. Even a learned man who is young rises up before an old man of advanced age. He is not obliged, however, to rise to his full height but need only rise himself sufficiently to indicate courtesy.

Even a gentile who is aged should be shown courtesy in speech; and one should extend a hand to support him, as it is said, "Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head", without qualification.
Scholars do not go out to take part with the rest of the community in building, digging or similar work for the state, so as not to lose their respect of the common people. Nor are they assessed for the cost of building the walls, repairing the gates, paying the watchman's wages, etc., or making a gift to the king. Nor are they obliged to pay a tax, jointly or severally levied upon the inhabitants of a city, as it is said, "Yea, though they hire (Joseph Caro in his Keseph Mishna, explains this verse thus 'If they all study Torah ((play upon Yitnu, which means in Aramaic, they study)), God will gather them; if only a few do so, they will be diminished') among the nations, now will I gather them up, and they begin to be diminished by reason of the burden of kings and princes" (Hos. 8:10). Soo to, if a scholar has goods for sale, he is to be given the opportunity of disposing of them first; and no one else in the market is to be permitted to sell, till the scholar has first sold his stock. Similarly, if he has a cause pending and he is standing among a large number of suitors, his cause is taken first, and (during the hearing) he is seated. It is exceedingly iniquitous to contemn sages or hate them. Jerusalem was only destroyed when its scholars were treated with contumely, as it is said, "But they mocked the messengers of God and despised His words, and scoffed at His prophets" (II Chron. 36:16); this means that they "despised those who taught His words." So too, the text "And if ye shall abhor My statutes" (Lev. 26-15) means "if ye abhor the teachers of My statutes." Whoever contemns the sages will have no portion in the world to come, and is included in the censure "For the word of the Lord hath he despised" (Num. 15:31). ((6. 1-11))

((Rules 6: 12-14 and 7: 1-12))

6.12 Although one who contemns the sages forfeits his portion in the world to come, yet if witnesses came forward and testified that a certain individual reviled a sage, even if only in words, the offender has incurred the penalty of excommunication. The Court (if he is found guilty) publicly excommunicates him and also imposes upon him a fine of one litra in gold, a penalty of uniform amount in all places, and this is given to the sage (Litra in gold = 25 gold denarii). Whoever reviles a

Chacham in words, even after the latter's decease, is excommunicated by the Court, which lifts the ban after he repents. If the sage who has been reviled is living, the offender is only released with the concurrence of the person on whose account the ban had been imposed. To safeguard his honour, the Chacham may himself excommunicate a boor who treated him disrespectfully. For this, neither witnesses nor a previous warning are necessary. The ban is not removed till the offender has appeased the Chacham. If he died before this was done, three men constitute themselves a quorum and remove the ban. If the Chacham desires to forgive the offender, and does not excommunicate him, he is at liberty to do so.

6.13 When a teacher, to safeguard the honour due to him, excommunicated any person, it is the duty of all his disciples to treat that person as under the ban. But when a disciple excommunicated anyone, for his own honour's sake, the teacher is not bound to respect the ban, but the people must do so. Similarly, anyone whom the Nasi (Patriarch of Palestine) excommunicated is to be treated by all Israel as under the ban. But if all Israel excommunicated a person, the Nasi need not treat him as excommunicated. Whoever has been placed under a ban of excommunication in his own city, is to be so regarded in another city. But one, who has been placed under such a ban in another city than his own, is not under a ban in his own city.

6.14 The foregoing rules only apply to one who was excommunicated because he reviled scholars. But if one was excommunicated for other transgressions, the penalty for which is excommunication, even if the ban was pronounced by the humblest individual in Israel, the Nasi and all Israel are bound to respect it till the offender repents of the transgression for which he had been excommunicated and is released from the ban. There are twenty-four offences for which the ban is pronounced on an individual, irrespective of sex. The category is as follows: 1) Whoever reviles a Chacham, even after his decease; 2) insults the messenger of a Court; 3) calls another person, a slave; 4) receives a citation from a Court to appear at its sessions, on a date fixed by the Court, and fails to attend; 5) slights any ordinance instituted by the Scribes, or, needless to add, any precepts of the Torah; 6) whoever refuses to accept the decision of a Court, is placed under the ban of excommunication till judgment is satisfied; 7) whoever keeps on his premises anything noxious, such as a vicious dog or an unsafe

ladder, is put under a ban till he removes the nuisance; 8) whoever sells any of his real property to an idolater, is excommunicated till he assumes liability for all injuries that may accrue from the idolater to his Israelite neighbour who owns adjacent property; 9) whoever testifies concerning an Israelite before the idolaters' courts and the effect of his testimony is to force the Israelite to make a payment for which, he would not, according to Jewish Law, have been liable, is placed under a ban till he makes restitution; 10) a butcher, who is a Cohen (priest descended in the male line of Aaron), and who does not separate the portions of a slaughtered beast due to the priest and give them to another priest, is placed under a ban till he does so; 11) whoever violates the sanctity of the second days of the Festivals, notwithstanding that the observance of these days is due to custom; 12) whoever does manual labour on the Eve of Passover, after midday; 13) takes God's name in vain; or takes it with an oath, in matters of no importance; 14) causes the public to profane God's name; 15) causes the public to eat sacrifices outside the prescribed bounds; 16) calculates, outside of Palestine, the annual calendar, and appoints dates for the beginning of the month; 17) causes the blind to stumble; 18) keeps the public from fulfilling a religious duty; 19) a slaughterer who permits forbidden meat to leave his premises as fit for Jewish consumption; 20) or who has not examined his slaughtering knife in the presence of the Chacham (religious head of the community); 21) whoever deliberatly practices priapism; 22) whoever divorces his wife and then enters into a partnership with her, or engages in other commercial transactions which bring them into close relations - when they come into Court (i.e. when they come under the notice of the Court) they are placed under a ban; 23) a religious leader of evil repute; 24) whoever unjustly excommunicates one who has not incurred the ban.

7.1 If a sage grown old in wisdom, a Nasi, or Ab-beth-Din, committed a grave offence, he is, under no circumstances, to be publicly excommunicated, unless he acted like Jeroboam, the son of Nebat and his confederates. But if he committed other sins less heinous, he is punished with stripes privately, as it is said "Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day, and the prophet also shall stumble with thee in the night" (Hosea 4:5); this means that even if he stumbled, conceal it as in the darkness of the night. And we also say to him "Save your self-respect and stay at home" (II Kings 14:6). So too, if any scholar

rendered himself liable to excommunication, the Court is forbidden to act precipitately and hastily put him under the ban. The members of the Court should flee from such a procedure, and take no part in it. The saints among the sages gloried in the fact that they never sat in a quorum of judges, to excommunicate a scholar, though they might sit as judges in a court that sentenced a scholar to be punished with stripes, if he had incurred that penalty, and even if the sentence was for contumacy.

7.2 What is the form used for Niddui (the lighter ban of excommunication)? (The authority who excommunicates) says "So-and-so (naming him) shall be under a ban." If the excommunication took place in the offender's presence, he says to him "This person, (naming him) is under a ban." For Cherem (the severer excommunication), he says to him "So-and-so (naming him) is under Cherem and accursed; he is under an imprecation with Oath and Ban."

7.3 How is the lighter or severer excommunication removed? The authority says to the person excommunicated "Thou art released; thou art forgiven." If the person is released in his absence, the formula is "So-and-so (naming him) is released and forgiven."

7.4 How should a person under the milder ban conduct himself, and how should others conduct themselves towards him? During the whole of the term for which he has been excommunicated, he is, like a mourner, forbidden to have his hair cut or to bathe. He is not counted in the quorum of three or ten, required for reciting the special introduction to the Grace after Meals. He is not included in the congregation of ten men for any function that requires that number. No one may sit down within four cubits of where he is. He may however teach and be taught. He may be hired and hire others. If he dies, while under the ban, the Court orders a stone to be put on his coffin, as much as to say that he is stoned because he is separated from the community. Needless to state that no funeral eulogy is delivered, and his bier is not followed.

7.5 One who is in Cherem (under the severer ban of excommunication) suffers the additional severities that he may neither instruct nor receive instruction, but he studies privately, so as not to forget what he had learnt. He may neither be hired nor may he hire others. No one engages in commercial transactions with him, except to a slight extent, as much as is sufficient to provide him with a livelihood.

7.6 If a person has been for thirty days under Niddui (the milder ban) and made no request to be released, the ban is imposed for a second term of thirty days. If this period also passed without his seeking to have the ban removed, he is placed under the severer ban.

7.7 How many persons are needed to remove the milder or severer ban? Three, even if they are private individuals. A qualified scholar can by himself remove the lighter or graver ban. A disciple has the right to do so, even in the locality where his teacher resides.

7.8 If three persons pronounced a ban of excommunication and left the place, and the offender renounced the practice for which he had been excommunicated, three others may proceed to release him.

7.9 If one does not know who it was that imposed the ban upon him, he should go to the Nasi and he will release him from the ban.

7.10 A ban that is conditional, even if self-imposed, requires annulment. A scholar who excommunicated himself, may himself annul the ban, even when he had added to it the clause, "According to the view of So-and-so," and even though the excommunication was for a transgression for which he had incurred that penalty.

7.11 A man who dreamt that he had been excommunicated, even if he knows who it was that had (in his dream) excommunicated him, requires ten men who study Halachoth (legal rules) to release him from the ban. If he does not find them, he must go as far as a Parsah (four mils) to seek them. If he fails to find ten men with these qualifications, ten men who study Mishna may release him. Failing these, he may be released by ten who can read Scriptures. If such are not accessible, he may be released by ten men even if they are unable to read Scripture. If he cannot find ten men in his locality, three individuals may release him.

7.12 If the ban was imposed on a person in his presence, it can only be removed in his presence. If it was imposed in his absence, it may be removed in his presence or absence. No interval of time need elapse between the imposition of a ban and its annulment, but the pronouncement of a ban may be immediately followed by its removal if the individual under the ban reforms. The Court may, at its discretion, leave a man under the ban for many

years, according to the extent of his wickedness. If the Court see fit straightway to impose upon a person the Cherem (severer ban), and the same ban on any one who eats or drinks with him or stays near him within the distance of four cubits, they may do so in order to punish the offender and build a fence round the Torah, so that sinners shall not break bounds. Although a Chacham has the right to pronounce the ban to safeguard his honour, it is not creditable for a scholar to accustom himself to this procedure. He should rather close his ears to remarks of the illiterate and take no notice of them, as Solomon, in his wisdom, said "Also pay not heed to all the words that are spoken" (Eccles. 7:21). Such too, was the way of the ancient saints. They heard themselves reviled and made no reply. Yet more, they forgave the reviler and pardoned him. Great sages, glorying in their commendable practices, said that they never, for the sake of personal honour, imposed on any one the lighter or severer ban. This is the way of scholars, which it is right to follow. It however only applies to cases where one has been reviled in private. But a scholar, who has been treated with contumely or been reviled in public, may not forgive the wrong done to his honour. If he does so, he is punished, for this is contempt of the Torah. We should relentlessly pursue the matter, till the offender begs his pardon, after which he should be forgiven.

In the second book of the Mishnah Torah, which Maimonides titled Sefer Ahavah, 'Book of Love', we find the Hilkhot Tefillah, the group of laws concerning prayer. In these, the great medieval codifier lays down several principles concerning the relative sanctity of the house of worship and the house of study.

((The Supremacy of the Beth Hamidrash (The House of Study)))

"The House of Study is greater than the House of Worship. Many great scholars, even though they lived in communities which had many Houses of Worship, would nevertheless hold services of public worship in the places where they studied the Torah. ((8.3))
It is permitted to convert a House of Worship into a House of Study, but it is forbidden to turn a House of Study into a House of Worship for the sanctity of the former is greater than that of the latter, for the rule is to ascend in the scale of holiness and not to descend. Thus, if the people of a community sell their House of Worship, they must purchase for that money a Holy Ark; if

they sold a Holy Ark, they must purchase for that money mantles or a container for a Torah Scroll; if they sold mantles or a container for the Torah Scroll, they must purchase for that money a set of the Chumash; if they sold a set of the Chumash they must acquire for that money a Torah Scroll. If, however, they sold a Torah Scroll they cannot acquire for that money anything else but another Torah Scroll since there is nothing more sacred that a Sefer Torah." ((11.14))

EXAMPLE 2: The rules of Joseph Karo (16th century)

The quotations that follow are from Goldman (1975), pp. 151-165. He quotes Karo's Hilkhot Talmud Torah in full (246: 1-26 below) together with some additional passages by Karo that relate to lifelong learning. Goldman also includes some commentaries on Karo, mostly concerned with study for adults.

The code of Maimonides served as the basis for subsequent codes, of which there were many. But the highest peak in Jewish legal literature was reached four hundred years after Maimonides issued his Mishneh Torah, with the publication in 1567 of the Shulhan Arukh by Joseph Karo. It is the greatest and most authoritative of all codes of Jewish law, and popular recognition has made it the standard codification of Jewish teachings and traditional practices. As might be expected, the Shulhan Arukh contains a good many legal formulations dealing with education generally and also with adult education. This is particularly true of the second of the four books of the code, entitled, appropriately enough Yoreh Deah ('Teaching Knowledge'), in which most of the material on education is found. There are also a few references to our subject in the first book, Orah Hayyim ('The Way of Life'), and in the fourth book, the Hoshen Mishpat ('Breastplate of Justice').
The vitality of Jewish jurisprudence is to be noted in the fact that even the Shulhan Arukh was not allowed to petrify the growth of Jewish law and custom. For, no sooner did its text appear than it became the basis for further interpretations and commentaries. Some of these soon achieved such an authoritative character that they were included as annotations to the printed text in every edition of the Shulhan Arukh. In the following translation, in addition to the main text, some of the more relevant of these comments are included as notes between extra lines and brackets.[144] We begin with some passages from Yoreh Deah.

((Obligations of Adult Education))

"246,1. The duty of studying the Torah rests upon every Jew, whether he be rich or poor, whether he be in sound health or an invalid, whether he be young or very old. Even the beggar who goes from door to door, and even a married man with a large family, must appoint some fixed time for study, both by day and by night, as it is said, "And thou shalt meditate thereon both by day and by night" (Josh. 1:8).

(If he be very pressed for time and has read only the Shema, both morning and evening, this suffices to fulfill the command. "My words which I have put in thy mouth shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed" (Isa. 59:21).
One who has given some decision of Jewish law without being paid therefor, or who has taught children without pay, can reckon this as fulfilling the command of fixed daily study. But if these actions are done for pay, they cannot be reckoned as satisfying the command for fixed daily study).

One who cannot learn because he is totally ignorant, or because of the distraction of his occupation, must make it possible for others to learn.

(Then it is reckoned to him as if he himself is studying. A man may make an agreement that another man should occupy himself with the study of Torah on condition that the former supplies the latter with his means of livelihood; they then share the reward. But if the former is already engaged in the study of the Torah, he may not sell his obligation of study for money).

246,2. Let a man first study Torah and then marry; for if he marry first, he will not be able to study Torah once the millstones are around his neck. But if it get to be impossible for him to study without a wife because his imagination and his desire overmaster him, then let him marry first.

246,3. Until when must one study? Until the day of one's death, as it is said, "Lest these words depart from thy heart all the days of thy life" (Deut. 4:9). So long as one is not busying himself with the Torah, he is forgetting it.

((Content of Adult Study))

246,4. One must divide the time he devotes to learning into three parts; one-third for the Bible, one-third for the Mishnah and one-third for the Talmud. The study of the Bible includes all the twenty-four books; that of the Mishnah includes the oral Law and the explanations of the written Law; and the study of the Talmud comprehends a deep understanding of the whole Torah, its development, deductions and analogies, the principles by which it can be expounded, an appreciation of the basis of the commandments, the basis for prohibitions and sanctions, and all similar traditional learning. How can this division of time be arranged? If he be an artisan, working three hours at his trade and nine hours at Torah, let him devote three hours of the nine to the Bible, three hours to the Mishnah and three hours to the Talmud. This should be the division of time in the early period of his study. But when he becomes more skilled in the Bible, and he does not need to study Bible and Mishnah so frequently, then let him study these at regular intervals so as not to forget anything of these fundamentals of learning, and let him devote all the rest of his time to the Talmud, so far as the breadth of his understanding and his power of concentration will allow.

(Some say that through the study of the Babylonian Talmud, which is made up of Bible, Mishnah and Gemara, one fulfills his obligation towards all three divisions of study. A man should only study Bible, Mishnah, Gemara and the legal literature which goes with them, for in this way he may attain both this world and the world to come, which he cannot do through the study of other branches of learning. But he is fully allowed to study other subjects, except if they be heretical. This study of other branches of learning is called by the Rabbis "Walking in Paradise." But a man should not "walk in Paradise" until he has partaken to the full (literally, "filled his stomach with the meat and wine") of a deep knowledge of Jewish learning and ritual.
Nor should he study Kabbala (the mystic philosophy of Judaism) until he is forty years of age. For this study one needs special sanctity, purity, zeal and godliness. Most of those who presume to enter into this branch of knowledge before their due time come to untimely grief through it).

((Payment for Adult Teaching))

246,5. In places where it is customary, one may teach the

Torah for remuneration; but it is forbidden to teach Mishnah and Talmud for pay. However, if a man cannot find anyone to teach him free, he may pay for instruction. Although he may have been compelled to pay for his instruction, he must not say, just as I have learned and paid for my learning, so will I teach for pay; he must be willing to teach others free. Since it is nowadays the custom to pay for teaching, the teacher may receive payment if he have no other means of livelihood. Even if he has means, he is allowed to take payment for his teaching in lieu of the business opportunities and other opportunities of earning money which he renounces for teaching.

(All later authorities allow the teacher to receive payment for teaching).

246,6. A woman who has studied Torah is meritorious, but not in the same measure as a man, because she does so at will not in response to a command. Although through study of the Torah she attains a reward, the Rabbis directed that a man should not teach Torah to his daughter, because most women have not a mind adapted to such instruction, and they would be apt to lose a sense of proportion on account of their deficient understanding. The Rabbis further said that anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he is teaching her folly. When they said this, they referred to the difficulties of the oral Law; but in the case of the Bible, although the father need not teach his daughter, if he has taught her, it is not as though he taught her folly.

(In any case, a woman must learn the laws affecting women. She is not bound to teach her son Torah; but if she helps her son or her husband, enabling them to study Torah, she shares the reward with them).

((Moral Character of the Student))

246,7. We should not go on trying to teach Torah to a student who is unworthy (with reference to Prov. 26:8). We must first try to change his disposition, put him on the right path, examine him, then bring him again to the House of Learning and teach him.

((Moral Character of the Teacher))

246,8. Even though a teacher be very learned and all the people have need of him, if he does not walk in the right path we may not go to him for instruction until he

changes his ways (with reference to Mal. 2:7: "For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should keep the law ((Torah)) at his mouth, when he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts").

((Classroom formalities))

246,9. What was the manner of instruction? The teacher would sit at the head of the room and the students would seat themselves before him, grouped around him in a semi-circle, so that they all could see him and hear his words. The teacher should not sit on a chair while his students sit on the floor. Either he and they must sit on the floor, or all must sit on chairs.

(Some explain that this ruling applies only to senior students who have reached the grade of ordination).

246,10. When students have failed to understand what the teacher has been teaching, he should not be angry with them, but he should go over the whole matter again, time after time, until they understand thoroughly. The student should not say, "I understand" if he has not understood; but he should ask, if necessary again and again. Then if the teacher becomes angry, let the student say, "Master, we are studying Torah and I must learn it, though my understanding is slow."

246,11. A student should not feel ashamed because a fellow student has mastered the subject at issue at once, or almost at once, while he has not grasped it after many explanations. For if he feel ashamed on this account, the result will be that he will enter and leave the House of Learning without having learned anything. Therefore the Rabbis said that the shamefaced cannot become learned, nor can the quick-tempered be teachers.
What has just been said applies to the case where the students do not understand because the matter which they are studying is profound, or because their capacity is limited; but if the teacher knows that they are treating the study of Torah carelessly and in an offhand way, and on this account they do not understand, then it is his duty to show anger and to shame them with his words in order to spur them on. This is what the Rabbis meant when they said, "Scatter gall on your students." For this reason, also, the teacher may not indulge in frivolity in the presence of his students, nor play in their presence, nor eat and drink with them, so that he may preserve his dignity and the respect they owe him, and they may learn the more quickly.

246,12. One may not ask questions of the teacher the moment he enters the House of Learning, before he has had time to settle down. Nor should a student ask a question immediately on his own entry, before he has had time to settle down. In order not to embarrass the teacher, two should not ask questions at the same time, nor should questions be asked except in connection with the subject of study. The teacher may mislead his students through catch questions or through other means, in order to sharpen their wits and to test whether they remember what they learn. It is hardly necessary to add that in order to stimulate them he may ask them questions about some subject other than that which they are studying at the time.

246,13. One should not ask a question while standing, nor should one answer standing, nor from a height, nor from a distance, nor from behind the teacher.

(Some say that a question of ritual law must be asked standing).

The question must be to the point, and must be asked in earnest. One should not ask more than three questions on the one subject.

246,14. When two questions are asked at the same time, one being to the point and the other not so, preference is given to the question to the point. If of two questions, one has practical bearing and the other is only theoretical, preference is given to the question with practical bearing. Of two questions, one of which refers to a point of law and the other to a point of interpretation, preference is given to the question referring to a point of law. Of two questions, one referring to interpretation and the other to Aggadah, preference is given to the question about the point of interpretation. Of two questions, one dealing with Aggadah and the other with a deduction a fortiori, the preference is given to the question about the deduction a fortiori. Of two questions, one concerning a deduction a fortiori and the other an inference from similarity of phrases, preference is given to the one concerned with the deduction a fortiori.

246,15. When there are two questioners, one of whom is a scholar and the other a student, precedence is given to the more learned questioner. Similarly, between a student and an ignorant man, precedence is given to the student.

If both questioners are of equal standing, whether scholars or students or ignorant men, and both have asked questions of a like category, whether it be a question of law or any other type of question, then the teacher may answer first whichever one he chooses.

(A learned bastard takes precedence over an ignorant priest).

((Conduct in the House of Learning))

246,16. One may not sleep in the House of Learning. Anyone who slumbers in the House of Learning will find his knowledge grow ragged, as it is said, "Drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags" (Prov. 23:21).

246,17. Conversation should not be carried on in the House of Learning on any matter other than the study of the Torah. Even when one sneezes, his fellow students should not say to him, "Good health."

(But nowadays this is permitted).

The sanctity of the House of Learning is greater even than that of the synagogue.

((Importance of Adult Study))

246,18. The study of Torah is regarded as equivalent to performing all the commands (because study leads to practice). When, therefore, one has before him the choice of carrying out a commandment or of studying Torah, if the command may be carried out by others for him, he should not interrupt his studies. Otherwise, he must fulfill the commandment and afterwards return to his studies.

246,19. When a man is judged in the divine judgment, he is first judged according to the way in which he has devoted himself to the study of the Torah, and afterwards he is judged according to his acts.

246,20. Let a man always devote himself to Torah, even though he does it not for its own sake, because in the end he will come to study it for its own sake.

(This refers to cases such as when a man studies in order that he shall be the recipient of honour. But if he studies the Torah in order to criticize and attack it, it were better for him that he had never been born).

((Learning versus Temporal Interests))

246,21. Knowledge of the Torah will not abide with one who comes to it carelessly, or light-heartedly, or while eating or drinking. It will remain only with the one who is willing to suppress himself utterly and afflict himself unceasingly for its sake, and who will not give sleep to his eyes nor slumber to his eyelids (Prov. 6:4. The Rabbis graphically describe the acquisition of knowledge of the Torah as calling for a regimen of bread with salt, water drunk by measure, sleeping on the ground and a life of painful toil.)

(Let not a man think to devote himself to the study of the Torah and at the same time to the acquisition of riches and honour; for one who lets this thought enter into his heart will never attain to the crown of the Law. (Three crowns were granted to Israel: the crown of the priesthood, to which only Aaron and his seed attained; the crown of royalty, to which David and his house attained; and the greatest crown of all, the crown of the Torah, which is free for all Israel.) To be successful in his study he must make it a fixed duty, and must make his occupation an occasional thing, minimizing his attention to business and making his main occupation the study of the Torah. He must abjure temporal pleasures. He must devote so much time to his daily work as is necessary for his support, if he have not otherwise the wherewithal to live, and the rest of the day and part of the night he should give up to the study of Torah.
It is a great virtue for a man to support himself by the work of his hands, as it is said, "When thou eatest the labor of thy hands, happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with thee" (Ps. 128:2). Anyone who thinks of devoting himself to the Torah to the exclusion of all other work, while being supported by charity, is profaning the name of God and bringing the Torah into contempt. For it is forbidden to reap any material advantage from the Torah, and all study of the Torah which is not coupled with work leads to sin and robbery of one's fellowmen. All this applies to a healthy man who, by spending some time at his craft or business, can support himself. But an old or sickly man may derive benefit from his study of the Torah and be supported in it. Some say that even a man in full health may do the same, and therefore the custom has grown up everywhere for the Rabbi to be allowed a stipend from the community, in order to avoid his being obliged to engage in other work, and thus publicly bringing the Torah into contempt into the eyes of the masses. Only a Rabbi who has need of

this income, and not one who is rich, may take advantage of this. But some allow even further for the Rabbi and his students to accept their needs from those who contribute to the support of students of the Torah, in order to allow them to devote themselves to study in comfort. Yet in any case, one who is able to support himself adequately by the work of his hands, and also to give up time to study, is living on the plane of piety. Such ability is a gift of God, to which not every man attains. For it is not possible for every man to give up time to study of the Torah and become proficient in it while supporting himself by other means.
Though it be granted that a Rabbi may receive compensation from the community, or a fixed income for his needs, he may not receive gifts from individuals. When, therefore, it is said that every one who brings a gift to the Rabbi is as if he were bringing the offering of first fruits, this applies only to small gifts, such as people are accustomed to give to an honoured man, even though he be not learned. But some authorities allow the Rabbi to receive more substantial gifts; and the Rabbinical head of a Talmudic College or of a Jewish Court may receive gifts without limit, for he is like a ruler. The latter must be very careful not to accept anything in the way of a gift from any litigant.

- A Rabbi must keep himself far from the great shame of those few who run after money and ask for gifts. For they bring the Torah and those who study it into reproach. If even the priests were not allowed to ask for the portions which were theirs by law, how much the less may Rabbis ask for gifts. Such conduct is a great sin, "and the just shall live by his faith" (Hab. 2:4). A Rabbi may take a small part of something on which he is asked to give a ritual decision when this is necessary to make his decision clear. But he is prohibited from taking as a gift any considerable portion of some object which he has declared as ritually permissible.
He who uses the crown of the Torah for his own purposes will perish.
But where the need exists, a young Rabbi may make himself known in a place where he is not known).

((Place of Study))

246,22. It is a tradition established as firmly as a covenant that everyone who learns the Torah in a synagogue will not quickly forget it. Everyone who labours at his study in privacy will become learned, as it is said, "Wisdom is with the modest" (Prov. 11:2). He who studies audibly will retain what he learns; but he who studies

without giving voice to the words he studies will quickly forget.

((Learning's Exclusive Claims))

246,23. He who wishes to attain to the crown of the Torah must be careful not to lose a single one of his evenings in sleeping, or eating, or drinking, or conversation, or similar ways of passing the time; but he must give them all up to the study of the Torah.

(For the greater part of what a man learns, he learns at night. One should begin night study from the fifteenth of Ab. One who does not add to his knowledge is all the while diminishing it).

246,24. A household in which the study of the Torah is not heard at night will be consumed by fire.

246,25. One who is able to devote himself to the Torah and who does not do so, or one who has studied and has then turned aside to the frivolities of life, or who has neglected his learning and cast it aside, is one to whom apply these words, "For he has despised the word of the Lord and broken His commandment" (Num. 15:31).

(It is forbidden to waste one's time in wordly conversation).

246,26. He who gives up his study of the Torah because he is rich will in the end have to give it up on account of poverty (Avot 4:11); while he who persists in the study of the Torah in poverty, will in the end continue it in wealth (Avot 4:11).

(It is forbidden to study Torah in filthy places. When one finishes the study of a complete section of the Talmud, it is a religious duty to have some general rejoicing and enjoy a repast, called a feast of religious obligation).

((Learning and the Fifth Commandment))

240,13. In case of a conflict of duties, studying the Torah takes precedence over the duty of honouring parents.

(This is so, however, only if the son has to choose between leaving the city for study and staying in the city for his parents' sake; but if he remains in the city, he must first minister to his parents, and then

turn to his study).

240,15. If a father bids his son break one of the laws of the Torah, whether it be an affirmative or a negative precept, the son must not harken to him. (Lev. 19:3: Ye shall venerate every man, his mother and his father, and ye shall keep my sabbaths.)

240,25. If a student of the Torah wishes to go to some other town where he is sure that his studies will be more effective because of a superior teacher there, though his father would prevent him through fear of the Gentiles in that town, the son need not in this matter harken to his father.

242,1. One must show his Rabbi more honour and respect than he accords even his father.

((Exemptions for Students and Scholars))

243,1. Rabbinical scholars are not wont to go out with the rest of the people to take part in building or digging operations for the city, and in similar work which would lower their dignity in the eyes of the people. Since they are free from such obligations, they do not have to hire substitutes to take their place.

243,2. This is the case only if the call is for individual service. But if all the rest of the people are serving or hiring substitutes, Rabbinical scholars must do their share or hire others to take their place, and they must make their contributions towards a public work that is needed for the well-being of the community. But in the case of any work connected with guarding the city, such as repairing the walls or its towers, or the pay of the watchman, scholars are not obliged to give their share, because they do not need protection. Their Torah protects them.
Similarly, scholars are free from having to pay any kind of tax or impost, whether it be a tax placed on the citizens as a whole, or on individuals, and whether it be a fixed tax or not. The other citizens must pay these taxes for them, even if the taxes were imposed on the individual.
All this applies only if the scholar is a professional Rabbinical scholar; otherwise, he must do his share with the others. He is regarded as a professional Rabbinical scholar if he is only slightly engaged in some business occupation that suffices to keep him with the necessities

of life without his making money, and every hour that he can spare from this business he devotes regularly to study of the Torah.

(There are some places where it is customary and others where it is not customary to free the professional Rabbinical scholar from the payment of taxes).

243,3. A scholar who disregards the commands of the law, and who is not God-fearing is reckoned as the least of the members of the community.

242,14. A scholar who is qualified to teach the law and does not do so, is guilty of withholding Torah and of putting stumbling blocks in the path of the community.

((Honour due to the Scholar))

243,6. It is a great sin to treat a scholar with contempt, or to hate him. Anyone who treats the learned with contempt has no share in the world to come, and to him apply the words, "For the word of the Lord he has despised" (Num. 15:31).

244,1. It is a positive command (Lev. 19:32) to stand up before any scholar even though he be only a young man. Even though the scholar be not one's own teacher, one must stand up before him, if he be the superior in knowledge.
Similarly it is a positive command to rise up before the hoary head, that is, a man of seventy years.

(This applies to an old man though he be not learned, so long as he is not bad of character).

244,2. From what moment must one stand up before the learned or the aged? From the time when they come within a distance of four cubits until they have passed by. This holds whether they are riding or on foot.

244,3. When the scholar is approaching within the four cubits it is forbidden to shut one's eyes so as not to have to rise up before him.

244,5. Artisans while engaged in their work are not obliged to stand before a scholar. If they are in the employ of someone else and wish to act strictly by rising up before the scholar, they are not free to do so.

244,6. A scholar should not make himself troublesome to the people by purposely passing before them and making them rise before him. Let him go to his destination by the shortest way, so that he will not make many people stand. If he is able to go by a roundabout way so as to avoid passing many people, it is meritorious for him to do so.

(This apparently applied only in Talmudic times when it was the custom to sit on the ground; but in principle it applies wherever it is troublesome to make the people rise. It therefore hardly has application where people are seated on chairs or benches).

244,7. A scholar who is only a young man should rise up before a very old man, not necessarily to his full height, but sufficiently to show him honour. A venerable Gentile should be addressed with fitting honour and one should extend him a helping hand.

244,8. Two scholars or two old men do not have to rise the one before the other, but each must show the other respect.
Even the teacher must show some honour to this pupil.

242,33. The honour of the student should be as dear to the teacher as his own honour.

244,11. Even while engaged in the study of the Torah, one must stand up before a scholar.

244,12. A scholar, even if he be the outstanding figure of his generation, should stand before a man noted for his good deeds.

244,15. When the president of the Sanhedrin enters the House of Learning, all those present rise up and do not seat themselves again until he says to them: "Be seated". When the head of the religious court enters the House of Learning, those present form two lines for him to pass between them until he is seated. When the Rabbi enters, those whom he approaches within four cubits stand before him until he reaches his place.

244,18. In the religious court or in the House of Learning, learning is considered the determining factor. Therefore when there come together a great scholar who is young, and an aged man who has some learning, the young man is given the seat of honour and the privilege of

having the first word. But at a wedding or social gathering, age is given the preference, and the old man is given the seat of honour.
If the scholar is a great scholar, and the elderly man is not very old, scholarship is accorded prior consideration; whereas if the old man is very old, while the scholar is not an outstanding scholar, old age is given the chief consideration so long as the old man has some claims to learning. But if the old man is not very old, and the scholar is not profoundly learned, greater consideration is given to old age.

((A Father Must Learn First))

245,2. If a father must himself study and also have his son instructed, and if he cannot afford to do both, then if the two have an equal capacity for learning, the father takes precedence over the son. But if the son is more intelligent and understanding than the father and has a better capacity for learning, it is the son who takes precedence. In this latter case, the father must not completely give up his own study but must study part of the time himself.

((Charity and Education))

249,16. There is some authority for holding that giving to the synagogue is a more important duty than giving in charity; but the charity of supporting poor boys in the study of the Torah or of giving to the needy sick is more important than the maintenance of a synagogue.

253,11. A needy scholar should be given aid in a manner befitting his dignity. If he is unwilling to accept direct aid, he should be supplied with goods which have been bought cheaply, so that he can resell them profitably. But if he understands business, he should be given a loan to set him up in business.

259,2. Charity funds which have been given for a synagogue or a cemetery may be diverted by the community for the needs of a House of Learning or a school, even against the will of the donors. But the funds of a school may not be diverted to the use of a synagogue.

(This is only so when the trustees of the charity funds fear that the needs of the school will not be met. But where the community supports the school adequately, and if, when school funds are diverted to the synagogue the community will make up the difference for the school,

such a transfer is allowable, even in a place where ordinarily it is forbidden to change the use made of contributed funds.
If no immediate use can be made of funds contributed for a specific purpose, the donor cannot retract his gift. For example, when a plot of land has been given as a site for a House of Learning and the House of Learning cannot be built at the time, the gift must stand until such time as the House of Learning can be built. All this has application only where there is no definite local custom in the matter ... But where there is a definite local custom, it must be followed either way, for it is presumed that the gift is made by the donor and accepted by the community subject to the local custom governing the right of transferring charity gifts).

The theme of learning is also treated in the Orah Hayyim.

((Early Morning Studies))

155,1. When one leaves the synagogue at the close of the daily morning service, one should proceed to the House of Learning. One should fix a regular time for study, and that time must be unchangeable even at great personal sacrifice.

(One who is too ignorant to study Torah with the others should nevertheless attend the House of Learning and thus get the reward of his attendance. Or he should take a seat apart and study a little of what he can, and thus have enter into his heart a spirit of conduct infused by veneration).

155,2. One may eat a light breakfast before going to the House of Learning in the morning if one is accustomed to do so, and it is advisable so to accustom oneself (in order to preserve one's health for the service of the Creator).

((The Pentateuch, the Basis of Jewish Learning))

285,1. Although by regular weekly attendance at synagogue throughout the year, one hears the reading of the whole Pentateuch, one must nevertheless read for himself every week the portion from the Pentateuch for the week, twice in the Hebrew text and once in the Targum (The ancient Aramaic translation of the Bible). Even verses which consist only of names should be read also in the Targum.

285,2. It is allowable to substitute the commentary of

Rashi (The acrostic name of Rabbi Solomon, son of Isaac, of Troyes, 1040-1105 CE, the author of the most popular commentary on the Bible and on the Talmud) for the reading of the Targum; but the pious will read both the Targum and Rashi's commentary. (The mystics prefer the Targum; others prefer to study Rashi's commentary.)

(One who is unable to read Rashi's commentary should read a paraphrase of the weekly Pentateuchal portion in the vernacular, such as the Tseenah Ureenah (A Judeo-German paraphrase, dating from approximately 1600 CE. This paraphrase was especially popular among women.) so that he gets to understand the content of the portion).

285,6. Professional teachers of children who during the week have studied with the children the weekly Hebrew portion from the Pentateuch do not have to read it over twice more and once in the Targum.

307,17. On sabbaths and festivals it is forbidden to study anything but Torah, though some allow serious reading, such as of medical works, or the use of astronomical instruments."

The rules quoted in Examples 1 and 2 are the detailed amplification of the idea that personal learning has to be regulated by a set of rules. There are also much simpler examples expressing the same idea, such as the one that follows.

EXAMPLE 3: The rules of Profiat Duran (14th century)

These are quoted from Israel Abrahams' Jewish Life in the Middle Ages (1896, reprint 1969, Atheneum, New York, pp. 355-356). Profiat Duran lived in Spain.

"1. Work in conjunction with a fellow student.
2. Use works which are brief or systematic.
3. Attend to what you read, and understand as you go.
4. Use mnemonics as an aid to memory.
5. Keep to one book at a time.
6. Use only books which are beautifully written, on good paper, and well and handsomely bound. Read in a pretty, well-furnished room, let your eye rest on beautiful objects so that you may love your work. Beauty must be everywhere; in your books and in your house. "The wealthy must honour the Law", says the Talmud; let them do this by paying for beautiful copies of the scriptures.

7. Use eye and ear; read aloud, do not work in silent posing.
8. Sing as you read, especially the Bible; in olden times the Mishnah, too, was sung.[145]
9. See that your text-books are written in square characters, as they are more original and more beautiful.
10. Use books which are written in a large hand with firm strokes, rather than thin and faint, for these make a stronger impression on the eyes and understanding.
11. Learn by teaching.
12. Study for the pure love of knowledge.
13. Study regularly at fixed hours, and do not say, within such and such a time I will finish so and so much. If you are occupied in business all day, read at night, when your day's work is over.
14. The road to knowledge lies through prayer; pray that God may grant you the knowledge that you seek."

This quotation is not a translation of the rules themselves but Abrahams' own summary. Goldman (1975) gives another version of some of these rules on pages 110-111 of his book.

Regulating personal learning for the lifelong pupil is not done only by organizing schools and houses of study but also finds its expression in the way in which the individual divides up his time each day. The following example described how this was done in one particular case.

EXAMPLE 4: A suggested daily programme for a lifelong learner.

This programme for daily study was found written on the title page of an old Pentateuch by an unknown East European lifelong student: exactly when he lived we do not know:[146]

In the Morning

"At midnight: Reshit Hokmah, ((a moralistic work by Moses de Vidas, first published in Venice, 1579, and frequently reprinted)); Mishnah; Shaarei Zion ((a compilation of special midnight prayers)); Psalms; Maamadot ((a compilation of selections from the Bible and Talmud for daily recitation)); Tzetel Katan ((a list of moral admonitions for daily perusal compiled by Rabbi Zevi Hirsh Elimelekh of Dynow)); Orhot Hayyim ((ethical pre-

cepts); prayers from the book Avodat ha-Kodesh; the Epistle of Nahmanides; Sulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim ((the daily duties of the Jew)).

At the Table

Scripture, Midrash Rabbah and Midrash Tanhuma ((homilectic compilations)), various compilations of Aggadah ((legends)).

Before Noon

Talmud, Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah ((instruction on things forbidden and permitted)), one sugyah ((topic of discussion)) a week.

Afternoon

Talmud, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat ((civil jurisprudence)) and Even ha-Ezer ((laws regulating family life)).

After evening prayers

Responsa, former and latter; Divre ha-Geonim ((a medieval commentary on Job)), Nahalat Shivah ((a book dealing with the correct forms of marriage certificates, bills of divorce, and other ritual documents)), Keset Sofer ((laws governing the writing of a Scroll of the Torah)), Brit Avot ((laws of circumcision)).

On the Sabbath

The tractate Shabbat, the laws of Shabbath; Shulhan Arukh."

Living one's whole life to rule, learning included, is liable to make a chore both of life and learning for anyone unable to draw joy from them.[147] The dangers of empty routine lie in wait wherever human thinking and human activities are planned in advance; but it is precisely the lifelong learner who, by means of his very learning, has the potentiality of breaking through that routine. In order to do this he must be able to understand the rules he is following, he must set store by what he learns and he must be able to make use of a considerable portion of what he learns in his personal and social life. If this is the case the rules will not chafe but will help him to achieve whatever goals he sets himself. Thus far the subject of rule[148] and routine.
The four examples mentioned in this section probably give the impression that daily learning will take the lifelong

learner so much time and require so much effort that little time will be left for pleasure and recreation. The reason for this is that the particular examples chosen are halakhic in inspiration rather than aggadic and are therefore of a somewhat prescriptive and formal character, which expresses itself in rules. It would be totally untrue to say that learning and pleasure rule each other out or to deny that learning can itself be recreational. Learning can be both a pleasure and a recreation and a pupil's life has many moments of play and times of festivity. Schools and houses of study are places of gaiety on occasion (see examples 5 and 6), and yet what is of even deeper importance is that learning itself gives meaning to life and brings the learner happiness.

EXAMPLE 5: Celebrating the first day at school (12th century)

The following quotation is taken from Abrahams (1969, pp. 347-348).

"Both the mother and the father participated in the important function of introducing the boy to school for the first time. This occurred when the boy was five, but it was deferred for a couple of years in case the child was weak or sickly. (...) Early in the morning the boy was dressed in new clothes, and three cakes of fine flour and honey were baked for him by a young maiden. Three eggs were boiled, and apples and other fuit were gathered in profusion. Then the child was taken in the arms of the Rabbi or another learned friend first to the school and then to the synagogue, or vice versa. The child was placed on the reading-dais before the Scroll, from which the Ten Commandments were read as the lesson of the day. In the school, he received his first lesson in reading Hebrew. On a slate were smeared in honey some of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, or simple texts, such as "Moses commanded us a Law, an inheritance for the assembly of Jacob" (Deut. 33:4); and the child lisped the letters as he ate the honey, the cakes, and the other delicacies, that the words of the Law might be sweet in his lips. The child was then handed over to the arms of his mother, who had stood by during this delightful scene."[149]

EXAMPLE 6: Celebration of the end of a period of study in the house of study (19th century)

The feast described below took place rather less than a hundred and fifty years ago in the Russian Bosk, to celebrate the completion of a particular section of study and the start of the next part of the programme set up by the house of study. The description is taken from Goldman (1975, p. xix):

"On Tuesday, the fifth of Nisan 5603 ((1843)) there was held a great feast by the Hevrah Aggadata. It was both a feast and a festival, and we rejoiced at the simhah shel mitzvah ((joy of the mitzvah)) that God had aided us to study and to complete the Aggadata. May God further help us to study and to teach, to observe and to do. We celebrated for two whole days. On Tuesday we finished the Aggadata, and we made a party and a festive day. We invited 123 guests, not counting the musicians and fifteen beadles. Four different and elaborate courses were served. The food was so plentiful that it was left over on the plates. If a man had not eaten in three days, he had more than enough to eat. The musicians were stationed in the women's gallery of the synagogue. Our joy was exceedingly great. Wine poured like water - some pouring into their throats and others pouring on the floor. On Wednesday we began anew the study of the Aggadata, and we obligated ourselves to study the Ein Yaakov. On that day, too, we made a great feast. The people made merry with trumpets and violins until it seemed the earth would split with the noise. The people who stood outside envied us our joy and our simhah shel mitzvah."

Such a festive conclusion, immediately followed by the impulse towards a new beginning (continuous learning!) is called syum.[150] The same custom of celebrating is found on a larger scale in the Simhat Torah-feast ('Joy of the Law'). At this feast the Torah rolls are carried round in a dance, there are good things to eat and drink and the reading consists of the final chapters of the fifth book of Moses (Deuteronomy) and the first chapters of the first book (Genesis).

The ranks of those who find happiness and comfort in learning are filled not only by the learned men or members of the professions[151] but also 'coachmen, bakers, butchers, shoemakers' to name but a few:
"Once I noticed ((writes a Christian man of learning of

his visit to Warsaw during the First World War)) a great many coaches on a parking place but with no drivers in sight. In my own country I would have known where to look for them. A young Jewish boy showed me the way: in a courtyard, on the second floor was the shtibl ((a small apartment for learning and prayer)) of the Jewish drivers. It consisted of two rooms; one filled with Talmud-volumes, the other a room for prayer. All the drivers were engaged in fervent study and religious discussion. ... It was then that I found out and became convinced that all professions, the bakers, the butchers, the shoemakers, etc., have their own shtibl in the Jewish district; and every free moment which can be taken off from their work is given to the study of the Torah. And when they get together in intimate groups, one urges the other: 'Sog mir a shtickl Torah - Tell me a little Torah."[152]

The emotional significance of the house of study for Jews and their tradition is linked in the closest possible way with the purifying effect of learning, of Torah study: "The bet ha-midrash ((house of study, see note 141)), was thus the place of assembly for the learners and the house of prayer for all those who set aside a fixed time for study. It was a resting place for the weary and a refuge for the troubled. It was a shelter for the aged and poor and also a hospice for the wanderer. It was a house of life for those who were giving their lives to the study of the Torah."[153]

Although the present section is concerned mainly with the principle of planning personal learning and not with the question of how that principle is to be expressed in practice, the detailed excerpts from Maimonides and Karo were included in order to illustrate and clarify the principle itself. There is no suggestion that either LL theorists or lifelong learners might or should take over these sets of rules, lock stock and barrel, but they do show the sort of content planned personal learning can have and the demands it is liable to make. While for most readers these long passages will be no more than illustrations and will possess at the most weak communicative authority (see I.2.5), there is a twofold justification for having included them. First, the meaning of the verb to plan requires full, illustrative explanation, and secondly, halakhic rules, which are directly concerned with lifelong learning (Examples 1 and 2) are largely unknown in the Netherlands, whereas there is a growing interest in certain aspects of lehrnen.[154] On the first of these two points it must be said

initially that the word 'planning' is often used in more or less technological contexts and planners often have scant regard for the individual people who will be taking part in their plans. It is nevertheless possible both to plan and to take account of the problems and difficulties experienced by individuals, and the examples given above show that this is true. Planned learning can only be of any use if the planning itself is humane and takes into account the indisputable starting point that learning is something that individuals themselves and not groups, things or institutions, must do, want to do and be able to do. Planning lifelong learning invades daily life - from cradle to grave - and any LL scheme that leaves the pupil no portion of the day to fill in as he wishes, or that disregards the pupil's emotional needs, is doomed to failure from the outset; this is true for any tradition, Jewish or non-Jewish.
The second reason for including examples of planned learning is that in the Netherlands more and more houses of study are coming into existence, indicating a growing interest in the phenomenon of 'lehrnen' and its various aspects. No one has as yet produced a systematic description of this 'wildcat' or spontaneous renewal in education, so we must be satisfied here with a list of some publications relevant to the subject of houses of study in the Netherlands and their sources of inspiration:

- M. Boertien, Het Joodse leerhuis (from 200 BC to 200 AD), Kampen, 1974.
- Praktische Theologie, 1975, 2/2. Special issue on 'zoiets als een leerhuis'.
- Jaaroverzicht Kolel Chacham Zwi 1976/77, Gerrit van der Veenstraat 26, Amsterdam. This 'Kolel' in Amsterdam has a 'department for full-time study of the Talmud by those in possesion of a diploma of rabbinical studies'.
- H. van Praag, 'Samen lernen'. In: Prana 13, Winter 1978/79, pp. 76-78.
- M. Wolff, 'Gedachten over het Leerhuis'. In: Wending, 34/6, June 1979, pp. 362-368.

To sum up, even though the modern reader will certainly not find himself at one with all the proposals put forward in the examples provided by the codes of Maimonides and Karo, he will have been furnished with a grand conception of LL and its organization in the personal life of a lifelong student.

Learning is not something that comes of itself. It takes effort and demands sacrifices and in lifelong learning

the requirement is even stronger:
"Cling to the Torah, even on your deathbed, the words of the Torah will only come alive for the man who is prepared to die for them."[155]
That is why a lifelong learner has to plan his daily life to include a time for study. The planning can only be dispensed with when the learning has become a fixed daily habit for the pupil concerned. John Dewey writes:
"It is the essence of routine to insist upon its own continuation. Breach of it is a violation of right. Deviation from it is transgression."[156]
The moment will come when the lifelong learner finds, perhaps to his own surprise, that he cannot do without daily study any more. It is the combination of continuity with learning and the constantly repeated effort required to reach new depths of comprehension that gives rise to such motivation.[157]

Notes

1 See e.g. Loewe (1966) and EJ, Vol. 16 under Woman.

2 Berman (1973, p. 8).

3 TB Ber. 17a. (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). See also TB Sot. 21a.

4 See e.g. Goldfeld (1975, pp. 245-256).

5 Echo of George Orwell (1958, ch. 10): "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."

6 Mishna Sota 3:4 (20a).

7 "The texts of both the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud would seem to support the position that according to Ben Azzai, women are equally obligated with men in the study of Torah (cf. Tosafot Sotah 21b s.v. Ben Azzai, straining the reading of J.T. Sotah 15b). This position is further supported by Mishna Nedarim 35b." See Tosafot.*

8 "The Amoraim lend an Aggadic quality to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer through their addition of the word 'keilu' ('as if'), Sotah 21b. (See my ((S.J. Berman's)) comments on the usage of 'Keilu' in Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 10, p. 1484, in article entitled 'Law and Morality'). The misogynistic tendencies here implied are made more specific in J.T. Sotah 16a."

9 Tosefta Berachot 2:12. See Tosefta.*

[10] See Amora*.

[11] TB Kiddushin 29a. "Cf. TB Berachot 22a and the manner in which it omits the references to women's study implied in its source. Tosefta Berachot 2:12."

[12] Viz. TB Sanhedrin as an instance of women studying Torah in relation to which Rabbi Eliezer's objection is not raised by the Amoraim. Many other such instances reflect the rejection of the position of Rabbi Eliezer.

[13] See Rishonim*.

[14] Strictly speaking, Joseph Karo belongs not to the Rishonim but to the Aharonim (see note 18).

[15] Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Talmud Torah 1:13. Tur, Yoreh Deah, ch. 246. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, ch. 246, sec. 6.

[16] See Ashkenaz*.

[17] Tosefot, Sotah 21b, s.v. Ben Azzai, Sefer Hasidim (ed. Bolonia) sec. 313. (ed. Mosad HaRav Kuk, pp. 244-245).

[18] See Ahronim*.

[19] Elijah Gaon ((1720-1797)); commentary to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, ch. 47, comment 18.

[20] David Halevi ((1586-1667)), TaZ to Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, ch. 246, comment 4.

[21] "Chafetz Chayim and others cited in Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 32. Indeed the authorities cited limit the distinction between Written and Oral Torah, and function essentially in terms of what is necessary to counter the effects of the society to which Jewish women are exposed."

[22] Beit Yosef to Tur, Orach Chayim, ch. 47, s.v. Vekasav. "His alleged sources are elusive, viz. Waldenberg, op. cit., p. 31."

[23] Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Laws of Talmud Torah, 1:15. "The Beit HaLevi (vol. 1, responsum no. 6) while affirming the possibility of an obligation resting on women to learn all laws necessary for their proper fulfillment of mitzvot, denies that such study would constitute a fulfillment of the mitzvah of Talmud Torah."

[24] Berman (1973, pp. 14-15, 26-27).

[25] See Shekhinah*.

[26] EJ, vol. 16, under Woman, col. 626-627. The talmud references are to TB.

[27] Prov. 6:20.

[28] Compare this with the three tannaitic positions given in digression 1.

[29] M. Sotah 3:4. R. Eliezer's words should be understood as follows: "If a man gives his daughter a knowledge of the Law, it is as though he taught her lechery."

[30] TJ Sotah III, 19a.

[31] T. Sotah 7:9 and parallels.

[32] T. Kelim Baba Kamma 4:17; T. Kelim Baba Metzia 1:6; T.B. Pesahim 62b.

[33] Safrai (1976, ch. 19, p. 955). See also Gollanz (1924), ch. 4: 'Female Education', pp. 110-114.

[34] See also Drazin (1940, ch. 7, pp. 128-133). According to Drazin in that period girls never went to school (p. 130) and daughters were brought up and taught by their mothers (p. 133) at home (p. 129). Drazin's 'never' would seem to be strong (Safrai, personal communication).

[35] Fishman (1944), ch. 8: 'The Education of Girls', pp. 118-121. See also EH, vol. 16, under Woman, cols. 623-630.

[36] Maimonides (1957, par. 34, pp. 49-53). Hayyim ben Israel Benveniste: Keneset ha-Gedolah: Yoreh De'ah, par. 245.

[37] See e.g. Fishman (1944, p. 120).

[38] See e.g. EJ, vol. 16, under Woman, col. 628 and the article on 'Idele' (Sadan, 1965, pp. 78-81).

[39] M. Avot 6:5. The number 48 is stated in the text but the numbering is mine. See also SEZ 17 and SER 14.

[40] M. Avot 2:8. See also TB Sanh. 99b.

[41] Josh. 1:8.

[42] Josh. 1:8.

[43] Deut. 4:9.

[44] Yad, Talmud Torah 1:8-10. (Hyamson, 1965).

[45] ARN 17. See also TB Ned. 81a and Num.R. 12:9.

[46] M. Avot 6:12.

[47] Deut. 33:4.

[48] M. Avot 2:4. See also Sif.Deut., Ekev 48 and Yad, talmud torah 3:7.

[49] M. Avot 1:15. See also TB Men. 99b and Mid.Ps. 1:8 and Yad, talmud torah 1:8.

[50] "He ((Shammai)) said, make the study of Torah the root and fundamental point and ((let)) all the rest of your affairs follow it." (Maimonides' commentary on M. Avot 1:15, David (1968), p. 15).

[51] TJ Ber. end (Goldman, 1975, p. 56). See also ARN[1] 24 and SEZ 16.

[52] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, p. 281). See also TB Ber. 35b.

[53] M. Avot 2:5.

[54] M. Avot 4:10.

[55] Sh.Ar.: YD 246:26. (Goldman 1975, p. 160).

[56] Yad, Talmud Torah 2:2 (Hyamson 1965). See also TB Ta'an 31a.

[57] Ben Yehuda (1959), vol. 8, col. 7785, note 1: Quotations from Medieval literature.
Nathan filio Jechielis/Alexander Kohut (1955), vol. 8, p. 243, note 1: matmid = pupil, who learns without interruption.

[58] Klatzkin (1928), part 1, pp. 238-239.

[59] Idem, part 2, p. 320.

[60] Idem, part 4 (1968, pp. 209-210).

[61] EJ, vol. 8, col. 795.

[62] Müller (1911, S. 17).

[63] Cf. I.1.1.

[64] Cf. part 1, par. 3.1.

[65] TB Sanh. 99a (Goldman 1975, p. 56).

[66] TB Ta'an. 7b (Goldman 1975, p. 56).

[67] TB Av. Zar. 19a (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). See also TB Ber. 63b.

[68] TB Er. 54b (Goldman 1975, p. 56). See also M. Avot 5:22.

69 Sifrei Ekev, ch. 48 (Goldman 1975, p. 56). See also M. Kin. 3:6.

70 Abbas: Jair Natib, 15. Kapitel. Quoted in Güdemann (1873, Drittes Kapitel, S. 153).

71 TB Pe'ah 1:1. Cf. section III.1.2, note 10.

72 TB Hag. 9b. See also TB Er. 54b.

73 Quoted in Heschel (1974, part 2, p. 107).

74 Cf. Stein (1901, S. 29-30).

75 TB Ta'an. 7a. (Goldman 1975, p. 58).

76 Cf. TB Ta'an. 7a. See also TB Mak. 10a.

77 TB Ber. 63b. See also SER 18 and TB Mak. 10a.

78 M. Avot 4:13.

79 Maimonides' commentary on M. Avot 4:13 (David 1967, p. 83-84). See also Eccles.R. 7:7 and TB Shab. 147b.

80 TB Ta'an. 7a (Goldman 1975, p. 58). Cf. note 75.

81 Idem.

82 Idem. See also the final words of Maimonides quoted above: "... colleagues and students to bestir you" (note 79) and his comments on M. Avot 1:6.

83 Cf. Jacobs (1965, ch. 9, pp. 94-95) on the term 'talmid hakham'.

84 Cf. II.1.1.

85 Cf. of the summary in III.1.2, point 44.

86 TB Ta'an. 7a.

87 Cf. part 1, section 1.1.

88 M. Avot 4:14. See also TB Sanh. 37a.

89 Maimonides' commentary on M. Avot 4:14 (trans. David 1968, p. 84).

90 M. Avot 3:6.

91 Idem. See also M. Avot 3:2 for words of similar sense. See also TB Ber. 6a.

92 M. Avot 1:16. See Maimonides' commentary on this (David 1968, p. 7) and ARN[1] 8.

93 See e.g. Menes (1971) and Alon (1970).

94 For a full discussion see Goldman (1975, chs. 12-13). Hevrot (sing. hevrah).

[95] Goldman (1975, ch. 12, p. 197).

[96] The word Shas derives from the first letters of Shishah Sedarim, the 'six sections' or main parts of the mishnah (talmud).

[97] The word hummash comes from the root hammeish, meaning five.

[98] 'Thesen über Feuerbach' (Karl Marx 1968, pp. 157-158).

[99] M. Avot 1:17. See also part 1, section 3.7, notes 68-71 and part 2, section II.1.2, notes 10-11.

[100] See Banning (1961, ch. II.A.1, p. 62).

[101] Bacher: Terminologie, I, p. 113. On the conjunction of 'Torah' with the concepts 'learning' and 'behaviour', see Kadushin (1938, ch. 2, pp. 28-30, 69-79).

[102] Kadushin (1938, p. 29).

[103] Part 1, section 3.7, note 71.

[104] TB Pe'ah. 1:1. See II.1.2, note 10.

[105] TB Kid. 40b. My emphasis.

[106] Yad, Talmud Torah 3:3. My emphasis.

[107] Friedmann, Seder Eliahu Rabba und Seder Eliahu Zuta (Wien 1902) and Pseudo-Seder Eliahu Zuta (Wien 1904), brought together in one volume under the title Seder Eliahu by Achiassaf (Warsaw). Abbr. SE. The quotation comes from SE 'Additions', p. 8.

[108] SE 'Additions', p. 39.

[109] Idem, p. 5.

[110] SE, p. 69.

[111] Kadushin (1938, p. 77). Cf. also Heschel's words in I.2.2, note 19.

[112] SE, p. 82.

[113] Idem, p. 69.

[114] Idem, p. 13.

[115] Kadushin (1938, p. 78).

[116] Heschel (1959, pp. 345-346). The paragraph is headed 'Actions teach'.

[117] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 23, p. 301).

[118] Tosefta Yebamoth 8:4 (Zuckermandel, M.S., ed.), p. 250. See also Gen.R. 34:6.

[119] M. Avot 1:17. See also note 99 and TB Yoma 86a and 72b and ARN[1] 24.

[120] David, Maimonides (1968, p. 20).

[121] Aaron Halevi of Barcelona: Sefer Hachinuch, mitswah 20 (Heschel 1959, pp. 305-306).

[122] TB Ber. 17a, according to Mss. version. See EJ, vol. 14, col. 646, under Sages.

[123] Sometimes it is the application that has to be analyzed in the first place, and then the other: "Rava advised a man who sees afflictions come upon himself to first examine his conduct and only 'if he finds nothing objectionable in his behavior, let him ascribe them to the neglect of the study of the Torah.'" (TB Ber. 5a, Mss. version. See EJ loc. cit.).

[124] Cf. the passages on halakhah in I.2.

[125] See further on, notes 138 and 140.

[126] As there are roughly as many women as men, the universality of the obligation to study is really only partial. Although they were not bound to do so, women did learn (see III.1.1)

[127] There were always some children who received private tuition. The more schools were established the rarer this became. Even as early as the end of the second century CE it was the general rule for children to attend school (Safrai 1976, p. 947).

[128] PT Ket. 8:32c.

[129] Safrai (1976, p. 947).

[130] TB Bava Batra 21a (cf. Safrai 1976, p. 948).

[131] In the last years of the Second Temple (63-65 CE) he was high priest there. EJ, vol. 10 under Joshua ben Gamla, col. 278-279.

[132] Safrai (1976, p. 948).

[133] PT Hag. 1:76c.

[134] Safrai (1976, p. 948-949).

[135] Idem, p. 949.

[136] See e.g. EJ, vol. 6, under Education, col. 381-466.

[137] See also III.1.1.

[138] Safrai (1976, p. 949-950). See also III.3.1, note 187.

[139] See e.g. Greenberg (1971) and EJ, vol. 6, under

Education (Jewish), col. 381-461 and the references cited there. Goldman (1975) describes all sorts of study houses and various forms of adult instruction, beginning in bible times and ending at the present day.

[140] Cf. part 1, section 2.4.

[141] Two systems of education are implicated here. On one side are scholastic systems such as 'beth ha-sefer', 'beth ha-knesset', 'beth ha-talmud', 'heder', 'talmud torah', 'yeshivah', etc. and on the other house of study systems like the 'synagogue', 'beth ha-midrash', 'kallah', 'hevrot', 'kollel', 'beth ulphana', etc.

[142] Goldman's (1975) subtitle reads. Title: Lifelong Learning Among Jews. Subtitle: Adult Education in Judaism from Biblical Times to the Twentieth Century.

[143] The English translation of Hilkhot Talmud Torah in this chapter is from vol. 1 of Moses Hyamson's edition of the Mishneh Torah (New York, 1973). Chapter and section citations are given in brackets at the conclusion of each extract. The parenthetical references and comments are Hyamson's. See also Veisblit (1966, pp. 40-43): Elifant (1973, pp. 11-16): Veinshtein (1973 etc.).

[144] This translation from the Shulhan Arukh was made by Dr. David de Sola Pool. It first appeared in Menorah Journal 10 (June-July 1924) and was reprinted in Jewish Education 16, no. 3 (May 1945). The parenthetical references and comments are from the notes appended by Dr. Pool to the translation; the annotations in smaller type (in brackets) were selected by Dr. Pool from the several commentaries on the basic text of the Shulhan Arukh.

[145] Jews everywhere were accustomed to learn while singing (Abrahams 1969, p. 355).

[146] See Goldman (1975, pp. xiv, xviii-xix).

[147] Cf. Heschel (1974, p. 9): "Jewish teachers insisted that everything must be regulated, codified; for every moment there must be an established form, a recognizable pattern. Dedicated to such an order of living, the practice of Judaism was in danger of becoming a series of acts performed by rote. Then came the Baal Shem ((Tov)), who reminded the people that spontaneity was as important as pattern, faith as essential as obedience, and that obedience without fervor led to stultification of the spirit. The Baal

Shem Tov's intention was to prevent Jewish piety from hardening into mere routine. Yet his path also became a habit, a routine. When first conceived, an idea is a breakthrough; once adopted and repeated, it tends to become a cul-de-sac."

[148] For a philosophical analysis of rules and behaviour according to rules, see e.g. Duintjer (1977).

[149] Abrahams' description largely follows the 12th century Mahzor Vitry (1824, p. 628). Güdemann gives a slightly different version (1880, S. 50).

[150] Cf. also Sh.Ar., YD 246:26 (Example 2 in this section).

[151] Eg. Safrai (cf. part 1, par. 1.3, the answer to question 25).

[152] Heschel (1963, p. 46).

[153] Lipschitz (1927, p. 149). Cited in Goldman (1975, p. 267).

[154] See III.1.5, note 95.

[155] TB Shab. 83b with reference to Num. 19:14. See also Example 1 (Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 3:12).

[156] Dewey (1922, p. 78). From Allport (1961, p. 233).

[157] Compare this with Allport's emendation of Hebb's principle: "The motivational character of routine is much enhanced if it contains within itself the complicating stress of novelty" (Allport 1961, p. 248). Hebb's principle, according to but unchanged by Allport reads: "Self-sustaining interests seem to reflect preoccupation with the novel when commingled with the familiar" (Idem, p. 247). See also III.2.2 on 'functional autonomy'.

III.2 LEARNING OBJECTIVES

III.2.1 To become a complete person

In Jewish tradition all learning goals that the lifelong learner can set himself are comprised in one single objective. He does not learn in order to practice a profession - even that of rabbi - nor to obtain power or authority, but in order to improve himself and his behaviour and thereby also the world. In other words he learns in order to become a complete person. At the end of an extensive study of literature this is the conclusion reached by historian Simha Asaf (1889-1953):
"One single aim and one only did our people have for the education of their children, namely to make them whole Jews,"[1]
and a whole Jew is here a complete person according to the traditional Jewish image of man,
"knowing the Torah, fearing God, observing the commandments, and inculcating them with such a love of God that when called upon they would readily give up their lives for the sanctification of God's name."[2]
Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), the first (ashkenasi) chief rabbi of modern Israel, puts it in a different way:
"The goal of Jewish education is to qualify man for his predestined role to lead the good and upright life,"[3]
and he remarks that this must be taught to children when they are young and that this learning goal always remains the most important goal of education:
"... it becomes necessary to dedicate oneself to fixed programs of Jewish learning, this process ((bringing up the pupils to be complete people)) must begin with earliest childhood when the child attends the Talmud Torah ((primary school))...
The preparation of man for the making of a living and for the battles of life are regarded among Jews as a secondary goal of Jewish education and not a primary one."[4]

What is a 'complete person'? There is no simple answer. It depends on the lifelong student's image of the world and even more on his image of man. It also depends on the people he admires, what aspect of culture he studies and finds worthwhile, his assimilation of the past and his outlook on the future. Briefly, the answer to this question depends on what the learner takes to be 'Torah' or Jewish tradition. To become a complete person is not an unattainable ideal but a possibility open to every human being, and the key to this lies in the Torah tenet that man is made in the image of God.[5]

It can be said in general that, over the last half century, optimism about the progress of human beings and the world has suffered hard blows from the disastrous events of the Second World War ("knowledge now goes for nothing"). The two names that symbolize these events are Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The first refers to the systematic persecution and annihilation of Jews, gypsies, political opponents and other elements that had somehow earned the disfavour of the Nazi régime (1933-1945). The second stands for the dropping of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in Japan (1945). From a technical point of view both Auschwitz and Hiroshima were successful operations: the time of bloody and revengeful murder expeditions was past; such 'barbarian' enterprises had been replaced by a 'clean', quick and efficient destruction of human lives. But from a moral point of view Auschwitz and Hiroshima represented the very lowest depths of man's inhumanity. These two catastrophes have demonstrated that genocide lies well within our human capabilities and that we are technically in a position to depopulate the whole earth. Auschwitz and Hiroshima are implications of our civilization and it may be that, for our time, to be a complete person is to be someone who can teach us how we can avoid a repetition of these catastrophes; teach us once again what humanity is and how we can work towards humanizing the present-day world.

In the preceding paragraph Auschwitz and Hiroshima came out in one breath but these two disasters cannot be bracketed together just like that. This is not the place to go into the handful of things they have in common or the many differences that distinguish them, but there is one thing that seizes our attention in the context of an analysis of 'completeness'. It stands out much more clearly from Auschwitz than from Hiroshima with what ease 'ordinary' people can be drawn into complicity in murder: "By far the majority of the thousands of Germans who played a larger or smaller role in the apparatus of destruction, were neither fanatics nor sadists. They were ordinary, everyday people, a cross-section of the German population, not born criminals. After the war they melted away unnoticed into the crowd and behaved once more as respectable citizens. It is precisely this that is one of the most terrifying aspects of the Endlösung that ordinary 'decent' people could be brought to do such things under the pressure of unceasing propaganda."[6] All this refers to those directly involved rather than to the silent accomplices who were those who stood aside and allowed the executioners to carry out their grisly task

without hindrance. Auschwitz teaches us to distrust every philosophy of neutralism.[7] Man has not only to choose between good and evil but in order to come to this choice has first to overcome neutrality, in the sense of indifference to good or evil:
"The primary task, therefore, is not how to deal with the evil, but how to deal with the neutral,..."[8]
Auschwitz has made us aware that those who find themselves obliged to maintain a neutral position and be neither on one side nor the other, may find that in so doing they play the role of co-murderer. Neutrality and indifference do not keep the world in existence but undermine its humanity. The humanity of the world has to be worked at every single day by every single person.

The lifelong learner of today, studying the Torah and attempting to understand Jewish tradition, the Jews, their history and their experience of life will sooner or later have to come to Auschwitz. He will never become a complete person if he avoids the question "How was Auschwitz possible?" or refuses to try to answer questions such as these:
"How exactly did the great evil arise from the German people? Would it have been possible for the Nazi's to commit such atrocities if they had not been helped and supported by other peoples? Nations who themselves had Jews in their midst? Could the catastrophe have been avoided if the allied powers had put more heart into coming to the aid of Jews who were being persecuted? Did the Jews living freely in other countries do everything possible to help their persecuted brothers and to get help from other people? What are the psychological and sociological sources of the collective hate known as anti-semitism? Can this age-old disease be fought against and if so, how? What lesson should be learnt from all this by the Jewish people and by other peoples and how should this lesson be taken to heart by each individual in his relationships with his fellow men?"[9]

These are some of the questions which can no longer be wished away from Jewish tradition or the Torah; study of the Torah in our times must include searching for solutions on precisely such points.
"Six million were wiped off the face of the earth. And there is danger that they will also be annihilated from our memories. Are they doomed to a twofold annihilation?"[10]
If the lifelong student of Torah gives no thought to Auschwitz[11] the disasters of yesterday will become the

possibilities of tomorrow once again. That is why at the exit of the Yad Vashem museum in Jeruzalem, the monument and study centre where the memory of the catastrophe of the last World War is being kept alive, the words "Forgetfulness leads to exile, while remembrance is the secret of redemption" (Israel ben Eliezer Ba'al Shem Tov, 1698-1760) are written. In general, whoever forgets the past simply ceases to keep in mind the negative turn of events in the past, thereby leaving the doorways unguarded against evil. No student may burden his conscience by himself having contributed to that forgetting, least of all the one whose goal is to become a complete person whose life is a response to the lessons of the Torah, the historical experience of the Jewish people and the terrors of Auschwitz.

DIGRESSION: "I dare say, man never, or at least not normally and primarily, sees in the partners whom he encounters and in the causes to which he commits himself merely a means to an end; for then he would have destroyed any authentic relationship to them. Then they would have become mere tools; they would be of use for him, but by the same token, they would have ceased to have any value, that is to say, value in itself."[12] For 'partners' one might read 'teachers and pupils' and for 'causes' 'the opinions and behaviour for which they stand'. As a rule, no lifelong student will be content to see himself or his learning exclusively as a means to an end, whatever this may be, to be reached in the course of learning and doing. If, however, the goal is to become a complete person, that is, to become himself complete, then neither the lifelong student nor his learning are exclusively a means, but also a goal. This is important. The American philosopher Walter Kaufmann sets out the principle in his introduction to his translation of Martin Buber's 'I and Thou': "Kant told men always to treat humanity, in our person as well as that of others, as an end also and never only as a means. This is one way of setting off I-You (Ich-Du) from I-It (Ich-Es). And when he is correctly quoted and the 'also' and the 'only' are not omitted, as they all too often are, one may well marvel at his moral wisdom."[13]

III.2.2 Learning 'li-Shema' and functional autonomy

Learning is an attempt to assimilate knowledge in order to know (how and that). The dualism consists of 'knowing' on the one hand and the factual actualization of knowledge on the other, and according to the Torah, the task of the pupil is to resolve this dualism (compare section

3.7 end). The Torah deems it wrong to put off the factual actualization of the knowledge until the moment when the pupil's knowledge is complete, the reasons for this being as follows: given that the pupil's knowledge never will be complete delay becomes infinite, sometimes becomes never and no pupil ever gets as far as even attempting resolution of the dualism. The Torah has a different way: "All that the Lord has spoken we will faithfully do!"[14] (literally (we will do and obey))
The 'do' in this quotation means action and the 'obey' learning.[15] In conformity with the order in the text, where doing comes before obeying, the Torah incites the student to act first, even though he does not yet know precisely what he is doing or why he does it, and then study the Torah and do his best to penetrate to the sources of his action.[16]

The lifelong student who is studying in order to become a complete person is trying to reach something the meaning and full consequences of which he is not yet aware. He does not yet know what form his completeness will take nor what there will be for him to do. What he is able to learn now, is to improve his conduct. Therefore his duty is to act and to evaluate his actions under those aspects most in need of improvement: in need of, but also susceptible of, improvement. He is to learn not in order to profit from his learning but in order to better himself.
The rabbinical ideal of learning is disinterested learning and that is learning li-Shema. Whoever declares:
"I am learning Torah that I may get rich, or that I may be called Rabbi, or that I may gain reward (from God)... I will learn Torah in order to be called learned, to have a seat in the academy, to have endless life in the world to come...,"[17]
is not pursuing the ideal of li-Shema.

In every tradition there are instances of complete people. The Torah says that such examples are, however, not to be imitated but to learn from:
"Whatever is brought to great and holy fulfillment serves as example, for it makes visible to us what greatness and holiness are, but it is not a model which we must copy. However little we are able to achieve, by the standards of greatness of our forefathers ((the instances of completeness)), its value lies in the fact that we produce it in our own way and out of our own strength."[18]
No two lifelong students follow the same path towards the common goal of completeness. No two pupils can ever be identical and each has his own path which certainly does

not consist in going over once again the particular route which someone else has already followed to its conclusion. In addition to the path of learning, the ultimate learning result will also vary from pupil to pupil, not in the goal that is set, for this is always to become a complete person, but in the actuality this represents which will always be specific to each individual.
The Torah rejects imitation either of the path of learning or of the outcome, because imitation would deny the personal uniqueness of each lifelong student. Rabbi Susja says:
"In the world to come I shall not be asked: 'Why were you not Moses?' I shall be asked: 'Why were you not Susja?'"[19]
Every pupil has his own way to travel and it is only during the learning process, that is, in the course of learning li-Shema, that his goal of becoming a complete person becomes clear to him in the full significance of all its personal consequences. Given that learning li-Shema is not only the attempt to reach the learning goal, but also to define that goal, learning itself, and not the learning goal, has become primary for the lifelong pupil. Learning li-Shema is also known as learning for learning's sake or for its own sake. In the following discussion no distinction is made between the concepts of 'learning li-Shema','disinterested learning' and 'learning for its own sake'.

No learning is held in higher regard than disinterested learning:
"Rabbi Meir said: whoever occupies himself with the Torah for its own sake, acquires by merit many things, nay more, the whole of the world is worthwhile for his sake. He is called a friend, a beloved, one that loves the all-present, one that loves (his fellow) creatures, one that gladdens God, one that gladdens man, and it (i.e. the Torah) ((learning li-Shema)) clothes him with meekness and fear, and fits him to be righteous, pious, upright and faithful. It also keeps him far from sin, and brings him near to merit (orious conduct); and men benefit from him by (way of) counsel, sound knowledge, understanding and strength."[20]
Disinterested learning is directed towards others and towards the world and is not designed to serve the pupil's own personal interests. At the beginning a pupil is incapable of disinterested learning and even an advanced pupil is often unable to achieve it. Every pupil is expected to accomplish disinterested learning but not everyone manages to do so. The route to disinterested learning is lifelong learning and that is the very reason

why one should study lifelong: lifelong learning, at first not disinterested learning, becomes so in virtue of its own continuity. Maimonides says:
"A person should always occupy himself with the Torah, whether for its own sake or for other reasons. For study of the Torah, even when pursued from interested motives, will lead to study for its own sake."[21]
This is a clear instance of the motivation that Gordon W. Allport calls functional autonomy. The philosopher F. Bretano (1838-1917) describes as a 'well-known psychological law' that:
"What at first was desired merely as a means to something else, comes at last from habit to be desired for its own sake."[22]
Through lifelong learning, learning becomes functionally autonomous and finally self-motivating:
"The original motives ((for learning in our case)) may be entirely lost. What was a means to an end becomes an end in itself."[23]
Little by little learning moves on from its initial state, becoming more and more disinterested until at last the pupil learns for the sake of learning itself.

Learning li-Shema, disinterested learning, is a learning that is independent of any form of reward or punishment outside the learning itself, outside the person engaged in studying Torah:
"Be not like unto servants who serve the master in the expectation of receiving a gratuity, but be like unto servants who serve the master without the expectation of receiving a gratuity."[24]
Learning's reward lies in learning itself and it is the pupil himself who inflicts his own punishment for failing to learn because by so doing he deprives himself of the joy of learning. Learning for its own sake, li-Shema is self-motivating:
"One precept (draws in its train another) precept and for the recompense for (performing) a precept is a precept ..."[25]
In this learning there is no longer any separation between learning as goal and learning as means. Learning li-Shema is an end (learning for the sake of learning) and a means (disinterested learning in order to be complete). Whoever studies li-Shema decides for himself both his learning goal and the way in which he is to reach it by lifelong study. Directing his own learning process, he functions as an autonomous learner or is functionally autonomous in the ordinary sense of the phrase though not in Allport's specific sense: in other

words, such a pupil is a free person. The student, engaged in disinterested study and learning for the sake of learning, and thereby continuously fostering his own completeness and learning motivation, is the prototype of the free human being:
"'And the tables were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, graven upon the tables' (Ex. 32: 16). Read not haruth (graven) but heruth (freedom), for there is no free man for thee but he that occupies himself with the study of Torah."[26]
Here, 'studying the Torah' means learning li-Shema. As soon as the learning changes from not being disinterested to being disinterested, the student becomes free. The path that leads to this freedom is the path of lifelong learning.

DIGRESSION: The Torah concept of learning li-Shema can also be related to the distinction between the psychological concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic learning motivation.
"Although there are several conceptualizations ((for example learning)) is intrinsically motivated if there is no apparent external reward for the activity: the activity seems to be the reward; it is the end rather than the means to an end."[27]

Motivation that is not intrinsic is extrinsic. Extrinsic learning motivation comes into play when learning is not an end in itself but a means to attaining other goals and rewards. Learning li-Shema is, as it were, both a means and an end, as has already been discussed on the previous page.
The connection between the three concepts mentioned above and lifelong learning might be expressed as follows: lifelong learning can be both intrinsically (the student takes pleasure in what he learns) and extrinsically (learning is a traditional value, nothing is more important than learning) motivated. As soon as lifelong learning changes to learning li-Shema the distinction between these two motivations loses its point; in other words, in li-Shema the distinction ceases to apply.

Notes

1 Asaf (1925, 1:10) and Goldman (1975, p. 269).

2 Idem. See also Ps. 12, 24:4-6, 34:14-15.

3 Quoted in Scharfstein (1945, pp. 15-16) and Goldman (1975, pp. 268-269).

[4] Idem.

[5] See Gen. 1:27 and section II.2.2. See also 'Nachahmung Gottes' (Buber, 1964, S. 1060-1065) and 'Sacred Image of Man' (Heschel 1975, ch. 10, pp. 150-156).

[6] Van der Leeuw (1970/1975, p. 1151).

[7] Levinas (1961): Conclusions, par. 7: 'Contre la philosophie du Neutre'.

[8] Heschel (1955, ch. 37, p. 383).

[9] These questions were framed by the judge who tried Adolf Eichmann in 1961, in Jerusalem. I quote from Presser's translation of the judgment (Presser, 1970/1975, p. 758).

[10] Heschel (1959, ch. 13, pp. 187-188). The 6 million of the quotation are the Jewish victims of the Nazi régime.

[11] In this passage Auschwitz is used in the same sense as the word 'holocaust'.

[12] 'Logotherapy and Existence' (Frankl 1978, ch. 4, p. 60).

[13] Kaufmann (1970, p. 16). See also Heschel (1965b, ch. 4, pp. 57-58).

[14] Ex. 24:7.

[15] Cf. Zevin (1946), the chapter on 'talmud torah', p. 208.

[16] Cf. TB Shab. 88a. See also Mid.Ps. 103:3 and 104:1.

[17] Sifrei (Deut. 41 and 48), quoted in EJ, vol. 15, under Study, col. 455. See also TB Ber. 17a and TB Ned. 62a.

[18] De Moor, Buber (1953, ch. 2, p. 17). Cf. also Luzzatto (1966, end).

[19] De Moor, Buber (1953, ch. 2, p. 19).

[20] M. Avot 6:1. See also TB Sanh. 99b.

[21] Yad, Talmud Torah 3:5 (Hyamson 1965). See also III.1.7, example 1. Maimonides quotes almost literally from the talmud. (TB Pes. 50b, TB Sot. 22b). Cf. also TB Ber. 17a.

[22] Hague, Brentano (1902). The quotation is from Allport (1961, ch. 10, p. 229). Allport defines 'functional autonomy' thus: "Functional autonomy refers to any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions

involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed." (Allport 1961, idem).

[23] Allport (1961, p. 236).

[24] M. Avot 1:3. There is an extensive literature on the opposition of 'reward and punishment' and 'li-Shema'. See e.g. Schechter (1975), ch. 11: 'The Joy of the Law', pp. 162-163. Bernfeld (1922), Erster Teil, 'Lohn und Strafe', S. 95-113. Ook Bernfeld (1968), ch. 5: 'Reward and Punishment', pp. 125-149. Herford (1924, ch. 5, B, pp. 123-135). Flusser (1968, pp. 109-111). Jacobs (1973), ch. 18: 'Reward and Punishment', pp. 260-268.

[25] Cf. M. Avot 4:2. For the word 'mizwah' (precept) can be substituted the most important of the mizwot, the command to learn. That this is the most important appears from TB Pe'ah 1-1: "the study of the Torah is of as much value as all of them ((all mizwot))." See also II.1.2.

III.3 EVALUATION

III.3.1 Evaluation and lifelong learning

In this section and the next, 'evaluation' will apply only to 'informative' evaluation of the progress made by individual pupils or learners within lifelong learning. Furthermore, the lifelong learning with which we are concerned lies within the Jewish tradition. Neither in these sections nor in the study as a whole, does evaluation of LL as a system come under discussion. It is taken for granted that the objective of becoming a complete person assumes a process of lifelong learning so that it may be said that if ever anybody wishes to attain completeness, he is in any case bound to study lifelong. The first priority in this section is to return to the analysis of evaluation given in Part 1 (section 3.7). It will be shown that the functional question 'Does the means lead to the goal?' has little relevance when the means referred to is lifelong learning and the goal the completeness of the pupil. Following on this we are reminded that interim goals do not necessarily have to be intermediate goals on the route to completeness and that there is generally more than one learning route to this goal open to the pupil. Finally, the problem of evaluating a disposition, in this case 'knowledge', is related to the concepts 'the complete person', 'the sage' and 'action' as these are used in Jewish tradition, and also to learning li-Shema. Means-goal analysis applied to the evaluation of lifelong learning will be demonstrated as inadequate where Jewish tradition and the evaluation of LL in its context are concerned. Between the means (lifelong learning) and the goal (completeness) there is also learning li-Shema, and it is in this learning that the distinction between means and goal, between LL and completeness disappears. Having already begun with the summary of its contents, the section can now continue in more detail.

Evaluation of a learning or teaching-learning process in which goals and means are clearly distinguished, is bound to take into consideration two questions, as explained in Part 1, section 2.7:
(1) The question of function: do the means lead to the goal?
(2) The question of principle: are means and goal morally defensible?
In the learning process that is Jewish tradition, the means are lifelong learning and the goal is that of

becoming a complete person. For this tradition the second question is easier to answer than the first and will therefore be dealt with at once.
The answer to the question of principle is 'yes'. 'Learning' in itself is never damaging; injurious consequences can occur when what is learnt is put into practice or, more often, when it is not put into practice. The same is true of lifelong learning so we can say that the means itself is morally justifiable. The goal is also morally justifiable as long as the completeness that is sought does not imply any conduct which might be thought of by one person as denoting completeness and yet by someone else as immoral. A complete person is, by definition, someone who does not act immorally and this means that the goal of completeness is also morally justifiable by definition.
The answer to the question of function is not a simple 'yes', but neither is it 'no'.
It must first of all be said that this question is irrelevant to pupils who are already complete people and who have thus already reached their goal, even though this does not mean that they can give up learning. Completeness is something which has to be worked at every day if it is not to be lost.
Secondly, the question has little meaning for lifelong learning or teaching-learning processes because these generally last for such a long time, for the whole lifetime of the pupil in fact. When the question is put in relation to an individual pupil then it must be answered in the affirmative as long as in the process of lifelong learning the pupil is indeed constantly becoming more complete. The fallacy in the question lies in the fact that it cannot be answered by 'no' in relation to any lifelong learner. A negative answer will always be premature because although for the moment the pupil may not yet have succeeded in becoming more complete or may have paused in the process, he may still succeed or take up the process once again, in the future. The answer 'no' can only be given - if appropriate - after the pupil has stopped learning. For the lifelong learner this must be after his death, and then he is no longer in a position to profit from the answer, be it 'yes' or 'no'.
The question of function, in spite of being irrelevant and futile in many LL situations, does have an answer and that answer is neither 'yes' or 'no' but 'sometimes'. Some lifelong learners achieve their goal or go on getting nearer to it, while others do not.
This completes our answers to the two evaluation questions in the case of lifelong learning as means to

the goal of becoming a complete person. Throughout the ages, students engaged in lifelong Torah study have followed various routes in order to achieve or approach their final goal of becoming complete people. Their paths have taken them from interim goal to interim goal (see section 3.7, part 1) and their various ways have been wont to differ in many if not all their interim learning goals. Variation in interim learning goals is clearly apparent in the curricula of schools, houses of study and individual students, and in the course of time these curricula have undergone considerable alteration.[1]
In our own time as well, in countries where there is a flourishing pluriform Jewish life, pupils and their parents are able to choose from among a number of curricula. This means that no single assemblage of interim goals, however arranged, has proved itself to be the best or only correct route leading to the final goal. It also means that the attainment of one or other interim goal cannot be guaranteed to bring the student nearer the final goal except in the case of a few extremely elementary goals such as reading skills, arithmetic and the art of listening. But this conclusion has already been reached in the general discussion of evaluation earlier in the book.[2]

Another conclusion reached at the same time was that it is not someone's knowledge that we evaluate, for that is a disposition, but the actualization of that knowledge. The dualism of knowledge and its actualization is the very thing that makes knowledge-evaluation so difficult. It was also noted that LL requires a form of evaluation that enables the student to improve his own learning and this we called informative evaluation. The more the student succeeds in resolving the dualism, the smaller the gap becomes between his knowledge and its concrete actualization and the more the evaluation of the actualization will approach evaluation of the knowledge and the more informative will become the evaluation.[3]

A learner who has resolved the dualism of knowledge and concrete actualization in reality, shows everything he knows in his verbal and non-verbal behaviour. For him, evaluation of his behaviour is at the same time evaluation of his total sum of knowledge (knowing how and knowing that). So the lifelong learner who would like to have informative evaluation of his learning must do his best to see that the gap between knowledge and behaviour is as small as possible.
In Torah terms, a complete person (ha-adam ha-shaleem)[4]

is one who is able to resolve the dualism of his knowledge and its actualization in his own way of life. The complete person defined in this way is sometimes also known as a talmid hakham, which is usually translated as 'sage' (Dutch geleerde, French docteur, German Schriftgelehrte), but which means literally 'pupil of a wise man'. No-one whose inner self fails to correspond to his outward showing can be a talmid hakham:
"A scholar whose face does not reflect his heart is not a scholar."[5]
A lifelong learner whose completeness is increasing reduces little by little the discrepancy between inner and outer selves and will succeed more and more often and more and more regularly in resolving the dualism of knowledge and behaviour.

What part is played by evaluation in Jewish tradition? For a start, the two questions of function and principle are not of central significance because lifelong Torah study is not so much a learning process with clearly distinguishable ends and means as a learning that is as it were both means and end. Here I am talking about learning li-Shema, disinterested learning, learning for its own sake. In learning li-Shema, lifelong learning that has achieved functional autonomy, the learner already discovers his learning goal in his learning; in the act of learning he learns what and how he himself - and nobody else - must learn.[6] In Jewish tradition a lifelong learner's learning is evaluated by what he does, in fact his conduct, during the learning and throughout life. Just as it does in the Torah, action lies at the heart of evaluation of lifelong learning.

III.3.2 Evaluation and Torah-learning which is also lifelong

Study of the Torah in schools is sometimes evaluated according to models which have more to do with the scholastic environment in general than with the Jewish tradition in particular. This can be seen in the following examples of evaluation which are not typically Jewish:
- The teacher may test his pupils' knowledge by putting catch questions which may mislead them. He may also test his pupils' alertness and their retention of material learnt some time before, by doing certain things wrong on purpose. He sometimes asks questions not directly connected with what the pupils are learning at that particular time, in order to stimulate greater industry

in repeating what they have learnt and to emphasize the necessity of habit.[7]
- Advanced pupils, capable of following the main lines of a talmudic discussion on their own, are set the task of writing an essay on a particular theme which is dealt with in several different places in the talmud. This enables the teacher to evaluate a section of the pupil's knowledge and teaches the pupil to express his knowledge in writing.[8]
- The pupils repeat their lessons; this is usually oral repetition and they are heard regularly by the teacher. But more important than repetition is the lifelong learning itself. Once a pupil has acquired the taste for learning he is considered able to improve his own learning as he goes along. Whether he has this taste and is already in the process of acquiring the habit of *lifelong learning does not need to be tested because it* is immediately apparent and the pupil himself is well aware of the level of unremittingness his learning has reached.

A Jewish school's principal task is not evaluation but initiation and stimulation. It is at school that the pupil becomes familiar with learning and the school is proud of every pupil or former pupil who engages in life-long learning. This is true of schools where examinations are regularly taken and diplomas given:
"((The)) students who poured into the Yeshivah from near and far, what were they seeking? And what was the Yeshiva seeking to give them? Did the students undertake to complete their course work at the Yeshiva in order to become rabbis, like graduates of rabbinical schools in the West? Doubtless, some had this motive, but they were few in number and did not shape the character of the school. This was neither the motive of Yeshiva, nor was its educational system directed towards this end. Thus, for example, Yoreh Deah,[9] the study of which was a prime requisite for the rabbinate, was never taught in the Lithuanian Yeshivas, nor were any of the later halachic authorities studied for the sake of knowing the practical application of the halachah. It is evident, then, that the 'rabbinic diploma in the pocket' which Bialik's matmid[10] dreamt about during the last years of the Volozhin Yeshivah was not what the student of Slabodka, Radin, etc., dreamed about. If, after having spent many years of study and companionship with his friends and teachers, a Yeshivah student decided to enter the rabbinate, he would leave the Yeshivah and devote himself for several months to those 'technical studies' necessary

for his profession. Slabodka students used to say: If you see a student devoting himself to the study of Yoreh Deah, or to the chapter of the talmudic treatise Hullin, beginning with the words 'These are considered trefah ((not lawfully to be eaten))', or to Eben Ha-Ezer,[11] and if he prepares himself for ordination from the very start, you can be certain that he is neither gifted nor knowledgeable in Torah. Although many graduates later became rabbis, and even though the Yeshivah considered the preparation of qualified rabbis among its goals, the period spent studying in the Yeshivah was not considered the proper time and place for those disciples dealing directly with practical halachah. If one was steeped in Torah, and sought an appointment, either because he was inclined to the rabbinate or because circumstances left him no choice, then only would he take leave and prepare himself for his vocation. The Yeshivah per se neither served as, nor was it considered, a school for the training of rabbis. (...)
The general intent of the Yeshivah was to open the gates of Torah to the entering scholar and induct him into its world by means of study; to train the student, in other words, to think and make the proper distinctions, to concentrate on Torah in order rightly to extract its truths and essence. No time limit was imposed upon the student either at the beginning or the end. One never completes his studies, and one is never a beginner."[12]

Thus far the more or less formal evaluation that takes place in schools. Final examinations and the diplomas that go with them are only of use to lifelong learning if they act as a stimulus; they must certainly never be allowed to become a hindrance. Formal evaluation, even at the school level, must be primarily informative, providing the pupil with an indication of what learning route he should follow and the kind of approach best suited to him.

Informal as well as formal evaluation is familiar to Jewish tradition and plays the greater role in lifelong learning. In schools there is informal evaluation but it is even more common in houses of study and places where students learn largely as individuals. Some elements of lifelong learning in which informal evaluation has a part are given below. In these four elements of lifelong learning:
(1) learning together
(2) discussing what has been learnt
(3) association with complete people, and

(4) coming to self-knowledge and self-fulfillment
it is not only evaluation that has to be considered but also 'interaction', 'mutual feedback', 'stimulation' and so on. What follows deals in particular with informal, informative evaluation as it occurs in these four elements of LL.

(1) Learning together. Learning collectively, whether in the company of only one other person or in a larger group, and talking about learning and what is being learnt, offers the possibility of mutual criticism, correction and also encouragement. The group, which must of course include at least two people, may consist entirely of students but may sometimes also have teachers among its number. Learning together is done at school and in houses of study.[13]

(2) Talking about what is being learnt. Whenever a group of people meet, for a meal or for any other reason whatsoever, Torah must be discussed.[14] This rule is not confined to schools and houses of study but extends to all assemblies. Wherever people meet they learn and refer to and discuss Torah and its application. This is one way for people to evaluate each other and learn from each other.

(3) Association with complete people. Two assumptions lie at the very root of the important principle of 'shimmush hakhamim' or association with complete people, one of the forty-eight ways of reaching knowledge of the Torah.[15] The first of these is that it is impossible to become a complete person only by studying books and without paying heed to living examples of completeness.

"If a man has read the ((holy)) text and learnt the Mishnah but is not on familiar terms with scholars, then this man is no better than the common people."[16]

In other words, a student who has made himself familiar with books but not with complete people, is ignorant ('am ha-arez') however much he knows, and can be neither complete nor a 'talmid hakham'. The second assumption is that through association with complete people the student himself also becomes more complete, just as he becomes worse the more he associates with bad people. The mishnah warns us therefore:

"Remove from an evil neighbour, do not befriend the wicked,"[17]

which means, according to Maimonides:

"Do not befriend the wicked through any type of the types of friendship or fellowship in order that you do not learn from his deeds. In the introductory chapters[18] we have explained that a man will learn vices in the company of the wicked ((and virtues in the company of virtuous

men))."[19]
These are the two assumptions underlying the rule. Without the living examples of complete people the student is generally unable to bring his own development to completion for which reason the word 'shimmush' (association with) is often treated as synonymous with the word 'lamad' (learning from), in contexts where the subject is learning under the guidance of a complete person, or a complete teacher, which in this case[20] are the same thing. The many examples to be found in the literature of 'shimmush hakhamim' show that it is the personality of the 'hakham' or wise person, his way of learning and teaching, how he associates with his pupils and colleagues, but most of all his way of life, that make the greatest impression on the student. The relationship between 'hakham' and student is one of mutual trust, respect and inclination.[21] Such a relationship creates a climate in which the pupil can develop freely and remain open to informative evaluation aimed at the improvement of his learning and of his conduct. The students concerned are mostly advanced students and at special annual feasts there will also be old students,[22] adults who are trying to pursue the way of life lived before them by the 'hakham'. Such feasts are certainly not inadvertent[23] because the 'hakham' is not the only figure engaged in evaluating his students and erstwhile students, for they evaluate each other by learning together, discussing what they learn and living in a learning community round the 'hakham'. In the course of doing all these things the students have the opportunity to evaluate each other, informally and informatively in the very throes of shared activities.

DIGRESSION (Association with complete people): Forms of teaching and learning which resemble the 'shimmush hakhamim' pattern are found in many different cultures. The association Jesus had with his disciples is a direct application of the pattern:"Jesus was born of the Jewish people, as were his Apostles and a large number of his first disciples. (...) And, although his teaching had a profoundly new character, Christ, nevertheless, in many instances, took his stand on the teaching of the Old Testament. (...) Jesus also used teaching methods similar to those employed by the rabbis of his time."[24] But even in present-day pupil-master relationships, glimpses of the 'shimmush hakham' pattern are to be had:
"It is a misconception which has, alas, become current, that all that a student learns from his teachers is professional knowledge. Looking back over my twenty years

of professorship and my own period as a student, I reach the conclusion that not more than about five per cent of all that a student learns from, let us say his best teachers, is professional knowledge in its strict sense. Of course the student learns a lot more professional knowledge than that five per cent but he does not need the teacher in person in order to do it. What he absorbs from books and practical work of all sorts consists largely of objective fact. With that I am not concerned, but simply wish to say something about the fruits of the pupil-master relationship as I have experienced it with my own masters, and as numbers of my students have experienced it with me. Inside this relationship at the most five per cent of the learning is to do with the actual subject within its narrowest limits. The remaining 95 per cent consists of things like:

- learning to analyse a problem;
- learning to describe a problem - in good style, and 'learning to write';
- learning to live in contact with and to be honest about all the uncertainties which are so much more a part of scientific practice than the so-called certainties of science;
- learning to distinguish between good and bad scientific work, between great ideas and worthless opinions, between scientists and professionals of stature, on one hand, and passengers and cheap jacks on the other;
- in short, learning to recognise quality in scientific work, education and human capabilities;
- learning to realise that 99 out of 100 of the ideas you yourself produce have already been thought of by someone else who has worked them out and expressed them better than you ever could;
- learning to look up, read and understand what those other people have produced and to quote it, instead of always wanting pig-headedly to put it into your own words in a 'creative way', as if it were a piece of school work.

Finally: learning to manipulate the respectable, democratic methods of communication, discussion, theory-formation, exchange of data, that predominate in the scientific world."[25]

The 'shimmush hakhamim' pattern is still today very probably one of the oldest forms of teaching and learning which continues to occupy a pre-eminent position.

(4) Coming to self-knowledge and self-development. The foregoing paragraph (point 3) emphasized the importance of association with complete people. A pupil who wishes

to become a complete person is well-advised to associate with complete people. Torah study is incomplete without 'shimmush hakhamim'. The 'hakham' is part of the Torah, its living, as opposed to its written element. This is also true of the lifelong learner: he also is a living element of the Torah and for him Torah study is incomplete without 'shimmush hakhamim' but incomplete also unless it includes self-study (the pupil's self-analysis), leading to self-knowledge and self-development. According to the Torah the first condition, really the first step, towards achieving these goals through self-analysis, is to be open to self-criticism and criticism from others. Without such receptiveness the pupil will gain nothing from informative evaluation. The Torah calls this openness which sensitizes the pupil to informative evaluation, jirah, respect or fear, and recognizes that it is something to be learnt:

"As the Holy One Blessed be He commanded in relation to a king, 'And it ((the Torah)) shall be with him and he shall read it all the days of his life so that he may learn to fear the Lord, his God.'[26] It is to be noted that we have 'so that he may learn to fear,' rather than 'so that he may fear,' the underlying idea being that this fear is not naturally attainable but that, to the contrary, it is far removed from one because of the physical nature of his senses and can be acquired only through learning. And the only manner in which one may learn to fear is through constant, uninterrupted study of the Torah and its ways."[27]

Without fear there is not only no self-knowledge and no self-development, but also a total absence of any knowledge leading to wisdom. It is the basis of the knowing how and knowing that which lead to completeness:

"The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge"[28]

and

"Where there is no wisdom there is no fear of God;
Where there is no fear of God there is no wisdom."[29]

Fear of this sort has to be learnt and cannot be forced. Not even God is able to impose it on the pupil:

"Everything is in the hand of heaven except the fear of heaven."[30]

Fear is not only the very first condition for reaching completion, but also a constant demand:

"It befits every Saint to exert himself to attain as much of this fear as he can, as Scripture states, 'Let his holy ones fear God.'"[31,32]

So essential is 'jirah' for the pupil whose aim is to become complete, and yet at the same time so difficult to attain, that even King David lamented:

"Teach me Your Way, O Lord; I will walk in Your truth. Let my heart be undivided in reverence for Your Name."[33]
Thus far 'fear' ('jirah'), the constant receptivity of the lifelong learner to informative evaluation. Not in itself a form of evaluation, either formal or informal, it is the personal attitude necessary in order to be able to profit from informative evaluation and to perceive one's shortcomings.
- The way that leads to self-knowledge and self-development via self-analysis is not an adventure confined to the spirit, leaving no perceptible trace in concrete reality, but is, on the contrary, the life lived by the pupil, reaching its culmination in what he does. The deed is more important than the intention. The act is central to the Torah. So must it be also in the pupil's life:
"It is in deeds that man becomes aware of what his life really is, of his power to harm and to hurt, to wreck and to ruin; of his ability to derive joy and to bestow it upon others; to relieve and to increase his own and other people's tensions. It is in the employment of his will, not in reflection, that he meets his own self as it is; not as he should like it to be. In his deeds man exposes his immanent as well as his suppressed desires, spelling even that which he cannot apprehend. What he may not dare to think, he often utters in deeds. The heart is revealed in the deeds."[34]
Evaluation of learning that expresses itself in deeds concentrates on these as learning results and is focussed on the deed. In the first place it must be the task of the lifelong learner himself; if his aim is to become complete:
"He must submit his actions to the closest scrutiny and exert himself to perfect them."[35]
Yet it would not be sensible to rely on self-evaluation alone for this is an art understood only by a small number of people. It is therefore to be recommended that self-evaluation should also be measured against evaluation performed by other people. A lifelong pupil's best evaluators are critics he finds among his friends because they know him well and he trusts them:
"A person's good, then, is to seek honest friends, who will open his eyes to what he is blind to and rebuke him with love in order to rescue him from all evil. For what a man cannot see because of his natural blindness to his own faults, they will see and understand. They will caution him and he will be protected. Concerning this it is said, 'There is salvation in much counsel.'"[37,38]
Critical friends are best qualified to give informative

evaluation and will not lead the pupil astray with flattery, which may not always be the case with the student's inferiors.[39]

DIGRESSION: Luzzatto declares that it is a pupil's critical friends who are best qualified to supply informative evaluation. This seems to me an important insight. All too few evaluators realize that criticism has to be based on sympathy and not vice versa. Sympathy based on criticism does not provide a sure foundation for informative evaluation because it fails to win the heart of the person who is being evaluated and generally gets neither his attention nor his assent:
"... all the prophets rebuked Israel till they repented. Hence it is necessary to appoint in every community a great scholar, advanced in years, God-fearing from his youth and beloved by the people, to rebuke the multitude and cause them to repent. But he who hates rebukes will not go to the exhorter nor hear his words, and will therefore persist in his sins which seem good in his eyes."[40]
"In a relationship there is certainly a place for criticism, but it can be voiced and reach its goal only in the context of deep solidarity in a situation of mutual commitment and real love, and not where there is opposition, confrontation or enmity, however well meant the criticism may be. So often it is the criticism which comes first and only afterwards the solidarity. If the solidarity is allowed to come first the criticism will take on another tone and find an attentive ear."[41]
There are all too few evaluators who realize that informative evaluation is a dialogue. Too many teachers in present-day education fail to realize that in the teaching-learning process, feedback cannot be effective where the relationship between pupil and teacher is not based on sympathy.
The requirement of sympathy as a sound basis for informative evaluation goes one step further than the 'two preliminary conditions'[42] formulated by Buis for efficient feedback. These are:
"(1) Creation of a situation in which the potential receiver of information ((the pupil)) is truly open and ready for feedback.
(2) The proffering of information in such a way that the receiver is able to do something with it."[43]
In my opinion, the requirement of sympathy goes so far beyond these two conditions as itself to precede them. Any pupil who meets with a large proportion of sympathy can also stand a strong dose of criticism and assimilate

it.[44]

In all the kinds of formal and informal evaluation of the knowledge shown by the pupil discussed in this section, the truth remains that the more complete the pupil the more his performance will conform to the inner self it conceals, and the more informative will be evaluation of the performance and the more advantageous to the pupil.[45] Finally, the joy with which a pupil learns is a measure of his completeness. Depression and gloom are not virtues that bring a person nearer to God[46] or testify to perfection:

"The further a person is privileged to enter into the chambers of the knowledge of the greatness of the Blessed One, the greater is his happiness and his heart rejoices within him."[47]

The greatest experience of happiness the lifelong pupil has and the highest reward for his labour is to come nearer to a state of completion. When he is asked "Does learning bring happiness?", the right-minded lifelong learner will therefore answer, "Nothing makes me happier!"[48]

Notes

1 EJ, vol. 6, under Education (Jewish), col. 381-461 and Goldman (1975).

2 Conclusion: Interim goals are not per se intermediate goals as well (on the route to the final goal), etc. Cf. Part 1, section 3.7.

3 Cf. Part 1, par. 3.7.

4 For this term see for example Luzzatto (1966, perek 1). The literal meaning is 'the whole (complete) person'.

5 TB Yoma 72b. Cf. III.1.6, note 120. See also Jacobs (1965), ch. 9: 'The Study and Practice of the Torah', pp. 93-105. This chapter deals with the 'talmid hakham'.

6 See III.2.2.

7 Yad, Talmud Torah 4:6 and Sh.Ar., YD 246-12.

8 Güdemann (1880, 1. Kapitel, S. 56-57).

9 The second main section of the Turim of Jacob ben Asher and the Shulhan Arukh of Joseph Caro, the halakhic standard-codex.

10 See III.1.3, digression.

[11] The third main section of the Turim of Jacob ben Asher and the Shulhan Arukh of Joseph Caro.

[12] Alon (1970, pp. 451-452). Still today many students who have semikhah (which means they are qualified as rabbis) put it to no practical purpose in their daily life.

[13] Cf. III.1.5.

[14] See e.g. M. Avot 3:3, 4, 7. Another illustration is the third meal of the Sabbath (se'udah shelishit) with the hasidim.

[15] Cf. III.1.2, note 39, no. 10.

[16] TB Ber. 47b (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). Cf. also TB Sot. 22a.

[17] M. Avot 1:7. (David 1968; see notes 18, 19). See also M. Avot 3:10.

[18] Gorfinkle (1912). Where Maimonides says "Man is not created with innate moral virtues or vices; they are acquired environmentally" (ch. 4, p. 58). Quoted in David (1968, ch. 1, note 25, p. 126).

[19] Commentary on M. Avot 1:7 (David 1968, p. 10). The addition is justified by the quotation given in note 18 above.

[20] Aberbach (1967, p. 2, note 14). Aberbach gives the following examples: M. Demai II, 3; Mishnah BB X, 8; TJ Nazir VII, 1, 56b; TJ Hag. III, 1, 78d; TJ Shab. X, 5, 12c; TB Hul. 54a; TB Er. 13a.

[21] Idem, p. 24: "All indications ((in the literature)) point to a relationship of mutual trust and respect between master and student - indeed of boundless love and devotion which, as we have seen, transcended and surpassed the natural bonds of love between fater and son."

[22] Drazin (1940, ch. 4, p. 74). The term 'old student' is paradoxical: the old student visiting the 'hakham' continues to learn from him.

[23] Cf. III.2.2, note 19.

[24] Document (3 January 1975, Rome), signed 'Johannes Card. Willebrands, President of the ((Vatican)) Commission ((for Religious Relations with the Jews)); Pierre-Marie de Contenson O.P., Secretary.' SIDIC 8 (1975), no. 1, p. 40. My emphasis.

[25] De Groot (1971, ch. 24, pp. 215-216).

[26] Deut. 17:19.

[27] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 25, p. 325). See also III.1.6, end.

[28] Prov. 1:7. Cf. Ps. 111:10: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

[29] M. Avot 3:17. See also M. Avot 3:9.

[30] TB Ber. 33b.

[31] Ps. 34:10.

[32] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 24, p. 321).

[33] Ps. 86:11.

[34] Heschel (1959, ch. 28, p. 284). Cf. also part 1, section 3.7, note 71; part 2, section II.1.2 and III.1.6.

[35] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1961, ch. 20, p. 267).

[36] Cf. part 1, par. 3.7.

[37] Prov. 24:6.

[38] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 23, p. 309).

[39] "It is to be clearly seen that most officers and kings, and men in a position of influence in general, regardless of their level, stumble and are corrupted by the flattery of their subordinates" (Idem, p. 307).

[40] Yad, Hilkhot Teshuwah 4:2 (Hyamson 1965).

[41] Aschkenasy (1978, p. 19).

[42] Buis (1978).

[43] Idem, p. 143.

[44] See also III.4.2.

[45] Cf. III.3.1.

[46] Ps. 68:4 and 100:2.

[47] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 19, p. 253).

[48] See Safrai's answer to question 25 (Part 1, section 1.3). See also 'The Joy of the Torah' (Hartman, 1975b, pp. 14-20).

III.4 TEACHER AND TEACHING METHOD

III.4.1 People as teachers

According to Jewish tradition human beings are first of all pupils and secondly teachers:
"Everyone who had gained a knowledge of the Torah was obliged to teach others, and he who studied Torah and did not teach it 'has despised the Word of the Lord' (Num. 15:31).[1]
After the Bar Cochba revolt[2] when a Roman decree demanded apostasy, the sages met and announced: 'Everyone who has studied shall come and teach, and everyone who has not studied shall come and learn.'"[3,4]
"To study without imparting knowledge to others was compared to a myrtle in the wilderness whose fragrance was wasted."[5]
'Talmud Torah', literally the study of the Torah, in Maimonides' view includes both teaching and study of the Torah and under the former heading he reckons both teaching your sons and teaching pupils.[6] The process of upbringing also comes under 'Talmud Torah'.[7]
A wise man is no more justified in keeping his wisdom to himself than is a rich man in hugging his riches to himself for his sole delight:
"If one possesses much wisdom, he is duty-bound to impart it to those in need of it. As stated by R. Yochanan ben Zakkai: 'If you have learned much Torah, do not take credit for it, for you were created to do so.'[8] One who is wealthy may rejoice in his lot, but at the same time he must help those in need. If one is strong, he must assist the weak and rescue the oppressed."[9]
The Torah is the heritage of the entire Jewish people[10] and no Jew has the right to withhold it from another Jew. Therefore no Jew can renounce his duty to teach another Jew Torah as long as he himself is able to teach and his fellow Jew wants to learn. Once a teacher gives up learning himself then at a certain moment he will become incapable of teaching. In comparison with the pupil, the teacher has an additional task. He has to learn, as does the pupil and everyone else, but in addition he has to teach. Jewish tradition sees the teacher as someone engaged both in learning and in teaching others. Nobody, and this includes the teacher, can ever grow past the pupil stage and grow out of the duty to learn. A pupil may sometimes take the role of teacher[11] but the teacher always has to sustain a double role, learning and teaching. As learners, pupils and teachers together are the principal culture-bearers of the Jewish community, and

as teachers, the most important transmitters of culture. Such 'bearing' and 'transmitting' of culture is not only a matter of intellect but also of practice. Culture is not simply a notion but a manner of doing; not something that is just enjoyed but something calling for daily creation and renewal. Culture is something that happens, a continuing process of human, social activities or deeds. The ultimate fruits of learning and teaching are not ideas and pronouncements but palpable changes in people and in the world.

"He who learns in order to teach, they afford him adequate means to learn and to teach; and he who learns in order to practise, they afford him adequate means to learn and to teach and to practise."[12]

These are the words used by Rabbi Yishmael to urge pupils and teachers to follow study through into practical action. A tradition which contains no inspiration to concrete action is doomed and will sooner or later come to nothing or fade away. Teachers who promote the sort of learning that leads to deeds are aware of this. Through their work and through their pupils' exertions tradition is maintained as a living entity.

Pupil and teacher are partners: in learning - for they both study - and in teaching - for they learn from each other - and in doing because they are both engaged in the attempt to maintain creation and the world and to bring them to greater perfection.[13] Their partnership dictates the nature of their relationship. Using terms like 'teaching methods', 'teaching procedures' and 'didactics' is dangerous in that they lay so much emphasis on teaching and the teacher's role at the expense of learning and the role of the pupil, thus obscuring the essential nature of the teaching-learning processes as the Torah sees it. The essence is the partnership of teacher and pupil, fellow-students of the Torah. For this reason the following section considers teaching-learning processes under the title 'relationship between teacher and pupil' rather than as 'teaching procedure', 'teaching methods' or 'didactics'.

III.4.2 The relationship between teacher and pupil

The title of this section may still be misleading. The relationship referred to is one between two different people, teacher and pupil, and yet at certain moments these two people may exchange roles. The teacher is supposed to teach and learn (see III.4.1) and the pupil to learn and to teach (see III.1.5). The Torah sees

teacher and learner as partners in studying and applying the Torah and, moreover, as partners who enjoy mutual trust, respect and inclination.[14] Perhaps the best word for the relationship between pupil and teacher and also between man and God[15] is sympathie. The prophet is the homo sympatheticos[16] who puts the human case before God and God's case to man,[17] and similarly the teacher's task is to bring together the Torah and the pupils. Knowing Torah and knowing the pupil is a question of the teacher's sympathie (friendship, love) for the Torah and for the pupil:

"The verb yada does not always mean simply 'to know', 'to be acquainted with'. In most semitic languages it signifies sexual union as well as mental and spiritual activity. In Hebrew yada means more than the possession of abstract concepts. Knowledge compasses inner appropriation, feeling, a reception into the soul. It involves both an intellectual and an emotional act."[18]

In the expression daath elohim (knowledge of God), knowing means ...

"... sympathy for God, attachment of the whole person, his love as well as his knowledge; an act of involvement, attachment or commitment to God. The biblical man knew of no bifurcation of mind and heart, thought and emotion. He saw the whole person in a human situation."[19]

To this may be compared the teacher's knowledge of the Torah and of the pupil. The verb yada sometimes, but not always, means:

"... an act involving concern, inner engagement, dedication, or attachment to a person. It also means to have sympathy, pity, or affection for someone"[20]

and I know no better description of the relationship between teacher and pupil than to describe it as a relation of sympathetic partnership. A teacher steeped in sympathy does not only talk about the pupil but also from within the pupil. There is a hasidic tale which illustrates this:

"Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sassov declared to his Disciples: 'I learned how we must truly love our neighbour from a conversation between two villagers which I overheard.
"The first said: 'Tell me, friend Ivan, do you love me?'
"The second: 'I love you deeply.'
"The first: 'Do you know, my friend, what gives me pain?'
"The second: 'How can I, pray, know what gives you pain?'
"The first: 'If you do not know what gives me pain, how can you say that you truly love me?'
'Understand, then, my sons', continued the Sassover; 'to love, truly love, means to know what brings pain to your comrade.'"[21]

A teacher's sympathy for his pupil means that the teacher will be ready to listen to the pupil and even to surmise the questions the pupil does not ask,[22] while his sympathy for the pupil and for the Torah enables him to answer these questions.
The possibility of sympathetic partnership between unequal entities such as God and man, teacher and pupil, has been denied, for example by Aristotle:
"Such a relationship seemed inconceivable to the mind of a thinker like Aristotle, who held that friendship involved equality. 'This is evident from cases where there is a wide disparity between two persons in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else; for such persons neither are nor expect to be friends. It is most clearly seen in our relations with the gods.'"[23,24]
But the Torah teaches that such a relationship can exist and that it is just such a sympathetic partnership that governs dealings between God and man, teacher and pupil.

Yet this is not to say that the teacher-pupil relationship is a symmetrical one nor that the teacher's role is inseparable or indistinguishable from that of the pupil. In spite of its various symmetrical aspects expressed in terms such as partnership, mutual trust, respect and inclination, the relationship is asymmetrical; as asymmetrical indeed as the relationship of father to son. The Torah sees the teacher-pupil relationship as an asymmetrical relationship with symmetrical moments. In his dialogues,[25] Martin Buber, in particular, pointed out the importance of the moments of symmetry. This, however, never led him to deny the reality of asymmetrical relationships between human beings and specifically between teacher and pupil, or, for example, psychotherapist and patient.[26] Pupils are often more radical than their masters and this is true of a number of people on whom Buber had a profound influence. One of these is the psychologist Carl R. Rogers who stressed what had been called by Buber the I-Thou relationship, to such an extent that in any relationship between two people, he recognized as fundamental only the moments of symmetry, applying this principle both to the teacher-pupil relationship and to that between psychotherapist and patient. According to Rogers "the effective moments in a therapeutic relationship"[27] are precisely those of symmetry, and if this Rogerian theory is applied to teaching-learning processes it must be concluded that teacher and pupil only really learn from each other when they enjoy a symmetrical relationship. Here Rogers' opinion clearly departs from Buber's. In Buber's view

there can never be a fully symmetrical relationship between teacher and pupil (or between psychotherapist and patient), but at the most, symmetrical moments in the course of an asymmetrical relationship:
"Every I-Thou relationship within a situation where one party is intended to have a specific effect on the other, exists by virtue of a mutuality which cannot and must not become complete."[28]
The teacher-pupil relationship is an I-Thou relationship which is not entirely equal. The teacher has to be able to put himself in the place of the pupil but it is not necessary for the pupil to be able to put himself in the teacher's place. Buber speaks of 'inclusion' (Umfassung): the teacher must be able to encompass both his own situation and that of the pupil whereas the pupil has his hands full coping only with himself:
"The teacher has to understand both himself and the student, but for the student it is enough to understand himself. Moreover, though the student may and should understand the teacher's words, he can never be expected to understand the teacher's being in its full dimensions. The true teacher will understand this not-being-understood by his pupil, and will never be offended or disappointed by this, but rather, he will 'embrace' the whole situation with its two poles; his own, and that of the pupil. The latter is concerned only with himself."[29]
The following pedagogic advice from the talmud throws light both on the asymmetry and on the nature of the relationship of teacher to pupil:
"With the left hand we should push away, with the right hand pull closer."[30]
Teacher and pupil are at one remove but the teacher does not lose contact with the pupil. The teacher takes a real interest in the pupil but is not fully identified with him. Until the pupil is able to learn independently, either with others or on his own, he must be able to rely on his teacher for guidance.

The teacher-pupil relationship, as seen by the Torah, can also be described and understood as one of personal dialogue between teacher and pupil: a two-man discussion or face-to-face conversation.[31] As best-known exponent of thinking in dialogue, Martin Buber says of himself:
"I have no doctrine but I conduct a dialogue."[32]
and Emmanuel Levinas, in his remarks on discussion (discours):
"The face is a living presence; it is expression. (...) The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse. He who manifests himself comes

according to Plato's expression, to his own assistance. (...) To present oneself as signifying, is to speak."[33]
Teacher and pupil meet each other and become significant for each other only in discussion. The teacher has to be there at all times ready to talk with the pupil and explain the Torah, bringing it to life from the written text to which it has been committed. It is in discussion between teacher and pupil that the Torah comes to life, and in lifelong learning that it becomes a teaching:
"The object of knowledge is always a fact, already happened and passed through. The interpellated one is called upon to speak; his speech consists in 'coming to the assistance' of his word - in being present. This present is not made of instants mysteriously immobilized in duration, but of an incessant recapture of instants that flow by by a presence that comes to their assistance, that answers for them. This incessance produces the present, is the presentation, the life, of the present. It is as though the presence of him who speaks inverted the inevitable movement that bears the spoken word to the past state of the written word. Expression is this actualization of the actual. The present is produced in this struggle against the past (if one may so speak), in this actualization. The unique actuality of speech tears it from the situation in which it appears and which it seems to prolong. It brings what the written word is already deprived of: mastery. Speech, better than a simple sign, is essentially magisterial."[34]
The teacher's exposition goes no further than simply putting forward the Torah by bringing it under discussion. The asymmetry of the teacher-pupil relationship lies in the fact that the teacher proffers and the pupil's role is to receive what is proffered, and this is a one-way system. However, the asymmetry becomes less pronounced if we take into consideration Levinas' statement that during discussion it is ultimately not the teacher but what is said and what is discussed (in other words the Torah) that guide the pupil:
"It ((speech)) first of all teaches this teaching itself, by virtue of which alone it can teach (and not, like maieutics, awaken in me) things and ideas. Ideas instruct me coming from the master who presents them to me: who puts them in question; the objectification and theme upon which objective knowledge opens already rests on teaching."[35]
Levinas is arguing with Plato and the well-known Platonic comparison of the teacher to a midwife. Hartman, another Jewish thinker, contrasts Plato's philosophy with the Torah view which opposes it, as follows:

"To Plato, truth is achieved through recollection, and anamnesis to Plato is the way in which men recollect that which they already know, and the function of the spiritual teacher in Plato's Meno is that of the midwife, in some way to help his student to give birth to that which he once knew; he is merely a midwife, helping the person to discover that which he already had. Therefore you have cognitive recollection as the grounds of spiritual perfection, whereas in the biblical framework it is not anamnesis in terms of truth, but the fundamental task of the teacher is not to help the student discover that which he already had, but to help the individual person to realise that his identity is only whole if it is anchored to the historical reality of his people ((Jewish tradition, the Torah)). The essential thing is not cognitive recollection but historical recollection, to continue in your consciousness the memory of Sinai.[36] In Deuteronomy 4 the important message is that you must make known to your children and to your children's children the day that you stood before the Lord your God in Horeb ((Deut. 4:10))."[37]

The teacher does not act as midwife but as a link between the pupil and the Torah. It is he who brings the pupil in contact with the Torah, introduces the Torah to him and invites him to continue the acquaintance in his study.

"The calling into question of things in a dialectic is not modifying of the perception of them; it coincides with their objectification. The object is presented when we have welcomed an interlocutor. The master, the coinciding of teaching and the teacher, is not in turn a fact among others. The present of the manifestation of the master who teaches overcomes the anarcy of facts."[38]

Receiving the Torah as it is offered, far from striking the pupil dumb, is precisely what enables him to enter into discussion with the teacher, and via the teacher with the Torah. It is not the teacher who objectifies the Torah but the actual learning done by the pupil. Accepting the Torah is not the end of the discussion between teacher and pupil but its beginning.

"The fire that 'raised the mount of revelation to the very heart of heaven' is renewed in the spark that leaps from teacher to pupil."[39]

Accepting the Torah means the start of a dialogue between student and Torah which can mean both drawing strength from it 'in order to work within it' and 'coming into opposition to it.'[40] Only in the case of the pupil who has no wish to study Torah does this mean a refusal to accept it or to enter into personal discussion with the teacher.

The way in which teacher and pupil learn together and from each other and their attitudes to each other, or in other words the whole teacher-pupil relationship, is more important than its expression in the form of educational strategies or didactic rules. Yet the fact remains that there can be no formal education or schooling without such concrete expression; what must always be kept in mind is the fact that it is the pupils' learning activity in relation to their teacher that is paramount, not the concrete expression, the school, nor even the teaching. It will surprise no-one conversant with the Torah, in which the greatest emphasis is laid on practice based on study - and here it is particularly of the halakhah that I am thinking - to find that from olden times every possible sort of concrete means to practical education has been used. It may be said in general that throughout the centuries, Torah teaching has always started from two principles: preserving the tradition and renewing the tradition. Whenever either of these was neglected the teaching ended in failure. If no attempt was made to preserve the tradition its continuity was interrupted and where there was no renewal the Torah became fossilized. It is my opinion that both principles are as valid today as they were in the past and that for this reason we can still learn from the pedagogical and didactic ideas of Torah teachers who have gone before us. This is not to say that such ideas should be taken over without critical examination, but that they should be thought of as serving as hermeneutics and heuristics which have to be translated for use in present-day education for our own teachers and pupils.[41]

If the discussion of the teacher-pupil relationship has so far been of a somewhat abstract nature, what we have now is a concrete talmudic account of giving instruction: (the references are to the Babylonian Talmud):

"Instruction was two-pronged in intent - improvement of the memory by accurate transmission and frequent repetition of material, and, at a later stage, the development of creative thought. Pupils learned to transmit statements in the same phraseology used by their teachers ('one is obliged to use the language of one's teacher'). Since the Oral Law, which could not be committed to writing, was continually expanding, accuracy in learning it was attainable only through endless repetition; hence the dictum, 'He who has repeated his chapter a hundred times is not to be compared to him who has repeated it a hundred and one times' (Hag. 9b). The pupils thus acquired proficiency in recitation and a knowledge of the language of Scripture and the basic

equipment required for participation in the creative study of the Talmud, essentially an incisive analysis of the mishnayot and beraitot.[42] The sages were strikingly modern in their practice of the pedagogic art. When Tarfon's pupils said to him: 'Tell us, teacher, by what virtue did Judah merit the kingdom?' he answered, 'You tell'" (Mekh., Be Shallah 5). On one occasion Akiva deliberately stated a halakhah incorrectly 'to sharpen the wits of his pupils' (Nid. 45a). Every possible mnemonic device was employed - notarikon, association of ideas, and many others. Only in this way could the vast body of talmudic thought have been transmitted generation to generation until the end of the fifth century CE, when it was finally redacted. Discipline played a vital role in this sytem (see Shab. 13a, and Rashi, ad loc., s.v. ve-eimat rabban aleihem). Although corporal punishment was inflicted when deemed necessary, the sages sought to curtail it as much as possible and warned against injuring a child. Rav's directives to Samuel b. Shilat the schoolteacher included the following:
'When you punish a pupil, hit him only with a shoe latchet. The attentive student will learn of himself; the inattentive one should be placed next to one who is diligent' (BB 21a).
This counsel applied to younger students; with those who were older the teacher might introduce the lesson with a humorous remarks to create an atmosphere congenial to learning. But the teacher's most valuable asset was the example he set for his students. Well aware of this, the sages sought to impress upon teachers the need for circumspection in speech and deed. Thus Ze'eira, a leading amora of the end of the third century, states: 'One should not promise something to a child and then fail to give it to him, for he thereby teaches him to lie' (Suk. 46b). Though the sages were remarkable pedagogues, the greater part of their achievement doubtless resulted from the atmosphere generated by their personalities, an atmosphere of unbound love for the Torah and of supreme self-discipline in the observance of mitzwot."[43]
Even more extensive accounts of actual instruction are to be found in the books whose titles are given in footnote 43. However, as the theme of the present book is lifelong learning rather than permanent education in general, the brief quotation given above must suffice.

Notes

1 TB Sanh. 99a.

2 132-135 AD.

[3] Canticles Rabba 2.

[4] Safrai (1976, p. 946).

[5] Aberbach (1967, p. 23). See TB RH 23a.

[6] Maimonides, Sefer Ha-Mitzwot, mitzwah 11. See also Zevin (1946, p. 106).

[7] Maimonides, Idem, mitzwah 419. See also Zevin (idem).

[8] M. Avot 2:9.

[9] Silverstein, Luzzatto (1966, ch. 22, p. 285).

[10] Cf. III.1.2, note 47.

[11] Cf. III.1.5.

[12] M. Avot 4:5.

[13] The alenu prayer (alenu means: it is incumbent upon us) speaks of letakeen olam: bringing the world to perfection.

[14] See III.3.2, note 203

[15] See II.2.3.

[16] Heschel (1962), vol. II: 'The Prophet as a homo sympathetikos', pp. 88-90.

[17] Heschel (1962, vol. I, p. 121): "He ((Jeremiah)) was a person, overwhelmed by sympathy for God and sympathy for man. Standing before the people he pleaded for God; standing before God he pleaded for his people."

[18] Heschel (1962, vol. I, p. 57). Compare our word 'to know' and its archaic use 'to know a woman'.

[19] Idem, p. 59.

[20] Idem, p. 57.

[21] Newman (1972, ch. 92, p. 221). Martin Buber included this tale in his Erzählungen (1949, S. 533). The idea of speaking from within as well as about the pupil (the other) was worked out by Buber in the concept of Umfassung, among others (see below - note 29) and by Levinas, for example in La Substitution (De plaats-vervanging: see Th. de Boer's introduction in the 1977 edition, p. 17).

[22] "... to guess the questions which he did not put" (Buber 1947, pp. 13f.), quoted in Farber (1967, p. 580).

[23] Nichomachean Ethics, VIII. 8, 158b, 33ff.: cf. Wheelwright (1951, p. 243). Quoted in Heschel (1962,

vol. II, p. 92).

[24] Heschel (1962, vol. II, p. 92).

[25] 'Ich und Du', 'Zwiesprache', 'Die Frage an den Einzelnen' and 'Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen', in the collection Das dialogische Prinzip (1962a). See also II. 2.3, note 50.

[26] See the postscript to 'Ich und Du', par. 5 (Buber 1962a, S. 130-132).

[27] Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers (April 18, 1957). In Buber (1965). Quoted on p. 169.

[28] Buber (1962a, S. 132). See also Buber (1965, pp. 166-184).

[29] Simon (1967, pp. 571-572).

[30] TB Sot. 47a (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936). See also Wiesen (1892, S. 32).

[31] Levinas calls it 'le-face-à-face, relation irréductible' (Levinas 1961, pp. 52-53).

[32] Buber (1962b, S. 1114).

[33] Levinas, Totality and Infinity. Tr. from French by Alphonso Lingis (1969), Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.

[34] Here Levinas is arguing with Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and his concept of 'durée'.

[35] Levinas (1961, p. 41) (1969, p. 70).

[36] Cf. Heschel (1959, ch. 43, p. 421): "In trying to understand Jewish existence a Jewish philosopher must look for agreement with the men of Sinai as well as with the people of Auschwitz." Also cited in Part 1, 1.4, note 40.

[37] Hartman (1975a, p. 35).

[38] Levinas (1961, p. 41).

[39] 'Die Lehre und die Tat' (Buber 1963a, p. 670).

[40] The same holds with regard to the concrete situation of any human being. The situation is a given one and must be accepted as such but this does not mean that he has to take it lying down: "Arbeitsfeld oder Schlachtfeld, er nimmt das Feld an, in das er gestellt ist." (Buber 1953a, Kapitel: 'Religion und Philosophie' VI, S. 47).

[41] See I.2.6 and IV b (pp. 267-268).

[42] See Baraita*.

[43] EJ, vol. 6 under Education, cols. 401-403. See also Enziklopedyah Hinnukhit, 4 (1964), pp. 144-68; includes bibliography; Ster (1915); Gollancz (1924); Morris (1960); Eliav and Kleinberger (1960, pp. 48-70); Berman (1968, pp. 25-35).

III.5 Propositions

The main points of the ideas on Jewish tradition as learning-process developed in III.1-4 can be expressed briefly in the form of a number of propositions:

1a. It may be said, in general, that learning occupies a relatively limited area in the life of the Jewish woman in comparison to the place it takes in the life of a Jewish man. Only in the present century has this position begun to alter.
1b. As a rule women not only have less obligation to learn but are also not allowed to learn as much as men. They are given less instruction than men.
1c. The Torah contains both positive and negative stereotypes of female qualities.
1d. In general, up to the twentieth century:
- women did take part in Jewish culture
- their role was active when the cultural setting was the home
- outside the home their role was a passive one.

2. Everybody (every male) is supposed to learn throughout his life. Everyone is expected to be a lifelong learner.
3a. Knowledge is not passed on by heredity. Knowledge of the Torah has to be acquired by personal effort.
3b. The Torah itself is the inheritance of the entire Jewish people.
3c. Those who acquired knowledge of the Torah (1) studied lifelong, (2) repeated what they had studied, (3) learned both individually and collectively, (4) learned by putting into practice and (5) planned their own learning.
4a. In the concept 'lifelong learning' the word 'lifelong' means, strictly speaking, not 'continuously and uninterruptedly' but 'always'.
4b. The two concepts 'lifelong learning' and 'practice of a profession' may be but need not be connected. Jewish tradition sees them as separate: lifelong learning is paramount, any other form of work secondary. Torah study is independent of any concrete training.
5a. Some knowledge is of lasting value. This is true of certain sorts of traditional (classical) knowledge and probably also of some present-day (modern) knowledge.

5b. The foundation of learning, of the attempt to acquire knowledge of the Torah is repetition.
6a. Learning is something the pupil has to do for himself but for which he also needs other people. It is neither exclusively individual nor exclusively social, but both. Individual learning by itself can swiftly lose impetus and easily gives rise to errors which the pupil himself fails to notice and therefore cannot correct. This is why the pupil must also learn as one of a group.
6b. Pupils learning collectively take it in turns to play pupil and teacher; both roles are equally educative.
6c. Collective study outside scholastic institutions has led (and leads) to the foundation of all sorts of societies for the promotion of learning (hevrot, houses of study etc.), which may be likened to guilds or colleges of study for lifelong learners.
7a. Torah is concerned not only with learning and teaching but also with conduct. Learning has to express itself in practical action, but it would be naive to think that proper action is only a matter of knowledge.
7b. Learning and knowledge are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for proper action: an ignorant person does not necessarily do wrong, nor a learned person right.
7c. There is a gap between theory and practice, learning and life. The only way to bridge the gap is to put learning to the test of living and bring them into harmony. This can be done because neither learning nor life are unalterable quantities.
7d. The Torah is not learning alone but a way of life. Torah study is aimed at both these things, learning and life, one's own and that of others.
8a. Schools to which children were taken and houses of study where adults would go to learn, have existed since the first century CE and perhaps before. The duty to learn (for men and boys) dates from that time. Even if girls and women were not obliged to do so, they did learn and, as a rule, attended school. In the early days of schools it was more exceptional for girls to go to school - but not to learn - whereas later on their attendance at school became more widespread.
8b. The pupil wishing to learn lifelong must devise his own rules for living and studying and may be helped in his task by a school, house of study or codex. Lifelong learning requires a systematic programme for daily learning and living. The lifelong learner takes upon himself the responsibility for lifelong learning, which therefore does not lie with institutes such as schools, houses of study or a codex of laws.

8c. Fundamental to the Torah is the perception that children's education, as well as adult education, is more a learning together of pupils and teachers than a course of instruction in which only teachers teach and only pupils learn.
8d. The lifelong learner engaged in planning his own learning, influences his own milieu by
- transforming all situations in which he finds himself into learning opportunities,
- taking part in varied types of individual and collective learning or giving them impetus,
- working for the foundation and maintenance of schools and houses of study for the attachment of learning cells (study groups, study centres) to virtually all organizations.
8e. It is true in general that learning is capable of breaking through the deadly routine of daily life and that it can just as well be pleasurable and relaxing as a burden and a strain, and that learning can give meaning to life and happiness to the pupil.
8f. The combination of continuity with learning and the constantly recurring effort necessary to reach new insights at more profound levels, often turns out to be a strong motivation.
9a. One unique learning goal takes precedence over all others: the goal of becoming a complete person.
9b. There is no instant answer to the question: "What is a complete person?" A lifelong learner's response to the question depends on the tradition in which he lives and on his personal answer to the question "What is Torah?"
9c. In general no lifelong learner will be happy to see himself or his learning only as a means - in the course of learning and doing - of reaching some goal or other. If, on the other hand, his goal is to become a complete person, that is, to become himself complete, then the lifelong learner or his learning is not merely a means but a goal as well.
10a. Every pupil has his own way to travel and it is only during the learning-process, that is, in the course of disinterested learning or learning li-Shema that his goal of becoming a complete person becomes clear to him in the full significance of all its personal consequences. Since learning li-Schema is not only the attempt to reach the learning goal but also to define that goal, learning itself and not the learning goal, has become primary for the lifelong pupil. Learning li-Shema is often described as learning for the sake of learning, or learning for its own sake.
10b. In Jewish tradition no learning is held in higher

regard than learning li-Shema.
10c. In learning li-Shema the distinction between learning as goal and as means to a goal, ceases to apply. In other words, learning li-Shema is both goal (learning for its own sake) and means (disinterested learning in order to become a complete person).
10d. Through lifelong learning, learning that starts off by not being li-Shema learning, can be transformed until it is. Through lifelong learning, learning becomes functionally autonomous in the sense given to this concept by the psychologist G.W. Allport, and finally becomes its own motivation.
10e. The pupil who learns li-Shema decides for himself what his learning goal is and how he is to reach it in the course of lifelong learning. Such a pupil, directing his own learning process and functioning as autonomous learner, is functionally autonomous (in the normal sense of these words and not Allport's specific sense); in other words he is free.
10f. Lifelong learning can be intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. As soon as it turns into learning li-Shema, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation becomes pointless. In other words, the distinction ceases to apply.
11. A lifelong learner's learning is evaluated by evaluation of his actions, which means his verbal and non-verbal behaviour, during learning and throughout his life. In evaluation of lifelong learning as in the Torah, what a person does is the key motif.
12a. A Jewish school's principal task is not evaluation but initiation and stimulation; the school makes the pupil acquainted with learning and is proud of every pupil or former pupil who turns into a lifelong learner.
12b. Once a pupil has acquired the taste for learning he is considered able to improve his own learning as he goes along.
13a. Evaluation can be informal as well as formal and it is the former that plays the most important role in lifelong learning.
13b. Elements of lifelong learning in which informal evaluation has a part include (1) learning together, (2) discussing what has been learnt, (3) association with complete people, and (4) coming to self-knowledge and self-fulfillment. For the last element fear (in the sense of respect) and analysis of the pupil's actions by the pupil himself or by others (critical friends) are essential.
13c. The delight with which a pupil learns (his happiness) is a measure of his completeness.

14a. A human being is first of all pupil and secondly a teacher.
14b. A teacher who ceases to learn himself will at a certain moment become no longer capable of good teaching.
15a. Pupil and teacher are partners both in learning (they both learn) and in teaching (they learn from each other) and also in doing (each tries to maintain and improve creation and the world), and their partnership governs their relationship.
15b. The relationship of teacher and pupil can be characterized in three ways:
(1) as a sympathetic partnership,
(2) as an asymmetrical relationship with sympathetic moments,
(3) as a personal dialogue.
15c. The Torah is preserved and renewed in the relationship between teacher and pupil and not in teaching procedures, teaching methods or didactics. The latter are never primary but always derive from the teacher-pupil relationship.

IV INDIVIDUAL LEARNING AS A DAILY HABIT

The LL outline has four empty frames, three of which have been filled in with concluding statements: chapter I.3 gives sixteen such conclusions, chapter II.3 supplies twelve and chapter III.5, fifteen. In the present chapter which is devoted to the fourth empty frame, the intention is to complete the study, adding some marginal comments and additional accents to the ideas on LL which have already been developed.

a. <u>(Lifelong) learning: traditional, personal, social</u>.
The text accompanying the forty-three conclusions attempts to provide them with communicative authority. Although I have purposely allowed my own way of looking at both Jewish tradition and lifelong learning to come through so that both the discussion and the text betray a personal point of view, this does not mean that I consider what I have written as of merely personal relevance. There are others to whom it may speak and this is true specifically of the parts dealing principally with the Torah for they contain matter that will interest educational theorists, psychologists and educational experts. The only pre-condition is the sharing of the conviction that every sort of knowledge transmitted by others, whether it be Torah, or culture, or knowledge of another sort, can only be used by the individual pupil in a hermeneutic or heuristic way if he is able to apply it and integrate it in its entirety into his own life. There is no such thing as <u>instant knowledge</u> to be handed on to other people. The individual learner himself is the only one who can make the knowledge handed on to him into immediate knowledge by living with it in his own particular situation or milieu and in his relationship with other people.
This concept is comparable to the idea of 'personal knowledge' put forward by the chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyl, and also occurs in Jewish tradition. Polanyl writes:
"The kind of knowledge which I am vindicating here, and which I call <u>personal knowledge</u>, casts aside these absurdities of the current scientific approach and reconciles the process of knowing with the acts of addressing another person. In doing so, it establishes a continuous ascent from our less personal knowing of inanimate matter to our convivial knowing of our responsible fellow men. Such, I believe, is the true transition from science to the humanities and also from our knowing the laws of nature to our knowing the person of God."[1]

At the opening of the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' in Frankfurt am Main (17 October 1920) the philosopher Franz Rosenzweig spoke of what he called the Neues Lernen which he described himself in the following terms:
"Learning in the opposite direction. Not learning from the Torah into life, but the other way about. From life back into the Torah."[2]
Every pupil stands on the borders of tradition and seeks to be joined to it:
"We take life as we found it. Our own life and that of our listeners and we carry life from the periphery where we found it, gradually (or suddenly) into the centre, borne up only by a belief which we certainly cannot prove, that this centre can only be a Jewish centre."[3]
The 'Zentrum' for the Jewish lifelong learner is of course the Torah. In the study-house, students (mostly adults) gather in order to learn together. No-one is asked for diplomas. On the subject of the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' Rosenzweig says later on:
"Where there had been popular lectures on Judaism was set up a Jewish house of study, that is, a modern Beth ha Midrash.[4] I interpret the word frei ((free)) in the sense in which it is used in the 'Freie Hochschule' in Berlin, that is that it is open to everyone, without examination. In reality, there was an emotional element in it, as you can, no doubt, hear."[5]
The study-house is the community house of the learning community. 'Neues Lernen' is both traditional, personal and social and that holds true too for both 'learning' and 'lifelong learning' in the present study.

b. LL - hermeneutics and heuristics.
The 43 conclusions are not rules of conduct but ideas about or relevant to LL; taken together they make up an LL-hermeneutic.
From the partial conclusions 3c and 4a of chapter III.5, it is quite simple to derive five rules for the individual pupil; taken together they make up an LL-heuristic.[6]
(1) learn all the time
(2) repeat what has been learnt
(3) learn as an individual and with others
(4) learn by putting into practice
(5) plan your own learning
It has already been remarked under (a) that this study is intended to provide the 43 conclusions with communicative authority. What happens to the communicative authority of these 43 proposals if the introductory sentences of chapters I.3, II.3, and II.5 are left out? These

sentences are:
- "The main points of the ideas on tradition and authority developed in I.1 and I.2 can be expressed briefly in the form of a number of propositions" (see I.3).
- "The main points of the ideas on the Jewish image of the world and of man developed in II.1 and II.2 can be expressed briefly in the form of a number of propositions" (see II.3).
- "The main points of the ideas on Jewish tradition as learning process developed in III.1-4 can be expressed briefly in the form of a number of propositions" (see III.5).

I have added the emphasis in the three sentences. The question is now: do these conclusions still possess communicative authority outside the Jewish tradition and traditions related to, or at least not inimical to that tradition? Extending this question further raises yet another: what sort of communicative authority do LL-hermeneutics and heuristics have in societies with a totally different world image and image of man from that of the Jews, and with completely different ideas of authority and tradition? These two questions cannot yet be answered. What degree of communicative authority the conclusions and the LL-hermeneutics and heuristics will eventually have, still remains to be seen.

What may now be said with justification and with communicative authority, is that any LL philosophy which makes no reference to the Torah and has no desire to learn from it, is at a disadvantage. I know of no other instance of LL where so much experience and wisdom in the ways of the world has been focused on lifelong learning as in Jewish tradition.

c. Individual learning effects: a neglected educational aim.

In present-day education in most schools, colleges and universities, the importance of personal learning (see (a)), of individual learning experience, is too little appreciated:

"In all learning processes we learn to know ourselves: our weak points and our strong ones, our idiosyncracies, our limitations and our possibilities. These learning effects are of the greatest importance: no-one would deny it, and yet they are seldom or never taken into account."[7]

Individual learning effects are hardly ever included in aims of education. Evidently those whose job it is to formulate educational objectives underestimate the

importance of individual pupils and of each pupil's personal qualities. This failure to take into account learning aims so crucial to the individual can, however, easily be remedied. Let teacher and pupil together formulate or reformulate their educational objectives and decide in mutual consultation what learning effects in the pupil they consider desirable and will both therefore pursue (see Part 1, section 3.6). Here as elsewhere teacher and pupil must act in partnership.
As, according to Jewish tradition, the pupil also has to be teacher (see III.4.1 and points f and g below), he must also transmit his knowledge. Everyone who has studied and is learned has to share what he knows with others. Individual learning effects are thus not confined to private possession by the individual pupil, but form part of the Torah, the heritage of the entire Jewish people. For this reason everyone is obliged to make his own individual learning effects accessible for others. To neglect to do this is to be a thief: a person who insists on keeping to himself what belongs also to others. In contrast, when one person's learning effects are in turn made available to others, that person is keeping the tradition alive and living it himself.

d. 'Learning' as alternative to school learning.
Just as the Frankfurt house of study is a modernized 'beth ha-midrash' (note 4) so the 'Neues Lernen' is a modernized version of 'lernen' ('lehrnen'), see III.1.5: "They have come here ((to the house of study in Frankfurt)) as Jews. They have come together to study. Because this word comprehends both learning and teaching."[8]
The learning or lifelong learning described under (a), at the same time traditional, personal and social, and which Rosenzweig calls the 'Neues Lernen', is none other than a new variation on the old 'lernen', that is, learning together and teaching each other; partnership between pupils and between teacher and pupil; co-operative rather than competitive; individual effort as well as social event; the essence of Jewish culture.
The concept 'lernen' is relevant not only to Jewish tradition but also to any society that is developing in the direction of a 'learning society': the Netherlands is one such example:
"The facts contained in this CBS publication[9] give a very clear picture. We are approaching a situation in which all children, and more than eighty per cent of young people, are at school from eight in the morning until four in the afternoon. The question this raises is how a school should be designed so as to be recognised not as a

'school' but rather as a house of study, in the sense in which this term is used in Jewish tradition."[10]
These are the words of the educationalist Carpay, speaking of young people up to the age of eighteen in the Netherlands. His words also apply to older pupils. Does this mean that there is increasing insight into the fact that the world should be a house of study rather than a school, and life itself a continuous learning process[11] rather than a perpetual school? I would like to think so.

e. How old is the lifelong pupil?
In LL the pupil's status does not depend on his age and in this study I have purposely paid scant attention to how old the lifelong learner is. I think the importance of the 'age' factor in 'learning' should not be over-estimated, especially in the case of 'lifelong learning' and where the learning goals in question are things like self-realization (see Part 1, section 1.1) or completeness (see Part 2, section III.2.1) with objectives such as these and in the context of permanent commitment required of the pupil, the overall differences between children and adults are much less important than their overall similarities.
The doctor and educationalist Janusz Korczak (1879-1942), born in Poland, contemporary of Pestalozzi and Makarenko,[12] puts the differences between children and adults in perspective in the following passage:
"You claim that a child is immature; but what does it mean, immature? To an old man, a man of forty is immature: for rich countries, poor countries are undeveloped; to rich classes, poor classes are uneducated."[13]
This is what Tomkiewitz remembers as Korczak's own words.[14] Tomkiewitz himself, who read Korczak's books for children and heard his broadcast talks on Polish radio, and who now lives in France and runs a home for young delinquents, makes the following comments on the quotation given above:
"To find the child given a place among the colonised, or designated member of a socially oppressed class, as early as 1920, is somewhat strange. Korczak seems here to be the true precursor of someone like Gérard Mendel, who calls for decolonisation of the child, and of a whole stream of ideas that one imagines arose for the first time in May 1968."[15]
Lifelong learning is not intrinsically linked to the lifelong pupil's professional formation or practice of a profession and in Jewish tradition it is essentially not so linked (see III.1.3). Scholastic phenomena such as examinations and diplomas have nothing to do with life-

long learning (compare III.3.2).
For someone engaged in lifelong learning it is of no significance whether he is child or adult but whether he is being or becoming a human being, whether he is being and becoming himself. It is the pupil's personal character and not what age he is, that matters.

f. 'Lernen' as alternative to school instruction.
Pupils learn not only in order to live and to survive but also to remember and to hand on (see Part 1, section 1.4). The five concepts 'learning', 'living', 'surviving', 'remembering' and 'handing on' are comprised in the single concept 'lernen', and, in the words of the Torah: "Take to heart these instructions with which I charge you this day. Impress them upon your children. Recite them when you stay at home and when you are away, when you lie down and when you get up."[16]
These are words that urge parents to instruct their children, and both parents and children to learn life-long. The same words have also found their place in the principal Jewish prayer, the Shema,[17] which is also the prayer with which the dying Jew ends his life.
'Lernen' is an alternative not only to scholastic learning (see (d)) but also to scholastic instruction: "In his article entitled 'Children helping children' Allen analyses research data on whether, and if so with what result, older pupils can be called in to help younger pupils learn. The results of this research on learning by 'teaching' are positive. Both the 'instructor' and the 'instructed' pupil learn. The data brought out by Allen make out a case for what is consistently emphasised in Jewish tradition and also by Vygotsky (1978): the importance of making the pupil play the role of teacher (read: employer) as well as that of pupil (read-employee)."[18]
In this passage Carpay is talking about pupils but 'lernen' changes the teacher's role as well. The teacher too is not only teacher (the one who instructs) but also pupil (the one who learns). 'Lernen' includes forms of instruction where teacher and pupil learn together, where the teacher is also the pupil and the pupil also teacher, but where both - teacher and pupil - are primarily people engaged in learning, who help each other, and who are only secondarily instructors whose duty it is to promote learning.

g. And to end .....
The theme of this study is Jewish Tradition as Lifelong Learning. L (lifelong) L (learning) as I have described

it, is a new variation on traditional 'lernen', and, to paraphrase Rosenzweig's terminology, is concerned here not only with 'new learning' as an alternative to scholastic learning and instruction, but also with 'new pupils', that is, lifelong pupils, who learn by teaching as well, and with 'new teachers'[19] who teach and at the same time learn lifelong. Only when learning has become a daily habit can anyone call himself a lifelong learner. However, before such a stage is reached the individual pupil - for it is finally each individual pupil who is responsible for his own learning - will have to have put in a great deal of work on himself. The habit of lifelong learning is not easily acquired. The individual pupil acquires the habit when his learning is a learning that he consistently repeats in whatever adverse circumstances he may find himself. The talmud recommends:

"If a man is on a journey and has no company let him occupy himself with the study of the Torah ... If he feels pains in his head let him engage in the study of the Torah ... If he feels pains in his throat let him engage in the study of the Torah ... If he feels pains in his bowels let him engage in the study of the Torah ... If he feels pains in his bones let him engage in the study of the Torah ... If he feels pain in all his body let him engage in the study of the Torah ..."[20]

Lifelong learning does not come by itself. Learning requires strength and lifelong learning requires perpetual strength. What more is there to say? Everything that has been said in this book so far is scarcely more than a commentary on the following key passages on the learning process, God and the Torah:

"I have learnt much from my teachers, and from my colleagues more than from my teachers, but from my disciples more than from them all."[21]

"If they only abandoned me ((God)) and yet fulfilled my Torah, for its light would teach them to find out once more the path that leads to the good."[22]

"Turn it ((the Torah)) over and turn it over, for all is therein."[23]

The Torah becomes real, relevant to the individual lifelong learner, in the relationship between those who are learning, pupils and teachers. Tradition is carried by individual people who are engaged in 'lernen', lifelong learning according to established custom. Tradition is developed and renewed not only by an élite but by the entire people:

"Only in Israel, people and Torah are one. All of Israel, not only the select few, are the bearers of this unity."[24]

In 'Israel' each and everyone bears the Torah: in a 'learning society' the tradition is borne by each and every one of its members.

Notes

[1] Polanyi (1974a, pp. 127-128). See also Polanyi (1974b, end, p. 115).

[2] Rosenzweig (1934/34b, p. 57). Compare Hoogewoud (1975, p. 119). See also Veit (1973, II. 6).

[3] Rosenzweig (1934/35b, p. 59). Compare Hoogewoud (1975, p. 119). See also Veit, II.6).

[4] See Bet ha-midrash*.

[5] Rosenzweig (1935a, p. 450; letter dated December 1922). Compare Hoogewoud (1975, pp. 118-119). See also Veit (1973, II. 3).

[6] Yet more LL hermeneutics and heuristics can be derived from the 43 conclusions. See section I.2.6 for terminology.

[7] De Groot (1979b, p. 5).

[8] Rosenzweig (1934/45b, p. 58).

[9] Central Bureau for Statistics, De Nederlandse jeugd en haar onderwijs, The Hague 1979.

[10] Carpay (1979, p. 3).

[11] Cf. Part 1, section 3.6, note 39 (Comenius and Husén).

[12] See Kurzweil (1964, pp. 193-194) and Schulze (1979, p. 498).

[13] Tomkiewicz (1979, p. 1022).

[14] Idem. A more literal version still is apparently: "Ask an old man, in his eyes a man in his forties is not yet grown up. In our daily life we meet entire groups or classes of people who cannot be termed adult because of their intellectual weakness. Moreover, there are entire nations and peoples whom we consider underdeveloped and immature. Where, therefore, is the boundary between childhood and maturity?" (Kurzweil 1964, pp. 181-182).

[15] Tomkiewicz (1979, pp. 1022, 1024). See also Dasberg (1975).

[16] Deut. 6:6-7.

[17] See Shema*.

[18] Carpay (1979, p. 15).

[19] Cf. also Veit (1972, II. 7).

[20] TB Er. 54a (Goldschmidt, 1930-1936).

[21] TB Ta'an. 7a, quoted above in III.1.5.

[22] Quoted above in I.1.5.

[23] M. Avot 5:22, quoted above in I.1.1, I.1.3 and II.2.1.

[24] Heschel (1975, ch. 13, p. 190).

GLOSSARY

The following explanations are from the 'Glossary' in EJ.

AGGADAH, name given to those sections of Talmud and Midrash containing homilectic expositions of the Bible, stories, legends, folklore, anecdotes or maxims. In contradistinction to halakhah.

AHARONIM, later rabbinic authorities. In contradistinction to rishonim ("early ones").

AMORA (pl. AMORAIM), title given to the Jewish scholars in Erez Israel and Babylonia in the third to sixth centuries who were responsible for the Gemara.

ASHKENAZ, name applied generally in medieval rabbinical literature to Germany.

BARAITA (pl. BERAITOT), statement of tanna not found in Mishnah.

BAR MITZVAH, ceremony marking the initiation of a boy at the age of 13 into the Jewish religious community.

BET HA-MIDRASH, school for higher rabbinic learning; often attached to or serving as a synagogue.

GAON (pl. GEONIM), head of academy in post-talmudic period, especially in Babylonia.

GEMARA, traditions, discussions, and rulings of the amoraim, commenting on and supplementing the Mishnah, and forming part of the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds (see Talmud).

HALAKHA (pl. HALAKHOT), an accepted decision in rabbinic law. Also refers to those parts of the Talmud concerned with legal matters. In contradistinction to aggadah.

HUMMASH, Pentateuch.

KABBALAH, the Jewish mystical tradition:
KABBALAH IYYUNIT, speculative Kabbalah;
KABBALAH MA'ASIT, practical Kabbalah;
KABBALAH NEVU'IT, prophetic Kabbalah.

MIDRASH, method of interpreting Scripture to elucidate legal points (Midrash Halakhah) or to bring out lessons by stories or homilectics (Midrash Aggadah). Also the name for a collection of such rabbinic interpretations.

MISHNAH, earliest codification of Jewish Oral Law.

MISHNAH (pl. MISHNAYOT), subdivision of tractates of the Mishnah.

MITZVAH, biblical or rabbinic injunction; applied also to good or charitable deeds.

RISHONIM, older rabbinical authorities. Distinguished from later authorities (aharonim).

SHEKHINA, Divine Presence.

SHEMA (((Yisrael)); "hear... ((O Israel)),", Deut. 6:4), Judaism's confession of faith, proclaiming the absolute unity of God.

TALMUD, "teaching"; compendium of discussions on the Mishnah by generations of scholars and jurists in many academies over a period of several centuries. The Jerusalem (or Palestinian) Talmud mainly contains the discussions of the Palestinian sages. The Babylonian Talmud incorporates the parallel discussion in the Babylonian academies.

TALMUD TORAH, term generally applied to Jewish religious (and ultimately to talmudic) study; also to traditional Jewish religious public schools.

TANNA (pl. TANNAIM), rabbinic teacher of mishnaic period.

TOSAFIST, talmudic glossator, mainly French (12th-14th century), bringing additions to the commentary by Rashi.

TOSAFOT, glosses supplied by tosafist.

TOSEFTA, a collection of teachings and traditions of the tannaim, closely related to the Mishnah.

YESHIVAH (pl. YESHIVOT), Jewish traditional academy devoted primarily to study of rabbinic literature; rosh yeshivah, head of the yeshivah.

ZOHAR, mystical commentary on the Pentateuch; main textbook of Kabbalah.

ANNOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Paragraphs

The paragraphs in part 2 are differently marked (numbered) than those in part 1. In part 1 each paragraph is marked with two arabic figures. In part two each paragraph is marked with three figures, one Roman figure followed by two arabic figures: the first (Roman) figure indicates to which category of the PL-model the paragraph belongs and the second (arabic) figure indicates under which entry of that category the contents of the paragraph is being arranged.

Examples:

1.4 means paragraph 4 of chapter I of part 1

II.1.2 means paragraph 2 of chapter II.1(World Image) of category II (Propositions) of part 2

3.7 means paragraph 7 of chapter 3 of part 1

III.2.3 means paragraph 3 of chapter III.2(Learning goals) of category III(Learning process) of part 2

List of literature

1975^{13} (see RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind) means: the 13th print of Ryle's book was published in 1975 and that print is being used

1974^{2} (see HESCHEL, A.J. A Passion for Truth) means: the 2nd print of the book etc.

In case (see Buber, 1963) reference can be made to two publications, this double-meaning can be alleviated by adding letter a or b, so (Buber, 1963a) or (Buber, 1963b)

The dates refer to the issues used and not to the first prints.

Abbreviations

A	Bochenski (1974b)
AA	Bochenski (1974a)
ad loc	ad locum (on the spot)
a.M.	am Main
Anf.	Anfang
ARN^{1}	Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, version (1) ed.Schechter, 1887
ARN^{2}	Avot de-Rabbi Nathan, version (2) ed.Schechter, 1945^{2}
Av.Zar.	Avodah Zarah (talmudic tractate)
b.	ben.
BB	Bava Batra (talmudic tractate)
BK	Bava Kamma (talmudic tractate)
BM	Bava Mezia (talmudic tractate)
e.g.	for example
C.E.	Christian Era.
cf.	confer
ch.	chapter
I and II Chron.	Chronicles, books I and II (Bible)
Compendia	Safrai, Stern, eds. (1976)

Dan.	Daniel (Bible)
Dem.	Demai (talmudic tractate)
Deut.	Deuteronomy (Bible)
DEZ	Derekh Erez Zuta (post-talmudic tractate)
d.h.	das heisst
Eccles	Ecclesiastes (Bible)
Eccles R.	Ecclesiastes Rabbah
ed(s)	editor(s)
eig.	eigentlich
EJ	Encyclopaedia Judaica, 16 vols.(Jerusalem,1973^2)
Eng.	English
EP	Education Permanente
Er.	Eruvin (talmudic tractate)
etc.	etcetera
Ex.	Exodus (Bible)
Ex.R.	Exodus Rabbah
f.	following
Fr.	French
Fs.	School and continuing education: Four studies(1972)
Gen.	Genesis (Bible)
Gen.R.	Genesis Rabbah
Git.	Gittin (talmudic tractate)
Guide	Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed
h.	halakhah
Hab.	Habakkuk (Bible)
Hag.	Hagigah (talmudic tractate)
hebr.	Hebrew
HM	Hoshen Mishpat
Hor.	Horayot (talmudic tractate)
Hos.	Hosea (Bible)
Hrsg.	Herausgeber.
Hul.	Hullin (talmudic tractate)
ibid.	ibidem
Id.	Het rapport-faure in discussie (1974)
Isa.	Isaiah (Bible)
Job	Job (Bible)
Josh.	Joshua (Bible)
Judg.	Judges (Bible)
Ket.	Ketubbot (talmudic tractate)
Kid.	Kiddushin (talmudic tractate)
Kin.	Kinnim (mishnaic tractate)
Lam.	Lamentations (Bible)
Lev.	Leviticus (Bible)
Lev.R.	Leviticus Rabbah
Ltb.	Faure a.o. (1972)
M.	Mishnah
Ma'as	Ma'aserot (talmudic tractate)
Mak.	Makkot (talmudic tractate)
Mal.	Malachi (Bible)

Mekh.	Mekhilta de-R. Ishmael
Men.	Menahot (talmudic tractate)
Mid.Ps.	Midrash Tehillim (The Midrash on Psalms)
Mid.Tan.	Midrash Tanna'im on Deuteronomy
Ms(s)	manuscript(s)
Ned.	Nedarim (talmudic tractate)
N.H.	North Holland
no.	number
nr.	number
Num.	Numbers (Bible)
Num.R.	Numbers Rabbah
OH	Orah Hayyim
op.cit.	opere citato (in the work quoted)
p(p)	page(s)
par.	paragraph
Pes.	Pesahim (talmudic tractate)
pl.	plural
PL	Permanent Learning
Prov.	Proverbs (Bible)
Ps.	Psalms (Bible)
R.	Rabbi
resp.	respective
RH	Rosh Ha-Shanah (talmudic tractate)
S.	Seite
Sab.	Shabbat (talmudic tractate)
I and II Sam.	Samuel, books I and II (Bible)
Sanh.	Sanhedrin (talmudic tractate)
SE	Seder Eliyahu (ed.Friendmann)
sec.	section
SER	Seder Eliyahu Rabbah
SEZ	Seder Eliyahu Zuta
Sh.Ar.	J. Caro, Shulhan Arukh: OH _____ Orah Hayyim YD _____ Yoreh De'ah EH _____ Even ha-Ezer HM _____ Hoshen Mishpat
Shab.	Shabbat (talmudic tractate)
Sif. Deut.	Sifrei Deuteronomy
Sifra	Sifra on Leviticus
sog.	sogenannt
Sot.	Sotah (talmudic tractate)
Suk.	Sukkah (talmudic tractate
s.v.	sub voce
T.	Tosefta
Ta'an	Ta'anit (talmudic tractate)
Tanh.	Tanhuma
Tanh.B.	Tanhuma, Buber ed. (1885)
Taz	David ben Samuel Ha-Levi
TB	Babylonian Talmud or Talmud Bavli

Tem.	Temurah (mishnaic tractate)
TJ	Jerusalem Talmud or Talmud Yerushalmi
Tos.	Tosafot
trans.	translation
Tur	Jacob ben Asher, Arba'ah Turim
B.C.	Before Christ
Vilna Gaon	Elijah ben Solomon Zalman
vis	see
vol(s)	volume(s)
Yad	Maimonides, Mishnah Torah (Yad Hazakah)
Yal	Yalkut Shimoni
YD	Yoreh De'ah
Yev.	Yevamot (talmudic tractate)
Yoma	Yoma (talmudic tractate)
**	Hebrew or Aramaic
((....))	addition not quoted in the text quoted
*	see Glossary

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AARON HA-LEVI OF BARCELONA, Sefer ha-Hinnukh.*

ABBAS, JUDAH BEN SAMUEL, Jair Natib.**

ABERBACH, M. 'The Relations Between Master and Disciple in the Talmudic Age'. Zimmels, H.J., Rabbinowitz, J., Finestein, I., eds., Essays. London, 1967.

ABRAHAMS, I. Jewish Life in the Middle Ages. New York, 1969.

trans. The Sages (Their Concepts and Beliefs) (Urbach). Jerusalem, 1975.

ACHTERHUIS, H. 'Freire'. De Nieuwe Linie, 22-1-1975.

ADELMANN, F.J., ed. Authority. Boston-The Hague, 1974.

ALBO, J. Sefer ha-Ikkarim.**

ALLEN, V.L., 'Children helping children'. Levin, J.R. and Allen, V.L., eds. Cognitive Learning in Children. New York, 1976.

ALLPORT, G.W. Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York, 1961.

Almanach des Schocken Verlags auf das Jahr 5695. Berlin, 1934/35.

ALON, G. Jews, Judaism and the Classical World. Jerusalem, 1977.

'The Lithuanian Yeshivas'. Goldin, J., ed. The Jewish Expression. New York, 1970.

ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics.

ARNONI, M.S. In plaats van ideologie. Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1972.

ARYEH LEIB BEN JOSEPH HA-KOHEN. Kezot ha-Hoshen.**

ASAF, S. Mekorot le-Toledot ha-Hinnukh be-Yisrael. Tel Aviv, 1925.**

ASCHKENASY, Y. 'Bubers betekenis voor de joodse wereld'. Sperna Weiland, J., etc. Martin Buber, Baarn, 1978.

ASCHKENASY, Y., WHITLAU, W.A.C. 'Joodse hermeneutiek'. Intermediair 7 (1971), no. 41.

AUSTIN, J.L. Philosophical Papers. Oxford, 1962^2.

Avot de-Rabbi Nathan. version (1) ed. Schechter, 1887. Abbreviated ARN^1.**
version (2) ed. Schechter, 1945^2. Abbreviated ARN^2.**

BACHER, W. Die Aggada der Tannaiten, I. Strassburg, 1903.

Terminologie, Hebr. transl., I.**

BAKAN, D. Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. Princeton, N.J., 1958.

BANNING, W. Karl Marx. Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1961.

Bein Jisrael le-Amim. Special issue of Heigot. Jerusalem, 1978.**

BENVENISTE, ḤAYYIM BEN ISRAEL. Keneset ha-Gedolah, Yoreh De'ah.**

BEN-YEHUDA, ELIEZER. A Complete Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Hebrew. New York, 1959.

Bericht van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 17 volumes. Amsterdam, 1970/75.

BERMAN, A. Toledot ha-Hinnukh be-Yisrael u-va-Ammim. 1968^{2}.**

BERMAN, S.J. 'The status of women in halakhic Judaism'. Tradition, 14 (1973), no. 2.

BERNFELD, S., ed. The Foundations of Jewish Ethics. New York, 1968 (reprint).

hrsg. Die Lehren des Judentums (Nach den Quellen). Berlin, 1922 (Teil 1, 2), 1923 (Teil 3).

BEVAN, E.R., SINGER, Ch., eds. The Legacy of Israel. Oxford, 1953^{5}.

BIALIK, Ch.N. Gedichte. Köln-Leipzig, 1911.

BIRNBAUM, P. Daily Prayer Book.

BLAUW, J. Mens, kultuur en maatschappij (Lotgevallen van een denktraditie). Nijkerk, 1978.

BLOCH, J.S. Israël und die Völker (Nach jüdische Lehre). Berlin-Wien, 1922.

BLOOM, B.S. 'Some Theoretical Issues Relating to Educational Evaluation'. Tyler, R.W., ed. Educational Evaluation: New Roles, New Means, Part 2. Chicago, 1968.

ed. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain. New York, 1972^{17}.

BOCHENSKI, J.M. 'An Analysis of Authority'. Adelmann, F.J. ed. Authority. Boston-The Hague, 1974a. Abbreviated AA.

The Logic of Religion. New York, 1965.

Was ist Autorität? Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1974b. Abbreviated A.

BOER, Th. de, trans. De Plaatsvervanging (Levinas). Baarn, 1977.

BOERTIEN, M. Het joodse leerhuis (van 200 vóór tot 200 na Christus). Kampen, 1974.

BOUWMAN, Th.L.M. 'De bevrijding van de mens'. Relaties, Onderwijskundige Brochures Reeks. Tilburg, 1975.

BOVEN, Th.C. van, De Universele Verklaring en de Internationale Verdragen der Verenigde Naties voor de Rechten van de Mens. Amsterdam-Antwerpen, 1974.

BRECHT, A. Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought. New Jersey, 1970³.

BRENTANO, F. The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong. London, 1902.

BRUNER, J.S. Beyond the Information given (Studies in the Psychology of Knowing). London, 1974.

BUBER, M. Between Man and Man. London, 1947.

Das dialogische Prinzip. Heidelberg, 1962a.

Drei Reden über das Judentum. Frankfurt a.M., 1920.

Die Erzählungen der Chassidim. Zürich, 1949.

Gottesfinsternis. Zürich, 1953a.

I and Thou. Edinburgh, 1970.

Der Jude und sein Judentum. Köln, 1963a.

The Knowledge of Man. New York, 1965.

De weg van de mens (volgens de chassidische leer). Den Haag, 1953b.

Werke. Munich-Heidelberg, 1962b (1. Band), 1963b (3. Band), 1964 (2. Band).

BUIS, P. Het functioneren van terugkoppeling in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs (Twee voorafgaande voorwaarden). Ph.D. Diss., Amsterdam, 1978.

Canticles Rabba.**

CARO, JOSEPH BEN EPHRAIM, Beit Yosef.**

Shulhan Arukh. Abbreviated Sh.Ar. Four volumes (**):
OH - Orah Hayyim,
YD - Yoreh De'ah,
EH - Even ha-Ezer,
HM - Hoshen Mishpat.

CARPAY, J.A.M. Over leerlingen gesproken. Public lecture, Amsterdam, 1979.

COHEN, H. Der Nächste. Berlin, 1935.

CORDOVERO, MOSES BEN JACOB, Pardes Rimmonim.**

COX, H. The Secular City. New York, 1965.

C(ommissie) O(ntwikkeling) W(etenschappelijk) O(nderwijs) 2: Het overheidsbeleid inzake het tertiair onderwijs - Begrippen en uitgangspunten. Den Haag, 1971.

DASBERG, L. Grootbrengen door kleinhouden. Meppel, 1975.

DAVE, R.H. Lifelong Education and School Curriculum. Hamburg, 1973.

DAVID, A., trans. The Commentary to Mishnah Aboth (Maimonides). New York, 1968.

DECI, E.L. Intrinsic Motivation. New York, 1976^{2}.

Derekh Erez Zuta (post-talmudic tractate). Abbreviated DEZ.**

DEWEY, J. Human nature and conduct. New York, 1922.

DIESFELDT, H.F.A. 'De volwassenheid en de ouderdom'. Losbladig Onderwijskundig Lexicon (Training, Onderwijs en Vorming). Alphen a.d. Rijn-Brussel, 1979.

DINUR, B. 'Jewish History - its uniqueness and continuity'. Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale, vol. 11, 1-2. Neuchatel, 1968.

Document (3 January 1975, Rome). 'Guidelines and Suggestions for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration "Nostra Aetate" (No. 4)'. SIDIC 8 (1975), no. 1.

DRAZIN, N. History of Jewish Education from 515 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. Baltimore, 1940.

DRIESSEN, J.J. 'De Bolsjewiki en het Jiddisch'. Internationale Spectator, 29-19, October 1975.

DUINTJER, O.D. Rondom Regels (Wijsgerige gedachten omtrent regel-geleid gedrag). Meppel-Amsterdam, 1977.

Ecclesiastes Rabbah. Abbreviated Eccles.R.**

ECKSTEIN, H., GURR, T.R. Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York, etc., 1975.

ELIAV, M., KLEINBERGER, P.A. Mekorot le-Toledot ha-Hinnukh be-Yisrael u-va-Ammim. 1960.**

ELIFANT, Z. 'Bi-Shevilei ha-Philosofia ha-Hinnukhit shel ha-Rambam'. Shevilei ha-Hinnukh 34, no. 1 (Autumn 1973).**

ELON, M. Ha-Mishpat Ivri. Jerusalem, 1973.**

Encyclopaedia Judaica. Jerusalem, 1973[2]. Abbreviated EJ.

Enziklopedyah Hinnukhit. Jerusalem, 1964.**

Ethics of the Fathers. Talmudtractaat Avot.**

Exodus Rabbah. Abbreviated Ex.R.**

FARBER, L.H. 'Martin Buber and Psychotherapy'. Schilpp, P.A., Friedman, M., eds. The Philosophy of Martin Buber. London, 1967.

FAURE, E., et al. Learning to be. Paris-London, 1972. Abbreviated Ltb.

Leren om te Leven. Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1974.

FERRON, L., trans. In plaats van ideologie (Arnoni). Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1972.

FINKELSTEIN, L., ed. The Jews. Vol. 1: Their History. Vol. 2: Their Religion and Culture. Vol. 3: Their Role in Civilization. New York, 1971[4].

FISHMAN, I. The History of Jewish Education in Central Europe (From the End of the Sixteenth to the End of the Eighteenth Century). London, 1944.

FLUSSER, D. 'A new sensitivity in Judaism and the Christian message'. Harvard Theological Review 61 (1968).

'Het verleden - Stellingen over het ontstaan van het Christendom uit het Jodendom'. Ter Herkenning 3 (1975), no. 5.

FRANKENA, W.K. 'Education'. Dictionary of the History of Ideas. New York, 1973.

FRANKL, V.E. Psychotherapy and Existentialism. Harmondsworth, 1978 (reprint).

FREUD, S. Totem und Tabu. 1909.

FRIEDLÄNDER, M., trans. The Guide for the Perplexed (Maimonides). New York, 1946.

FRIEDMANN, M. Seder Eliahu. Warsaw. Abbreviated SE (**)
- Seder Eliahu Rabba (Wien, 1902). Abbreviated SER.
- Seder Eliahu Zuṭa (Wien, 1902). Abbreviated SEZ.
- Pseudo-Seder Zuṭa (Wien, 1904).

FRIEDRICH, C.J. Man and his Government. New York, etc., 1963.

Tradition and Authority. New York, etc., 1972.

Genesis Rabbah. Abbreviated Gen.R.**

GERHARDSON, B. Memory and Manuscript (Oral Tradition and Transmission). Uppsala, 1961.

GINZBERG, L. 'Jewish Thought as Reflected in the Halakah'. Goldin, J., ed. The Jewish Expression. New York, 1970.

GOLDFELD, A. 'Women as Sources of Torah in the Rabbinic Tradition'. Judaism 24 (1975), no. 2.

GOLDIN, J., trans. The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan (ARN^2). New Haven, 1967^3.

ed. The Jewish Expression. New York, 1970.

GOLDMAN, I.M. Lifelong Learning Among Jews (Adult Education in Judaism from biblical times to the twentieth century). New York, 1975.

GOLDSCHMIDT, L. Uebertragung. Der Babylonische Talmud. Berlin 1930-1936.

GOLLANZ, H. Pedagogics of the Talmud and That of Modern Times (A Comparative Study). Oxford, 1924.

GORFINKLE, J.I. The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics. New York, 1912.

GREENBERG, S. 'The Concept of Man Underlying the Biblical Rabbinic Philosophy of Education'. Jewish Education, vol. 39, 1969.

'Jewish Educational Institutions'. Finkelstein, L., ed. The Jews, vol. 2. New York, 1971.

GROLLMAN, E.A. Judaism in Sigmund Freud's World. New York, 1965.

GROOT, A.D. de, De betekenis van "intelligentie" en "aanleg"; een begripsanalyse met consequenties. Amsterdam, 1979a.

COHO-'Notitie' I. 1974a.

Een minimale methodologie op sociaal-wetenschappelijke basis. Den Haag-Parijs, 1971a.

Onderzoek als leerproces. Amsterdam, 1979b.

Standpunt over onderwijs, democratie en wetenschap. Parijs-Den Haag, 1971b.

Vijven en zessen (cijfers en beslissingen: het

selectie-proces in ons onderwijs). Groningen, 1974[8]b.

GUEDEMANN, M.I. Geschichte des Erziehungswesens und der Cultur der abendländischen Juden (während des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit). Wien, 1880 (1. Teil), 1884 (2. Teil), 1888 (3. Teil).

Das jüdische Unterrichtswesen während der spanisch-arabischen Periode. Wien, 1873.

GUTTMANN, M. Das Judentum und seine Umwelt (Eine Darstellung der religiöschen und rechtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Juden und Nichtjuden mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der talmudische-rabbinischen Quellen). Berlin, 1972.

HAGUE, C., trans. The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong (Brentano). London, 1902.

HARTMAN, D. 'Jews and Christians in the World of Tomorrow'. Jews & Christians. Bergen N.H., 1975a.

'The Joy of the Torah'. SIDIC 8 (1975b), no. 1.

HARTOG, Ph., RHODES, E.C. An Examination of Examinations (Being a Summary of Investigations on the Comparison of Marks allotted to Examination Scripts by Independent Examiners and Boards of Examiners, together with a Section on a Viva Voce Examination). London, 1935.

HELLER, YOM TOV LIPMANN BEN NATHAN HA-LEVIE, Tosefot Yom Tov.**

HEINEMANN, Y. Darkhei ha-Aggadah. Jerusalem, 1970.**

HERFORD, R.T. The Pharisees. London, 1924.

HESCHEL, A.J. The Earth Is the Lord's & The Sabbath. Cleveland-New York-Philadelphia, 1963.

God in Search of Man. New York-Philadelphia, 1959.

The Insecurity of Freedom (Essays on Human Existence). New York, 1975[2].

Man is not alone. New York, 1972 (reprint).

A Passion for Truth. New York, 1974[2].

The Prophets, 2 vols. New York-Evanston-San Francisco-London, 1962a.

Torah Min Ha-Shamayim. London, vol. 1, 1962b, vol. 2, 1965a.**

Who is Man? Stanford, 1965b.

HIMMELFARB, M. 'Plural Establishment'. Commentary 58 (1974), no. 6.

HIRSCH, S.R. Neunzehn Briefe über Judentum. Berlin, 1919.

HOOGEWOUD, F.J. 'Anders dan alle andere leerhuizen'. Praktische Theologie, vol. 2, 1975, no. 2.

HOROWITZ, ISAIAH BEN ABRAHAM HA-LEVIE. Shenei Luhot ha-Berit.**

HOUGHTON, V., RICHARDSON, K., eds. Recurrent Education. London, 1974.

HUSÉN, T. De lerende samenleving. Utrecht, 1977.

HYAMSON, M., trans. Mishneh Torah (Maimonides). Jerusalem, 1965. In example 1 in par. III.1.7 the 1937-edition (New York) is used as well.

ISAACS, N. 'Study as a Mode of Worship'. Jung, L., ed. The Jewish Library (First Series). New York, 1928.

Jaaroverzicht Kolel Chacham Zwi 1976/77. Amsterdam, 1978.

JACOB BEN ASHER. Arba'ah Turim. Abbreviated Tur.**

JACOBS, L. Faith. New York, 1968.

A Jewish Theology. London, 1973.

Jewish Values. London, 1960.

Theology in the Responsa. London-Boston, 1975.

We have reason to believe. London, 1965[3].

The Jewish Encyclopedia. New York, reprint of the 1901-edition.

Jews & Christians between Past & Future (Theological Seminar, Jerusalem, 1975). Bergen N.H., 1975.

JUNG, L., ed. The Jewish Library (First Series). New York, 1928.

KADUSHIN, M. Organic Thinking (A study in Rabbinic thought). New York, 1938.

Karl Marx 1818/1968. Bad Godesberg, 1968.

KARO, JOSEPH. See CARO, JOSEPH BEN EPHRAIM.

KATZ, J. Between Jews and Gentiles. Jerusalem, 1960.**

Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Jewish Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times). New York, 1969[2].

Tradition and Crisis (Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages). New York, 1971.

KAUFMANN, W. Critique of Religion and Philosophy. New York, 1961.

trans. I and Thou (Buber). Edinburgh, 1970.

Without Guilt and Justice (From Decidophobia to Autonomy). New York, 1973.

KIM, Y.C. 'Authority: Some Conceptual and Empirical Notes'. Western Political Quarterly 19 (1966), pp. 223-228.

KIRSCHENBAUM, A. 'Students and Teachers: A Rabbinic Model'. Conservative Judaism, vol. 26.3, 1972.

KLATZKIN, J. Thesaurus Philosophicus. Vol. 1 and 2, Berlin, 1928. Vol. 4, New York, 1968.

KLINKENBERG, G.A., trans. De eenheid van lichaam en geest (Ryle). Amsterdam, 1971.

Koran, Sura 3.

KOSMALA, H. 'Martin Buber'. Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute 4 (1965).

KRATHWOHL, D.R., BLOOM, B.S., MASIA, B.B. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain. New York, 1971[8].

KURZWEIL, Z.E. Modern Trends in Jewish Education. New York-London, 1964.

LALLY, J.R. 'Infancy to three years of age'. Fs. Paris, 1972.

LEEUW, A.J. van der. 'Kurfürsten Strasse 115-116'. Bericht van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam, 1970/75.

Leo Baeck Yearbook, vol. 15. London-Jerusalem-New York, 1970.

LEVINAS, E. Difficile Liberté. Paris, 1963.

Het menselijke gelaat. Bilthoven, 1975[3].

De Plaatsvervanging. Baarn, 1977.

Totalité et Infini. La Haye, 1961.

Leviticus Rabba. Abbreviated Lev.R.**

LIEBERMAN, S. Greek in Jewish Palestine (Studies in the Life and Manners of Jewish Palestine in the II - IV centuries C.E.). New York, 1965.

Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. New York, 1950.

LIPSCHITZ, Y. Zichron Yaakov. Kovno, 1927.**

LOEWE, R. The Position of Women in Judaism. London, 1966.

Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume. New York, 1945.

LUZZATTO, M.H. Mesillat Yesharim. Jerusalem, 1966.**

MAGEE, B. Popper. Glasgow, 1975[2].

Mahzor Vitry. Berlin, 1824.**

MAIMONIDES, M. The Commentary to Mishnah Aboth. New York, 1968.**

Guide of the Perplexed. Abbreviated Guide.**

Mishneh Torah (Yad Hazakah). Abbreviated Yad.**

(R. Moses b. Maimon). Responsa. Ed. J. Blau. Volumen Primum. Jerusalem, 1957.**

Sefer Ha-Mitzwot.**

MARGOLIOT, MOSES BEN SIMEON. Penei Moshe.**

Mekhilta de-R. Ishmael. Abbreviated Mekh.**

MENES, A. 'Patterns of Jewish Scholarship in Eastern Europe'. Finkelstein, L., ed. The Jews, vol. 2. New York, 1971.

MEYER, M.A., ed. Ideas of Jewish History. New York, 1974.

Midrash Tanna'im on Deuteronomy. Abbreviated Mid.Tan.**

Midrash Tehillim. Abbreviated Mid.Ps.**

The Minor Tractates of the Talmud. transl. London, 1965.

MOOR, L. de, trans. De weg van den mens (volgens de chassidische leer) (Buber). Den Haag, 1953.

MOORE, G.F. Judaism, vol. 1. Massachusetts, 1927.

MORRIS, N. Toledot ha-Hinnukh shel Am Yisrael. Tel Aviv, 1960.**

MOSES BEN MENAHEM GRAF. Va-Yakhel Moshe. Dessau, 1699.**

MUELLER, E. Uebertragung. Gedichte (Bialik). Köln-Leipzig, 1911.

NATHAN FILIO JECHIELIS, KOHUT, A. Aruch Completum sive Lexicon. New York, 1955.

NEUSNER, J. 'Review Essay: Ideas of Jewish History (ed. M.A. Meyer, New York, 1974)'. History and Theory (Studies in the Philosophy of History), 14 (1975), no. 2.

NEWMAN, L.I. The Hasidic Anthology. New York, 1972[3].

NOBEL, O. de, PEPERZAK, A., trans. Het menselijk gelaat (Levinas). Bilthoven, 1975[3].

NOVAK, M. 'Failed Socialism' (bookreview). Commentary 64 (1977), no. 3.

Numbers Rabbah. Abbreviated Num.R.**

OOSTVEEN, T. 'Linkse christenen zijn antisemieten' (interview met David Flusser). De Tijd, 16 June 1978.

ORWELL, G. Animal Farm, Harmondsworth, 1958.

PARREREN, C.F. van Psychologie van het Leren, I. Arnhem, 1969.

PETERS, R.S. Authority, Responsibility and Education. London, 1959.

PINCHAS OF KORETZ. Midrash Pinchas. Warsaw, 1876.**

PINES, S., trans. The Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides). Chicago, 1964^{2}.

PLATO, Meno.

POLANYI, M. 'Faith and Reason'. Schwartz, F., ed. Scientific Thought and Social Reality: Essays by Michael Polanyi. Psychological Issues 8 (1974a), no. 4. Monograph 32.

'From Copernicus to Einstein'. Schwartz, F., ed. Scientific Thought and Social Reality: Essays by Michael Polanyi. Psychological Issues 8 (1974b), no. 4. Monograph 32.

POOL, DAVID DE SOLA. 'The Traditional Code of Jewish Education'. Menorah Journal 10 (June-July 1924); reprinted in Jewish Education 16, no. 3 (May 1945).

POPPER, K.R. Conjections and Refutations. London, 1974^{5}.

PRAAG, H. van, 'Samen lernen'. Prana, Winter 1978/79, no. 14.

Praktische Theologie, vol. 2, 1975, no. 2. Special issue on 'zoiets als een leerhuis'.

PRESSER, J. 'De moderne Haman'. Bericht van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam 1970/75.

PRINS, F.W. 'Onwetendheid: een educatieve uitdaging (Over het onderwijs in de ontwikkelingslanden)'. Pedagogisch Tijdschrift/Forum voor Opvoedkunde 1 (1976), no. 3, pp. 121-136.

PRINZ, A. 'New Perspectives on Marx as a Jew'. Leo Baeck Yearbook, vol. 15. London-Jerusalem-New York, 1970.

RACKMAN, E. 'Halakhah - Orthodox Approaches'. Encyclopaedia Judaica Year Book 1975/6. Jerusalem, 1976.

Het rapport-Faure in discussie. Den Haag, 1974. Abbreviated Id.

ROLAND, J. 'On "Knowing How" and "Knowing That"'. The Philosophical Review, vol. 67, 1958.

ROSENGARTEN, A. Emeth Keneh. Piotrkov, 1907.**

ROSENTHAL, J.M. Studies and texts in Jewish history, literature and religion, 2 vols. Jerusalem, 1967.**

ROSENZWEIG, F. Briefe. Berlin, 1935a.

'Neues Lernen'. Almanach des Schocken Verlags auf das Jahr 5695. Berlin, 1934/35b.

RUSSELL, B. Education and the Social Order. London, 1970^{2}a.

Unpopular Essays. London, 1970^{3}b.

RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind. London, 1975^{13}.

SADAN, D. 'Idele'. Mahanayim 98 (1965).**

SAFRAI, S. 'Education and the Study of the Torah'. Safrai, S., Stern, M., eds. Compendia. Assen-Amsterdam, 1976.

Das jüdische Volk im Zeitalter des Zweiten Tempels. Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1978.

Rabbi Akiba ben Josseef. Jerusalem, 1970.**

SAFRAI, S., STERN, M., eds. Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum, Section One, The Jewish People in the First Century, Volume Two. Assen-Amsterdam, 1976. Abbreviated Compendia.

SAMUEL, M. In Praise of Yiddish. New York, 1971.

SCHARFSTEIN, Z. Toledot ha-Hinnukh be-Yisrael be-Dorot ha-Aharonim. New York, 1945.**

SCHECHTER, S. Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology. New York, 1975^{5}.

SCHILPP, P.A., FRIEDMAN, M., eds. The Philosophy of Martin Buber. London, 1967.

SCHOLEM, G.G. Über einige Grundbegriffe des Judentums. Frankfurt am Main, 1970.

School and continuing education: Four Studies, The. Paris, 1972. Abbreviated Fs.

SCHOUTEN, G.H.L. Education Permanente. Groningen, 1975.

SCHULZE, G. 'Die pädagogischen Gedanken Janusz Korczak'. Pädagogik 33 (1978), Heft 6.

Seder Eliyahu Rabbah. Abbreviated SER.**

Seder Eliyahu Zuta. Abbreviated SEZ.**

Sefer Hasidim.**

SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LYADY. Shulhan Arukh HaRav.**

Sifra to Leviticus. Abbreviated Sifra.**

Sifrei to Numbers and Deuteronomy.**

Sifrei Deuteronomy. Abbreviated Sif.Deut.**

SILVERSTEIN, S., trans. Mesillat Yesharim (The Path of the Just). Jerusalem, 1966.

SIMON, E. 'Martin Buber, the educator'. Schilpp, P.A., Friedman, M., eds. The Philosophy of Martin Buber. London, 1967.

SKINNER, B.F. The Technology of Teaching. New Jersey, 1968.

SPERNA WEILAND, J., ASCHKENASY, Y., BEEK, M.A., TIEMERSMA, D. Martin Buber. Baarn, 1978.

STEIN, S. Schulverhältnisse, Erziehungslehren und Unterrichtsmethoden im Talmud. Berlin, 1901.

STEINSALTZ, A. The Essential Talmud. New York, 1977.

STER, J. Die talmudische Paedagogik. Breslau, 1915.

Talmud Bavli (or Babylonian Talmud). Abbreviated TB.**

Talmud Yerushalmi (or Jerusalem Talmud). Abbreviated TJ.**

Tanhuma. Abbreviated Tanh.**

Tanhuma, Buber ed. 1885. Abbreviated Tanh.B.**

Tenach. Pentateuch + Profeten + Geschriften = Oude Testament.**

Tosafot. Abbreviated Tos.**

TOMKIEWICZ, J. 'Janusz Korczak, sa vie et son oeuvre'. AMIF, no. 280, 1979.

Tosefta. Abbreviated T.**

TYLER, R.W., ed. Educational Evaluation: New Roles, New Means, Part 2. Chicago, 1968.

URBACH, E.E. The Sages (Their Concepts and Beliefs). Jerusalem, 1971[2].** English translation 1975.

VEINSHTEIN, Y. 'Ha-Rambam ha-Moreh le-Dorot'. Shevilei ha-Hinnukh 34, no. 1 (Autumn 1973), continued in ibid. 34, no. 2 (Winter 1973), and in subsequent issues.**

VEISBLIT, S. 'Darkhei Horaah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam'. Mahnayim 108 (Av 1966).**

VEIT, R. De didaktische Ansatz von Franz Rosenzweig. Ph. D. Diss. Dortmund, 1973.

VERHOEF, E. Er staat geschreven .... Ph.D. Diss. Meppel, 1979.

VRIES, B. de, Hoofdlijnen en Motieven in de Ontwikkeling der Halachah. Ph.D. Diss. Haarlem, 1959.

VYGOTSKY, L.S. Mind in Society. Harvard, 1978.

WALDENBERG, ELIEZER. Responsa Tzitz Eliezer.**

WHEELWRIGHT, P. Aristotle. New York, 1951.

WIESEN, J. Geschichte und Methodik des Schulwesens im Talmudische Altertume. Strasburg, 1892.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik. Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1972^2. Paperback.

Philosophische Untersuchungen. Oxford, 1958.

WOLFF, M. 'Gedachten over het Leerhuis'. Wending 34 (1979), no. 6.

Yalkut Shimoni. Abbreviated Yal.**

ZEVIN, S. Le-Or ha-Halakhah. 1946**

ZIMMELS, H.J., RABBINOWITZ, J., FINESTEIN, I., ed. Essays presented to the Chief Rabbi Israel Brodie on the occasion of his seventieth Birthday. London, 1967.

ZUIDEMA, W.H. Gods Partner (Ontmoeting met het Jodendom). Baarn, 1977^2.

trans., 'Het verleden - Stellingen over het ontstaan van het Christendom uit het Jodendom' (Flusser). Ter Herkenning 3 (1975), no. 5.

This book is an excursion into educational philosophy in the context of the Jewish Tradition which, since time immemorial, has valued and cultivated the concept of study as a sustained and necessary element in the life of the individual and that of the community. Students of **éducation permanente** can hardly afford to ignore the treasury of experience offered by a tradition which, through so many centuries, has emphasised the importance of daily learning continued throughout the life of each member of the community; a learning which fulfils its aim only when it overflows into action and has its effect both on the individual and his immediate environment.

Dr. Abram constructs and discusses in detail a model for permanent, or lifelong, learning, which demonstrates the possible extent of the contribution of Jewish Tradition to the idea of **éducation permanente** and to the development of its theory. Part I introduces the key concepts of the model: tradition, authority, image of the world, image of man, the pupil, learning objectives, evaluation, and the teacher, and in Part II their treatment and position in Jewish Tradition is described and discussed in detail. Drawing widely from rabbinic literature and many other sources, the author gives us the key to a country of enormous wealth, scarcely visited as yet by Western educationalists.

SVO

Stichting voor Onderzoek van het Onderwijs
Plettenijkade 50
2515 SH Den Haag
Telefoon 070-824321